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Summa ry. 
The continuous theocemtric mould of the thou~ht of leibniz 
I e ads u s t 0 sus p e c t t hat" ,t h e pro b I em 0 f e v i I" has a :J rea t e r 
relevance to his philosophy than is commonly reputed.This is 
a'l1ply confirmed by an unbiased readin~ of his writin~s as a 
whole and of the ne::Jlected Theodicee in particuiar."A reconstruction 
of the systS'fi which L9ibniz should h3ve written ll (8.Russell )cannot 
t3.ke the olace of wt);:tt Leioniz .:Ii.:! in fact write and is contrary 
to the hlstonic31 jeveiop~ent of his t~OUl~l. 
L':Jioniz 3.ooroacnes the crQ:)io'f' as an inhGritor of the theolo:Jical 
tradition of the School~cn.Hls i"jeo3nje~c~ reveals itself in the 
hazarJoJs 3.ttevr,pt to ntionalise the :)ivine ~atur0 and in his virtual 
·~ 
a ban don XI 0 n t 0 f t net r a d i t ion a I a n s w e r 0 flit h e F a I I 0 f W3. nil. The u n i v e r s e 
is a world of values,of :podness as well as Qf rational ity.The pre-
estaol ished harrr:ony,with the subseq:Jent later .:Ioctrine of the 'TIO.nad, 
haloed Leibniz"to justify the ways of God to manll.The idea of God as 
Creative Love must 'TIDan that ~an is more than incidental to the epic 
of creation.The har~ony oetween the Real~ of Nature and the Realm of 
Grace,with its illplications in a future life,answers the a~e lon:J 
problem of the incidence of ~ood and evil in this present world.This 
world is still"the best of all possible worlds".Where evil is not 
merely oaf'asitic,it is transubstantiated into the ~ood of the whole 
after the llanner of the ancient Stoic ar~uments.This is true even of 
'Tloral evi I which is a consequence of man's creaturely free.::lom,thou~h 
as evil,Dutside the Divine antecedent volition. 
, 
#" '.' 
Summary (Continued). 
The answer of Leibniz thus falls within the ambit of ethical 
theism.8ut the monadolo~ical readin~ of the universe a~qravates the 
difficulties alrea~y latent in the Leibnizian Weltanschauun~.~is 
rationalism,not to speak of the crux of the Deity within the 
monadolo~ical schema of the universe,makes his answer dan~erously 
approach the deism of his century.None the less the argument of 
Leibniz has blazed a trai I which the theodicean argument of ethical 
theism has since been content to follow cobsciously or unconsciously. 
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Synopsis. 
I nt roduct i on. 
(The numbers refer to pages.) 
I.The essenti~1 unity of the thought of Leibniz ~s phi losopher 
an~ theolo~ian.Statement of the view that Lelbniz,as theologian, 
is "the champion of i~norance and obscurantism".The Couturat-
Russell school. 
2.The te~ptation presented by the complex thou~ht of Leibniz to 
h~zard of uni lateral interpretlitions.Their surgical quality. 
3.Conse~uent 'liodern ne~ lect of the "Essa!s de Theodicee". In spite 
of the obvious difficulties lelbnlz is his own best co~mentator 
on his thou1ht. The Theodicee not unioue amon~ the writings of 
Le ibn I z. 
4.The many early writin1s of Leibniz less a problem on this view of 
the fundamental unity of his thought. 
5. Continued. All lelbniz must be considered In the statement of his 
answer to "the proble'Tl of evil".Philosophy for Lelbnlz nothing 
unless ancilla theolo~iae. 
\ 
Synopsis. 
Chapter i. 
God. 
7. Leibniz a true son of the theocentric 17thcentury.Consequent 
crucia(ity for him of "the proble~ of evil". 
8. The deity for Leibnlz no mere usus loquendl but inte1ral to 
his thou~ht. 
9. The Perfect Personality of God. 4is Nature as Si~ple Substance 
and 4is Attributes. 
lo.The fulcrum of "une bonte souveraine" and the qualitative readi n1 
of the !)ivine Attributes. 
ii.The interestln1 contrast between lelbniz and Clarke In the matter 
of the proof of "the :Joodness", of God. 
i2.The debt of leibniz to the theolo:Jlcal tradition of the Schoolmen 
and the li1ht it throws upon his thou~ht. 
i3. The ethical an:! ~hristian interpretation of "100dness",for 
leibniz as well as Its metaphysical meanln~. Goodness In God as 
100dness In man. 
i 4.Conseauent dee.penin} awareness of ".the prob lem of evi I". 
i5.Alle~ed debt of leibniz to ~ystical writings and influences.Yet 
re~alns a "rational theoI01 i a n". 
i~.lelbniz and the Neo-Platonic influence in "the theol01 1cal 
traditlon~ His credo ut intell11sm. 
i7.leibniz's idea of God as Creative love rests ultimately upon the 
presuppositions of Christian d01~a. 
\ 
Synopsis. 
Chapter iii. 
The Universe of Leibniz. 
29. Leibniz's views on the universe reveal the theocratic 
tendency of his thou1ht.The Theodicee sets the problem 
for the ~onadoloqy. 
30. The abiding theistic views of Leibniz set the pF&~~e~ sta1 e 
for "the prob lem of evi 1".No lack in the Divine forest1ht or 
power.Godnot only existens but existentificans.No absentee 
deity. 
-31. The inherent "~oodness" of the universe as wei I as its 
rationality.An arena for the activity of free spl rits.and the 
manifestation of the Glory of Go~.The Pre-established ~armony 
-a Copernician revolution in our thou~hts of the unity and 
variety of the world. 
32. The pluralistic universe,yet tn some way unum in see 
33. This unity known alone to the Divine ~lnd.mhe amphibious 
existence of Monads.The Independence of the Divine Mind and 
its reflection In the inter-relatedness of the universe. 
34. The ~radej universe anl its three monadic levels.No vacuum 
fo r'fla rurr. 
3s."Transceration" reconciles evolution and creation. 
3~. Its i'flpllcations,orthodox and unorthodox. 
37. Man's place in the cosmos.Two teleolo~ies. 
38. The over-rulin1 of evll.Ten~ency of Leibnlz's rationalls~ to 
theol01 i cal deter~inis~. 
39. ttDivine Mathematics"" and its influence. 
40. L01ic explains the ~odus operandi of creation 
-41. but not its ori~in. Difficulties owin~ to dichoto~y of the 
Divine Will and Understandin~. 
42.The pfimacy of the Oivine Wil I and the unity of the Oivine 
Nature sub specie creationis. God~s self-limitation. 
43.NO li~ltation of the Divine Nature ab extra.Potentalltas of 
God as transcendin~ the universe. 
\ 
Synopsis. 
Chapter i i. 
The Perfection of God. 
-18. The ar;umentum e~ analo~ia hominis an1 its I imitations. 
19. The confluence of two influences in the thou~ht of lelbniz 
about Go~. ~js interpretation of Descartes. 
20. The difficulty of the conception of a relio idearum In the 
mind of 301. Walebranche • 
. 21. The 300d not prior to God. H~rmony of the Divine Attributes. 
The theololical prudence or timi~ity of leibnlz. 
22. Continued."Necanismus ~etaphysicus" saves the ethical theism 
of lelbniz from the pitfal I of ~ spurious "Omnipotence". 
23. "Optime alere" Includes 101ical within ethical perfection. 
24. The plus of Existence over Possibi I lty."lmportance of nDynamique n 
The via media of leibnlz. 
25. Contrast with Descartes and Spinola. The difficulty In the 
'Yletaphorlcal lan~ua1e of leibniz. 
2~. The deity,as 1uarantor of possibl lity,the keystone of the 
syste~ of Lelbniz. 
27 and 28. God as Creative Love the final explanation of His 
Perfection and of the demand for the reciprocity of man. 
\ 
Synopsis. 
C hap t e r 1 I I • (C 0 n tin u e d. ) 
44.The misunderstandin~ of Descartes by lelbniz.No vivi-sectlon 
of the Oivine Creative fi~t. 
45.No hi'!tus betw'lel1 the'Realm of Nature and the Realm of Grace. 
~armony of God as Archltect an1 as ~onarch. 
4R.The 41 I-inclusiveness of the Oivine ~ejng.The supra-natural 
as the interiority of the universe. The Glory of God the 
purpose of the world. 
47."The City of God" reveals the moral purpose of the universe. 
"The Love of God"- II·General Good". 
48.Thelstic realism or pessimism? 
49.The reconciliation of provl1entia speclal18slma ~Ith the 
theocentrlc view of the uni'verse in the n~oodness" of Cod. 
50.The ~oral order of rational beings not a secon~ary consideration 
in ... plan de Dieu·,. 
5i. The intuitive metaphysics of Christian faith.Omnipotence of 
love. 
\ 
Synopsis. 
Chapter Iv. 
n,Essais de Theodicee". 
53. The fruit of prolo,,~ed m'}ntal incubation on the part of 
Leibniz and only an instatement of a projected plan. 
54. The search for 3. perennis philosophla."Essais de Theodicee" 
written ~par lambeaux"~Thelr patchwork and rechauffe 
character. Incorporation of earlier thought.Not merely an 
answer to gayle. 
55-5~.Leibniz a fundamental creator of all theodicean argument. 
Lacks the power of exclislveness.Contact with the thou~ht 
of his day and phi losophic charity.The claim of the Theodlcee. 
\ 
Synopsis. 
Chapter V. 
~7. Bayle's "Opus Yercueleum"sets the sta1e for Leibniz.Yls 
former didactic intermin~les with present polemical motive. 
nc 'est la cause d~ Dleu QU 'on piai1e".Bayle embodies the 
influences of the Refor~atlon and Enll~htenment. 
58. The unstab Ie balance of power between reH:}fon and philosophy. 
3avle- n a house di¥ided a~ainst Itselfn~Undermlnes the 
foundations of the ivory c~stle of doq~atlc theoto~y.The 
~ethod of gayle. Dichotomy of faith and reason.Certum est,quia 
impossibile est. 
59. The anti-rational nature of the dogmas of theology."Reason only 
fit to make man know his i1norances and powerlessness,and the 
necessity of another rerelatlon". The Kant of the i7th.century. 
A more consistent rationalist than either Descartes or Lelbnlz. 
1)0. His Cos'floI01Y. Revelation te~ches (i) God disposes of the world 
as He sees fit. (a) Ye n~eds only a simple act of Will to do 
what pleases l1im. (3). Nothin~ can happen but what He has put in 
the plan of 4is work. Unexpected affinity with the views of 
Le Ibn i z. 
-~I. Man not the sole end of Creation.Yet cannot doubt the essential 
"10odness· of God which led Him to create the world. 
h2. 80th 8ayle and Leibniz have the same view of the "Goorlness" of 
God and the conseQuent crucial ity of "the pfoblem of evi (". 
Revelation alone can untie this nodus."I'optimus precede 
toujours Ie 'naxilflus". 
~3.The Manichaean Answer. Cannot reason a~ainst the facts of evil. 
Evil no ~ere deprivation.Juxtaoosition of the omnipotent 
transcendence of ~od and the stark evil of the world excludes any 
minirnisin1 tendency.Manichaeism has (a)clear Ideas and (b) is 
adequate to experience. Three questions-the nature,ori1in and 
s i ~ n i fica nee 0 f ev i I. 
'\ 
Synopsis. 
Chapter V. (Cont i nue:!). 
64.The answers of ~anichaeism reviewad by Bayle. The rational 
stren~th of the ar~uments of Manichaeism contrasted with those 
of Catholic orthodoxy. 
~5.The Answer of Ori~en. gayle's preference. The transitory 
character of human life contrasted with the everlastinqness of 
eternity.The opposite jan~er to Manichaeism. 
~~. ~anichaeis~ has three answers for the three principles of 
Ori~enls~-fre910m,repentance anj eternity. Our i~norance about 
Pur::Ja.tory.The "':ioodness". of God i.e."Goojness" in sumrr:o ~radu 
T.ust exclUde al I defects. 
~7.80nu'11 ex Inte1ra causa,rralu'Tl ex quocunque defectu.The dan:Jer of 
dual is/r, in the answer of Ori~enism.i)a'Tlnatlon of the :Jreater part 
of the hU'Tlan race conflicts with the ~oo:iness of Go::!. The Answer 
OF gAYLE. The statement of the problerr by Lactantius. 
~8.The necessity of evil for Lactantius.Criticisrn by !3ayle on 
psycholo:jlcal and other :Jrounds.~ankruptcy of the Fathers of the 
Church.8enary of philosophy in the theory of personal devil and 
the"Fall" of 'J'·an. 
~9.The Scriptural teachin1 of the ~oodness of God the only solution 
of "the prab lern of evi 1".Abandonment of reason. The 'J',oral 
:Joodness of God the sh~et anchor alike for 3ayle and Leibniz. 
Differences betwe~n the~ out funda~ental a~reement. 
70."Ab actu ~j poteniia~ valet conseauentia"."This has happened, 
then, this is not contrary to the h~liness an::f ~oodness of Go:!". 
The Revelation of the Scriptures anj "Ie principe de I~ 
sou~ission". Criticism of popular answers to the proble~. 
71.Elevation of faith and abase~ent of reason. 9ankruptcy of the 
rational is~ of the sects and ·of orthodoxy. 
72.The n8arthianis'Tl" of gayle. His ~reat value is "piauer d'honneur" 
Synopsis. 
Chapter V I. 
The Fact of Evi I. 
7 3. The d Iff i cui t y of i so 1 at i n g the data 0 f 'IV ii, wit h 0 ute x p I a I n I n g 
thei r existence.The influence of ~ayle. The danger of hasty and 
superficial judlments. 
74. Continued. The ;'0 felix culpa" aqurr,ent."istory as the arbiter 
of value. 
75. The li'Tlited character of our knowJed~~. Individual happiness not 
the only en~ of creation.The supre~acy of spiritual joys.The 
~reatest happiness consists In the ijope of future happiness.The 
"'ilieu. for the facts of evi I."L'univers •••• est tout ::t'une piece 
7~. To see the world is to see it not sub specie hominis but sub 
specie dei which a1ain 'Tleans sub specie universi. The ~ulf 
between a "cos'Tlodicy" and a theodlcy.The organic unity of the 
world but no anima 'Tlundi. 
77. The :Jroupinl of evils. (tlailflonldes?). (i)Metaphysical (2)Physical 
(3) Moral.The ~reat problem of justice is not omitted by 
lelbniz but Included as a postulate of the 100dness of God. 
78. (i )Metaphysical evi I the 'Tlatrhc of all other evi I. (2)Physicl1l 
evil and Its roots. 
79. Its explanation. (3)Moral evi I has a moral cause. 
80. Exa~leration of its extent.The hu~an race only a fralment of 
The City of God.~od does not will moral evi I.A hypothetical 
neces.sity. 
\ 
Synopsis. 
Chapter VII. 
"The Fall of Man and "Ori~inal Sin". 
~ 
81. Ne~lect of the attitude of leibniz to the traditional answer 
of Christian do~~a to "the proble~ of evil".lntrinsic and 
extrinsic importance of the"Fal I"doctrine,especially in the 
17th. cantu ry. 
82. Leibniz exe~pl ffies the tension between humanism and the 
Reforrr,ation.His heterodoxy both in re~ard to the Counci I of 
Trent and the symbolical books of Protestantism. The virtual 
Manlchaeism of Lutheranism. 
83. The vin~ication ~f the honesty of Leibniz. Attempt at a via 
media. 
84. Five issues of the "Fall" doctri'1e. (i)Acceptance by leibnlz of 
classical texts. (2) Ori~inal state of man explained by 
"Transcreation".No catastrophic "Fall". 
85. The empirical inevitabi I Ity of the sin of Adam but man not born 
a sinner.The doctrine of essence and accidents. 
8q. The relevancy of rran's imperfection in Goj's plan of the 
universe.Free will acts throulh the power of God but evil comes 
(nto bein~ th"'·OUlh creaturely limitation. (3)The alle~ed 
j~mnosa hereditas. 
87. Leibniz's virtual aban:10O'fient of orthojoxy as conflictln~ both 
with his metaphysical ideas an~ his view of a beneficent deity. 
So cal led "ori~inal Sinn"but another name for human infirmity. 
(4}.Explanation of alle~3,., infection with lIori1inai sin". 
88."Transcreation U as an alternative to Pre-existence,Traducianism, 
ani Creationis~.More a1reeable to Divine Justice than the other 
llternatives. No da~nation of the innocent. 
89. (5}.Result of "ori1inal sin" of Adam is merely as the taint of 
heredity. The Rei1n of Nature serves the Rei~n of Grace. 
89.No champion of orthodoxyJ 
, 
Synopsis. 
Chapter VI.II. 
The Grounds of Opt imism. (i). 
90 .. Explanation of the disrepute of the "optimism" of leibniz. 
leibniz here,again,his own best interpreter.Difference from 
Descartes an~ Spinoza. 
-91_ The moral nature of Sod the foundation for the opti~ism of 
leibniz.The a priori and the a posteriori methods of prvvin1 
that the world is the handywork of God.The revelation of nature. 
92. A new proof of t~e existence of God.Assumotion of the perfection 
of the world.Apart fro~ the idea of ~od there is no sound basis 
for any tot31 itarian verdict on the universe or the extent of 
The City of ~od.E~rly date of the optimism of leibniz refutes 
its alle1e~ 'Tlona::nc ori?in. God's choice of the best. 
93. A value juj~'Tlcnt at the foundation of the creative fiat of God. 
The pre-existence of God. (I) God as the primary 1round of all 
existence. (2) Value ~nd values as the secondary ~round. (3) 
Hierarchies of value and their ~bein~" in the 'Tlind of God. 
Criticis'Tl of the views of Prof.H.WI Idon Carr. 
94.The optl~is~ of leibniz the ver11ct of ~ reli~lous spirit. 
Con;parison with Ori:)en. The infinite perfectibi lity of the 
universe. 
95.The inherently dyna'T·ic and pro:}ressive nature of the universe 
as a whole. 
9~.Dyna~ic relation of God-who se~s al I totum simul-to the world 
e~plains the uni~portance of tiTe in the system of leibniz.The 
verdict sub tot ius universi. Preservation as continuous creation. 
The world 'Tlust mirror the perfection of its creator and 
• 
upholder. 
97. "Concours je );cu~.No hazarj in the crciative enterprise of the 
deity of leibniz. Contrasted with Arnauld. 
98. leibniz's crIticism of the deism of Newton.God is at work in 
the universe and yet He is an intetlilentia supramundana.The 
'Tletaphysical and moral attributes of God the primary foundation 
for optimis'f!. 
, 
: Syn~P8Is. 
Chapter 'IX .. 
The Grounds of Optimlsm·OI}. 
99.The proble'fl of &vll for leibniz a problem of values.Evils (·n 
the world an~ a~ ,vil worl1.The h~ed for finality in 
explanation.The cul-de-sac of n6turallsm. 
ioO.The universe th~ r~sult of a QivJne vafu~-Ju~lment.Th~ Will 
.~oraJiter optlmusWbehin~ the universe.The ·beJn~·· of the 
possible worljs.The problem of ihe difference between 
.actu~1 lty· or "existence- and ·bein~~. 
loi. The fable of the pyr!mid.~as ao apex but no base.The 
Indelible ~ark of all theistic thou~ht -the wilt of ~od Is 
a WII I for the best ~ossible~~The ~oodne$s of ihe whole not 
Ipso facto the 100dness of the part. 
i02.The or1anlc unity of the universe. (I) Metaphysical evil 
Inseparable from existence. 
io~. (II) PhysIcal evll,~ •• nly a con.eQu~nce of moral evll.The 
lre~t proble~ of It. Incidence answered by the belief in a 
(uture life and the possIble spiritual ;alns throu~h sufferlnl. 
Ewtent of ohysical evil eW!11erated.Physlcal well beln~ Is not 
~erely pleasure. Part of th& meanin] of physical sufferi"~s, 
whIch sre "~ans ltordre-of the universe," to prepare us for a 
future life. 
i04. The just1ce of the universe a result of the h.r~Ony between 
th~ world ot Nature an~ the world of Grace.Other reasons for 
ph y s i ce I ev t t • 
i05. (iii) ¥oraJ evil due to the dele}ated freedom of man.Phe place 
of mor.' evi I in the unity of the worl~.The concurrence of 
Go; with ",o·rat evil as an hypothetical Inevitability. 
iOS.The ~et9physical imperfection of creat~rrlness.Nothtng 
8cci~enta' in ~an's sinntn~ or in the creative decree of God. 
The ;reat inftuence on leibnlz of his ideas on the laws of 
movement. 
· . , ,
, 
C hap t e r rx. (C 0 n tin u e d) ~ 
. 107. The interpretative value of minds as c npartes totales"ln 
the universe.The failure of mere intellectual analysis. 
Mircocosm and macrocosm."Felicity is to persons what 
perfection is to thin~s".Neith~r man nor God can deny 
them s e I v e s • 
-108. The final ity of values for God as a Moral Person.Not all 
values for God af"'e moral values,thou~h they have a 
predo~inant plsce in "the perfection of the universe". 
~ 109. The nature of "oossibility"for leibniz.8roa:i's summary of 
the views of Leibniz and comparison with those of ~cTa~~art. 
110. "God's unrlerstandin:l the source of essences anj His will the 
origin of existences".The world the expression of a purpose 
in which the bo~u~ an1 the faciendum 8~ree.The nature of God 
the key to unlock the ~ystery of the universe. 
Synopsis. 
Chapter x. 
La Li b erte. 
iii.Attacks on his doctrine of liberty anticipated by lelbniz. 
The cruciality of liberty to his answer of the problem of 
a'lj I.F~tal ism not the last word of leibniz, 
ii?!fChe Via ~e::li~ betw~;en (i) determinism a"d {ii}libertlnlsm. 
Tl-tree rr:eanin~s of fr~.ejom{Rashdall).liberum arbltrlum 
indifferentia~·. forciblv rejected by Leibniz. 
ii2A. Freedo~ for leibniz is self-1eter~lnation.The adjjtion of 
L~ibniz to t"e two ~Itornatives of l3ayle-"incl ination without 
neces<;itv".Tl)ree oarts of freedorr.:- i.intelli1ence. if. 
soontan~ity iii.continloncv. 
ii3. FREEOOM in W4N. The Pre-established ~armony the custodian 
and ~uarantee of man's freedom.The achievement of fr,~do~ 
limited both by the weak Ilason between jud~ment and will 
an:! also by the li'Ylitation of If.an's intell i~ence.These 
11'I',itations an in"evitable result of creaturllness. 
ii4.The cultivation of Rune bonne volonte"."11 y a un si ~ran:l 
trajet de I 'esprit au coeur".Only"the wise man" is free. 
Explanation of lJloral evi I. 
ii5. ~uman con~uct capable of explanation and not arbitrary.Human 
fre,do~ not inconsistent with the fact of predictability in 
detai I. No olural istic via 'fledia for Leibniz. {Ward-·,Realm of 
Enos"l 
ii~.Fai lure of :arteslanism to reconci Ie freedom with Provijence. 
The .distinction b~tween metaphysical and moral determination. 
The difficulties in this view to be ttaced to whether we 
be~in our interpretation of Leibniz from the Monads(~onadolo~y 
or from God(Theodicge).The Lelbnizian crux between deity and 
the Monads is in part the old Question of the relation 
between omniscience and frssdom. 
Chapter x. (Continued). 
ii7.leibniz's rejection of CRrtesian,Supra.lapsarian and 
Infralapsarian answers.The "non-temporal"nature of the 
Divine foresight. Difficulties in this view no argument 
for Leihniz's lack of sincerity. (8.Russell). 
iis. Chevallier's answer in explanation of the weakness of the 
moral phi losophy of Leibniz the finaf word. 
FREF.OOM IN GOD. Arnauld's assertion of the impossibi Iity of 
creation on the pre~ises of Leibniz.Free~om in God is human 
freedom writ 'a~~e. 
ii9. Leibniz's opposition to the prevalent Socinian idea of 
Oivine freedom-an absolutum 0ominium. Leibniz also oppose~ to 
the Necessitarianism of Spinoz~ and 40bbes.The answer of ~ 
une necessite moral" the only alternative. 
i20. Other alternativos ruled out of court."une 4EUREUSE 
Necessite"~xplains the Divine initiative to be found in 4is 
Goo~ness. 
i2i. lelbnlz's anticipations of criticisms.Objection of gayle to 
the reconciliation of the freedo~ of the Divine choice with 
the optimum of the Divine wisdo~.Lelbniz answers by sayin~ 
that God's freedom extends wa::J maXiryl8,ad omnia", so far as no 
contradiction is i'Tlpiied. 
i22.God's "necessity" is His nature and this includes the habitat 
of "eternal truths".leibniz's reply to Arnauld by showln~ nls 
objection to the possibility of creation on the premises of 
Leibniz incompatible with his aoceptance of the leibnizlan 
principle "praedicatum Inast subjecto". 
i21. The oqanic unity of the uniwerse. The ~eneral 3nd par'lticula 
intentions of ~od. 
SYi'!opsls. 
Chapter X'l .. 
The solution of lelbniz. 
The ~roblem oftnterpretatlon. 
-124. The l~portance of a "point de consi~eratton· In the 
phi losophy of talbntz.The I01Jco-~athe~atical school of 
interpretation. Its pluralistic ,readin1 of (t)lbniz summed 
U D by F. C .. S. Sch i J l e r • 
i25. Th~ t1iaditionaJ schools of interpretation and their minor 
differonces.The hi~torlc vindication of the continuity of 
the thei$tic views of leibniz. 
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Introduction. 
", 
In an important inedit Leibniz says that nothing can be 
I. 
disguised in his system, because throughout there is a perfect 
connexion. Proper and exact distinctions are made because they 
are necessary. Then he goes on to add that he has not always been 
able to explain himself fully but he has always striven to speak 
precisely. "I begin as a philosopher, but I end as a theologian. 
One of my great principles is that nothing takes place without a 
, reason. It is a principle of philosophy. But at bottom it is 
nothing else than the acknowledgement of the divine wisdom, although 
I did not speak of it at first."(I) This emphasis of Leibniz on 
the essential unity of his thought has not always been given the 
prominence it deserves. It has been recognised by older writers 
like Ed. ~eller, Kuno Fisher and ;!.mile Boutroux, to name some 
famous students of Leibniz. But in more recent times many 
commentators have tended to follow one another in the condemnation, 
express or implied, of those parts of the system of Leibniz 
"which most nearly concern human life". 
So we are asked to believe that Leibniz the philosopher 
is one person and Leibniz the theologian is another. The latter 
is a mere purveyor of "edifying phrases" and tlthe champion of 
ignorance and obscurantism" (2). The real Leibniz is Leibnez the 
philosopher and by philosopher we mean a rationalist pur sang. 
For this reason we must explain away any non-rational surd in 
Leibniz's thinking as either a palpable inconsistency or a base, 
if diplomatic, accomodation to the avowedly theological 
atmosphere of the 17th. century. This interpretation of Leibniz 
is one to which, since the days of Hegel, many eminent philosophers 
have freely lent their nmnes. Of recent years it has been much 
canvassed in this country by Bertrand Russell and in France by 
Louis Couturat. In the preface to his book "La logique de Leihniz" 
the latter says "The philosophy of Leibniz appears as the most 
complete and the most systematic expression of intellectual 
rationalism: there is perfect accord between ~Ao.~~t~d things, 
between nature and spirit; reality is entirely,;to~reason, because 
it is pene tra ted with reason. To characterise th1s metaphysic in 
a word, it is a panlogism" (3) According to the tiouturat-Russell 
school of thought logical atomism is the quintessence of Leibniz. 
Outside Leibniz the logician there is no Leibniz. All else must 
be discarded. nw~, who do not depend upon the smiles of princes 
may simply draw the consequences which Leibniz shunned." 
2. (p3.above "Th$ Philosophy of Leibniz rT B Russ~ll) IT A monism 
is necessarily pantheistic, and a monadiam, when it is logical, 
is as necessarily atheistic. Leibniz, however, felt any philosophy 
to be worthless which did not establish the existence of God, 
and it cannot be denied that certain gaps in his system were 
patched up by a reference to the Divine Power, Goodness and 
WisdomlT (Russell. p • 172 above). (4) 
It is no matter for great wonder that Leibniz constitutes 
a problem in himself. He is, in a sense, the best illustration 
of the metaphor he has made a philosC3.Phical common-place 
"point de vue IT,. or npoint de considerationfl - "as the same town, looked 
at from various sides, appears quite different and becomes as it 
were numerous in aspects". (par. 57. The Iv'Ionadology. Latta's "Sdit.. 
p. 248). For this reason he will not fit readily into any schema. 
~ it must be admitted~ the dazzling complexity of the genius of 
Leibniz constitutes an almost irresistible temptation to make a 
simplicity not otherwise patent. In dealing with so eminent a 
genius it may well be questioned whether a canon of textual 
cri ticism"Difficilior lectio potior; "the harder reading is to be 
preferred to the easier"- is not more applicable to his case than;tk 
hasty and ruthless use of Occam's razor. The all too elucidating 
emendation of the industrious scribe has often an inverse value 
to the ease it introduces to the reading. So in the case of a 
genius like Leibniz the more difficult reading of him may have a 
greater claim upon our allegiance than the all too logical 
simplifying of his complexity. 
There are different methods of fitting Leibniz into such a 
bed of Procrustes. LvlOst commentators of this school are content 
to show that in the end the philosophy of Leibniz and the 
philosophy of Spinoza lead is tee ena to the samee consequences. 
According to Secreten e.g. (La Fhilosophie de Leibnitz 1840) the 
ultimate difference between the two is a difference in style (5) 
Others like Ludwig Stein (Leibniz und Spinoza. 1890) have virtually 
accused Leibniz of plagiarising Spinoza. Rub out the writing of 
Leibniz and we shall discover the original Spinozistic palimpsest 
beneath. J.A. Froude in his essay on Spinoza has greatly popularised 
this impression of Leibniz in :::!ngland. (See nShort Studies") 
But the question may well be asked how far can we advance 
by following such a method of interpretation • By what right do 
we gag Leibniz when his utterances do not conform to our small 
predilections ?\1hat will the History of Phi~osophy read if, wi th 
the forthright honesty of Secreta..n we sa.y that the opinion of 
Leibniz is one thing and his philosophy another? (6) There is 
a surgical quality about such remedies which may well make us fear 
for the subject of them. Apart from any question of the philosophical 
denigration oM Leibniz" no case is made out for treating Leibniz with 
less respect than we give e. g. to his illustrious predecessor 
Spinoza. However puzzling we may find t.te Leibnizian jgg-saw, it is 
a poor beginning to throwaway some of the pieces and especially 
those most valued by the originator himself. Non tali auxil,io 
shall we ever do justice to the many sided nature of the genius of 
Leibniz. rle cannot interpret Leibniz 'a la carte. 
3. 
The unfortunate persistence of this interpretation 
of Leibniz has brought about the almost complete neglect of the 
only work of Leibniz published in his life time- rt"1;'ssais de 
Theodice'e sur la bonta" de Dieu, Ie. liberte" de l' homme" et 1 'origine 
du mal" (1710). It is almost certainly the most neglected writing 
of Leibniz and yet it is one to which he himself attached more than 
ordinary importance. The most commonly read summary of the 
philosophy of Leibniz is "the l'IvIonadology"(1714). The historica.l 
fact is not always remembered that it was the Thef'odicee which was the 
indirect cause of the writing of the Ivionadology at the instance of 
Prince Eugene of Savoy. So little was Leibniz himself conscious 
of any discrepancy between the larger work and the smaller work 
that he gives references in the ivionadology to the corresponding 
paragraph of the Theodic€!e. 
It must not be supposed from our preceding remarks that 
we are forgetful of the serious difficulties in the working out 
of the philosophy of Leibniz in general and in particular wi th that 
part of his philosophy with which we are more immediately concerned. 
But at all costs these difficulties must not deter us from 
allowing Leibniz to speak for himself and,. as far as may be possible, 
to be his own interpreter. The inconsistencies and difficulties in 
Leibniz may in this way find a less tortuous explanation tha.n the 
drastic treatment so often meted out to them. Still less need we 
forget that the period marked by the publication of the Theodicee 
was one whose religious ethos is well summed up in the title of 
Lock's tre.a tise If The Reasonableness of Christiani ty~· It marked, what 
l,~ark Pattison calls, the seculum. rationalisticum (1688-1890). But 
reason as yet had not become the substitute for faith. If the religious 
atmosphere of the time was as pervasive as its philosophical 
atmosphere, it is only natural to suppose that Leibnizpad no 
more immunity from this than he had from/'l' e spri t geometrique 11 of 
Descartes. In the courts of Prince,s and in the circles of scholars 
in which he moved he was perhaps as much subject to influences as 
any other philosopher of his day. It is no real disparagement of 
Leibniz to say "Critics have noted that Leibniz, while thinking as a 
philosopher, never lost the pre-occupation with what might be thought 
of his positions by the religious authorities" (Prologomena to a 
New Metaphysic. T. Whittaker. 1931.) p. 89. footnote.) 'He may find 
later that the alleged "pre-occupation" of Leibniz in walking delicately 
in respect of religious do gas:. is more fancied than real e .g. ~ ~ 1 
"original sin "and "the Fall of iVlan ". And of philosophers in gene:ral 
it is true ths,.t they owe much more to their age than they realise. 
Leibniz made so many contracts with intellectual life that it would 
be pass.ing strange if he did not take some acc:ount of those who were 
most likely to peruse his works. lind Leibniz does avowedly express 
some concern about the reception of the Theodicee among theologians, ( 7) 
The mistake so commonly made wi th reM~to Leibniz is to 
suppo se that the Thea dicee is u.nifUe in marking,{u1.ll!e of his putting Ii-
sickle into the field of theology. For the Theo'dicee is as much a 
work in theology as a work in philosophy. ~s Couturat reminds us 
among the cOltected MSS of Leibniz it is 91assed under the rubric 
"T heologie ,~( 8 Be this as it may, The Theodic{e was not born like 
Athena from the head of Zeus. It was the cubnination of a long 
( 
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period of rwnination on the Justifying the ways of God to man. Its ~ 
history can be troced back to his earliest writings. Indeed a 
strong case can be made to show that it is precisely in those 
parts of the philosophy of Leibniz rtwhich most nearly concern 
human life" that a presumption is ra.ised as to the fundamental 
unity and persistence of his thought. No detailed study of 
Leibniz will suffer us to say that in these matters on the border 
line of philosophy and theology Leibniz was consciously or 
unconsciously hypocritical. To suppose, that this is the case is to 
malign a great genius. 
The evidence of the earlier writings of Leibniz is much 
less a problem on this view of the fund~me.ntal unity of the 
thought of Leibniz. A. recent writer in a brilliant book 
("Dynamique et rvretaphysique Leibniziennes,t lvl. Gueroul t. Paris 1934) 
has put this case' for the fundamental unity of the thought of 
Leibniz against the prevalent one-sided interpritations with 
convinc.ing clearness. "Outre que. c.es interpretatio,ns unilaterales 
risquent fort d'alterer les ve-ritables perspectives de Is. 
doctrine,. elles sont en de'Saccord avec ce que nous savons de 
l'activite/de Leibniz depuis sa plus extr~e jeunesse. Cette 
acti vi te ~e revele, en effe t,. comme celIe d' un genie e sse~tielleill.ent 
encyclopedique. 1.L suffit de consulter la liste des premieres 
oeuvres pour se convainore de la diversit~originaire des th~mes 
(logi&ue, mathrullatique, physique, juridique" moral, religieux, 
the"Ologique, philosophique, etc.), d 'analyser ces oeuvres pour 
les retrouver tous en chacune d 'elles, mais a des points de vue 
differents" (Reference to '\'1. Kabi tz" Die. Philosophie des jungen 
Leibniz. Heidelberg. 1908.). In agreement with this statement 
(which we have read after forming our own opinion} we shall see later 
that the The()dice6 does incorporate a good deal of this Leibniz's 
e,arlier thought. Leibniz as a youth is the defender of the faith. 
In 1668 he wrote a work whose title explains itself rtContessio 
naturae contra atheistas" where he especially exposed the weakness 
of the ltomists. 1¥year later he attacks the Socinians, "Qu.orum 
paupertina fuit philosophia", under the guise of a defence of the 
dogma of the Trinity "Defensio Trini tatis per nova reperta logica 
contra epistolam Ariani". All this points to the a.cti ve interest 
he early manifested in religious controversy. rlhat is, however, 
even more to the point is that about this time, too, Leibniz 
contemplated a magnum opus "Demonstra tionum catholocarwn". Thanks 
to the researches of WI. Foucher de Careil we are able to J.h~ve some 
idea of the aim and contents of this projected work. The~c rr'esponds to 
the "Discours pr61imin~re sur la co nt'o rmi te de la foi avec la 
raisonll~of the Theodicee and bears the title ItSpecimen Demonstrationum 
catholicarum" seu apo,logia fidei ex ratione". The first part of the 
work is probabl,. a MSS. with the title "Dialogus de immortali tate 
me ntis e t nece ssi tate rec toris in mundo, et Conte ssio philosophi, 
seu de Justitia Dei circa praedestinationem, aliisque ad hoc 
argumentum spectantibus". This is almost ,gertainly the early 
Dialogue Leibniz mentions in the The'odicee (Par, 211. G.6. p. 244) 
as having shown during his sojourn in Paris to ~ Arnaud, the 
head of the theological faculty at the Sorbonne. (9) As Leibniz 
himself reminds us at this early period he had already formulated 
his main theodicean argument. "The princ!le which I 
1\ 
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uphold here, to wit that sin was permitted beoause it was 
involved in the best ~lan of the universe, was already employed 
there, and M • .Arrnaud did not appear to be afraid of it" (above). 
The fragment that remains of this Latin Dialogue shows olearly 
enough the preoooupation of the mind of Leibniz with the 
problems of the &ater Theodioee and the extent to whioh he had 
already found his solution to the problem of evil. Evil is in-
dissolubly involved in the best plan of the universe and the 
existing universe is God's choioe of the best possible world. There 
are other unpublished MSS. e.g. " Rationale fidei oa tholicae "whioh 
probably belong to the same contemplated enterprise. 
Another interesting point, worthy of mention here, is 
that one of the subjeots Leibniz tells us he canvassed with 
Spinoza, during his visit to the Hague in 1676, was that of the 
neoessity of the existenoe of an absolutely perfeot being. At this 
time Leibniz was beginning to feel aoute dissatisfaotion with the 
meohanistic outlook of Cartesian philosophy and this shows 
olearly enough the trend of his thought. (10 ) 
Again in the "Dialogue em:ti:n entre Theophile et 
Polydore", written before Leibniz was thirty years old i.e. 
before 1679, we find an antioipation of the argument of the 
The'odioee. God made the world and all the oreatures therein to 
share in that harmonio perfection of whioh it is capable. 
Happiness (pleasure) is the experienoe aooompanying growth in 
perfeotion. To be reasonable is to share in the happiness 
possible in a world of harmony. The sum total of its perfeotion 
and haplliness cannot apparently be realised without the 
unhappinesifof some who deserve their fate. (11). 
The pOint, we wish to make here, is that we must take 
all Leibniz into oonsideration. And, if we do this, then we 
shall find that his views on the relations of God and man are as 
vi tal and as important as any other of his opinions. ;:le must try 
and remember that the author of the TlMonadology", of the 
"Disoourse on Metaphysios" and the oorrespondent of Arnaud is also 
at the same time the author of the Theodicee and Three lviystioal 
Dialogues (see Baruzi- Rev. de~~~L-~t~.~~. 1905.) not to 
speak of the voluminous inEfdi tSiwnICll'1airow oooassionally a 
strong but fliokering light on a very complex personality. In 
these inquiries we oannot separate historioal faot from 
philosophio truth. Purg~ing the even tenor of our disoussion in 
this way we may find that Leibniz's own words about himself 
have more than a grain of truth, that beginning as a philosopher 
he ended as a theologian. Further we may find that the 'reason 
for this is that philosophy for Leibniz was ever the anoilla 
theologiae and that his typioal attitude was always fides quaerens 
intellectum. For this reason Leibniz was muoh less a rationalist 
than he realised. The leit m~tif of muoh of his writing was an 
unconsoiously realised "piete" to whioh no doubt the atmosphere of 
his centnJ'Y and his immediate environment oontributed in no small 
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degree. This is not to underestimate the virility of his logic 
but to do justic.e to the complex and many sided nature of his 
genius. (lOt The philosophy of Leibniz is like the Lei~nizian 
universe where Iltout est lie, tout conspire: crv/'7ivo/.{ ~V-r;i. ~' 
Only by realising this can we do justice to the completeness of the 
answer of Leibniz to the problem of evil. (12). 
7. 
Chapter 1. 
GOD. 
No judgtment on Leibniz has any value unless it begins 
wi th an imagine. ti ve realisation of the theo-centric te;ndency of the 
17th. century.As H. Vlildon Carr says (Theory of Monads. 1922. p.97-8.) 
"To the philosophers of the seventeenth centurry God is the be,ginning 
and end of philosophical speculation. It was one of the striking 
features of the rise of modern philosophy that whatever the special 
subject-matter the idea of God was the dominant motive. The 
forrn in which the problem of the nature of God was debated gives 
to the arguments of that period a certain remoteness from our actual ~ 
it1terests to-day. At times,. too, the acrimony of the disputes 
recalls the bitterness and repeats the ineptitudes of the fourth centu ry. 
Ye,t it is not difficult to see that the problem of divine nature 
which exercised Spinoza and Leibniz is identical with our problem 
today and nothing but the mode of expression is changed. Tl 
we, who live at such a distance from the Dllinediate 
influences of the Reformation, find it difficult to realise the 
truth Professor Wildon Carr enunciates. So remote are we from those 
days that there is some excuse for thinking that what is 
speculatively unimportant for us was unimportant for them. We do 
not,of cours~, mean that God was a kind of household famulus to 
Leibniz but that what Leibniz understands Spinoza to say of himself 
is equally true also of Leibniz and the 17th. century philosophers 
as a whole "Vulgar philosophy begins from things, Cartesian from 
the mind" ~e himself starts from God". (1) ~ Thus~t:eibniz asserts tha,t the principal aim of phi4-osophy 
ought to be a knowledge of God and of the soul which can inspire 
the soul to love God and to practise virtue {It je diray qu f en effect 
Ie but princi'p~l de la Philosophie dOit""e,stre une connoissance de 
Dieu et de L' J:mie qui fpisse excite~ l'Ame 11. aimer Dieu et ~ 
practiquer la vertu" "~claircissement sur les Natures Plastique 
G.vi. p. 548. afte'r l704.} It wo,uld be' difficult to see how 
philosophers could otherwise escape this theological environment, 
especially when we remember the acute and wide spread nature, of 
IT 
the religious controversies in general and of JaR.~....n..i3IDl in particular. 
In all this m~lee of religious debate and argumentX1'1ved and 
moved and took an active part. 
Leibnizts doctrine of God is a well known crux i~terpretum. 
For this reason alone it merits careful scrutiny. But itfspe,cially 
re'levant here in the consideration of Leibniz's solution of the 
problem of evil. The PROBLEivl of evil is one of varying acuteness 
in different systems of thought. There are obviously systems of 
thought for which it is non-existent. In the same way there are 
others where it assumes a form of almost crucial urgency. The 
philosophy of Leibniz is one of these. He himself shows fully 
that he realises the crucial nature of the whole problem in his 
philosophy-tlSi DJieus est,. u,nde malum? Si non est,. unde bonum? TI 
There is all the difference in the world between "evil " in a 
IT cosmodicy" and in a theodicy. (2) 
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Without God Leibniz's whole system of philosophy must 
alter its character. The Leibnizian doctrine of the deity in fact 
is much more than a pied a terre than is commonly realised. 
"Cette quali te; moral de Dieu lf is a court of judg~ment from which 
there can be no appeal. It is e.g. his final argument for personal 
brnnortality. (3) The beneficent choice and fiat of such a deity is 
the ultima te ground on which "the best of all possible worlds TT must 
ke·ep what is sometimes a rather precarious balance. Of this we shall 
say more in detail later. Here it is sufficient for us tiD recognise 
the essential fheocentric character of the approach of Leibniz to 
the problem of evil. This is not to say that other considerations 
and arguments do not wield some sway. But the conception of the 
deity is organic to the whole of his thought, and,broadly speaking, 
it is from this angle that he enJisages the whole problem of evil. 
For Leibniz the ultimate 17'Du o-'{t.j is the hotion of God. Like a 
modern writer we can almost overhear Leibniz saying "it is very 
strange, and yet, I feel sure, quite sure, most true that all this 
evil, in ea,ch of its several degrees and ways, is most real,. is 
most baffling; and yet that only by thus recognising all this evil 
as genuinely extant, and yet as inexplica,ble by us even as regards 
such existence, do we reach a depth at which a deliberate and 
final theism is fully possible and entirely assured", ( "The Reality 
of God". Baron F. Von Hugel. 1931. p.67.) The difference between 
the two being, of course, that for Leibniz the element of 
inexplicability is not always stressed. The intention of both 
writers, however, is virtually the same, to assure a deliberate 
and final theism in the teeth of the flagfant evil and evils of a 
recalcitrant world. 
\Ie have already tried to show in brief, in the matter of 
historic develop~ment,the theocentric tendencies of the early 
thought of Leibniz. Leaving this historic issue1so far as possible, 
on one side, we go on to ask the intrinsic importance of the idea 
of God in the Leibnizian Weltanschauung. 
It is at this point great care is required if we are to 
know the real mind of Leibniz and not father upon him our 
pre-conceived readings of his monadism. Because it is possible 
to think out a monadistic scheme of things sans Dieu, we must not 
therefore conclude that the whole idea of the Deity in Leibnizianism 
is a vulgar, base and uncritical accretion, in short a mere 17th. 
century usus loquendi. Still less must the difficulties and 
sometimes the obscurity of the precise views of Laibniz lead us to 
a minimising view of its basic importance to him and to the 
integration of his whole philosophical scheme of things. 
Having uttered such a caveat, we may begin with the 
stress Leibniz lays upon the Personality of God. In an early 
letter of February 1676 (published by Ivan lagodinsky p. 34. 
Leibnitiana. 1913.~ (4) Leibniz has a categorical assertion to the 
effect that God is not some imaginary metaphysical something, 
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incapable of knowledge, will a.ctlon as some try to make out. Ire is 
not merely anothe.r name for nature. fate, fortune" necessity or the 
World. Itgodis something substantial, a Person,. A IVIind"- TfDeus est 
substantia quaedarn, Persona, MensTt. In other words Leibniz fo~wears 
the "Deus sive Natura" of Spinoza, though he would agree with the 
latter that there is no distinction between Deus and dei tas. In our 
chapter on "Freedom!! we shall see that Leibniz further underlines this 
statement. For if self-determination is the differentia of 
personality y then God has this in the h~ighest possible degree. GQd 
for Leibniz is Perfect Personality. 
God, too" is a Simple Substance and endowed with infinite 
Attributes. For "This primar'y simple SUbstance must include eminently 
the perfections contained in the derivative substances which are its 
effects" (Par. 9. Princs. of Nat. & of Grace. La.tta .• p. 416) "Thus tt 
Leibniz goes on to sayff it will have power, knowledge and will in 
perfection" that is to say, it will have su.preme (souveraine) 
omnipotence, omniscience and goodness H • He is the Anseimic ·'id quo 
maius nihil cogitari potest~ But his real natu.re is never once in 
que·stion. God has a consti tu tional monarchy lillli ted only by his 
own nature. (5) 
The Attributes of this Simple Substance, despite its 
Simplici ty y Leibniz treats wi th a certa.in scholastic rigour. One 
of the good lega.cies of the j);~anichaean controversy of the early 
centuries was to demonstrate once and for all the hazardous nature 
of separating,even in thought,the Attributes of the Divine Being. 
To do this is to walk on a slippery slope which in the end must 
land the avowed monotheist in the slough of ~,.ianichaeism. Leibniz .. 
escapes so crude a dualism. But it may well be questioned whether at 
times Leibniz does not leave himself ope·n to serious criticism 
in his manner of speaking of the Divine Attributes. 
Yet for Leibniz there is a fundamental "interpenetration" 
of the Attributes. God is suum esse. In an early letter of April 1676 
he e.xpresses this truth with great clearness. "The Attributes of 
God are infinite, but none of them involves the whole ~ssence of God. 
For the essence of God nonsists in this that it is the subject of all 
com.patible Attributes. Any property or affection of God involves his 
Essence; as it is certain God has produced anything constant to our 
sense,. however little it may be,.. it involves the whole nature of God 
because it involves the whole series of things of that kindTT 
( c f. lagodinsky •. p.96. ) (6) 
In other words God is primarily Essence rather than 
Substance. For Substance seems inevitably to imply accidents. So, 
like Augustine"Leibniz is constrained to say that habere and esse 
in God coincide. TTideo simplex dicitur quoniarn quod habet hoc est H 
to use the phrase of Augustine (De civ. xi.lO.) 
Thus in God,. conceived as personal, there is no 
distinction between e ssentia and existence. In this re spect He differs 
from all finite being which is invariably a combination of both 
actuality and possibility or essentia. In @od there is no urge to 
any self-transcendence and on this interpretation God can have no 
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history. This idenity of existence and essentia in God explains, as 
we shall see" the view tacitly assumed and inheri ted by Le.ibniz 
that in God existence. and goodness are the one and the same thing. 
Like Plato ih the Republic ii. 379 La,ibniz would say "Then that 
which is good is not the cause of all things, but only cK~....:t-
is as it should be, being guiltless of evil." For both fhe. goodness 
of God is a vital ca~on of principle. 
Thus no emphasis on God as either the First Cause or the 
Bns Realissimum.mQst conflict with the truth that he is a spirit and,. 
as such,. other than the work of his hands. The difficulties begin to 
assert themselves here as we shall see. later. 
"~/e can even say that it is because he is a spirit that 
God is the originator of existences" for if he lacked the power of 
will to choose what is best, there would have bee n no reason why one 
.possible being should exist rather than any other. Therefore God's 
being a spirit himself dominates all the conside~ation which he may 
have toward created thingstt ( •••••• iiinsi la qualite/ de Dieu, qu.lil 
a dlestre Esprit luy mJme, va devant toutes les autres consider.tions 
qutil peut avoir'a. 1 regard des creatures". Discourse on Metaphysics. 
Montgomery's Translation. Open Court Pub. Coy. 1931. p. 61. C.xxvi. 
See G. i v. j 461.) We may here ask more pre cisely what is the nature 
of this "quali tEf' de Dieu. TI 
In an interesting comment on the orthodox view of the 
Divine Attributes Bayle, speaking on the Ivlanichaean side, says "'En 
damnant ~ vStre pr~ncipe la toute-puissance et la gloire de jouir 
seul de l'~ternit~, vous lui Ste~ celui de ses attribute qui passe 
devant tous le.s autres, car 1 'optimus precede totijours Ie maximus 
dans Ie style des plu.s savantes nations, quand elles parlent de 
Dieu" (See Fauliciens. p.2325. Dictionaire Historique et Critique. 
1702.) This idea. of the qualitative aspect of the Divine Attributes 
is particularly germane and crucial for Lei,bniz. As we have already seen 
it is from this standpOint that he approaches the whole question ,,0' 
of evil. In the words of Boethius he asks "SI D11!US BOlruS EST, unde 1ttt~. 
The more we read Leibniz the more deeply we percei ve that 
his whole system of thought turns and moves upon the fulcrum of 
n une bontS" souveraine lT • This is, in the end, the sole ratio sufficiens 
of the world. It is the major promise o·f all the argume.nts of Leibniz 
and so of practically everything he has written. It is alike the 
source of his confident optimism and the urge of his apologetic 
enterprise in the handling of the facts of evil. "God wills nothing 
wi thout reasonrt (Deus nihil vult sine ratione.). A fragment in 
Bodemann puts the ca..se wi th succinctness and meets the antiCipated 
criticism. (7) . 
rlhat account does Leibniz give of this idea of the 
goodness of God? iVlr Bertrand Russell says ''Most philosophers seem 
to suppose that" if they can e stablish God's existence this 
goodness necessarily follows. accordingly, though Leibniz does in 
certain passages,. give, some argument for what, in a metaphysical 
sense, may be called God's perfection, he nowhere takes the trouble 
to prove his goodne ss" (p. 189 "The Philosophy of Leibniz".) 
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Russellgoes on to add that,. on this view of perfection, God's 
inf ini te goodne ss is included and his inf ini te badne ss excluded ,. 
only if a priJit'itive view is taken of -evil. This view of evil, 
we are already beginning to see, Leibniz fulLy endorses. 
It is interesting and instructi ve to compare Leibniz on 
this matter of the goodness of God with our own Samuel Clarke, the 
contemporary of Leibniz. Ultimately they both take the same view of 
evil but they arrive at the same conclusion by very different methods 
of argument. It is true that in a remark in Par. '71 of the Discours de 
la Conformite"de la Foi avec. la Raison G.vi.p.91. Leibniz speaks with 
approval of Bayle's recognition that natural reason is for the unity 
of Princ iple against the i;~anichaeans and "that the )S0odne ss of God is 
proven invincibly by the Reason". ("et que Ie. bonte de Dieu est 
prouve'e invinciblement par la Raison"). Again in Par.44. above he tells 
us that we have no need of revelation to know that there is a unique 
Principle of all things, perfectly good and wise. Reason informs us 
of this by infallible demonstrations and consequently all the 
objections taken from the sequence of things, where we observe 
imperfections, are only founded on false appearances. (Or nous n'avons 
point besoin de 113. Foi reve~ee, pour savoir qulil y a un tel Principe 
unique de toutes chases,. par!aitement bon et sage. La Raison nous 
l'apprend par des d~onstrat~ons infaillibles; et par cons~uent 
toutes les objections prises du t~ain des choses, o~ nous remarquons 
des imperfections, ne sont fondees que sur de fausses apparences".) 
But no attempt is made by Leibniz to substantiate in any detail 
these assertions. 
Clar\kJon the other hand devotes the twelfth section of his 
famous book l"A Discourse Goncerning the Being and ..attributes of God" 
(1st edit. 17 05} to prove "The Supreme Cause and Author of all 
Things, must of necessity be a Being of infinite Goodness, Justice and 
Truth, and all other I~.ioral Perfections; such as Become the Supreme 
Governor and Judge of the '110 rId ". Clarke sets out explicitly to prove 
what B. Russell complains Leibniz never attempts to do, the essential 
goodness of God. He does this in his own characteristic fashion 
along the high and dry road of "reason". 
According to Clarke's argument there is a demonstrable and 
rational connection between all the attributes of the Divine Being 
and it is possible both to prove the existence of the Divine Being 
and the Necessity of all His attributes by one and the same 
demonstra tion. "The Supreme Cause, IT he says p.113. (7t h. e di t. 1727. 
"A Discourse &c. IT) "must in the first place be infini tly Good; tb.a t 
is, he must have an unalterable Disposition to Do and to Communicate 
Good or Happiness; Because,. being himself" necessarily Happy in the 
Eternal enjoyment of his own infinite Perfections,. he cannot possibly 
have any other Motives to make any Creatures at all, but only that 
He may communicate to Them his Own Perfections; according to their 
different Ca..paci ties, arising from that Variety of Nature s, which 
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it was fit for infinite Wisdom to produce; aacording to their 
different linprovements, arising from that Liberty which is 
essentially Necessary to the Constitution of Intelligent and Active 
Beings". If further argument is still required, the infinite 
Goodness of God follows from (1) His All sufficiency and accordingly 
His freedom from all malice and envy. (2) His being infinitely 
Just and (3) His being ~rue and Faithful 
Clarke's argument has the merit of recognising with 
frankness and perspicuity the necessity of argument in a thorough-
going rationalism for Itthe perfect benevolence ll (to use Hume's 
phrase) of God. The question we must now ask is how did Leibniz 
escape from the necessity of promulgating some such apology for 
"the goodness of God". 
Vie have already seen that Bertrand Russell has asked 
this question. Other commentators have also asked the same question. 
e.g. Boutroux and Renouvier. The latter puts the case with admirable 
lucidity in his "La Nouvelle IVlonadologie (Ch. Renouvier et 1. Prate 
p.310) "At bottom, the thought of Leibniz appears to have been that 
Sufficient Reason is the principle of the world as well as of tae 
intellig~nce. By virtue of this concept we pass from the idea of 
.ll0ssibi.l.ity in general to the idea of the universal reality which 
is God. And from that to all the infinites. The moral character of 
perfection i~ stFange to this theory (Le caract~re moral de la 
perfection est etranger a cette th€orie)". There can be no question 
that Renouvier is equally right in tracing "Ie caract~re iral de la 
perfection" to "la tradition the-Ologique".IT ••••• it is not ess true 
that Descartes, before Leibniz, and following the theolog cal 
tradition, has included in the idea of perfection, on the one hand 
the perfection of being, or absolute being, with infinite attributes, 
on the other hand, the moral perfections, without showing that 
the latter can ally themselves with,the first. besides maintaining 
in this way all the contradictions of the Schoolmen r without seeing them' or without trying to avoid them" (p.3l1. above). (8) 
It is interesting to recall at this point the argument 
of Descartes. "It is impossible that God should ever deceive me; 
since in all fraud and deceit one meets with some kind of imperfection 
and although it may seem that to be able to deceive is a mark of 
cleverness or of power" the wish to deceive always indicates, withmut 
a doubt, feebleness or malice; and accordingly such a wish cannot 
exist in God" Oviedltation iv. Veitch's Trans.} The absorbing interest 
of Descartes in the theological teaching of the Schoolmen has had 
a greater influence than is commonly realised. It is this teaching 
which lies at the basis of the optimism of Leibniz. 
The persistence of this lTtheological tradition "from the 
Schoolmen to Leibniz helps us to understand a great deal of what 
otherwise is inexplicable. As McTaggart says ("Some Dogmas of 
Religion"p.253. 1906. ) "if it were proved that there was a person 
in the universe who greatl~ excelled all others both in wisdom and 
power, yet this would not by itself prove the existence of God. 
For God has not only to be wise and powerful, but also good l1 • How 
is it possible to prove the goodness of God? lvlcTaggart goes on to 
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show that any argument for the goodness of "the director of the 
Universe" can be rebutted by an equivalent argument for his "badness". 
Tt I cannot see, therefore, that any reason has been given for supposing 
a director of the universe. to be good rather than baa rT • To suppose 
11 the director of the universe" to be bad,. it is only necessary 
to explain away the good"","in the sarne way as the existence of 
evil was by the more cheerful theoryrT. The existence of good in 
the world, reasoning this way, "would no more prove his goodness 
than the refreshments administered in the intervals of tortures 
proved the humanity of the torturers". IT Nor would this possibility 
be removed,. even if we could prove that good far outweighs evil 
in the universe. It would still be possible that the aim of the 
director of the universe was to produce a much worse result, and 
that the excess of good merely proved that the conditions under 
which he worked were unfavourable to his purpose tt • (p. 256 above.) 
If our only ground for inference as to the moral nature of God is 
the present state of the universe, then as lVlcTaggart says, it is 
possible to ma.ke this cut both ways. 
The continuity of "the theological tradi tionlT, to which 
Renouvier and others draw attention, is especially seen in the way 
in which Leibniz underl~nes the Christian meaning of the word. It is 
possible to speak of ffgoodness lT and to leave the precise meaning 
suspended in abstraction. I.lany metaphysicians use the word in a 
metaphysical sense. By his conception of "me taphysical evil IT Lei bniz 
Js.iiHl:s&lf has virtually lent himself to this use of the wora .• But 
no such meaning is given to his idea oflTla bont€". Here there is a 
definite putting on of the Christian idea of Love. Goodness for 
Leibniz is what supplies a motive for acting with the happiness of 
others in view.(!! amare est C}8udere felicitate aliena".) His 
attitude to the ~uietist controversies of his day puts this 
beyond doubt. 
Leibniz finds hlmself,too,in fund4mental agreement with 
Bayle that goodness in God is of the same nature as goodness in 
man. (See TheodiceePar. 179. G, vi.p.221. (9) If there is in God 
an attribute of "Goodness", then the characteristics of "Goodness" 
in general must conform to it. And when we reduce "Goodness" to 
its most general quality we find that it is "la volontede faire 
au bien". So far then,. from saying with Spinoza that goodness for 
the deity no more resembles human goodness than the zodiac sign 
re·sembles a barking dog, Leibniz agrees that goodness in man and 
goodness in God are of the same stuff. To say otherwise is to invite 
metaphysical chaos and complicate still further the problem of 
evil. The late Dean lli.Lansel, in his ITLimits of Religious Thought" 
4th. ~dit. Preface. p.xiii.,. regarded this ~ differentiation of 
goodness in man and goodness in God the only way to solve the 
problem. He says "the infliction of physical suffering" the 
permission of moral evil", not to speak of other things, " are facts 
which no doubt are reconCilable, we know not how, with the infinite 
Goodness of God, But which certainly are not to be explained on 
the supposition that its sole and sufficient type is to be found 
in the finite goodness of man". In other words there can be no 
a.rgument for the goodness of God save that of His Omnipotence. 
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It is noteworthy that Bayle, however much he may flirt 
with Manichaeism, never regards the goodness of God as open to 
any question. Like William King, of whom Leibniz wri tes (G. vi.p. 
406. Par. 6. nRemarques sur Le Livre de i$'origine du mal, publia 
depuis peu en AngleterreTTj-TTDe origine mali ff1702ril.fter having 
spoken of some attributes of God, the author recognises (reconnoist) 
that God acts for an end, which is the communication of his 
goodness, and that his works are well ordered" (10). Bayle, too 
is at one with Leibniz on the essential goodness of God. 
Like the Schoolmen Leibniz asserts an analogie. entis 
between God and man. The quality we know as goodness exists in 
God eminenter. For this reason the Schoolmen sometimes spoke of 
the super-bonitas of God and said that to speak of the goodness 
of God was to talk not univocally nor equivocally but analogica~~y. 
This is the only difference Leibniz would make between human and 
divine goodness, a difference in degree and not in kind. He never 
wearies of making an attack on Spinoza for his saying that 
goodness in man and good+ness in God are toto caelo different 
from each other. Leibniz begins,then, his answer to the problem 
of evil by deepening our awareness of it by his qualitative 
reading of the Divine Omnipotence as Goodness. It is this 
accentuation of the Divine Goodness which gave the problem of 
evil for Leibniz its vital importance and the world of letters 
its Theodice'e. 
The well known mot of Luther "The reason knows that 
God is, but who or what He is, who is truly called God, it does 
not know" has its application to Leibniz. As Couturat remarks in 
"La Logi~e de Leibniz", Leibniz' s arguments for the existence 
of God prove an intelligent rather than a benlficient cause. 
("En tout cas,si ce principe (principe de raison determinante) 
prouve l'existence de Dieu, comme il Ie croit, crest plutat 
comme 'cause intelligente' que comme cause bienveillante et 
bienfaisante TT • ) 
rle need not delay here to discuss in detail all the 
influences which led Leibniz to formulate this view of the 
essential goodness of God. as Erdmann says "Anyone who is fond 
of discovering plagiarisms would have an easy task with Leibniz" 
(p. 172. Vol. ii.Risty, of :Philosophy. 1889.) 
Some writers like Jean Baruzi (cf."Leibniz et 
l'organisation religieuse de la terre 1907") ha.ve drawn attention 
to certain backstairs influences in the thought of Leibniz 
through his a.ooarent early foddne ss for mystical writings. In an 
unedited letter to Iv~orel dated 10th. December, 1696(nSee note 
4 Introduction")he says n As to St. Theresa you do well to esteem 
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her works. I found there one day this beautiful thought, that 
the soul ought to conceive things as if there were only GOd and it 
in the world. This gives also a considerable reflection in 
~hilosophy that I have emplo~ed usefully in one of my hypotheses" 
{quoted by Earuzi. p.494. Above.) .As Baruzi pOints out such an 
opinion nannot be discounted merely on the ground that Leibniz was 
writing to a: person of mystical temperament, for in the most 
rational of all his works, ffDiscourse on IvIetaphysics Ti , he has a 
passage to the same effect, without forgetting the sourse of the 
inspiration. n It is for this reason that a person of exalted 
mind and revered saintliness may say that the soul ought to 
often think as if there were only God and itself in the world. 
Nothing can make us hold to bmnortality more firmly than this 
independence a.nd vastness of the soul which protects it completely 
against exterior things, since it al.one constitutes our universe 
ana. together wi th God is sufficient for itself" (Par. xxxii. 
p.55. Discourse on Iv~etaphysic8. Open Court. Pub. Coy. )G.iv.p458. ) 
If r as Leibniz says so often~ ffDieu est Le seul object irnm~iat externe des esprits", the way is open to suggest that 
behind the logical founda tion of his monadism, there is a dee.per 
mystical experience. Such a sugge stion cannot in the nature of 
things alike be easily proved or easily rebutted. The language of 
Leibniz does at times take on this mystical meaning. "For it 
appears clearly that all other substa~s depend upon God just as 
our thoughts emanate from our own substances; that God is all in 
all and that he is intimately united to all created things, in 
proportion however to their perfection; that it is he alone who 
determ.ines them from without by his influence ,. and if to act is to 
determine directly, it may be said in metaphysical language that 
God alone acts upon me and he alone causes me to do good or ill, 
other SUbstances contributing only because of his detenninations; 
because God, who takes all things into conSideration. distributes 
his bounties and compels created beings to accomodate themselves 
to one another. Thus God alone: consti tues the rela tion or 
communication between substances" ("Discourse on Il'.Letaphysics. n 
Par.xxxii.p.54-5. Open Court Pub. Coy. G.iv.p.457.J It is difficult 
.to estimate the influence of this mystical strain in the thought 
of Leibniz. Otherwise Leibniz is a more rational theologian than 
the later Schoolmen! 
It will be sufficie,nt for our purposes here to 
remember the u.ndoubted presence of this deeper element in the 
thought of Leibniz and its possible. priority in the develop~ment 
of his thou·ghts. The.re is a hint of this develop¢,ment in the 
unjiated Di_al~gue. "Marquis de Pianese e~ P~re ':!mery"p.l. Revue de 
liJ.I.{t et de h'l.Janvler 190,5 (11) where Lelbnlz makes a rather 
obvious reference to himself as being one who delighted in 
contempla ting God in the marvels of nature. The se thoughts were 
all different pictures of the grandeur and beauty of God, with 
whom he has fallen in love. At the same he had also a mathematical 
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gift and he wished to try to reach the same certitude in more 
exalted matters. That this is not an isolated sentiment is made 
abundantly clear in other similar references. In a letter of l69~ 
quoted by Baruzi in Revue de Met. et de M.P.4. footnote,} to 
1 'Electri.ce Sophie1"Leibniz expresses the wisP.. that discoveries in 
science were made "par un principe de pi~te, laquelle serait Ie 
fruit d'une science bien entendue, bien loin d'y €tre contraire lT 
~lsewhere Leibniz makes a reference to the fact that his purpose 
in mathematical studies was the hope of one day making them serve 
the cause of piety. (TlJe n~ai pas E(tudi{ les sciences 
mathefuatiques 'pour elles-memes, mais afin d'en faire un jour un 
bon usage en avancant Ie. piata". Quoted Baruzi p.~.above. Klopp. 
Die werke von L.erste Reihe.t.4.p.444.) But however mystical at 
times Leibniz may appear, he never sets out "to break logic". 
We are perhaps on less disputed ground in tracing the 
dominant influences in the thought of Leibniz to his philosophical 
inheri tance and in particular to the "theo~gical tradition" of the 
Schoolmen in general and Neo-Platonism in particular. It has 
already been remarked how "perfection" as applied to God was 
regarded as including moral as well as metaphYSical perfe~tion. 
In this wayan easy transition was made from the "First Cause" to 
the Pater Noster of Catholic orthodoxy. As an inheritor of this 
tradition Leibniz foundatrail already blazed for him and makes 
abundant use of it. 
The Neo-Platonic element in this tradition is obvious. 
But Leibniz breaks away from the emanational view of the universe 
implied by Neotplatonic writers like Plotinus, Iroclus and, in his 
way,. Spinoza. However much Leibniz avails himself of Neo-Platonic 
help in expressing his ideas, he will not allow it to compromise 
his idea of God. For this reason Leibniz falls back upon the 
idea of God promulgated by Catholic ortodoxy and not the 
monOhypostatdc deity of philosophy. For this reason the criticiffi~s 
of Bertrand Russell do not apply to the God of Leibniz at all. 
"God's good actions then are contingent, and true only with.in the 
actual world. They are the source, from which all explanation of 
contingents by means of sufficient reason proceeds. They themselves, 
however, have their suffiCient reason in God's goodness, which 
one must suppose metaphysically necessary. Leibniz failed to show 
why, since this is so, God's good actions are not also necessary}' 
(p.38-9 above) Samuel 61arke puts the issue in the plainest 
terms. "Though nothing, I say, is more certain, than that God 
acts, not necessarily,> but voluntarily; yet 'tis nevertheless as 
truly and absolutmly impossible for God not to do (or to do any 
thing contrary to) what his ~oral Attributes require hliu to do; 
as if he was really, not a Free but a Nece ssary Agent • .And the 
Reason hereof, is plain; Because Infinite Knowledge, Power and 
Goodness in, Conjunction, may, notWithstanding the most perfect 
Freedom and ChOice" act wi th al toge ther as much Certainty and 
Unalterable Steadiness; as even the Necessity of Fate can be 
supposed to do" (p.116 "A Discourse concerning the Being & Attributes 
of God &c" 172~.) All such arguments, however, forget that the 
mere rationalistic view of the Divine Nature is not the . 
inheritance of'Leibniz. Leibniz never doubts that God is Love 
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and that the essence of love is the contradiction that it 
cannot but do what it need not do. About which the final comment 
is Credo ut intelligam 012) (see also p.2/. ) 
.As we shall see later Leibniz's avowal of orthodox 
views on the Divine Nature, the pre-creattive existence of God, 
the Three Persons, make His relationship to the Universe primarily 
as Creator and not as Substance. It is the inheritance of this 
full theological tradition which enables Leibniz to answer such 
cri ticisms as those of B. Russell and so escape "Spinozism". 
Leibniz's idea of God rests on the presuppositions 
of Christian theology. God for Leibniz is Creative Love. He sees m 
necessity for proving the Goodness of God because he begins with 
it. It is an essential part of Leibniz's argument that God's 
crea t ion of the world was a free act, as he says, "of cho icen 
and that this is the source of that basic harillony between the 
world of Nature and the world of Grace. "The ancient philosophers 
knew very little of these important truths. Jesus Christ alone 
has expressed them divinely well, and in a way so clear and siillple 
that the dullest minds have understood them. His gospel has 
entirely changed the face of human affairs". ("Discours on 
hletaphysics". Far. xxxvii.p.62-3. Open Court. Pub. Coy.) 
All this enables us to see the significance of the 
remark of Leibniz that beginning as a philosopher he ended as a 
theologian. For Leibniz there was no real hiatus between religion 
or theology and philosophy. In all this he was a child of his 
own age. As Clement C. J. \"lebb has said "It was the error of the 
'rational theology' of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
that it tended to assume as a factor in a non-religious problem 
a conception that derived all its significance from an experience 
which was nevertheless regarded by it rather as a consequence of 
that conception than as its source" (cf.p.240. il.rist. Socy. 
Suppleme ntary Vol. i v .19 24. Symposium: The idea of a transcendent 
Deity.) Or as l~~ark Pattison puts it in Sssays and Reviews {186l. 
p. 29?} "The defect of the eighteenth century theology was not 
in having too much good sense,. but in having nothing besides lT • 
Chapter 11. 
The Perfection of God. 
In the last chapter we have already see n sOIlle thing 
of the meaning Leibniz attaches to the Perfection of God. lie 
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have seen how Leibniz inheriting lithe theological tradi tionll from 
the Schoolmen has no difficulty in saying that the Divine 
Perfection includes as part of its meaning the moral googness of 
God. Before we advance further it is important to consider this 
idea of the Perfection of God in more detail. 
In one of his letters Leibniz makes the claim that 
his conception of God giveS-eutirely different idea of perfection 
from that of other philosophers in general and of Descartes 
and Spinoza in particular and further that this conception can 
serve us alike in the physical as well as in the moral sphere.(l) 
This new idea of the Ferfection of God involves a reconsideration 
of the Divine attributes. 
'.fe have seen that leibniz, unlike his great 
,I:redecessor, does not despise the argumentum ex analogia hOlllinis. 
J:lccordingly we can ~ that Llan is the iulage of God-ffune i.tl1age de 
Dieu ll and that His goodness, His justice as well as His wisdom 
only differ from ours because they are infinitely more perfect" 
(Discours Prel Theodicee. Far.4.G.vi.p.51. (2) It is because of 
this perfection of the Divine Attributes that we make so many 
errors when speaking about them. (Response 'a la Troisi~me 
Replique de Clarke. Par.18.ir.vii.p.374. (3) Accordingly we must 
not speak as if we knew the whole compass of the Divine '\1isdoill.. 
There is something infinite in the scope of the Divine care for 
the world and what we know of it is almost nothing. How foolisn~ 
absurd it is to think that we can measure His goodness and His 
wisdom by our own. (4). For this reason,then,we must not try to 
push the ergumentum ex analogia hominis too far and forget tl1at 
there is a place for a philosophical agnosticism. For what exists 
in man exists in God eminenter. (5). 
The human soul is, then, an bnage of God. Compared 
with the rest of the world it has the greater value. "A single 
spirit is worth a whole world~ because it not only expresses the 
whole world, but it also knows it and governs itself as does 
God. n ("Discourse on lvletaphysics" Par.36. p.61. Open Court Pub. 
Coy.) \'lhat this me.thod of gove.rnment is the psychology of the 
human soul abundantly reveals. For we are not merely empirical 
creatures, dependent upon the merely experimental knowledge of 
the relations of things. He understand the necessity of eternal 
truths and the reasons of facts and in this way imitate the 
architecto.nic activities of God. So man is ca.pable of entering 
into society with God and becoming a member of the City of God. 
(6) As Leibniz says elsewhere every rational mind is omniscie'nce 
confused. "Mihi videtur omnem. mentem esse omnisciam, confuse" 
p.61. Bodemann.) 
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Roughly speaking Le ibniz inher! ts that idea of God 
which is the confluence of two streams of influence. On the one, 
hand the.re is the Ar;istotelian ideal of the Diety as nthought 
thinking it self n (VdlttrlS lIoA'rl.c,.>s ) and on the 0 the r the He brew ideal 
of the De i ty as nlUmightyTt (lId.v-rOKf/.,-r.Jf ). It is instruc ti ve to 
remember the interplay of these two dominant modes of thought. The 
more metaphysical wri tings of Leibniz emphasise the Gontemplati ve 
ideal and the Theodicee the Monarchial ideal. 
Leibniz's idea of Divine Perfection is the result of 
an endeavour to combine at least these two ideas of God. vYe find 
him pillorying Descartes and still more Spinoza for holding that 
Ttthe perfection of God consists in that amplitude of his working 
so that nothing is possible or no'nceivable that He does not 
actually produce n ("la perfection de Dieu consiste dans ce tte 
ampli tude de son operation en sorte que rien ne soi t possible ou 
concevable qu' il ne produise actuellement't Letter to Philippi. 
January. l680.G.iv.p.283.) This idea of God he says is Ttthe 1i'1'[31'0" ft'Jf. 0 S and the foundation of atheistical philosophy which 
does not permit the saling of good things about God ff (above). 
(C'esta mon avi~ le1f(1.>1i>"'IIJ~()Set Ie fondement de la Fhilosophie 
...:ithee. qui ne la~sse pas de dire de Dieu des be.lles choses en 
apparence ff above.) This idea of God, he says, is Hobbism in another 
form. For it cuts away at once the distinction between the possible 
and the actual. It makes Providence a misnomer for what Ex 
hypothesi is an impossibility. For if God makes all and makes no 
choice among possible alternatives, then Irovidence on these 
premises can only be a chimera. In this matter Spinoza was more 
outspoken than Descartes but in the end their views are identical. 
TtSpinosa incipit ubi Cartesius desinit" (p.48.b.n irnadversiones ad 
Joh. G. ~7acteri. Hebraeorum ph(ilosophia.A.F. de Careil. above.) 
It is a moot point how far Leibniz correctly interprets 
Descartes in this matter. Though statements like -Hoc est ratio 
eorum bonitatis ex eo pendet, quod voluerit ipsa sic facere 
(Descartes. Resp. ad object. sext.n.8.)- seem to support the 
contention of Leibniz. On the other hand there is more ground for 
the assertion that for Descartes in God will and intelligence are 
one. TtWe should not conce i ve any preference or priority be tween 
the intE}llect and the will of God" (To IVlesla.nd. A.T. iv.llS. 
Quoted Arist. Socy. 1929-30 ). it is tilalebranche who puts the, case 
for this fundAmental unity of intelligence and will most cle,arly. 
"In like manner. if a, spiritual or thinking substance were without 
will,. it is clea,r that it would be quite useless,. for it would not 
Xllam: be attracted towards the objects of its perception and would 
not love the goo,d for which it is made. vIe cannot,. therefor~, 
conceive an intelligent being so to fashion it." lRecherche. i.i.i.) 
If there is some such unity in the Di vine mind be,tween the wil.l 
and the understanding of God, then it is sllrrply false to say 
with Leibniz that Descartes holds the world and the eternal truths 
of the world to have reality by the mere fiat of God. In this way 
the frequent argument of Leibniz against Descartes is answered. 
For Descartes as for Leibniz "the eternal truths of metaphysics 
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and geometry, and consequently the principles of goodness, of 
justice, and of p,e,rfection •• -••• follow from his (God t s) understanaing 
which does not depend upon his will any more than ~oes his 
essence." (Discourse c. ii.p5 Open Court Pub. Coy.) 
\le are not concerned,however~with :pescartes but with 
Leibniz's reading of his philosophy. What this7there can be no 
doubt. Will is separable from intelligence and the will of God 
is prior to His understanding and" what is of more importance, 
determinative of it. According to Leibniz to speak in this way 
is to deprive the Deity of any real moral attributes at all and 
to speak instead of a blind necessity. (Uune necessitE! aveugle lT ) (7) 
On this view the goodness, justice, wisdom of God are 
terms without meaning. For, as Leibniz nevera tires with the 
schoolmen of reminding us, every act of will must be an act sub 
ratione boni. A necessary corollary from the view that God is 
Perfect Goodness is that such Goodness can only express itself 
through an act of will. Like the Schoolmen Leibniz regards these 
two truths so fa~ from being contradictory that they are 
complementary the one to the other. God's goodness is the ultimate 
cause of his creative acts but this goodness can only implement 
itself through the intermediary of the will. And as we have just 
seen the will can only act sub ratione boni. 
If, then, every act of the Di vine will must be an act 
sub ratione boni, it is but a short step to the view that in God 
there is a regio idearum. This leads us to consider briefly the 
difficulty there is in the interpretation of Leibniz on this pOint. 
According to Leibniz the regio idearum in the mind of 
God is not subject to His will but is independent of it. For any 
other view he professes the utmost abhorrence. On the~ther hand 
he seems condemned to some such view of reality and i:4;.s knowledge qf,"JA 
as that of walebranche. For Leibniz seems to be driven to the V 
view that the ultimate reality of which all monads are representations 
is nothing less than this regio idearum in the mind of God. 
lvlalebranche (under the influence of St. Augustine ) held the view 
that the difficulty of representationalism.1eft by Descartes could 
only be solved by saying that we see all things "in God Tl • For only 
in the mind of God are the true ideas to be found and to see all 
things" in God" is to see them as they truly are. Leibniz, in 
saying that the ultimate reality of all representations is th.e 
nature of God as Perfect Omniscience seems to hold a similar view 
to that of lv~alebranche. (8) 
In the case of Leibniz we escape the consequences of this 
view by an insistence that "the eternal truthsll which are the real 
essences of things have an independence of their own within the 
Divine Understanding and al:e not mere modes of it. Yet they could 
not have being unless in a Divine linderstanding which takes 
cognisance of them, 8n this point Leibniz is distinct. (De plus,_ ces 
. '" '" verl. te s meme s ne sont pas sans ~' il Y ai t un entendement 
qui en ~nne connoissance; car elles ~e subsisteroient point,s'il 
Nfl n'y avoit un entendem.ent Divin, Olt elles se trouvent realisees 
POlW ainsi dire IT Theodicef Par 189. G. vi. p.229. This must be 
considered Leibniz's final view. It raises difficulties in nis 
theory of knowledge and of reality. These we must leave, as Leibniz 
left them, unresolved. 
In his anxiety to show that the good is not a merely 
arbi trary result of the Di vine Will Leibniz tends to go to the 
opposite extreme and to assert the anti-religious alternative that 
the good is prior to God himself. He avoids this apparently to his 
oWJl_§~JMactw~n~9~ saying that the re.gio idearum exists in the fii'in~GO-a;Tfiis'1tgain requires careful interpretation as we have 
just seen or our last state is as bad as the first. 
For Leibniz the perfection of God reveals itself in 
the perfect harmony of His attributes. "In us pleasure is the mark 
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of the increase of perfection. In God perfection itself is once for 
all po sse ssed" {tt In nobi s Voluptas est ' se nsus' augme nti perfe c tionis, 
in Deo est ipsa perfectio, tota semel possessa" lagodinsky. p. 126. 
Letter. april, 1676.} Leibniz has no doubts on the perfect SovereignJty 
of God and that eternally He is His own Ferfection. The Perfection of 
the Divine Being has no history. 
!tIn God there is Power, which is the source of all, also 
Knowledge, whose content is the variety of the ideas, and finally 
'Jill, which makes changes or ,Products according to the principle 
of the best" (ivionadology. far. 48. Latta's Translation p. 244.) In 
the Theodicee Leibniz tells us that "Fower" (I'uissance) precedes 
Knowledge or Understanding (Entenuement) and Will (Volont~. 
(See Theodicee Par. 149. G. vi. p. 199; !tGoodness is in the will, 
wisdom is in the understanding. \lh.ere in is power? Someone will 
say it is in body or !ILatter. But bOGy is not a substance unless it 
be taken to be a unity; and moreover there is power in God who 
is without matter. It is t~e, however, that power is in what 
corresponds analogically to matter, that is to say, in the common 
subject of goodness and wisdom, which is the source of changes or 
actions. This subject illay be c~lled matter in created things. tr 
Fragtne nt without title. Bodemann .p. 70 Translated n-Sverymanl1 p. 248.) 
It is interesting to see how a more explicit fathoming of 
the orthodox teaching about the Divine Nature, teaching which Leibniz 
invariably assume s, might have sugge sted a more adequa te way of 
escape from some of the inevitable difficulties incident to his 
resolution of the problem of evil. To begin with the self-sufficing 
as well as the self-originated life of the One God might have been 
more clearly explicated by a full recognition of the mutual 
permeation of the Three Persons of the Godhead. By the same doctrine 
a reconciliation might have suggested itself of the apparently 
conflicting views of the divine beatitude and the divine suffering 
through His self-determined contact with the world. In the. sam.e 
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way Le.ibniz might have been a.ble to formulate more eff'e,ctivelyand 
more dogmatical¥y his key idea of the PRO-craation of the universe 
and the choice of rlthe be st possible world IT. For the actual process 
of Creation in orthodox doctrine belongs to God the Son, while. the 
act of creation in the sense of initiation belongs to God the 
Father. The thought behind the Creative >.lord is the real creative 
function and is the function of God the Father. The function of 
God the Spirit is the gradual develop¢ment and organisation of 
what has bee'n created. 
In some such way as this Leibniz might have made a 
much fuller use of the orthodoxy he assumed. If he had said that the 
Divine ~ssence is incomprehensible,. there might have been more 
reason for his theological prudence. But in this case he would ha.ve ~ 
forced to abandon his rationalism for an empiric19m. Thus there is 
some truth in this criticism that Leibniz did not work out in detail 
the precise relation of his solution of the problem of evil to the 
current orthodoxy and in particular to the Christian idea of God. 
But to say this is to forget that Leibniz"begins as a philosopher 
and only ends as a theOlogian:' Further the 17th. century theological 
climate is very different from that of the 20th. century. This is ~ 
obviously truer reason for Leibniz's failure to put the corpus 
of Christian do~a about the nature of the Deity at the foundation 
of the Th~odicee. No one can read Leibniz and think that for him 
there was an avert inconsistency or conscious discrepancy between 
his philosophical outlook and the orthodox dogma of Catholic 
orthodoxy. Leibniz ~ prided himself on acting in the role of a 
defenso~fidei, although at times his apologetic help must have ~ 
been an embarrassment e.g. in the doctrine of'~riginal sin~and tae 
Fall of l~~an: 
In the relation of these Attrib~~~ of the Deity great 
emphasis has often been laid on the appare~ prec~nce,Lthat Leibniz 
accords to I1Connaissance" over "Volonte". In this way it' has been 
made possible to interpret Leibniz as the author of a new 
"mecanismus metaphysicus" and so destroy at onee any pretensions of 
Leibnitziani~~ to be an ethical theism. 
One good effect however, of Leibniz's view of the 
rational Nature of the Divine Being is to destroy, so far as he is 
concerned, that spurious idea of Omnipotence which has often proved 
a stumbling block. The IJeity of Leibniz is not the Ilomnium potens lT 
of the Deity of a Boethius (9) or a IVlcTaggart. (p.2l7.'f Some Dogmas 
of Religion"F "It is not an unusual position to maintain that God 
is absolutely omnipotent, and, at the same time, to believe that 
there are certain things he cannot dO, and even to be quite ce,rtain 
what those things are. As against such a view as this it seems 
necessary to emphasise the tolerably obvious fact that" if there 
is anything which God could not do if he wished,. he is not 
omni'potent • It) Celus in his famous polemic against the Christian 
faith made the utmost use of this idea of a God so Omnipotant that 
He !<tcan do nothing irrational, unnatural or wicked Tt (Origen. 
Contra Celsum. i.xiv. 22.) Leibniz's interpretation of the Divine 
23. 
"Puissance", as guided by "connaissance" and enforced by His 
"Volonte IT, liberate shim frOJ-ll the pit-falls which await those who 
take ov.er the crude Hebrew idea of the Divine £lmightiness. 
On the other hand the langu.age of Leibniz is often 
open to serious objection in going to the other extreme and 
stressing overmuch this rationality of the Divine Nature.e.g. 
"When God calculate s and employs thoght, the world is ma.de" ("QUUIll 
Deus calculat et cogitationem exercet fit mundus IT • De connexione 
inter res et verba. (1677. G. vii. 191.).; n ••• in the very 
origination of things a certain Divine mathematics or metaphysical 
mechanics is employed". ( •• nin ipsa originatione rerum mathesis 
quaedam di vina seu m.ecanismus me taphysicus exercea tur It De 
rerum originatione radicali. G. vii. p. 304.t 1. "Nihil est 
regularius intellectu Divino, qui fons est omnium regularum,-~ 
regalap~, et producit systema mundi regularissimum seu 
perfectissimum et quam iilaxime harmonicwn, adeoque plurimarum 
observationUIll universalium capax." Letter to \Iolf. 1715. p. 171. 
l~lathm. Schrift. Vol. viii.) 
Following this trend of the thought of Leibniz we reach 
an idea of perfection which is entirely logical. In a letter to 
'~/olf (3rd. October 1714) he says "Perfection, about which you. ask, 
is the grade of positive reality,. or what comes to the same thing, 
affirmative intelligibility, so that that is the more perfect in 
which more things worthy of note are found. IT {"Perfectio" de qua 
quaeris, est gradus realitatis positivae, vel quod eodem redit, 
intelligibilitatis affirmativae, ut illus sit perfectius, in quo 
plura reperiuntur notatu digna n (Iviath..-:l. Shcriften. viii.p. 161.) 
This logical conception of perfection has, of course, 
an llnportant place in Leibniz's thought but it in no way exhausts 
all its meaning. For Leibniz there is no good unless it is a 
bonum intellectum. But this is not to say that a scientia visionis 
is the same as a sCientia approbationis. This is the point of 
Leibniz. For him the world is meaningless unless it clothes an 
intentional causality and all the. t this implies. He ought not to 
have the vain subi~y of admitting wisdom without admitting a 
wise man. (10) 
Leibniz's real idea of perfection is to be summed up in 
two words-rloptime agere". On the one hand this allows for t he view 
that "perfection is nothing but quantity of essence" and "that 
out of the infinite possible combinations and seriea~.· of possible 
things there exists that one through which the greatest amount 
of essence or possibility is brought into existence" (Latta p. 
340. On the Ultima.te Origination of Things. De "terum originations 
radicali) 
It is quite clear that Leibniz was feeling after 
that idea of the Divine Being which affirm.s the intrinsic nature of 
God to be Goodness. That the good is not merely good because God 
wills it nor is the good prior to God himself. Both of these 
suppositions are untenable f~~ Leibniz. The only way out of this 
dilemma is to say, as Leibniz tries so hard to say, that God 
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is intelligent \/i11 and this 1,lill is of intrinsic goodness. 
T'he Glory of God for Leibniz demands the mutual 
co-operation of the lima thesis quae.dam. div.ina"" and the "divina 
Voluntas". Quod Deus omnia dirigat ad suarn. gloriarn., id.e.m est e.c 
dirige.re eurn. ad sw:nrn..aID. rerurn. perfectionern., in e.o enim vera gloria 
consistit,. optim.e 4gere. (L. to Wolf. 21 Feb. 1705. Iviathrn. Schrift! 
Vol. vi i i • P • 18. ) 
For Leibniz there is more in heaven and earth than 
can be computed more geometrico. He never wearies in the sa,ying 
that behind the geometrical there is the moral. (rtII y a de la 
geome'"trie partout et de la morale p&rtout ,. mais crest la morale 
qui est la raison de la geometrie meme n ) In other words the 
further we retrogress the nearer do we find ourselves ba.ck a.t 
"cette quali te morale de Dieu". Gouturat gi ves us a most important 
in~it (dated 2 December 1676) to show that the alleged Spinozisrn 
of Leibniz is more imaginary than real (Op. et Frag. inedits de L • 
.p. 529-530 ). Possibility and :q;xistence are ve,~different terms 
and between them there is a great gulf fixedtl~wever we may 
attempt to bridge it by any computation of reality ("Itaque 
nulla alia ratio determinandi. quam ut existant potio~a, quae 
plurimum invol vent reali tatis lip. 530 above) 1 the chasm still 
remains. (11) 
It is clear from a hint in a letter to Remond and 
elsewhere that Leibniz was aware of some of the defects in his 
armour in stressing overmuch the role of the Divine Understanding 
in the creation of the world. Remond had written to Leibniz on the 
subject of "]')ynamique, qui me semble estre Ie fondement de 
vostre systeme ff. Leibniz in reply states that Remond is right 
in saying that "Dynamique "is the foundation of his system. But to 
express himself fully on the matter would demand. a special book 
because he had not get said. all he had to sayan this matter. (12) 
Leibniz has some consciousness that his rationalism has lead h.im 
to over-reach h.iillself. 
That Leibniz should?e still cogitating five years 
after the publication of the Th.eodicle goes some way to show th.e 
dissatisfaction h.e already felt in th.e statements of his main 
posi tion. Perhaps he was beginning to see the evident mis-
interpretation to which some of his statements lent themselves. 
But there is no hint that he ever weakened in his main argument. 
God's will is the will for the best and in this He is guided by 
His understanding. (13) 
It is clear that Leibniz was trying to steer a iniddle 
course between the IV.Lonarchial (Creator) idea of God and the 
Contemplative idea. According to Leibniz the view of Descartes is 
"une profani te dangereuse n because too much is made of the fun.ction 
of the Divine \/ill as an arbitrary chOice, ~verything is regarded 
as its outcome, including the eternal truths of mathematics and 
morality. This view in the end, Leibniz pOints out, results in the 
deprivation of God of "Will" in any real sense and leaves us 
only wi th an unlimited power from which all emanates.. This 
merits rather the name of nature than that of God. ("ne 
laissant qu'une certaine puissance demesuree dont tout emane, 
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qui merite plustost Ie nom de la nature que eeluy de Dieu" G. iv. 
p. 344.) How is it possible, Leibniz asks, that God's Understanding 
should depend on His Will and how is it possible for God to have 
a Will which has not the idea of good for an object but for 
an effect.("Gar comm,nt est il possible que son entendement (dont 
l'object sont les verites des idees enfer.mees dans son essence) 
puisse dependre de sa volonte? et comment peut il avoir une 
vOlonte ~ui n'a pas l'idee du bien pour objet, mais pour son 
effet"? (above) 
It must be remembered that in so far as the 
polemical purpose of the philosophy of Leibniz defmned itself, 
it was an attack against the atomism of Cordemoi, Gassendi and 
others. This will help us to realise the unlikelihood of a 
determinism, however new fangled,. being the ,final truth about 
his philosophy. The teaching of Spinoza resulted in "une 
nece ssi te' a veugle" and thiS, too, was only the logical outcome of 
the reasoning of Descartes about the Divine Vlill. To think in any 
of the se ways was to render meaningle ss any idea of God as "une 
providence gubernative" (Dialogue Theophile et Folidore ). 
According to Leibniz it was as important to know that the 
Gubernator lViundi was benedictus and not maledictus as to know 
whether He existed or not. 
It may be questioned whether some of the difficulty 
in the interpretation of Leibniz is not helped by his use of 
metaphorical language as when e.g •. he sEeaks of essences "striving 
to exist" or their"need of existence'(14J :i:xistence is the 
exigentia of essence. For Leibniz it is clearly more than a 
metaphor. Surreptitiously it introduces an element into his thought 
which brings him perilously near the abyss of Spinozism with the 
conception of God as an Bns Realissimum. But this idea of 
"la tendance lT, as Boutroux reminds us, is one of the dominant 
ideas in the philosophy of Leibni.z. " La monde de Leibniz 
n'est qu'une tendance, intermedia're entre la matiere nue, qui 
n'est qu'une abstraction, et l'acte poprement dit, qui R1:%e, ~rl 
n'est realisequ'en Dieult (p. 169 "La:' Ivionadologie" jgnile Boutroux). 
Leibniz removes in this way the conflicts agitating contemporary 
philosophy only to impart difficulties into his own. How to 
account for this supra-ge.ometric element can only be "explained" 
by supposing a Divine Understanding where they exist. (see later). 
In a letter to Bourguet written in 1712 ~ G. iii. p. 
558 (15) he compares the number of possible worlds to the number 
of possible novels one might write. General intelligibility is 
enough for possibili ty but verisim.ili tude to real life is the 
deciding quality of the good novel. Something of the same, Leibniz 
thinks, is true of the way the possible worlds range themselves in 
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the understanding of God. They too are judged on their merits. 
For however.,.. we may define perfection asH the harmony of thingsrT, 01" 
"identity in difference", "grade of considerability", or even 
"grade of essence", there is no escape from the corollary 
inevi tably involved of the necessi ty of a Di vine liUnd capable 
of judg~ment. To use Leibniz's own words, written Iilay 1715 in a 
letter to Wolf, uRinc pulchre. etiam patet, Dewn esse perceptione 
et quidemmaxima praeditum seu mentem summam: alioqui non curaret 
Harm.onias Tt ( IVlathm. Schrift. Vol. viii. p. 172.) 
We are now in a position to sum up this part of our 
argument. Leibniz goes some length towards a logical idea of 
perfection and towards an explanation in this way of the creation 
of "the best of all possible worlds". But any such interpretation 
of Leibniz must ultimately break down before the explicit 
statements of his views e.g. in a letter to Bourguet 3 April, /' 
1'716 (G. iii.p. 592.) -"Les idE!es ou essences sont toutes fondees 
sur une necessite"independente de la sagesse, de la convenance et 
du choix; mais les existences en dependent ff - and the integral 
place the idea of a bentfictent deity has in his systelJl. 
It is possible to transmofgrify Leibnitziani~ so 
that God becomes a superfluous entity in his philosophy. But to 
interpret any thinker in this way is to put an end once and for 
all to the history of philosophy. And what is really the keystone 
of Leibniz's whole philosophical system cannot be so easily 
discounted. In the last resort we are always driven back to 
Leibniz's idea of God. God is the guarantor even of the fact of 
possibili ty- "Itaque dici potest Oi~lN~ POSSIBL'~ ':~XISTlTUhIR'!'l:, 
prout scilicet fundatur in Ti!nte necessario actu existente, sine 
quo nulla est via qua possibile perveniret ad actum" (Reswnede IvA"ta.ph~sique (6). p. 5i;4. Ope ~t Frag. In{di tsde Leibni~. Couturat. 
190Z.l Such a statement Leibn1z often makes. The Deity 1S not only 
the touchstone of all reality but also of all possibility. In a 
letter to Arnauld he calls the Di vine Understanding ITpour ainsi 
dire Ie pays des realites possibles" (1686. G. ii.p.55.) (16) 
I/o:hat reali ty possibili ties or essences have, outside their being 
made contingently actual r is due to their existence in the Divine 
understanding. IT •• neither these essences nor what are' called 
eternal truths regarding these essences are fictitious, but •• they 
exist in a certain regio n (if I may so call it) of ideas, that 
is to say, in God Himself ,.~~the source of all esse nce and of the 
existence of other things'."'( sed existere in quadam ut sic dicaill 
regione idearum, n~mpe in ipso Deo, essentia~ tomnis existentiaeque 
caeterorum fonte }-: That this is not a mere gratui tous assertion 
of mine is shown by the existence of the actual series of things. 
For since the. reason of the series is not to be found in itself,. as 
has been shown above, but is to be sought in metaphysical 
necessities or eternal truths, and since existing things can come 
only from existing things, as we have already remarked" eternal 
truths must have existence in some absolutely or metaphysically 
necessary subject, that is, in God, through whom these things, 
which would otherwise be imaginarYJare (to use a barbarous but 
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expressive word) realised. rr ( De rerum originatione oFi~iaatiQn8 
radicali. G. vii. p. 304-5. Latta's Translation. p. 343.) 
Cf. I\Jlon~. Par. 43. To the same effect Leibniz speaks in'the 
Th{odicee Par. 184. G. vi. p. 226. The Divine Understanding makes 
the reality of eternal truths. lUI reality is founded upon 
something existant. an atheist might geometrise but without ~d's 
existence there would be no object for his geometry. For without 
God there would be nothing existant and nothing possible. 
(nIl est vray qu'un Athae peut ~tre Geometre. Mais s'jl p'y avoit 
pOint de Dieu, il n'y auroit point d'objet de la Geometrie. Et sans 
Dieu, non seulement il n'y auroit rien d'existant, mais il n'y 
auroit rien de possible". (above). 
The Perfection of God is grounded in His essential 
Goodness. and this Goodness rules over all. flSi intellectus Divinus 
aeque bona ac mala produceret, illimitatus maneret, perfectus non 
maneret. Perfectius existere ex possibilibus sola meliora, quaii1. 
indiscriminatim bona et mala aeque existere. Est tamen et 
intellectus quoad optimum. i11imi ta tus in suo genere, quia infini tas 
producit harmonias". (L. to Violf. 18 mai 1715. iVlathm. Schrift. 
vol. viii p. 170.) ',1e see this more clearly if we a.sk the question 
why God created the world. A..T_b.E;reA can be only one answer to this 
for Leibniz, the answer Of~.rXnlg~Vfnich Leibniz quotes with approval, 
"L'abondance de la bonte-de Dieu en est la cause TT (Theodice'e G. 6. 
p. 407.l And King further speaks for Leibniz when he continues 
"il est de la bont€' infinie de choisir Ie mei11eu.r". This :ravine 
initiative demands explanation, however much we may stress the 
truth that God makes all by numbers, by measure and by weights. 
("Dieu fait t,9ut par nombre, par mesure et par poids TT p. 250. Sur 
l'blluortalite de l'Ame. A. F. de Careil} 
With this description of the nature of the goodness of 
God, as showing itself in the nfree choice u of the best,. Leibniz 
reveals how closely he follows the doctrine of orthodox Christianity. 
In this respect he is different from Plotinus and Irocius to 
whom it was anathema to think of the goodness of God being expressed 
in the apparent hazard of any,fchoice" whatsoever. Unlike these 
and other wri ters Leibniz never says that "Di vine necessity 
corresponds with divine volition.1I For when Leibniz speaks of the 
Goodness of God, he speaks of the Goodness of a Person and not of 
an abstract principle. 
It is in the essential goodness of God that we perceive 
the secret of the fundamental unity and harmony of the Leibnizian 
universe and a ~U:rri of the perfection of God. For this reason 
there can be nd hiatus between nature and grace or faith and 
reason. This idea of God is the foundation of the system of Leibniz. 
The major premise of Leibniz is the major premise of Christian 
theology. God IS LOVE. This is the fulcrum of Leibnitzianism. It 
is to this Divine dynamic that we trace the whole majestic poem of 
creation, its well ordered harmony and its deep toned symphony. 
God is creative love and it is the duty of man to reciprocate 
love with love. to return the love of God .... by observing His laws 
and. furthering His purposes of good. In this way we can surely say 
ltGod is a.n a.bsoluely pe.rfect being"" and that Tr ••• God who P9ssesses 
supreme and infini t.e wisdom acts in the most perfect manner not 
onlymetaphysically~ but also from the moral standpoint"". (Discours 
1. p. 3. Open Court Pub. C·oy. G. iv. p. 427.) Because the Goodness, 
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of God makes Him more than:a me,re principle of metaphysical pe,rfectlon 
we can not only love Him.. but trust implicitly in His goodness to 
gi ve all we can wi~h for our happine ss. l see Dialogue, "Theophile. 
et Polidore fT p. 36 above fl ••••• nous devons aimer Dieu sur toutes 
choses, puisque nous trouvons tout en Iuy avec plu.s de perfection que 
dans les choses rrre-mes; et ~uisque sa bonte nous tient, lieu de nostre 
to ute puissance. Car par la nous obttenons tout ce que nous pouvons 
vouloir pour nostre bonheurlT.) With such a God in our heaven,. all 
must be right with the world. ""It is reasonable and assured that 
God will always do the best, though what is less perfect does not 
imply contradiction" ("Discours de l\iI(t&physique" Par. 13. G Iv. p. 
438. ) 
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Chapter Ill. 
The Universe of Leibniz. 
Any consideration of the views of Leibniz on the nature 
and scope of the universe will serve to elucidate and underline the 
essential theocratic tendency of his thought. It will help, too, to 
explain the crucial nature of the problem presented by the facts of 
evil in his system.- For against the background of his iPI • • theism 
evil cannot be regardJd as a mere side issue of Ii ttle importance. 
The fact that the Theodicee is the only work of Leibniz to be 
published in his life time and that it is as comprehensive, not to 
say diffuse, as it is requires little further comment. On such a 
philosophy there must be no residuum of evil unexplained. 
At this point it is vital to remind ourselves that 
there is~ so to say, a pre-monadological Leibniz. So many commentators 
persist in regarding Leibnizianism as identical wi th his lvionadism 
that it is salutary to remember that Leibniz had a philosophy before 
he arrived at his doctrine of created substance expressed in his 
"Siscourse on Metaphysics" (1686) and before his letter to de l' 
Hospital (12-22nd. Jul~ 1695-see G. I\ll. ii. p. 294.) where he first 
uses the term "Ivlonad". So far indeed from the "lvlonadology" being 
prior in thought to the Theodicee, the converse is the case. It is 
hardly an exaggeration to say paradoxically that it is the TheOdicee 
which sets the problem which the rest of Leibniz tries to answer 
in detail. The obvious fact that it incorporates what is admittedly 
so much of Leibniz's earlier thinking and that it was published 
as late as 1710 places this contention beyond all cavil. This raises 
the presumption that the fundamental views of Leibniz about God 
and the universe reillained unchanged and that the monadological pmint 
of view so far from being inconsistent with these opinions was, on 
the contrary,their most satisfying justification. As Leibniz 
himself says ItBesides,_ no hypothesis but this (which I venture to 
call proved) fittingly exalts the greatness of ~d; and this 
lv.i.onsieur Bayle recognised when, in his Dictionary (article Roarius), 
he raised objection to it, in which indeed he was inclined to think 
that I was attributing too much to God, more than it is possible to 
attribute. But he was unable to give any reason which could show 
the ~possiblity of this universal harmony, according to which 
every sUbstance exactly expresses all others through the relations 
it has with them" (Monad. Par. 59. Latta. p. 249-250.) 
It is possible to give some account of these abiding 
philosophical convictions of Leibniz about God and the universe. They 
have been conveniently summed up under six headings. nWe thus see, in 
Leibniz's early years before he has any conception of the individual 
sUbstance as a self-contained monad, a definite conception of the 
universe as a whole as (i) created by God as the most perfect of all 
compossibles, (ii) pre-established in all its parts so as to involve 
no further decrees on the part of God,. and (iii) yet needing the 
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general concourse of God to maintain it in existence; (iv). 
containing among other things, active substances which are creatures 
and nevertheless free; (v) a complete harmony so that every part 
of it reflects whatever is happening everywhere; (vi} infinitely 
varied, so that there is no portion however small which does not 
contain varie ty wi thin it." ("Some Problems on the Philosophy of 
Leibniz:' L.J. Russell p. 206-'7. Arist. Socy. Proceedings 1922-3.) 
These abiding views of Leibniz on the scheme of the 
universe help us greatly to understand the exact fralO.ework the 
monadology was to fit. For us they are of more than historic 
ingerest in the develo'p~ment of the thought of Leibniz. For they are 
the background against which Leibniz envisages the problem of evil. 
Abundant confirmation of this view can readily be found by a brief 
consultation of the earlir correspondence of Leibniz. (1) 
Points (ii) and (iii) are especially important. God is not 
a Deus Negotiosus. There is meaning in the phrase "Ie plan de Dieu". 
This means that all the detail of the universe is forseen and pre-
established. There coul.d only be Divine intervention for one of two 
reasons either (i) there was some imperfection in the plan as 
originally proposed or (2) there was some imperfection in the Divine 
foresight. Both of these possibilitie~,however, are ruled out by the 
idea of a Perfect Being. "I do not say that the corporeal world is a 
machine or watch which goes without God's interposition, and I am 
insistent enough that created things stand in need of His continual 
influence. But I do maintain that it is a watch which goes without 
needing His correction; otherwise we should have to admit that God 
keeps improving upon His own work. God has fore seen everything, He has 
provided a remedy for everything in advance. There is in His works 
an already pre -e stablished, harmony and beauty" (2nd. Faper. to Clarke. 
'Bver,yman Ed!t. of Leibniz p. 196.) For Leibniz as for Augustine, to 
God futura 2am facta sunt. "For all is regulated in things, once for 
all" with as much order and mutual connexion as possible, since 
supreme wisdom and goodness can only act with perfect harmony. The 
present is big with the future, the future might be read in the past~ 
the distant is expressed in the near rt (Frincs. of Nature and Grace. 
Latta p. 419.) Above all there is always a reason in the providence 
of God for the future. (2). 
Like Augustine,again,Leibniz holds that conservation 
mef4ns continuous creation. "By the continuous creation that I admit in 
conservation, I understand only the continuation of the first 
dependence, and in effect creatures always depend equally on God" 
{"Par Ie. crefation continuee que j 'admets dans la conservation, je 
n'entends que la continuation de Ie. premiere dependence, et en 
effect les creatures dependent tousjours egaleI9-ent de Diea" (Letter 
to Bourguet. Oct. 1712. G. iii. p. 558.) The contingency of the 
world not only involve s "ann ultimate reason of things "which is 
"called God lt (Princs. of N. & Grace. p. 415. Latte) but "the 
reason which has led to the existence of things through Him. 
makes them. also depend upon H~ for their continued existence and 
working". God is pre-eminently not only :J;xistens but Bxistentificans 
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(It Resume' de 1\;;4aphysique p. 534 CouturatT! Ope at Frl?g. inE2~its 
de Leibniz) Thus if God is no Deus Negotiosus neither is He the 
Absentee De i ty 4'" :Pascal fathers on Cartesianism I who gave Hune 
chiquenaude pour mettre Ie monde en mouvement; apres cela, il n'a 
plus que faire de Dieu". (Pascal. Pensees, 77. ~dit. Leon Bruschvieg. 
Hae:he t te ) • 
In the same way,. too, Leibniz had never any doubt not only 
of the essential rationality of the universe but also of its 
inherent goodne ss. The world might conceivably be pe,rfectly rational 
without being good. To be good it must provide an arena for the 
activity of created spirits and manifest the glory of God. Yfe must 
be able to say, if the world is good as well as rational, that what is 
contingent and free remains ~ after the crea ti ve fiat as it was 
before l "Ainsi ce qui est contingent et libre, ne Ie demeure pas 
moins sans les decrets de Dieu, que sous la pr<fvisionTT • TheodicGe 
Par. 52. p. 131. G. vi.) Anything in the nature of a Fatum. lv~ahometamm. 
working in and through all the universe might still allow of the 
rationality of the world but not of its goodness. Leibniz speaks of 
"une spontane i te merve illeuse en nous" which must have recognition 
and describes it as a consequence of his system of pre-established 
harmony. ("Cette spontaneite'" peu connue jusqul'icy, qui eleve nostre 
empire sur nos actions autant qu'il est yossible, est une suite du 
Systeme de 1 f Harmonie preetablie n. (Theodice'e Par. 59. G. vi. p.135.) 
In other words however much we may rationalise the world in idea, 
our system of things must allow for the real activity of free 
creatures and for the world in respect of God "pour manifester sa 
gloire" (G. iv. p. 439.) 
The essential harmonic character of the world Leibniz 
ever refused to jeopardize. We see this e.g. in the early a.ttempts 
o·f Leibniz at a theory of knowledge. Leibniz's interpretation of 
this harmony took different forms according to his view of mind and 
of matter but the principle of the harmonic inter-relatedness of 
the universe was never in any real danger. It is a world of such 
infinite variety and at the same time laced through and through with 
such an inexpugnable unity that it becomes easy for us to realise 
something of the perfection of its Author and Maker. The full 
teaching of the pre-established harmony was a Uopernician revolution 
in our thoughts of the world and gave another face to the essential 
harmony of the universe. (3) 
The advent of the monadistic point of view for Leibniz 
meant that this whole idea of the essentially harmonic character 
of the universe was given a deeper note as at the same time it was 
given a fullef justification. It gave a unity by its doctrine of God 
and a variety by its doctrine of Monads to which "Ie.. philosophie 
superficielle" comme celIe des Atomistes et Vacuiste s ll (L. to Clarke 
5th. Letter. G. Vii.p. 395.) was quite strange. At the same time, 
too,it helped Leibniz to formulate in more detail his answer to the 
problem of the existence of evils, an answer already implicit in 
these early foundational opinions of his philosophy. The fact that tre 
Theodicee embodies so much of these early opinions puts the truth of 
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of this beyond a.ny dispute. In the same way there can be no question 
that in the denouement of the problem of evil it is the Illonadistic 
point of view which leads Leibniz into his greatest embarrassments. 
In particular the precise relation of God to the .onads provides the 
greatest crux "a·of his theodicean argume.nt. 
There can be no question about the attractive completeness 
of the articulated universe of the philosophy of Leibniz. Through 
its conce.ption of the I~onad it hQ..s an affinity to modern scientific 
thought and in this respect it leaves the systems of many other 
great philosophers far behind. 
When Leibniz said that his atoms were luonads he had 
apparently disintegrated the universe into discrete puncta. How to 
rele. te the se "spiri tual It substances so that what is so obviously 
a "multiverse n can become a universe is the problem. As we have 
already seen Leibniz has never any doubt about the fundamental 
unity of the universe and of the witness of this unity to the reality 
of' God t s existence. How otherwise can we explain the agreeme nt 
between the sequence of representations in the soul (Ula suite des 
representations que If~e se produit n) and the sequence of 
representations of changes in the universe itself (nla suite des 
representations des changemens de Ifunivers meme n ) unless by some 
f'orm of the argument ab effectu? as Leibniz says "There is also 
here a new and surprisingly clear proof of the existence of God. 
For this perfect agreement of so many SUbstances which have no 
communication with one another can only come from their COIITmOn 
cause li (New System. Far. 16. p. 316. Latta. G. iVa 485.) There is 
no doubt, then r that the universe is unum quoad Deum, just as our 
e.xperience shows that it is unum quoad nos. It must. therefore, in 
~Q~& way be unum in see 
Its Qni ty is reflected in the individual iJJ:onad itself 
so that Leibniz can say "each ... ~onad is a living mirror, or a mirror 
endowed with inner activity, representative of the universe 
according to its fOint of view, and as subject to rule as is the 
universe itself" Princs. of Nat. & Grace. Latta.. p. 409.) Yet 
Leibniz refuses to emphasise the unity of the world at the expense 
of its pluraliffiu. For this reason he says that he has never been 
able to say that TTthere is one sole substance of all things,. and 
that this substance is the spirit It (~. ~e ne diray point , .••• qu 1 il 
Y a une seule substance de toutes choses, et que cette substance 
est Ifespritl1.) (G.vi. p.625.) For there are as many substances 
as there are Monads and neither are all the Monads "Spirits" nor 
is the whole which they compose" a Spirit 5l • ("Car il y a autant 
de substances toutes distingu~es qu'il y a de Monades, et toutes 
les IVlonades ne sont point des ''l;sprits, et-~ ces Monades ne 
composent point un tout vtritablement un, et ce tout si elles en 
compo~ient, me serpit point un esprit". (above) ) 
According to Leibniz "matter", like space and time, has 
. a perceptive unity of its own which he describes in the phrase 
"phenomena bene fundata". The unity of the universe is revealed to 
the subordinate Ivlonad first through its own nontent which alone is 
present to it as it really is eXistentially and essentially. The 
contents of the other lv~onads are essentially present to it 
merely as phenomena bene fundata. Though the unity of the 
universe is reflected to some degree in all Monads from the 
"bare" Monad to "the soul" and to "the rational soul", it is only 
God who has the penetration to see all in the least portion of 
matter.("ll n'y a que Dieu qui ait la pe"'ne1ration d'y tout voir, 
mais cela n'empgche point que y soit representee, et il faut 
savoir que meme dans la moindre portion de la mati~re, celuy qui 
sai t tout, lit tout l' uni vers, en vertu de l' harmonie des chose s" 
G. vi. p.626. ). 
The essential mni ty of the universe, then, can only be 
fully contemplated by the Divine mind. God has no point of view. 
For God phenomena such as the phenomena bene fundata must appear in 
an entirely different light. For the Divine mind there can be no 
mere tota aggregationis. To the Divine II,Und the whole i\u.onadic 
universe is present in essence. ·~le might even say that outside 
the Divine Mind lvlonads have no existential independence, though 
Leibnlz tries to avoid the implications of such a view. For 
eternal truths are not subject to the Divine Will and the essences 
of things, though present in and to the ~vdnd and Understanding 
of God, are not dependent upon God, though outside His IVlind and 
Understanding they can have no existential independence. They have 
a kind of amphibious existence. 
This difficult position Leibniz held in order to 
escape the obvious consequence of saying that the !vlonads are 
merely modes of the Divine Being. Yet to the Divine l~.iind the 
grades of Ivlonads form. an infinite linear series with no lacunae 
save the "transcreative" gap between soul and rational spirit. In 
other words the 1,~onads lose their distinctness. For by"the 
principle of indiscernibles" existential differences may be 
disregarded and essential differences here alone considered 
relevant. If we are to be loyal to Leibniz's own interpretation of 
his philosophy we must be content to leave these difficulties, as 
Leibniz left them, unresolved. 
The Di vine l .. ind for Leibniz has a reality other 
than the existing ~Jl.onads which lllake the universe and the cOllpossible 
l\~onads of other possible universes. "Accordingly we have the 
ultimate reason of the reality both of essences and of existences 
in one Being who is necessarily greater, higher, and ol.der 
(anterius) than the world itself, since through Him not only the 
existing things which the world contains but also possible· things 
have reality" ("On the Ultimate Origination of Thingsff. Latta p. 344.) 
Thus God is at one and the same time the source and the guarantee 
of the harmonic nature of the universe. Its essential inter-
relatedness is the reflection not only of His Understanding but 
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even more importantly is the supreme ge sture of His act i ve Goodne ss. 
Apart from saying this Leibniz asks from us a reverent agnosticism 
as to the further working out of the intricacies of the Divine 
IV~ind and we may extend it to certain other insoluble difficulties 
of his philosophy e.g. how a GRlm~ of hlOnad can ever become a 
PART of the universe. 
This last remark leads us to say a word about the 
essentially Leibnizian conception of a graded universe. Here again 
we are further reminded of the surprising modernity of Leibniz. 
The graded universe is to-day a philosophical commonplace. But it 
is a concept~on for which modern philosophy is greatly indebted to 
Leibni z. 
For Leibniz the whole universe is in travail towards 
"perfectionfl. It knows not yet what it shall be. It is a universe 
which has,as the expression of its own teleological purpose, "Ie 
plan de Dieu". This must be merely another name for "la perfection 
de I tuni verse It • 
In this nisus towards perfection, which Leibniz describes::s 
sometimes as the greatest reality with the greatest variety, there 
are three lVionadic levels to be distinguished. ~ach in their own 
status of existence express the universe. The two lower levels of 
.t::~onads, "the bare li.onads Tf or unconsci:>us konads and the conscious 
l,~onads, need not trouble us here except to say that they too share 
in their own degree the perfection of lithe best of all possible 
worlds lT • For it is unthinkable that the world should be "the best 
of all possible worlds ll merely on the whole and not also in its 
parts in their respect to this whole. 
For Leibniz there can be no vacuum formarUill. It is 
just as reasonable to suppose that there are substances capable of 
perception above us, as there are below us. So that our soul, so far 
from being the last of the series, really occupies a place mid-way. 
(nIl est raisonnable aussi, qu'il yait des substances capables de 
perception au dessous de nous, comme il y en a au des~~s; et que 
nostre ~e, bien loin d 'estre la derniere de aeeente t'outes, se 
trouve dans un m.ilieu,. dont on puisse descendre et monter; autrement 
ce seroit un defaut dtorc.re, que certains Philosophe·s appellent 
Vacuum formarum" (G. vi. 543. Considerations sur les Principes de 
Vie.) On the upwa.rd level above man there are the geniS's (genii) 4nd 
Leibniz's view of the order of the universe leads him. to believe taat 
one day we shall be of their number. ("II est a croire qu'il y a des 
true s ;aisonnables plus parfai te s que nous, qu' on peut appeller 
Genies, et nous pourrions bien estre un jour de leur nombre. L'ordre 
de l'univers Ie parolst demander" Leibniz to Princess Sophie. 
6 Fevrier, 1706. G. vii, p. 569.). Contrariwise it is alien to the 
thought of Leibniz to suppose that the human soul could sink below 
the level of its true status of existence. To suppose other~wise 
would be to deny the perfe ct ion of the uni verse. The lvlonads on this 
lower level of "animal souls", however, rise upwards to the 
higher level of the rational soul but only by a special 
ttranscreative'act of God. 
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This Leibnizian idea of ITTranscreation lr is a profound 
reconciliation of evolutionism and creationism. It shows the 
length Lei bniz was prepared to go in order to assert the continuity 
of the universe. The microscopic researches of 1li1. Leewenhoeck and 
others had unquestionably a great influence upon the mind of 
Leibniz and,like everything else he read,Leibniz turned it to good 
use. For the microscope seems to confirm the great truth that 
the wisdom of God is shown in the harmony of all his works and 
that the realm of nature is parallel to that of grace ("Aussi ay 
je fait remarquer plus d'une fOis, qu'il est de la sagesse de 
Dieu, que tout soit harmonique dans ses ouvrages, et que Ie. 
nature soit pa'tellele 'a la grace. rf (Theodicee. Par. 91. G. vi. 'p. 152 ,) In accordance wi th this harmony Leibniz believes that the souls 
which will one day put on humanity have existed since the 
commencement of things, but only in a latent condition (dans les 
semences) and in some kind of organised body. ("Ainsi je croirois, 
que les ames, qui seront un jour ~es humaines, comme celles des , 
autres esp~ces, ont eta" dans les sem.ences, et dans ancetres jusqu~a 
Adam, et ont exist' par consequent depuis Ie co~nencp'ment des 
choses, tousjours dans une Llani~re de corps organise". p. 152. above.) 
They exist in this state and only in animal or sensitive souls 
until the time for the generation of man. Then they receive the 
gift of reason. In the view of Leibniz there are only two ways in 
which we can conceive of this elevation of a sensitive to a 
rational soul. The, first is the way of natural elevation (un moyen 
naturel d'elever une rune sensitive au degre d'rone raisonnable). 
This Leibniz thinks inconceivable. The secondis to say that God 
gives this new endowment to the soul by a particular operation 
"par une esp~ce de transcre'ation". This is a view which must 
cornmend itself because Revelation teaches so .nuch about the 
liUffiediate operation of God upon the soul. But for Leibniz this 
doctrine of Transcreation has other advantages •. For it enables us to 
escape the difficul ties presented otherwise by the "origin of fOr-illS" 
and,raore importantly J it is more in accord wi th the Divine Justice 
"to give to the soul, already corrupted physically or animally by 
the sin of Adfun, a new perfection which is the reason, than to put a 
soul reasonable by creation or otherwise, in a body, where it must 
be corrupted morally. ~ (Ilil est bien plus convenable'a la justice 
Di vine de donner a 1 fa.mjn~" de'ja corrompue physiquement ou 
animalement par Ie ptfche dtAdam., une nouvelle perfection qui est la 
raison" que de rnettre une ~e raisonnable par creation ou autrement, 
dans un corps, Otl elle doive- -e'tre corrompu~mOI"alelllent"( Far. 91. 
Theodicee. G. vi. p. 153.) 
This venturesome re-statement of the generation of 
man and consequently of the doctrine of lToriginal sin!! sharply 
distinguishes itself from the three views then widely prevalent, viz 
(1) The doctrine of Pre-:1:xistence. (2) Traducianism. (3) The doctrire 
of Creation. As Leibniz reminds us (1) was the view of Origen and 
was held by Ifenry lJlore and other :flatonists. (2) was the doctrine 
of St. Augustine and is supported by the greater number of the 
theologians of the Confession of Augsbourg.(3) is the most 
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commonly received opinion. These views, according to Leibniz, have 
difficulty in explaining how the soul can be infected with original 
sin~ which is the root of actual .sins, without impugning the 
Justice of God. (IlLa .premi~re difficult€! est, comment 1 'ii'me a pu 
€'tre infectee du peche.-"originel,,,ui est la racine des peches actuels, 
sans qu'il y ait de l' injustice en Dieu'a l'y exposer." Par. 86. 
Theodicee. G. vi. p. 149. Of the se views (3) has the mo st difficulty 
in explaining !loriginal sinn" (2) is really inexplicable and (1) 
becomes intelligible when instead of Pre-Existence we speak of 
Preformation and Generation as only a Transformation or Au&nentation. 
(Par. 90. TheOdicee. G.VI. p. 152.) (See C. vii) 
The great advantage Leibniz sees in the doctrine of 
Transcreation is the fact that it puts in a clearer light the 
essential solidarity of the universe to which man is organic. After 
having shown the regular orderliness of the anDual world it is 
unreasonable to think that man is outside all this and that every-
thing that concerns his soul is mirac~ous. ("Apres avoir ~tabli 
un si bel ordre, et des regles si generales 'a l'egard des aqpnaux, 
il ne paroit pas raisonnable que l'hofnm.e en soit exclus enti",re~nent, 
et que tout se fa sse en lUy par miracle par rapport a son 'ffineItFar. 9l. 
T h?o'dic~. G. vi. p. 152.) As early as I'Lay 1663, in his degree 
dissertation/IDe prin<;ipio individui:' Leibniz had adUIllbrated this 
view asserting that the hlliuan soul includes within itself the 
vegetative and sensitive soul. 
This doctrine of "Transcreation" gives us further 
evidence as to the sincerity of Leibniz. For it cuts across the 
dOlllinant 17th. century religious ideas as to the status of man au,a. 
of "original sin". In paDticular it avoids that doctrine of 
Creation which,as Leibniz says~s so widely accepted in his day but 
has special difficulties with regard to "original sinlt. ("La 
trosi~ille opinion et la plus re.9ue aujourdhuy est celIe de la / 
Creation: elle est enseignee dans la plus grande pay tie des ~coles 
Chretiennes, mais elle re~oit Ie 1]lus de difficult€ par rapport au 
peche' originel!! Par. 86. G. vi. .p~.l49.) The sin of Adam remains 
in so far as it has cast a blight upon the universe but its dire 
human entail is not tran~nitted in the way orthodoxy teaches. 
Thus Leibniz succeeds in keeping intact his lirrportant 
principle that nature does not march per sal tum., However rlliraculol.ls 
may be the relationship of God to the world of his hands, it is 
otherwise with creatures themselves. For the relations of the latter 
as well as their specific difference!) find some explanation in the 
laws of motion and continuity. 
In the same way this doctrine of "Transcrea tionrT 
illustrates in an admirable way the typical Leibnizian attitude 
towards Christianity. For here he marches in step with Christian 
revelation but towards dogma adopts a rather independent attitude. 
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This "transcreative" progress of the soul of man not 
only shows us in what sense man is organic to the universe but also 
throws some light on t he place of man in the scheme of the universe. 
There are times when Leibniz lends himself to an almost Pauline 
reading of the epic of creation-Narn expectati() creaturae, revelationem 
filtorum Dei expectat. (R. 8. 19.). In his criticism of a remark of 
Bayle Leibniz goes the length of saying that a world without reasoning 
creatures would be practically worthles.~ and that "sin" is not too 
great a price to pay for such a gift. (M. Bayle dit aussi selon Cotta, 
de eiceron, que la raison est cause de to~ les maux, il ne falloit 
done point la donner. fuais pour dire 1& verite, la raison est une 
si grande et si bel~ chose, qutil semble que Ie monde ntait pas valu 
la peine dtestre cree sans la raison, et si on ne la pouvoit accorder 
aux 9reatures sans Ie peche, il falloit mieux, a mon avis que Ie 
peche arriv~tf"Remarques critiques de Leibniz sur Ie dictionnaire de 
Bayle" see p. 182. Lettres et Opuscules intdits de Leibniz. A. Foucher 
de Careil. Paris 1854.) 
But if Leibniz could at times talk in this way, there is a 
complete abs~ence in his case of anything in the nature of 
antropocentric megalomania. The 16th. century recoil from the 
geocentric universe of Scholasticis:;:n had many philosophical reverberations 
in the 17th century. On every hand we notice a new spaciousness of 
outlook. This is noticeable in the case of Leibniz. For whatever else 
Leibniz has to say about J.uan, he never says hOIno mensura omnium. Like 
the player King in Hamlet Le1bniz would have us believe:-
"Our thoughts are ours f their ends none of our own". 
This is a view that Leibniz does not underline, but it is integral to 
his thought. Like the rest of the 17th. century philosophers Leibniz 
is still a little bewildered with the spaciousness of a heliocentric 
uni verse. 
For Leibniz there are two teleologies f the Divine, and the 
human. The first is the teleologically deterlllined universe. The second 
is the human teleology inserted, as it were" within this comprehensive 
whole. This wider teleology through which human teleology is laced is 
simple and comprehensive. It includes a maximlrn as well as an opti::llWU. 
In the building of the universe there are no round stones where 
squared stones are more adequate. ("ll faut dire aussi que Dieu fait 
Ie plus de choses qutil peut,. et ce qui Itoblige a chercher des loix 
simples, cteste. fin de trouver place pour tout aut ant de choses qu'il 
est possible placer ensemble; et s'il se servoit d'autres loix, ce 
seroit comme s1 on vouloit employer des pierres rondes dans un batiment 
qui nous ostent plus d'espace qu'elles ntoccupent" L. a lVlalebranche. 
22 June 1679. G. 1. p.331.). 
According to Leibniz this wider teleology is ontologically 
determined, and the human teleology is axiologically determined. The 
common criticism of this distinction as involving a denial of freedom 
might equally well be brought against any philosophy of a Realm of '3:nds. 
It is true ,. as we' shall see, that Leibniz's teleological view of the 
universe allows of no final thwarting of its end. ~ven the prevalence 
of evil in the world ministers inevitably to its greater perfection. 
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Without evil the universe might have the value six, but with evil 
it might have the value of eight. In this way God would have no other 
choice open to him but to allow for the actuality.of evil for a 
greater good. ,Jor the perfection of the world iID..p.r:es a harm.ony and 
often the best/6f advance is to take a step back. ~ 4} 
That there are serious difficulties in the interpretation 
of such a point of view is obvious. If evil to man is not absolutely 
evil to God and in relation to the universe, then the validity of all 
moral judgements seems to be imperilled. Again such a view seeiliS to 
identify the judg¢ments of the moral consciousness with the Divine 
1;fill as revealed in the causal order of phenomena. Such are some of 
the difficulties that must be met when the whole teleology of the 
existential process is regarded as ontologically fixed and determined. 
The common objection that it involves a virtual denial of freedom is 
groundless, for within a teleological universe free action is possible~ 
The t he ism of Le i btY.:z, however, force s us to ask the que st io n \'Jhe ther 
a still wider teleo.zgy is not de£uanded by the purposive action of the 
deity in creating the present universe and so on ad infinitlliu. 
Leibniz's inheritance of the Ghristian idea of God as interpreted in 
the phrase of Anslelll-nihil quo maius cogitari potest-answe'rs for him 
this difficulty. -
The crux of Leibniz's interpretation of the teleolo3ical 
view of t he universe is to be h-ace d to his view of t he nature ofJ.od. 
The trouble begins for leibniz when he insists on separating the 
attributes of the Divine nature. fro separate in particular the .fill 
and the Understanding of God is to do exactly what Leibniz so 
frequently accuses D3scartes of doinS Le. to sup'pose that God can 
act irrationally. Here the rationali&~ of Leibniz overreaches itself. 
l1.S we have already seen it al!llOst leads Leibniz to a 
theological determinisLl. -the arch-her·esy of the SchooL.llen. For by 
dealing with the endel'standing separately in this way it is possible, 
as Vie have already seen, to give a quasi-lllathematical inter,Pretation 
of the principle of the best in terms of tfun mecanisme rnetaphysique ll • 
In other words we are dealing wi th the sarIle . .laximurn and miniJlwu 
problems for 'INhich Leibniz had already invented the Infini tesirnal 
Calculus. "And as possibility is the prinCiple of essence, so 
perfection or degree of essence (thDough which more things are 
compossible the greater it is) is the prinCiple of existence lf (TI'J:t ut 
possibilitas est principium ~ssentiae, ita perfectio seuJssentiae 
gradus (per quem pluri.illa sunt compossibilia) principium existentiae.[l 
De rerum originatione radicali.-~Qqq 1697. G. vii.p.304.) (Latta's 
Translation.p. 342.) Thus if ABC D are four possibles equally 
Nerfect and ABC are equally sompatible mrrong themselves but 
incompatible with D, while D is incompatible with A and B and compatible 
with Conly. E.. B C will be given existence. For the oru.y alternative 
to this is C D. But C D as a combination is less numerous and less 
perfect that ABC. (G. vii. p.194.) 
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In other cases the problem is more complicated. ffThe whole matter 
may be likened to certain games in which all the SPaces on a 
board are to be filled up according to def ini teo rule s, so t ha t , 
unless you can make use of some ingenious contrivance, you find 
yourself in the end kept out of some refractory spac,es and compelled 
to leave empty more spaces than you intended and some which you 
might otherwise have filled. Yet there is a definite method by 
which the most comflete filling up of the spaces lilay most easily 
be accomplished ll • On Ultimate Origination of Things. Latta p. 341.) 
ffBut best of all is the illustration we get in ordinary mechanics, 
where, when several heavy bodies act against one another, the 
resultant motion is that which produces the greatest fallon the 
whole. For as all possible things by an equal right tend to exist 
in proportion to their reality, so all weights by an equal right 
tend to exist in proportion to their gravity; and as in the case 
of the latter ther~is produced a mmtion which involves the greatest 
possible fall of the heavy bodies, so in the case of the former 
there is produced a world in which the greatest nwnber of possible 
things comes into existence ll (On the UltiIllate Origination of Things 
Latta p. 342.) (G. vii.p. 304.) The fact that there is more than 
analogy here is clear from Leibniz's own admission that the lavl's of 
movement themselves suggested this theory and in his view they are 
only a particular instance of the metaphysical principle of t he be st. 
'r-he extent to which Leibniz carries this is clear from the Cluasi-
mechanical equilibrilli~ he pictures in the Livine Understanding in 
relation to possible essences. The principle of deterluination is 
"ut .. uaximus praestetuI' effectus illiniino, ut sic dicam., SlliIlptU:' The 
possible essences exist in the Livine understanding and there contend 
wi th one another for the right of existence. In a relllarkable frag.nent 
Leibniz illustrates the tension of the continuous Tlstrivingtf for 
existence by the analogy of. a compressed liquid which strives to 
escape from its confin.:a.ent by every Iossible way and in the end 
escapes by itsl!choic,~!l of the easiest way. (5) 
In SOlne such way as tais do we understand "how in the very originatio n 
of things a certcin Divine lliathematics or ~etaphysical hlechanics is 
eillployed and the greatest Quantity is brought into existence" (On 
the Dltimate Origination of Things. Latta. p.342. 1!11;X his jam 
mirifice intelligi tur, Quomodo in ipsa originatione rerwn iv:athesis 
Cluaedam l)ivina seu "I .. echanismus lvietaphysicus exeI'ceatur, e.t maxLni 
deterIdinatio habeat 10cUill ft G. vii. r:.304.). 
It is true that Leibniz seems to carry this view of 
ttDi vine lllat hema tics II and TIme tap hysical me c hanic s if to somewhat extreme 
lengths. In an early meinoir on optics, publ,ished in 1682, Leibniz 
tries to show that the laws of reflection and refraction are capable 
of logical deduction from the mere principle that light follows the 
easiest path-lmnen a puncto radiante ad punctwn illustrandum 
pervenit via omnium facillima. And Couturat has argued that this 
suggests an interpretation of "final cause" for Leibniz which is 
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primarily logical rather than moral. In his Nouveaux IG"ssais iv. VII. 
Par.15. Leibniz speaks of nature as always acting in the shortest 
ways or by the most determined ways (tlpar les plus courtes voies, ou 
du moins par les plus determine"es". G.iv.447.) Couturat quotes an 
illu...'TIinati ve fragment to the same effect that everything in nature 
is capable of demonstration both by final and by efficient causes 
and th~t nature does nothing in vain and works along the shortest and 
most regular paths. ("Om.nia in tota natura demonstrari possunt tum 
per causas finales tllill per causas efficientes. Katura nihil facit 
frustra, natura agit per vias brevissimas, modo sint regulares". 
Bodemann p.89. ~uoted by Couturat "La Logique de Leibniz" p.230 
footnote.) But it is wrong to saY,as Couturat does,that because 
Leibniz gives such an extreme rationalistic interpretation of the 
workings of nature that therefore logiC is the last word of Leibniz. 
( cf. TYCe tte finali te consiste moins dans la bonte ou convenance lllorale 
(comme on pourrait Ie croire dfapr~s les forlllUles thealogiques du 
principe raison) que dans la determ.ination logique des lOis de la 
nature. C
'
est ce qui ressort du Tentamen anagogicum, qui est 
precisement destinEt'~ lUontrer l'utilitEfde la recherche des causes 
finales en Physique. tI p.230. "La Logique de Couturat rt ) For this 
is a view Leibniz was concerned to refute not only in his later 
works ~ the De Rerwn but also in an early work like the De 
Veritatibus (1687.) 
It is true that Leibniz flatteren himself that for an 
infinite understanding contingent truth can be derived a priori 
from eternal truths. Just as the old logic was a lJgic of possibility, 
so there was also another l~gic which was tae science of the real-
quowodo ex veritatibus EAeter-nis sive essentialibus vel metaphysiciis 
oriantur veritates temporales, contingentes siva physicae. (G. vii. 
30D.) by the logiC of frobabilities man can enter in a slight degree 
upon some knowledge of this "Divine m.athematics". But experience is 
for us here the rough and ready mentor, for expe.,.rience takes the plaoo 
of proofs in ari thmetic. ("Car l'experience est a l'egard de la raison 
ce que les preuves (cormne celles du noveneire) sont a l'egard des 
operations Arithme'tiques". G.vii. 17~.) But to God and even to a 
superior being the blurred image of experience of natural truth becomes 
more lucid and intelligible. ("Ante omnia pro certo sumo, omnia fieri 
per causas quasdam intelligibles, sive quae a nobis 'possent percipi, 
si quis angelus eas nobis vellet revelare" De modo perveniendi ad 
veram Gorporum Analysin et rerum naturalium causas. G. vii.265.) 
But all this hardly warrants the conclusion of Couturat 
that the creation of the world for Leibniz emp·hasises more His wisdom 
than His goodness (cf. p.227. C'est Ie.. cette I1mathefn.atique divine" et 
ce ftrneeanisme m€taphysique" par 9\1 s'exerce et se manifeste 1& sagesse 
(encore plus 'lue la bonte} du createur. "La Logique de Leibniz.") This 
is a conclusion to which Leibniz himself would strongly demur. But it 
is a charge almost always brought against Leibniz. hS Friedrich Albert 
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Lange says (much in the same ll.i.anner 8.S Couturat above) the optim.ism 
of Leibniz isYlnothing but the application of a ,.t)rinciple of mechanics 
to the foundation of the reality of the world" ("nichts als die 
Anwendung eines Frinxips der l·jieci'lanik auf die Bergrundung der 
\"leltwirklichkeitt! quoted JI.42. Die Theodicee 1m 18 Jahrhundert. von 
Hans Lindau. Leipzig. 1911.) 
Apart from anything else 1TDivine ~v~athematicsn could 
never explain the ORIGIN of a worl(l, though they might explain 
something of the inodus operandi of its creation like mechanical 
physics. And though finality in nature may be construed. quasi-
logically,_ it is clear that for Leibniz a final cause is a final 
cause for someone and it is chosen for its value. In his Tentamen 
Anagogicurn and elsewhere Leibniz draws a distinction between flIes 
determinations Architectoniques ll and HIes determinations GeolILE{triques ll • 
The latter are such that the contrary implies a contradiction, while 
the former signifies a necessity of choicer the contrary of which 
is an imperfection ("Les o.eterminations Geometriques importent une 
necessi t€( absolue, dont Ie contraire implique contradiction, 111ais les 
.h.rchitectoniques nfimportent qufune necessitede choix, dont Ie 
contraire llnporte imperfection. G. vii.278.) He illustrates the 
difference by saying that if nature was given the task to construct· 
a tri&ngle and that for this purpose only the sum of the sides was 
given and nothing more, it is inevitable that it should construct 
an equilateral triangle. The general principle that nature acts by 
the most deter~ll.ined ways is only architicetonic in effect, while the 
apf·lica tion of this pr inc iple on the datA gi ve n is geome trically 
necessary. If nature was purely geometrical the above would not be 
true unless there was some .lJore deter;:;}.inant than the periphery of the 
eides of a triangle. but si~ce she is governed architectonically 
Hdes deItly-de'ter..:ainati:Jns geometriques" are sufficient for it to 
co~nple te its work. (n Si la nature e.}lto i t br'u te" pour ainsi dire, c' e'St 
"'a dire pureillent i.Ilatirielle ou G6ometrique, Ie cas susdit seroit 
impossible, et a moins que d 'avoir Cluelque chose de plus deter.ninant 
Clue la seule peri,pherie, elle ne produiroit point de trian&;le; illais 
puj,squ' elle est gouver nEfe l~rchi tecto niquement, des demy-deterllLina tions 
geomEftriques luy suffisent pour achever son ouvrage, autrement elle 
auroit est~arrestee Ie plus souvent" G.vii. p.279.) 
Leibniz's unfortunate dichotomy of the ".7il1 and the 
Understanding of God makes it dif'ficult to see with the clarity he so 
greatly desires the ultimate nec.essity for "raisons architectmniques IT • 
'Especially must this be the case when the relation between the 
metaphysical principles and the mathematical principles is one not 
of opposition nor of juxtaposition but of superposition. So faE as 
the phenomena of nature are concerned the laws of mechanic.s suffice 
but it is necessary to have recourse to metaphysical conside~ations 
in order to account for these laws themselves. Thus in the ultimate 
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considera tion Le ibniz is forced to re tract his extreme rationalism. 
The dichotomy of the ':iiill and the Understanding [a dichotomy he 
otherwise strongly re.pudiates in the consideration of freedom both 
human and divine} leads Leibniz far into the wilderness and it is 
with difficulty he finds his way back. 
In all this we mast acce.pt Leibniz and not try to ma.ke 
him more lucid than he is. His final word is that behind mechanical 
and mathematical laws there are meta'physical 'principles and there 
is no absolute necessity in natural law.(~Omnia quidem in natura 
fieri mechanice, sed lvletaphysics esse 'principia mechaniSlni" et 
constitutas Hotuum~1~aturaeque Leges non absolute quideill necessitate, 
sed voluntate causae sa'pientis, non ex mero arbi trio, sed ex . 
convenientia rerurn.1I - .!intibarbus Physicus pro Philoso'phia Reali. G. vii. 
p. 343.-4) This view is midway between the o'pinions of DescarteAs ~nd 
S.pinoza. The laws of nature 'proceed from the Divine choice of the 
best, but the three dimensions of s'pace are !).ecessary with a blind 
and geometrical necessity. (ndfune necessite aveugle et Geometrique lt 
(Letter to Coster 8 July, 1711. Ope et Frag. Couturat. Phil.ii.'p.419) 
In s'pi t.e of this dichotomy of \1111 and Understanding, 
God for Leibniz is one-eternally and immutably. Hownere is this truth 
of the Divine i'Jature 1110re significant than sub specie creationis. It 
is because of this truth that evil for Leibniz is primBrily a problem 
and not merely a fact. In a "strung-along universe tT evil would be 
primarily a fact and not a problem. 
Leibniz's im'plied assertion that the Divine initiative 
in the act of creation is Love or Goodness and his adoption of the 
scholastic doctrine that every act of God (as well of man) must be an 
act sub ratione boni places a primacy on the Divine,lill. "Le bienlt 
is always the object of the Divine Kature, however it may be mediated 
through the Divine "Understanding. 
It is this mediation of the Divine Understanding which 
reveals most clearly the unsatisfactory state of the thought of 
Leibniz on this 'point. According to Leibniz the ~ssences behind the 
universe exist in the Divine Understanding alone and, though not 
subject to His viiI I , have no other existence. In a word these Essences 
are the object of the Divine ~nderstanding. 
Like aquinas F Leibniz would say that God is limited by 
His own nature. (See Note 5. C.l.) The interpretation of this idea 
of Divine self-lbn~tation requires careful definition. Otherwise we 
shall find a tele~gy within which the Deity itself must act. In his 
view of com'possibllity Leibniz almost defines a teleological universe 
within which the Deity must act. So we prepare the way for an 
infinite regress. ;Je must needs pre-suppose a supra-Divine Being 
for the creation of the God of the present universe and so on ad 
infinitum. The situation for leibniz is saved by the ass~tion that 
though "eternal truths" do not depend upon the Divine iViind, they 
exist in it. The 'possible worlds which are infinite in number have 
no other "existence" than their ideal existence within the Divine I>ilind. 
43. 
There is no determinism of the Divine lv~ind ab extra. 
This universe is one of many. It is "the best possible". Behind it 
there lies an infinite welter of other possible worlds. '.7e cannot 
say thut this one universe contains eminenter a.ll the other possible 
worlds. All we can say is that this present world polarises in the 
most supreme and final way possible all the qualities we know of the 
Divine Nature. Just as a good poet does not make all the verses he 
might make, be they good or bad, so wi th God as the arc hi tect of the 
world. (In a letter to Fontenelle dated 7 April 1703 Leibniz writes 
:~t c'est ~omme si feignant qu'il soit une des perfections de Dieu, 
~'estre poete, on vouloit que ce po~te parfait fist taus les vers 
possibles bons et mauvais, il en est meame de l'architecte et Dieu 
l'est veritablement". p.228. fl.. Foucher de Careil. above.) "God can 
do everything that is possible, but He will only do what is best." 
(Dieu peut faire tout ce qui est possible" mais il ne veut faire 
faire que Ie meilleur tt • 5th Paper to Clarke G. vii.:p. 408.) 
If the words of Leibniz are to have any meaning we must 
regard the potentalitas of God as transcending this one "best of all 
possible worlds". Otherwise the phrase would be v:)id of me~ning. 
It is this potentality of God as transcending the universe which 
explains the existential independence of the I.lonads, even though 
they are essentially related within the universe they compose. For 
it is by this potentiality that God himself is distinguished frow the 
universe, as it seems in the end by the same distinction that "spiritslT 
are separated from the "bare monads tf • For though tTspirits" are 
transcreated "bare monads" they reflect their Creator, while "bare 
monads tT reflect the uni verse. Thus "spirits" have the abili ty to 
act outside the immediate determination of God, though not outside 
his cognisance or his over-ruling providence.' In this way the 
rational spirit of man has a footing of its own in the universe. For 
the knowledge of man, so that his action can be predicted, cannot 
invalidate his freedom. 
Thus the ratio sufficiens of the universe lies outside 
itself. Only in this way can we explain the apparent fortuitiousness 
of the world. Its ffGrund" must be outside the time extension and 
every point in the world is related to it in the same manner as every 
other pOint. Reasoning in this way, reasoning,too1in the same way as 
k-ugustine, Leibniz could say that existence is If a continuous 
creation". Thus the relationship of God to the world is put on a new 
basis and the old supernaturalism of the schoolmen is superceded. 
The danger of pantheism on such a view is obvious. But 
there is no inherent reason why this should be the case. For the 
relation of the "Grund" and what is lIbegrundet" is not necessarily 
that of substantial identity. Both pantheism and supernaturalism 
make the same mistake of putting the time series on the same level as 
t he fl e t e r nal " • 
If rational souls were, like the rest of the universe 
though in a higher degree, merely modes of the Divine Being, without 
the possiblity of any axiological determination, two consequences 
would llTmediately follow:- (1) man would be incapable of any action 
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of ethical value and (2) in the same way could never become a 
member of the Kingdom of Grace and live in cOllliliunion with the Divine 
Being. On the other hand the delegated free.dom of m.an. can never 
imperil the unity of the universe. For the unity of the universe is 
primarily a unity of nisus and as such can never be outside the 
Divine cognisance and still less the Divine over-ruling Providence. 
There is even a sense in which God does not need us and in which 
the universe can reach its end withoutrco-operation as individuals. 
("11 est vray que Dieu n'a point besoin de nous, et quand nous 
ns"gli?erions notre devoir,. les choses ne laisseront pas de se faire 
parfal~ment bien; mais alors ce sera sans que no~s y prenions 
assez de part nous-mekes, et cette perfection gem(rale se trouvera 
en paTtie dans la justice de notre- chastiment, qui sans cela se 
seroi t trouvee dans notre bonneur particulier" p. 278 memoire pour 
les Personne.s ~clairees et de bonne intention. a.F. de Careil above.) 
Leibniz's misunderstanding of Descartes (and through 
Descartes of the school.llen) aRe. that there can be no ultimate 
distinction between the \1ill and the Understanding of God is the 
source of much of his ill-informed criticism as well as of the 
difficul ties we hove already seen. According to Descartes God is 
Actus Furus and His nature is fundamentally one. ~onsequently 
finaliSill for the Leity is not as it is for man something we can 
vivi-sect into the striving and the object striven for. To Descartes 
finalism for the Deity must be the expression of His indivisible 
nature. Uill and "Cnderstanding in the Divine Nature can be separated 
only in thought and not in reality. Descartes does not say that 
God wills eternal tr'uths but that God wills them to be necessary. 
"By his study of l~Cluinas Lescartes was able to escape the perils 
incident to an over-rationalisation of the Divine Nature in the way 
hazarded by Leibniz. For Leibniz the Deity is never incomprehensible" 
lTiillmensus" to use the word of Athanasius. 
Placing the emphasis 1e ibniz does upon the argur.1ent ab 
effectu, it is difficult to see how he could altogether escape the 
counterpart in the world of the immutability and harmony we know 
to exist within the Divine Nature. ni,~isercordia et veritas 
obviaverunt sibi; justitia de caelo prospexit." (Fs. 85. IIF 12.). 
The universe, too,for Leibniz must shadow forth something of the 
TTperfectionll of the Divine Being. So "the source of the mechanical is 
in the metaphysical ff( Leibniz to Remond. 1714. G.3.p. 607.) and 
efficient causes must point to causes which depend for their motive 
power fTupon the perception of good and evil,. or that which is 
most fittingn (Leibniz too Bierling 1711. G.7.J:.50l.) 
In thus saying that that which is first is spiritual, 
then that which is natural Leibniz shows how the essential harmony 
of the Divine Nature casts the smIle spell upon the universe. 
nT.hus it is that efficient causes are dependent upon final causes, 
and spiritu.al things are in their nature prior to material things, as 
also they are prior to us in knowledge, because we perceive more 
Dnillediatmly (interius) the mind (as it is nearest to us) than the 
body; and this indeed Plato and Descartes ~ave observed." 
(above. G.7.p.501.) 
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It is for this reason, according to Leibniz~ that any 
consideration of the universe must inevitably involve a 
consideration of the Divine Being who is its source and upholder. 
"Thus the final reason of things must be in a necessary 
substance, in which the variety of particular changes exists 
only eminently, as in its source; and this substance we call GOd. f1 
(I~lonadology. Par. 38. Latta p. 238.) 
Efficient and final causes for Leibniz belong to 
different levels of existence-the Kingdom of Nature and the 
Kingdom of Grace. These two spheres for Leibniz are not contrary 
the one to the other, rather are they supplementary. For while 
final causes have their energised field in the Realm of Grace, 
evidence of their functioning is only to be discerned in the 
Realm of Nature. 'Je thus look through Nature to God and in the 
essential goodness of God see the final cause of the universe. 
Thus there is no hiatus between the Realm of Nature and the 
Realm. of Grace •. Thus God as .ti.rchi tect and God as l(lonarch are 
both true aspects of the one Deity • 
.hS a :Kingdom of I\ature the world has a definite 
unity. 3ut besides this unity of f~ct, it has also an ideal 
uni ty as a hingdom of Grace. In this way there is rOOl,l for tne 
actions of free beings and the Realm of :~ature beco..:aes a stage 
for the mor;alisation of free beings in fulfilment of the 
purfosive unity of the universe. This purposive unity is a vital 
part of the meaning of "the best of all possible worlds lt • 
This Kingdom of Grace, in which man is a co-worker Vii th God, and 
in which he reaches his fullest perfection" is "the Illost exalted 
and most divine among the works of God H (:i:,,,onadology. Far. 86. 
Latta p.267.) It thus expresses the final purpose of' the universe 
as that purpose exists in the divine :mind. 
S::his "haTillOny between the physical realm of nature 
and the moral realm of grace Tl is the counterpart of the 
distinction we make "between God, considered as Architect of the 
Illechanism. of the universe and God considered as ;'v;onarch of the 
divine City of spirits" (l:J.onadology. Far. 87. Latta p.26b.) 
Thus the Realm of Grace is the explanation of the Realm of Nature 
and its raison d'e'tre. For the haTillony between the two Realms 
has its basic source in the harmony of the divine nature. So we 
can say !1God as Architect satisfies in all respects God as LavJ-
gi ver and thus sins must bear the ir penal ty wi th t heill, ~hrough 
the order of nature, and e~en in virtue of the mechanical ' 
structure of things; and similarly that noble actions will' attain 
their rewards by ways which, on the bodily side, are mechanical, 
al though this cannot and ought not always to happen ill1ID.ediately". 
(konadology. Far. 89. Latta. p.269.) 
In thus making ths Kingdom of Grace co-extensive 
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with, though distinct from, the l{ingdol1l of I:;ature Leibniz 
departs from current orthodoxy. Like booy and soul they are 
distinct but harillonious. But just as soul is the real substance, 
though the body is a phenomenon bene fundatU1:a, so the f1moral 
realm of grace" is the ultimate explanation and illeaning of 
TIthe physical realm of nature fl. Thus the terra. VTGrace H loses 
something of its savour as a technical term of Catholic orthodoxy 
and a new reapprochement takes place between "the natural ll and 
lithe supernaturar'. The gulf fixed by current orthodoxy between 
the natural and the supernatural is bridged. ~he traditi~nal 
conflict between nature and spirit, a conflict so aggravated by 
Christian dogma,is finally resolved. For the I~ingdom of Grace 
is cO-6xtensive with reality. fJ..'he diversified detail of concrete 
existence, so fully ordered by the laws of geometry and illechanics, 
and the I:ingdoill of .}race are asrects of the sarlle world. The 
linportance of this lies not so much in the mere fact of 
co-extensiveness as in the obvious corollary of such 
co-extensiveness taat nothing can be ultim.ately outside nle plan 
de Die-u lT • There is no ne plus ultra in the :iangdom of Grace. This 
is Leibniz's less logical but none the less vital way of speaking 
of the ~'J.l-inclusiveness of the Divine Being. 
~hus for Leibniz the supernatural is really the 
interiority of the universe. It is something always in nature, 
though hidden and unknown. For Ieibni~ the supernatural does not 
srring froill the natural as a flower from its stalk, it is always 
there in apparent, th~ugh masterly, inactivity. Thus for Leibniz 
there is no frontier between the natural and the supernatural, 
though we must continue to speak of the realm of illechanimn and 
the realm of finality. Leibniz is loath, however, to let the 
idea of the supernatural slip out of his scheme of things.(6) 
This new view of the complete solidarity of the 
universe extricates Leibniz at onC0 from many grave difficulties. 
In a universe where there is such a fund2tmental uni ty lllany 
difficulties illay be resolved but only at the price of adding 
others equ811y formidable. If the probleIa of evil is somewhat 
softened, we may find the interpretation of the unity of the 
world too simplelexpedient for so intractable a crux. 
v/hen we ask the question what is the final purpose 
of the universe, Leibniz's answer to this is definite and 
unhesitant. The purpose of the world is ."the Glory of GodlY. This 
Llanifestation of the go~dness of God is the result of no 
necessity, but has its ttsufficient reason ll in the moral 
nature of God. (7). E'or Leibniz the idea of creation involves 
m~re than the idea of a beginning in tirue or a beginning of time. 
It implie s the idea of conserva tio nand 11 continuous cre a tionl! 
(in the Leibnizian'sense). For flthe general system of phenomena 
which God co nside r¢ s goo d to produce to :.nanife6t his glory ("Ie 
syst~me g{ne-ral de s phenomene s qu' il trouve bon de produire pour 
manifester sa gloire lf ) is one fully considered from. all sides 
and invol ve s no relation which can escape his omniscience. 
Accordingly we have no difficulty in saying that God is the 
continuous support and. ground of the world. 
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Thus the Glory of God is in a process of constant 
irruption throughout the whole universe. ~very sUbstance shares 
in this Glory in proportion to, its "perfectionH • In the case of 
man this Glory is fevealed by his fellowship and co-operation 
with God. This moral order in the universe Leibniz calls rtthe. City 
of God lT TfThis Ci ty of God, this truly uni ve,rsal monarchy, is a 
moral world in the natural world, and is the most exalted and 
most divine among the works of God; and it is in it that the glory 
of God really consists, for He would have no glory were not His 
goodness known and afuuired by spirits. It is also in relation to 
this divine City that God specially has goodness, while His 
wisdom and His power are manifested everywher'e rT (lv"onadology. I'ar. 
86. latta's Translation p.26?-8t) 
Accordingly it follows that in so far as man is a 
fellow-worker with God, he is promoting the Glory of God. In other 
words TTthe general good" is but another name for Tlthe glory of 
"Gad" (TTla Gloire de Dieu".) ("Je crois que Ie renoncement total 
a soi me-me ntest autre chose que de preferer Ie bien commun t ou, 
ce Q.ui est la me'me chose, la gloire de Dieu, a son inter~t 
particulier •••• Ce renoncement ne deltlande pas un repos, mais 
plutO't une activitE0'. (Unedited letter to ","orell. September 16<;;8. 
~uotea by Jean Baruzi. p. 497. fTLeibniz et l'organisation 
religieuse de 10. terre" 1907.) 
ITThe love of God" is the counterpart of ti,le via 
pc.ternitatis of }Qd.IT •• in relation to thelli (esprits) He is not 
only what an inventor is to his machine (which is the relation 
of God, to other created things), but also what a prince is to his 
subjects, and, indeed, vJhat a father is to his children lT (1.lonadology 
:E'ar.64. Latta f. 266.) This love of God is man's reciprocity to 
the Divine goodness and it puts man in complete harmony with tne 
purpose of the universe. It leads him to surrender self-interest 
to the COIl'lLlon good and in this way promote the glory of God. 
TlHe who loves God, that is he wilO is wise, will love all men, but 
e&ch in proportion as he hopes to find in hLl a com.panion ready 
and able to promote the co~on good, or (what come s to the Sfuue 
thing) the glory of God, the Giver of good thingsl! (De tribus 
juri s naturae e t ge nt ium. gradi bus ... ,.olla t. p .1:::. Quote d by 
Latta p. 283 footnote.) 
vie have seen, that so far as man lives in accordance 
with his heritage as a member of IYthe most perfect State that is _ 
possible lT , there can be no disharmony between him and His Creator'~­
But it is obvious that harmony does not always describe this 
rela~ionship, otherwise there would arise no problem of moral evil. 
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The place of 111an in the scheme of things Ineans that there is a 
contingent human teleology to be inserted, as it were, VI i thin 
the ontol'Jgical determination of a divine teleology. HUIllan action 
depends on the law of sufficient reason and when man acts rightly 
there can be no conflict between his actio'ns and the plan of God. 
("Ie plan de Dieu"). 
It is when we come to ask what is the value of man in 
this scheme of things that we notice in Leibniz something of 
that bewilderment which visits 17th. century philosophy when it 
speaks a,bout the place of man in an heliocentric universe. 7e are 
reminde d of t he words of De scarte s. flThough as far as regards 
morals it may be a pious thought to believe that God illade all 
things for us, and though it is even in some sense true, because 
there is no created thing of which we cannot make some use" it is 
by no means probable that all things wer'e created for us in this 
way, that God had no other end in their creation. This supposition 
would be plainly ridiculous and inept in .rhysical reasoningfl. 
(Princupia 1hilosoIhiae. pars. 2a. 2. ~dinburgh Transl.,P. 168.) 
This Stoic idea of man's place in the universe has 
some influence with Leibniz, though it is never underlined. It is 
not only that the world is not made for us personally. ',Ie 1Iiay 
find. in the world what dis,I:leases us but we ro.ust reL'1ember that 
it VIas not ::!lade for us alJne. ("Kous en trouvons dans 1 'univers 
~ui ne nous plaisent,point; mais sachons qu'il n'est pas fait 
'pour nous seuls Tt • Theodice-s. Par. 194. G.vi.'p.~32.) This is 
Leibniz's way of saying with Fope:-
"Has God, thou fool worked solely for thy good, 
Thy joy, thy pastime, thy attire, thy food?" 
(~ssay on ~an. ~p.iii. 27-8.) 
But Leibniz goes further than this. His the04centric 
tendency of thought refuses to believe that the work of creation 
draws all its si~nificance from. man's life. This is the other 
side of Leibniz's theistic realism. In some ways it miEht be 
called Leibniz's pessimism. Thus Leibniz tells us (Theodic~e. 
par. 119. G. vi. p. 170.) that man's reason vvas gi ve n to hi.ll II non 
pas lui" but to contribute to ."la perfection de l'univers tl • Again 
he tells us th~t the happiness of man is not the sole nor the 
final end of God. ~ "la felicite" de toutes les creatures raisonnables 
est un des buts ou il vise; maise elle n'est pas tout son but, 
ny rn1me son de$er but" (Theodic€e Par. 1191 G. vLp.169-170.) 
But this theo~centric tendency of thought Leibniz does not over-
elaborate. Some of its conclusions are , to say the least, in 
conflict with the trend of his other conclusions. Thus in 
ThE(odicee Par. 118. (G. vL169.) we are told that it is by no 
mean~ certain that "un seul homme tT is of more value than "toute 
1 'espece des lions". 
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How far we are to accept statements like these au pied de la 
lettre is another matter. A hint as to their consistency with 
Leibniz's vie,ws on the importance of .. flan in theschellle of 
creation is supplied by a sentence from his early dialogue 
"Theophile et Polidore". If God is the supreme wisdom, as his 
VJonderful works seem to show, and if his wisdom seeks perfection 
everyvvhere it is possible , it cannot be doubted that the most 
perfect beings and the beings most approaching God are the most 
considered in nature and that God has a regard for their 
happiness in preference to every other thing. For this can exist 
without the order of nature opposing itself. (8) 
In this way Leibniz believes it possible to reconcile 
his theoMcentric view of the universe with that otS@~ view of 
the universe we find expressed in Section xxxvii of the "Discourse 
of lV.ietaphysics"and elsewhere, "now God has more regard for the 
least one among intelligent souls than for the whole machinery 
of the world Tl (p. 69. Open Court Pub. Coy.) Of this providentia 
specialissima for man we can say-Hcela se peut sans que l' ordre. de 
l'universe sly oppose." In the thought of Leibniz the pendulUil1 
swings from one side to the other. Thus it is possible to read 
into the theocentric argument of Leibniz a thinly veiled pe ssimiSJ.11. 
This is the point that Baruzi i.ilakes (sea 478 f. "Leibniz et 
l' organisation religieuse de la terre:_,) "La The-odic'e nous 
presente un optiflis,:ne universel et un pessLlliShle humain-Ilus 
.prJfo~deme~t: Si Ie pessimisme surgit d'une me"ditation de lluniver's, 
la Theodicee figure un pessimisme". 
"Un pessiluisme humaintt is a hard description for 
the theistic raalisw of Leibniz. For Leibniz is simply saying that 
our thoughts are not Godls thoughts neither are our ways rt~s wa~, 
To condemn Di vine transce nde nce as If pe ssimi SlU" in re gard to wan 
is to do violence to language. j.1,nthropo-centricis .• i is not the 
only form of optirrrisH in regc',rd to man. The ,mistranslation froln 
the book of Job"Though he slay ,.ille, yet will I trust Him" expresses 
a thecentric vievJ of the universe, which is at the same time 
optiillistic in regard to the ultLrrate welfare of the individual 
human soul. 
The proof texts which might be quoted from. the 
Theodic€e to prove that illan is subservient to the cosmic scheme 
of tn-ings (e.g. !fO n peut dire que les hOIllilles sont choisis et 
ranges, non pas tant suivant leur excellence qu~ suivpnt la 
convenance qu,ils ont avec Ie plan de Dieu." Theodicee Par. 105. 
G.vi.p.161.) must be interpreted in the light of the essential 
goodness of the deit~. God for Leibniz is essentially philanthropic 
lto use the adjective of Abhanasius). And if it comes to proof 
texts, it is possible to cite Leibniz to our purpose. 1t There are 
people vlJho think that we are of too little aonsequence, in the 
sight of an inf ini te God, for Him to have any care of us: we are 
supposed to be in relation to God 'What the wor;ns which we crush 
without thinking about it, are in relation to us. But this is 
suppose that God is like a man and cannot think of everything;Tb 
Just because God is infinite, He does things without labour b~ 
kind of consequence of Ria will, as it is a consequence of illy 
50. 
will and that of my friend that we are in agreement, no new 
action being required to produce. our agreement/, beyond the 
resolve which each of us has made. Now if the human race and 
even the smallest thing were not well governed, the universe 
itself wouJ.d not be well governed, for the whole consists in its 
parts" (tJH5ditation sur la notion com.:nune de la justice. ~uoted 
Latta. p.348-9.) 
On any view of the deity we cannot regard the claims of 
.man alone as the exclusive determinant of the divine creative 
activity. But they are a determinant and this is what Leibniz so 
explicitly asserts. The City of God is not only" the most exalted 
and most divine alllong the works of God lT but "it is also in 
relation to this divine City that God specially has goodness, 
while His vdsdom and His power are Inanifested everywhere" 
{konadology. Par. 86. Latta p. 268. ,. 
If God is essentially good, then it cannot be that 
the claims of the moral order of rational beings are ever a 
secondary consideration in "1e plan de Dieu". They are, of course, 
part of the wider cosmic purposes of God. But as Leibniz says 
there is no reason for supposing that there is any incompatibility 
between this concern for the wider purposes of the world ~ 
~1;tl;p.e and that part of it which concerns the life of man. On 
the contrery there is a perfect harmony betvJeen the two and ITa 
resul t of this har;llony is that things l~ad to grace by the very 1i"J&YS 
of nature". (MonadoJogy. Iar. 86. Latta f.~6S. I If the universe 
is not made for us alone (llpour nous seuls n ), it is, however, 
made for us, if we are wise; it will accoillodate us, if we wfill 
accomodate ourselves to it; we shall be happy there, if we wish 
to be so. (1111 est pourtant fait pour nous, si nous SOIllUles sages: 
il nous aCCOlTI1IlOdera, si nous nous en accoll.t;'.1.ouons; nous y serons 
heureux, si nous Ie voulons '$'tre ll Theodicee. Iar. 194.G.vi.'p.2~2.) 
But this, of course, is not to say that we can never break 
ourselves against the wheel of life. Not th.at the expression of 
our whims and desires in prayer will deviate the tranquil operation 
of Godts perpetual providence. The importunity of our prayers aas 
no influence with God. He knows better than we what is necessary 
for us and He will not grant save/ wha t is, agreeable to the whoJ...e 
schem.e of things. ("L'i.rnportunite des prieres ne fait rien auprEls 
de Dieu; il sait rnieux que nous ce qu'il nous faut, et il 
n' acc orde que ce qui convient as tout". T he15dic~ Iar. 12,J. G. vi. 
p. 174. J But this truth in no way al te rs t he fact tha t the 
happiness of rational creatures is the principal part of the 
purposes of God, even though it is not His sole purpose. 
(1YJ'accb[de que Ie bonheur des Creatures intelligentes est la 
principal..e partie des desseins de Dieu, car elles luy ressern.blent 
Ie plus: mais je ne voy point cependant cOilIDlent on puisse prouve!' 
que c'est son but unique" Theodicee Par. 1l8. G.vi.p.168.J 
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was something in the nature of demonstrative certainty. This 
was required as much in metaphysics as in theolo8Y. This 
dream of a perennis, philosophia was never to be fulfilled. 
The Latin appendix to the ThE(odic§e ItCausa Dei Asserta per 
Justitiam Ejus, Cum caeteris ejus Perfectionibus,Cuntisque 
"tctionibus Conciliatam" shows clearly enough the form such a 
venture -e'6rire la Thee>logie t~ett.odo l>/athematica (letter to 
fJurnett. Feb. 1697. G.iii. n. 190)- would hRve taken. In a letter 
to des Bosses as late as 30th •• ;une. 1715 Leibniz still expresses 
his longing after the accom:nlishment of this idefll of his 
youth, to recast all his philosophy "in disciplinae formam Vl 
after the model of this apnendix to the 'l.'h6odicee. 
The crovlded complexity of the interests of I.eibniz 
gave him little leis~re to fulfil uhat he considered to be so 
necessary. i::ven the J8ssc·.is de '.!:'lleodicee, the only \7orlr of 
Leibniz, published in his life time, uere {rritten s~oradically. 
Fe tells us th;·~t the .:-:reatGr nprt of it VlfiS '.!I'i tten in 
fra,:6'l1J.ents (ilp[jr lambsaux"} nne, c.rose Ol1.t of the philosoY)hic:J.l 
and theoloCical discussi8ns of the courts of ~erlin Gnd ~~nover, 
rIhera the Diction6.ry of B2',yle and other ;'Jod~s o:? that'acute r;lind 
';Jere IilUCh in vorst-"e. ?he (-:,u8on of Prussia often asked Leibniz to 
wri te his anS1'vsrs to Fayle. :..nd nfter her cle:)th I.eibniz gathered 
these fragments toc;etl-'..er s.nd 2dded to then to form the :~asais 
de ':2heodic€e. 
The prolixity of the Essais reminds one forcibly of 
r;:'ertullian' s rer:lL~rl;: on IT] rc ion- !!lan;C;:leno circa mali qu::\est ionem" • 
(:l.dv. I.carcionerll. i.2.). 1t is quite clear th:lt Leibniz had amassed 
r'mch fIlP.terial on the sub ject s of liThe r}oodne 5S of (:-.od, the 
Li berty of L::.n G.na: the Origin of J.;vil" and the endeavour to 
incor:oorate all this explains to 801:18 extent the patchwork and 
r(chauffe character of the £ssuis. In particular they incorporate 
TIruch of the earlier thou~ht of Leibniz. 
From Wh~lt has been sO.id 1fJe can realise sor.-lething of the 
encyciopaedic sco~e of the mind of Leibniz. 7hough he regarded 
the ~ssais de Theodic€e as fully expressing his mind on the 
problem of JVil and though he was v)3ry jealous for its repute (cf.~3'espere que ces Essais de Theodic!e ou de la justice de 
Dieu ne de"plairont pas en ~illgleterre. "Leibniz to Burnett, 30th. 
October 1710. G. iii. D. 321.), yet they ~ere only the prelude 
to a much more complete enterprise. 
:~ have perhap~ said enough to show that the 
Theodicee of Leibniz is not merely an answer to Bayle, as is 
so widely thought. It is true that Bayle is never far from the 
mind of Leibniz and that he regards him in the light of a 
mediaeval advocatus diaboli if only because of his erudition 
and acumen. (Hses instances sont ordinairement pleines d'esprit 
et d'srudition, et servent ~ donner un plus grand jour a ceite 
controverse ll TheOdice~ Par. 107. G. vi. p. 162.) !s Leibniz 
says elsewhere of Bayle "ubi bene, nemo melius" (The'Odicee. 
Par. 174. G~ vi. p. 2l7). 
But it is a mistake to think thRt Leibniz had no 
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other people in vievT besi des Bayle. '.~1i thout Bayle it would be 
possible to sketch out in some detail the argulllent of the Theadicee. 
For it is an argUlllent implicit in all his metaphysical writing. 
Leibniz in his own right is one of the fundamental creators of 
all theodicean argUlllent. As far back as 1673, we have already 
seen, Leibniz Vlrote a Lat in dialogue 1,1hich embodied as he tells 
us in the Preface the same arguments as the Theodic$e (cf. Preface 
G. vi. p. l6.) But just as Origen required the critical acumen 
of Celsus to bring out his skill as an apologist, so Bayle with 
an almost narallel acuteness sunnlies Leibniz with the problems 
of the The{odice'e. -. 
It is on reading the The6dice~ of Leibniz that one 
becomes conscious of the justness of the remark of Ldolf Harnack 
"The power of exclusiveness was lacking to the great thinker 
whm saw everyt hin.g in one If ("Die :.7raft der Exklus i ve fehi t e dem 
grotzen, alles in cins schauenden Denker ll quoted p. 47. Die 
Theodicee im 18 .Jahrhundert. I:::a.ns Lindau. Leipzi3;. 1911.) ':rhe 
over-loading of the ':::'he'odicee 17i th references both to current 
and ancient literature hns always proved a serious obstacle to 
it s being read. "Lei bniz is not stron€); a(;e.inst ancient rubbi sh. 
Fe throVTs too little away. He loads himself up with useless 
weights." 
~o write+ an account of· the correspondents of Leibniz 
or to give an account of th8 works referred to in the Th~odicee 
and elsewhere would be to write a considerable part of the 
history of this (!seculwll rationalisticum!'. ..~s vIe proceed we 
shall have occasion to note how closely Leibniz kept in touvh 
with the thought of his age. The correspondence \7i th "the ,~reat 
':l.rnauld fl (1612-94), and with ,3amuel Clarke (1675-l729.),not 
to speak of the lifouveaux Essais and the many references to 
contemporary philosophy and theolo~y in the Theodicee and the 
two appendices on Hobbes and the IIDe Origine r."alifl (1704) of A-rd-
-tishop "ing are enough vindication of this • 
. lri tten so late in his philosophical career and the 
only work of his to be published in his life time, it is not 
surprising that Leibniz continued to regard it as furnishing a 
satisfactory ansner to the problems with which it deals. For its 
subsequent fate as the least read of all his works Leibniz has 
only himself to blc,me. But behind it s diffuseness there is 
easily discerned an energetiC thinker and one who writes with 
an almost prophet~c fervour. The all embracing character of his 
argument is not only a reflection of that philosophical charity 
he so clearly tried to embody but is a witness to the fervency 
of his own belief in the essential soundness of his apgHemt 
arguments. Though there may be a thousand TIays of justifying 
the conduct of God (lfil y a mille moyens de justifier la 
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condui te de Dieu VI ) yet it is only by his own system, Lei bniz 
believes, that it can be shown that there is nothing so 
elevated as the 't"J'isdom of G-od, nothing so just 8.S his judgE/ments, 
nothing so pure as his holiness, nothj.n,g more boundless thnt his 
goodness. (!til n'y a rien de si e'leve que la sagesse de Dieu, / 
rien de si juste que ses jugemens, rien ~ si/pur que sa saintete, 
et rien de plus immense que sa bont{n Theodicee. Par. l06.G. vi. 
p. 161.). 
57. 
,,=, c. v. 
Pierre Bayle. (1647-1706.) 
Ue he,ve already seen that Leibniz formulated quite 
early the main lines of his theodicean argument. Hor is this 
strange since he had been meditatin~ upon the subjects of the 
Theodicee since his youth. But though there \Jere many times when 
he was tempted to,urite upon the subject (nil a encor eu des 
raisons particulieres asses considerables qui l'ont i9vite'a 
mettre la raain'a la plume sur ce sujetfl (Preface. The'odice'e. " 
'Jr. vi. p. 39.) , it Vl8,S not unt il Bayle issued his 1I0pUS Hercuel¥1H 
(Preface G. vi. p. 16.) that the stage was set for Leibniz to 
play his part. 
If previously the aim of Leibniz was more didactic and 
edifyin~ in accordance with the Zeitgeist of his century ("dont 
le but principal devoit ~tre la connoissence de Dieu, telle qu'il 
a faut ~our exciter la pi~te~ et pour nourrir la vertu" ), now 
his Gim is more polemical'l to just ify my system against the 
ne..,'l difficulties of E. Bayle; I purposed at the same time to 
communic,~'te to him the thoughts ! have had for a lonr; time on 
the difficulties \7hich he brines against those who try to malee 
reason agree with faith in the :matter of the existence of evil. 
Indeed there are few people who h'Jve \'lorked on this nore than / 
nyself" (fl just ifier raon systeme contre les nouve lIes difficul tes 
de I'onsieur :Dayle, J'~Avois dcssein en m~He terc.ps de luy cOIrJlcuniquer 
les pensees que ~' avois eues depuis Ions-temps 8Ugrles difficultes 
qu'il avoit fait valoir contre caux qui t-gchent d'accorder la 
R:=;,:i;son avec la Foy 'a l' e:~[~rd de l' existence du 1,:81. En ~ffet, 
il y a peut-~tre peu de psrsonnes qui y ayent travaille plus 
que moytl Preface. rrh/odicee G. vi. :n. 43.) For Vii th all his long 
sust~ined polemical thrusts the old forensic and edifying motive 
is st ill present ... 'is Leibniz reminds his readers it is God's cause 
that he yleads. ("c'est 10. cause de Dieu qU'on plaide Yl Preface. 
Theodicee. G. vi. p. 38.) Before v7e listen to his pleading 
in the ;)ustification of God, it may be profitable to come to a 
closer acquaintance v7i th the charges. 
In a sense Buyle represents the 17th. century better 
than almost any other TIriter of note. He is the forerunner of the 
following s¢eculum rationalisticUL1. In his writing he embodies 
the confluence of influences from the Reformation und the 
Renaissa~ce. The thou6ht of Protestantism under the influence of 
persecution had found a new toleration and there was consequently 
a greater liberty of thinking as well as of prophesying. Araong 
these new ideas Cartesianism was the most dominant. The inevitable 
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consequence of this ferment ~as an unstable balance of power 
between religion and philosophy. As yet there was no prospect 
of anything else than a declaration of armed neutrality. But 
where lesser men saw an apparent state of peace, others with 
profounder insight foresaw the coming of wars and rumours of war. 
iwong these was Jacques Benigne Bossuet (1627-1704), Bishop of 
~,'=eaux, who said that a great attack was preparing against the 
Church under the name pf Cartesian philosophy. (nun grand combat 
se pr{parer contre l'Eglise sous le nom de la philosophie cartes-
ienne") 
In the mind of Bayle this conflict had already begun. 
Never surely did the history of philosophy provide a better 
example of fla house divided against itself". In Bayle scepticism 
and faith dwelt together in unity. ris scepticisPl took the form 
of undermining the authority of reason, especially as that 
authority was exercised in philosophy and theology. So 
penetrating VIere Bayle's '~SEiticisms that his influencel long 
survived his death and w~~e a force in the subsequent century. 
Long after Leibniz had replied to the criticisms of Bayle on the 
current solution of the problem of evil, Dayle's influence even 
wi th regard to this particular issue still exercised much svw .. y 
on the minds of men. 
. To read Bayle to-day is to be conscious not only 
of 3. raptlfr 111ee logic but of arguments i7hich have in no way lost 
their cogency or liveliness. !~ writer of the 17th. century so 
rocked the foundctions of the ivory castle of do~~uatic theology. 
There was Iiluch excuse for the view of SOlae conteaporary 
theologians that "Sayle Das a mortal enemy to reli~ion nu;"squerading 
as an angel of light. 
The L~ethod of Bayle. 
Bayle's antinomy of faith and reason uas, strangely 
enough, a consequence of the orthodox teaching of the dichotomy 
of the flesh and the spirit. ]]'or Dayle reason nas banlcrupt so 
far as any consti tuti ve purpose in life is concerned. t~e quotes 
favourably Luther's "fJell knm7n saying flIn Theologia verum. est, 
Verbum esse carne:o factum. In Philosophia simpliciter impossible 
et absurdum" (.4cirt. (fLuther". Dict ionaire~:i storique et Critique. 
1702. p. 1946.) The unsolved and unsolvable conflict betneen 
faith And reason Das a sood thing if it remindec man of the 
rock whence he was heHn and the pit Ilhence he VIas digged. f'ro,q;ress 
was only to be made along the lines of the lli8.xim of Tertullian 
certum est, q~ia impossibile est. For the point Bayle never 
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wearies in elaboratine is that the tenets of dogmatic theology 
e .S. the doctrine of ''the fall of man/and the general teaching 
de auxiliis ~ratiae, are not r~~rely super-rationel but anti-
rational. ':'hese dogmas of catholic orthodoxy cannot be justified 
at the bar of reason. 
Reason for ~Ryle could be vropaedeutic to religion, 
if it was not merely content to disrupt the edifice of orthodoxy 
but also to humble r;Jf).n' s intransigent belief in his own unaided 
pOrler of reflection. Faith rrhich 1;'[<3S really TJorthy of the mune 
was in diametrical and inevitable opposition to reason. Thus 
Be.yle's "scepticism\? ITJe.s the handmaid to religion. Hevelo.tion 
through the li~ht of re~son might \;ell be cO!:lpJ.red fJi th what 
Christian theolo~;y teact.es of the I'Loss.ic dispensation.'" It ','Jas a 
schoolnaster (these ere their ~ords) to lead us to Christ. Let 
us say the s3.l!1e,almost the senne of reason; it is only fit to 
YHul{e r.1an knor:T his ignorc'l,nces anJ pouerles,sness, and the necessity 
of another revelation. (v'Elle etoi t un pedagogue (ce sont leur 
terms) pour nous amener a cTesus- Christ. Disons 'a peu l'res Ie 
rm3me de In raison; elle n'est rropre quI a faire connottre ~ 
l'horume ses t~n~bres et son impuiss2~, et la n(cessite/d'une 
autre revelation. "Art. flli~anicheens "(..p." 2022.) 
In u sense ,::e fl'J.y call ;~:~yle the ~:ant of the 17th. 
century. ',,!bat ::,e.yle advocates :;l,;::; a pra,ctical Llodus Vivendi, :tant 
affiras by [Irsu..."'r:ent. Like :;:ant 5eyle indul'36s in a ~ ri t ik of 
reason ('Jna lU~e', nt, as for 'e.yle ,t~l ere is left over s certain 
residuUl,_ of dogr~la \lhic:~l reason can neither prove nor dis2Jrove. 
Rec03nising cleArly the disruptive force of reason ~ayle finds 
himsir!f lead to destroy, so far as argun;.ent is concerned, 'Vlhat 
cannot survive this strugsle for existence. Royle is therefore a 
much more consistent "rationalist" than either Descc;,rtes or 
Leibniz, though a less constructive thinker thon either. He 
knows nothing of the harmonising spirit of Leibniz •. :here Leibniz 
is content to blend the colours of his p81ette, ~ayler has no 
colours save black and white. His aim throu!";hout is to embarrass / 
philosophers and to shmi~:reakness of reason'~ ("Car il passoi t aise-
ment du blanc au noir, non pas dans une r,lauvai se intent ion, ou 
contra sa conscience, mais parce qu'il n'y avoit encor rien 
d'arreste dnns son es~rit sur la Question dont i1 s'agissoit. 11 
s'accommodoit de ce qui luy convenoit pour coptrecarrer l'adversaire 
qu'il avoit en teste, son but n'stant que d'embarrasser les 
Philosonhes, et faire voir la foiblasse de nostre raison: et je 
crois que jamais Arces~as ny Carneade n'ont soutenu ~e popr et 
Ie contre avec plus lI'eloquence et plus d'esprit" Theodicee Par. 
353. G. vi. ~. 324-5.) But as Leibniz continues to add it is 
not necessary to doubt for the sake of doubting, doubts should 
serve as a plank to reach the truth. (rtEais enfin il faut point 
douter Dour douter, il faut que les doutes nous servent de planche 
. " ,,/' -pour parvenir a la verite". (above.) 
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The Cosmology of Bayle. 
V For Balle out side "the system of the Scripture fI 
(Ie systeme de l'Ecriture) there is nothing but confusion of tongues. 
With the help of Revelation alone is it possible to establish 
"the solid foundations of providence and the perfections of God". 
("les fondemens solides de la providence et des perfections de 
Dieu" • Art. ~Epicure" Dict. p. 1138.) 
From this source Bayle would have us compose our 
philosophia perennis. God is the Creator of the world both as 
regards its ??matterl! as well as its "form'? From this at least 
three con~lusions 'follow:- (1) God disposes of the world as He 
sees fit (2) Ee needs only a simple act of will to do what pleases 
Him. (3). nothing can happen but what He has put in the plan 
of His work. (IiDe ce que Dieu Ie cre'ateur de la mati~re, il 
resulte 1. QU'avec l'authorit~la plus legitime qui puisse ~re, 
il dispose de l'univers comme bon lui semYle. 2. Qu'il n' a 
besoin que d'un simple acte de sa volonte pour faire tout ce qu'il 
lui plait. 3. Que rien n'arrive que ce qu'il B. mis dans Ie plan 
de son ouvrage tl ) (above). inother consequence of this view is 
that the heresy of PatripassianislU is avoided. For we can say, 
if this is true, that the 'course of the world is not a matter 
which can weary or disappoint God and that there are no events 
such QS can trouble His blessedness. If things happen which Re 
has forbidden end which He punishes, they do not happen, 
nevertheless, contrary to his decrees and they serve the adorable 
ends which he has purposed from eternity and vlhich make the 
greatest mysteries of the Gospel. ("il s'ensuit de la que 161. 
conduite du monde n'est pas une affaire gui puisse fatiguer ou 
chagriner Dieu, et qu'il n'y a point d"venemens quels qu'ils 
puissent gtre qui puissent troubler sa bt1atitude. S~il arrive des 
ch2ses qu'il a defendueJ, et qu'il punit, elles n'arrivent pas 
neanmoins contre se~ decrets, et elles )ervent aux fins adorables 
qu'il s'est proposees/de toute eternite, et qui font les plus 
grans mysteres de l'Evangile) ~bove.) 
This clear statement of the views of Bayle enables us 
to discern more affinity with the views of Leibniz than we might 
surmise from a cursory r~ading of the Theodic/e. For the apparent 
arbitrariness implied inl~nd (2) above is qualified elsewhere 
by Bayle in the Leibnizian manner. For in Objection 3 of the 
Epicurean to the Platonist he says that goodness without 
judgement is not praiseworthy. (IfJe renonce me'me a. cette ?bjection, 
c'est que la bonte pour etre louable doit ~tre accompagnee de 
jugementil) .Again in (3) we have almost the qUintessence of the 
ontological teleology of Leibniz. f'le have the sarele insistence 
upon the transcendenc~ of the Divine Eeing above the travail 
and sorrow of man. Th0l:?h the plan of his v!ork (Hle plan de son 
ouvrae;e ll ) is determined from eternity, it is so embracing that 
it can include within the ambit of its compass that abuse by 
man of his freedom which we call moral evil and which c an be 
transmuted to the greater glory of His l'fins adorables?t 
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Bayle and Leibniz alike stand aloof fr~m any facilis 
descensus hur.lanismi. Bayle in his Fensees Diverses sur la 
Com~te expresses views which might almost equally well come 
from the pen of Leibniz. Religious fanatics saw in the comet 
of 1680 a sign of divine displeasure as some years later the 
Lisbon earthquake "!'l8..S to cause similar popular alarm. Bayle's 
reply is shattering vVvJhat service can it render the Church 
].=ili tant that Jupiter has satellites which move regularly 
around it n (fiDe quoi peut servir a l' Eglise mili t~nte que 
~Tupi ter ai t des satellites, qui se meuvent regulierement autour 
de lui?" Par. LXi. Continuo des F'ense8s div.). He deals / 
trenchantly with the opinion of Ealebranche who in his tfTraite 
de la Nature et de la Grace" (1684) regarded man as the sole 
and chief means for the end that the Creator proposed to himself 
in making the world. (" comme le seul et le principal :rr.oyen de 
la fin que le Cre-ateur s'est en faisant le monde" E,bove.) If 
thi s is so, Bayle [~sks, wby has Grod placed the fixed stars at 
such a distance from the earth and why is it that other stars 
have only come to the ~en of man through the invention of the 
telescope. Bayle agrees with Seneca that the world of nature 
ministers to a sreater and a more sublime end than the 
conservation of the human race. It is true th~n enters into 
the cares of God and that 1:e wishes to bless -~: ;,.11 this 
demands recognition but it is 30inS too f:lr and we presume too 
much on our iIlportance if ue thinl.:: that 1-;e are His colUl!il1s of 
Fer'l1cles, l:is chief end, the centre round vlhich all the novements 
of nature worl: :;.l1d the ubiqy.i tous ret'son of all hip worlcs. 
("r:lais qu' il va beaucoup/: plus loin, et que nous :presunerions 
trop de nous si nous pretendions ~tre ses colonnes d'Horcule, 
son but principal, le centre a qUOi aboutissent tous les 
mouvemens de la nature et la raison ubique de tous ses travo.ux" 
Par. LX. above. 
Yet though neither Bayle nor Leibniz hold that n11'\n 
is the only purpose of all things, both are equally emphatic on 
the essent ial~oodnes s e.s (yell as the transcendence of t}od. Doth 
agree that ...... God's goodness determined. him to create the universe 
("sa bonte seule l'a determine""~ cr~r cet univers n ), thoue;h 
Leibniz interprets this phrase of Bayle's in his own way. If 
God's goodness determined him to create this universe, it is 
necessary to add that fiis goodness moved Him antecedently to 
create and produce all the good possible. d.lso th2.t His wisdom 
made the choice ("sa sagesse en a fait le triage 'V ) and vias / 
the cause that He has chosen the be st consequently. (Theodicee. 
Fa r. 116. G • vi. p. 16?) 
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Thus Bayle and Leibniz are in fundamental agreement 
about the infinite ~oodness of Jod. And both (in spite of 
partial denials) interpret this goodness as being expressed 
pre-eDinently in the relation of God to man. (cf. The~dicee 
Par. 118. G.vi. p. 168.) Both Bayle and Leibniz experience 
the srune difficulty in expressing this truth, without at the 
same time saying that the welfare of man is the chief aim of 
God. 
Bayle no more than Leibniz has any areument for this 
infinite G-oodness of God. It is something universally accepted 
and to think of God vIi thout the qualification of IJ.oral predicates 
is to outdistance the sceptics of history. ("Les plus grans 
Sceytiques de l'antiquitl ont dit, que tous les homrues ont une 
idee de Dieu selon laQuelle il es~une nature vivante, heureuse, 
incorruptible, pDrfaite dans 1& fe1icite(, et non susceptible 
d'aucun mal" 11.rt. ,spinoza. ,Pict. D. 2777.) To thinl>: this is to 
lapse into the nath6isme execrable" of Jpinoza. Even those 1,\Tho 
deny the moral predicates of God often unconsciously bring them 
in to interpret God's relation to !!lan and speak of Vlperfectionsl? 
of the sovereign being, ~hich He does not fail to adjust to the 
ideas \,"Jhich ,;Ie have of virtue. (HOnne sera plus certai~ que sa 
justice l'ensage'a punir le mal, et l'on ne scauroip refuter 
ceux qui soutiendroient qu'il est l'auteur du p~che, et qu'il 
puni t n6ml1loins fort justen:.ent, et Q.u' en tout cela il ne fait 
rien aui ne s'accorde avec les perfections infinies du souverain 
-etrle, "ce.r ce ne sont pes des perfections qu'il faille c:juster aux 
idees que nous avons de la vertu ll • above.) 
This reliance upon the te2chin~ of the Scriptures 
hel~)s us to understand the em.phasis EHyle places upon the 
infinite Joodness of1od and the correspondin5 cruciality for 
him of the problem of evil. For the creat ion of the rwrld by 'Jrod 
is a truth the importance of '\lhich ce.nnot be exa?~gera.ted. ("cetts 
verit~est d'une importance nonn8reille, car on en tire COLrrae 
d 'une source feconde les dogfi1e .. s les plus sub1il!le~, et les :Prus 
fondsmentaux, et l'on ne sgauroit poser l'hypothese opos{e a 
celle-1A sans ruiner plusieurs grans l")rincic,es du reisonrunent yv • 
~rt. ~picure. Dict. 1140.) Thus it is only by Jevelation that 
this nodus of the problem of evil cml be untied. J!'or it is only 
by Revelation that '.-:-e can understand that the omnilOotence of 
God is an onmi1ootence of love. (ncar l'ontin:..us prEfc6de toujours 
le n!a.:ximus dans 1e style des l)lu8 s~~vantes nations, quand el1es 
:p2.rlent de Dieu l ? i!l.rt. Pc;u1iciens Dict. n. 2325.). 
The Lanichaean ,i.:..uswer. 
~vil for Dayle is a fact which cannot be explained 
by explaining it away. ~here is nothing more stupid than to 
peailm reason against facts ("11 n' y a rien je plus insensl que 
de raisonner contre des faits". Art. L:anicheens Dict. n. 2022.) 
In the S8.IDe place Ire are told that we must not suppose Bayle to 
agree with those who hold that evil to be merely ~ privation 
(nle mal n'est qu'une privation). 
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But if the Scriptures teach us the complete sovereigntty 
of God and His essential unity, this is a lesson which the rest of 
creation teaches us as well. ("Les cieux et tout Ie reste de 
L 'uni vers p&chent la gloire, la puissance, 1 'uni te" de Dieu V? above.) 
Thus we have no alte~native but to follow the solution to which 
we are pOinted. From effect to cause is an axiOL1 as plain as 
the proposition two and two equal four. (fll'axiome ab actu ad 
potentiam valet consequentia, est aussi clair que cette proposition 
2 et 2 font 4." above.) 
Thus if there is no minimisin~ of the do~vnatic insistence 
upon the omnipotent transcendence of the Deity, so 1ike'l.'7ise there 
is no evasion of the plain stark evil of t~e world. Bayle's 
insistence u:oon the juxtaposition of these conflicting truths is 
refreshinGly candid. If ue say that evil is impossible in the 
\,70rld c:eated by n pOfJer infinitely good and holy, r;Ie must reply 
the. tit is a fact and therefore ver~T possible (iI~~U' on nous vienne 
de dire avec un [rand appareil de raisonnemens, Qu'il n'est P8S 
possible que le 1,13.1 nor,>~l s'introduce dans Ie !.londe, r>ar l'ouvrace 
d'un princi-pe infiniment bon et sr:.int, nous r{pondro~s que cela s' 
est pourtant fait, et par conse~uont c,:,'J.e celC'. est tres l'ossible" 
I~rt. tlLs.ni cheens!l above.) 
It is this absence of any minimising tendency in the 
thinkinf~ of '~;'yle that le::'ds hiLl to flirt \7ith Lemichaeism. For 
l~nichaeism conforms to the t~o canons of criticis~ ~ayle proposes 
for any philosophical system. Firstly it must have clear ide~,s, 
secondly it must be adequate to experience and lec~ve no lacunae. 
:::~anich2.eisTI survives both these tests c\S uell 2nd better than 
most monistic philosophical systems. It certainly has clarity of 
ideas and its value for the a posteriori explanation of the 
phenofaena of daily experience is e s grea.t as :!lost rival systems. 
There are three sepQrate questions raised by the problem 
of evil. (1) c"-!hat is its nature! (2) Jhat is its orisin.? 
(3) .!hat does it prove? Though Bayle does not analyse the problem 
in this \Jay, his appraisal of :>~enichaeism directly involves them. 
~enichaeism had direct answers to all three and answers such as 
might nell appeal to & losical mind. 
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<}e have already seen that Bayle l7ill have nothinG to do 
with the Spinozistic conception of evil 8S limitation and illusory. 
Bayle takes over the pessimistic teaching of the Church on the 
fallen state of man's nature. Physical and moral evil are facts, 
even though the 3cri~tures teach only of a ~ood Principle. (~rt. 
Pauliciens. Dict. p. 2323.) I=Uowledge of the world and indeed 
of oneself are sufficient warranty of their reality. 
~gain what other system can so explain the origin of 
evil as Tanichaeism or finally what other philosophy can give so 
totalitatian~verdict on all the irvarring nnd vexatati0f31Y discrete 
phenomena of hUll1F,·n life? ':lhus "lilhile ]"&nichaeism may at first 
inspire horror, yet a little consideration of the failure of 
other solut ions of t he problem of evi 1 may mal\:e us more sympathet ic 
at least to its stern logic. Thus ~e note e.~. how easily the 
Christian '!:i'athers refuted the I'arcioni tes and T anicha(ns I"Ii thout 
themselves giving any satisfactory answer to this problem of the 
origin of evil •• ~d when e priori considerations give place to a 
posteriori considerations we realise more clearly the urgency of 
the problem. 
~he many contrasts we Illeet in the world of nature e.g. 
li::::;ht and d"rkness, heat o.nd cold point t-~naloe;ously in the direction 
of an ultimate dualisr;:. 7et these contrasts are not decisive/" for 
t1::ey do not imperil the unity of the uni Vf.r8e. It is only when ',Ie 
consider man that this unity is vi tull:! inperilled. ii'or man's 
unhappy st lte both in tte !'latter of mor:,',l:.:'nd physical evil 
requires some explc)nation. lhe orthodox teachinG of the Fall of 
~dfuu only complicetes the problelil and sup~lies no answer to the 
why and wherefore so persistently de~~nded. 
'rhus ~~Q.yle could se.y th~,lt he did not E:spouse D~nichaeism 
or any other dualism. Eut rationally considered it could.sive as 
good an uccount of itself as any other system. The objections of 
the t:anichaeps ail on the origin of evil uere difficult to/rebut. 
("On a tant de peine a rEtpondre as objections des Lanicheens sur 
l'ori\~ine du mal.!t Art. Pculiciens. Dict. p. 2323 ). :Bayle goes 
further to say that the !~anichaeans with an hypothesis completly 
absurd and contradictory explain experience$ a thousand times 
better than the orthodox, with the supposition, so just, so 
necessary, so uniquely true, of a first principle infinitely good 
and all povlerful. ("les Fanicheens qUi avec un hypoth~se tout-
'a- fait absurde et contradictoire, expliquent les experiences cent 
fois mieux que ne font les orthodoxes, avec la supposition si 
juste, si necessaire, si uniquement ve~itable d'un premier principle 
infiniment bon, et tout puissant.!t. Art. Pauliciens. Dict. p. 2325.) 
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The Answer of Origen. 
Leibniz, in one of his replies to Bayle, says that 
if he had to choose between being an Origenist or a L:anichaean, 
he would prefer to be the former and never the latter. (I'Cependant 
s'il falloit choisir entre deux, suivant la raison, je ·serois 
plusto/t pour l' Origeniste, et jar:2ais pour le L~anichten". Beponse 
aux Beflexions 2nd. edit. Dict. C. de K. Bayle. G. iv. p. 567.) 
As it is obvious that Leibniz had this discussion of the problem 
of evil before his mind and in particular the arguments and 
elucidations of Bayle tIe Iilay profitably spend a little time on 
Bayle's handling of the'frreek Father. 
Payle reduces the doctrine of the Origenlsts to three 
propositions:- (1). "God has made us free, t03ive scope to 
virtue and to vice, blame and praise, reward and punishnlents. 
("Dieu nous a fait libres, pour donner lieu \ la vertu, et au 
vice, au bl~me et 'a louange, 'a la recompense et aux peines) (2). 
"He dalo"llns no one simply for having s innect, but for not be ~ng 
repentant" (HIIA-ne damne personne simplement pour avoir pech/, 
mais pour ne s'etre pas repenti") (3) "Physic~l and moral evils 
are of so short a durat ion in CQI:Flari son vii th eternity that 
they cannot hinder ::!od passin3 as beneficicnt and the friend of 
virty.e. (fiLes [llaUX physique s E. t L10raux du genY'e hll1.:ain sont d tune 
duras 3i courts en cor,;pe.rison d.e l' eterni te, qu' ils ne :Del.went 
pas e;,:~p~cher que Dieu ne p[~sse pour bienfais!)nt et pour :.1£.11 de 10. 
vertu n'l.rt. Crisene. Dict. :n. 2259.) 
It is this last sentence, Eayle reminds us, uhich 
contains the essence of Ori~enisR and accounted for its success 
in refut in,'~ the I':nichs,eens. .Jhere )"u:,;ust ine and Fela .. -<i us had 
laboured in vain, Ori~enisE succeeded. [ence the po~ularity 
Cri:~enis111 en,ioyed in f'lcin~; the qUE)stion us forGidr,ble in those 
days as it is still in our ov:rn-}hence comes evil Dnd -.-.hc.t is its 
oriGin? (V'D'ou vient Ie I:lal, et quelle en est l'ori:;ine?", ~uite 
obviou.sly it lent itself more to orthodoxy th~:n the disruptive 
dualism of ;'cnichreisIi1, dividin::: the rmrld flS vi th 9. hatchet into 
t,,70 fields of influence, both equally independent ~nd both 
e~ually pov.rerful. 
It is fl far cry fror:'J. the troubled dualism of L:.'nich2~eism 
to the quietism of Crigen. Fut though Orit:Senism lead to other 
peculiarities of doctrine, its TIonism at least left the Godhead 
of the deity not only intact but s1.1.:preme. The danger of Origenism 
came frOfJ. the o:pyosj,te direction. It went too fc"r along this 
monistic path and inclined at times to lapse into the abyss of 
Spinozis~ by identifyinc the spirits of usn with the Divinity 
itself. ~Dict. p. 2264.) 
For the Origenist "time li1c8 a dome of m&ny col~u.red 
glass stains the dim radiance of eternity". Life on this earth 
was so transitory in respect to the everlastingness of eternal 
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life that its sorro·;,rs and vJickedness co..n forDl no ipicter.::.ent of a 
supremely benefic.ient God. l'"oreover even the pains of purgatory do 
not last for ever and,evea after 3061. has punished those who have 
abused their freedoLl, fhere is all the ensuing bliss of eternity 
for them to lick their wounds. If a watcl1ma.ker makes a pendulurtl 
17h1ch journeys regulClcrly on its bea.t for a TI'hole year, it is no 
tarnish on his craftsmanship to point out that at the beginning of 
its long career it made one or two unequal strokes. In the same way 
if the Deity can reduce the disorders of earthly life in a moment 
of eternity, we need not trouble ourselves that He does not 
intervene nOH amid the sins and hardships of men. 
=:ut there are rnany criticisms that a L~anichean (according) 
to Bayle) could bring ag~inst so easy a d{~oueffient of the Gordian 
knot. ~gainst these three propositions of the anSDer of Origen there 
might be brought three particular criticisms:-
(1). '~'he ,gift of freedom, Hi th its consequence of purgatorial 
propiation for its misuse, contradicts the lo~ical &nd ~erfect ideal 
of supreme go061.ne s S. ":.l.S the Jrieeni st believes in an eternity of 
'lJ.ndimx:1ed and unfading bliss, he is not in a position to (leny that 
the same bliss is alvr~~ys~pos si bili ty and consequently no::;ood 
re2son why perfected liberty with its tHin conseQuences of virtue 
and hapniness should not coexist on this earth (::iven un C'I'ni:potent 
c.n61. ,11 Lovin --; Dei ty ~. ~ 'oreover if ue 8.re to read. (irii::;enisr.: ':1i th 
any strictness there can be no sort of proportion betBeen the brief 
nrobtltion of l1~an tLis e£.trtll and the eternity of bliss ~7:1ich o.i'lai ts 
t1:e o(;izhteou.s. :)0 grec.t is t~1is dispro~;ortion that 'ie l'lUst resard 
this bliss as a 3ift to SOlle and Dot to all. 
(2) .~~bsence of repent3.nce really r;'.eCll'lS c, :'-:li suse of freedom and 
so is o.n &rguil-..ent in a circle. 
(3). The weak noint here is thE i~norance of the Cri~enist as to 
the e.lleged proportion of the torments of rlUr3~tory to the bliss 
of eternity. =~reover a ferfect ~ein3 is very different from a 
"lYCttchrc..aker ho',:ever excellent he N8.Y be. ;.oodness in SULJl.:lO e;r,.ldu 
excludes all opnosites and defects. ==oreover the relativity of 
pur:);I:~torial p(:l,ii1S and torments to the~lory the,t shall be revealed 
is an objective consideration uhich TIould wei~h liGhtly uith the 
person most concerned. 
But there are other ,::;rounds for impugning more directly 
the teachings of the Origenists. Is it not true to say that both 
experience and netaphysics sho~1 that to do evil to a person in 
any way even for a Greater good, and thou~h the evil be of but 
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brief durat ion, is something inconpat i ble t'?i th ~)erfect goodness 
save in the cas. where it is impossible to lead them ari~ht~ The 
pains of ,the darrmed rr..ay well be short and 8i~reet in colt:parison 
with the~r ulticate eternal bliss, yet as pains they are 
incompatible nith the infinite and SovereiGn Goodness of J.od. This 
truth the maxim (so frequently quoted by Leibniz) illustr~tes­
Bonura ex integr,} causa, maium ex quocunque defectu. 
The difficulty of accepting Origenis.as the solution 
of the problem of evil is simply that 1;7e find ourselves back again 
in the pit whence we thought to have escapea.. To Wake the bliss of 
heaven dependent on the pains and tri~ls of pur3atory and on life 
as it is upon the earth and to say that God cannot order it 
otherwise is to lapse asain into Lanichaeism and to save the 
goodness of God at the expense of his omnipotence. It is the ~.,i 
re introduct ion of the d.octrine of "matt6r" over wh0j1.e recalc i trancy 
the Deity has no coruplete control. Loreover there &H:43 still 
unans\7ered the vf:;ry difficult areument10f the r.:anichGeans that in 
any c:..'.se the greater proportion of t he human race are eternally 
damned and the arSUIilent 8.dvanced by the Jocinians that~m ever-
last in::!: hell e.nd the infinite Goodne s s of God are incomp9.t i ble . 
.Ii th stwh arzm::.ents and counter G.rSU.lilents :'ayle 
once kore reiterates the ~}ract i cal l:lore.l of fui th. '.2h:J.t to j~.ld3G 
ri::;htly of the conduct of '}od 1."8 l:lUst heve recourse not to the 
ideas of rueta,hysics but to the oracles of 3criI'ture, (ftC 'est que 
les notions :rnE{tanh~Tsicues ne doivent 1)~,S etre notre r6ty le Dour 
..... '- ;.l,.. ... '-~ .'" 
;,iu:,:er de la co))d1J.i te (.1e Dieu, LlJ is qu' il fa.ut 3t;;;) conforr~6r alL 
oracles de L'~criture.n (_:..rt. Uric;ene. Dict. r. 2262.) ':'here 
is no anmler to any of the pr'oblems of life, rt:uch less to the 
~roblem of evil unless the ipse dixit of the deus revelatus. 
The .t'illswer of ::Js.yle. 
Eayle ~ives the presnant st~teLent of the problec of 
evil made by ~~picurus ~as quoted by Lactantius in De Ira Dei) 
as e ruthless laying bare of the issues to be faced. In the L2tin 
the pre9;ne.nt brevity of the are:uIilent is inescap:?ble. IIDeus, inqui t 
:;:J.:picurus, aut vult tollere mala. et non pote8t; aut potest et 
non vult; ::lut negue vult, neque potest; aut et vult et potest. 3i 
vult, et non potest, imbecillis est, quod in Deum non cadit . .Ji 
potest, at non vult, invidus; quod aeque alionera c.. Deo. 3i neque 
vult neque pot est ; at invidus et ir,lbecellis e~;t; ideoque neque 
Deus. bi vult et potest, quod sollml Deo convenit; unde er/o sunt 
mala? aut cur ill), non tolli t?7? As E8..Jle says the problem 
could not be stated in more pOinted words, J.lnd if VIe include 
moral evil as crell as the physical evil, uhich the words have 
specially in visu, their relevance to the discussion is even 
more deadly. 
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1'118 solut ion of Lactant ius is briefly that ?:ood <;;lnd 
evil are compler,.i.entary .fi thout evil Jod could ~ have communicated 
to us neither '(;,)'1 sdom nor virtue. (In E::yle' s lanr:m-?i~;(; 1'11 3. f:).lu 
<lue Dieu ,rod,:isit le mel 1 , p}rce qu'autrement il n'~uroit pu nous 
corr,xflunic:u€r n~ sa. sagesse ni la vertu, ni le sentir:lent du bien" 
Art. n Pauliciens. Dict. p. 2324.) For Lactantiu.s there must needs 
be evil, for unless we first knew evil ue could not kno~ good. 
(1IIta,'Ule nisi.i prius rilalum agnoverimus, nec bonum poteriuI!1us 
agnoscere • Vi above.). 
Bayle's objections to this resnonse of Lactantius is 
that it is not only feeble but full of errors and even heresies. 
("elle est non seulement foible, D&is pleine d'erreurs, et neut-
'8'tre m6\,lo d' here'S ies" above.) It is contrary to thE; orthodox 
te3.chin,g on '~he fVLll of mun "8.nd me.kes .meanin';less the idea of heevenly 
bliss . ~he psycholo~ical ~rounds for this view are its ueakest 
part mid with all the cl.udacity of the conlin'; century ¥:r,,;ues that 
it is untrue thst our soul exnerionees evil before it ec.n tCtstc 
n;ood. ("que notre ~ne uit senti du 1::<11, c,.fin c~e r:outer le bien il ). 
!t is rather sinr,;ulo.r the't :?~yle ohould h'J.ve seized u!l0n this 
criticism of L2ctantiu~. In his criticism of ;anichneisn ~R~le 
sroid tl-:::},t it reduc8d itself to o..n effort to s,va tho r<~oodn8S'3 ~f 
"',od "' .... the C~P1')G"""''' o-f' 1'1l''''' rOT7E'r (iVon sc,"vort'\l't 1'-1 b01()tr-f Cl~G" ~"l'eu u. tJ ...... /..\. .lt~-Jv J. .Jh~" .... ~ 1,.11 I.. ~ ~ ;_,~i<.,~ '.J _Co "'. _  , . -
'-'i.J.? -'C''''e'''-'~ (1,0, on ""'-'1' "''''''DCe rt Ar]' r""'ne -.,; ct "" <}<)':l ' I I ... hr.. u~ v!",' -' ........ ""'" t,,4 0;0: 'J' >~ .~/ 'V.. ....... U \--- I...to. • ",,-> _ 7- I; ..1 )..L • ~'. c .. [.J '0 • / 
L::~ct':mtiu s does tl~e S;T~e thin" in. ro~t;:cY' C j_ff2rc?~lt 'J:r • 
. ccordin.' t.o ",,"10 there i3 not ~~',,'.cL :;,01:(" of-, 
solu.tion ,~t t 1:e t''.r,e..c'Jof t:lE '...'J,t:lCr8 of t bs GLri[:>ti"~~~ ';~nrc:t'.. 
-~1"1] i::E: tl:le :::1 (,tonists t!~,o.'l co"),lCl not invo::::e tt,(;; ~ ·'::'i~icl, e~ 1:el:0 
of 1;r;'£tter f1 :.:.10., b2li::eo, in thj_z ,:u~~rtcr, tb.6Y turned to the delG::~,toc1 
freecloTIl of }'D.. "tlt t:t.is ,msrrer, instec~d of c"J.ttin'; the }:::not, 
2ccordin~ to -~yle onl~ serves to stren7t~en its bonds. If thay 
c("l.ld not appeal to the lstent '_~nich!.".eisr.: of PlatonisY;;" still les8 
could thetT Iilbi.;,Ze the ec,sv l)Cl'?an de-houer1 snt of the ri vr:~lrie s of t::e rantheon.u;~ain,tb0 Gol~tlo~ of p~rDon~l d~vil involved More 
di ffic1)_1 ties th~n it sol vod. :::Cor tria invol \Tee c.loirl~ ::ore de o;")i te 
to the ideu of "'!.ad th2 .. n the d'vlc.lisn: af :~8.nicb.@isr;~. jar th07 de,ril, 
beinz not eternal ':.'.ncl bein~'2 ere:..\t'Jcre/" must h~ve l~8en L;'.ld.-. .30 -;e 
h~:ve not e.l1.other ::3ein,;, l;~' levolent cmd inCleDenclont of rv"od but, wh ,t 
ia iilfinitel.y ~!Orse?m1 evil prj_nc,irl~ create(l bY,'~od hi111self) ..J[,ld 
e.llowed to dlvlde t,18 er~~ery of tue nUlJJEtn r':lce YJlt;1 ~~od- tl1e:)l ty 
of "::00. 2nd the rJi ty of !)estr'~lction ..... J .. 1d to S:::l~r this is a tl:OI.lsand 
times Dorsa thQn to say thRt he is not the sale necessary ~nd 
independent be in'~. (\lCr c' est faire Mille foi s plus de tort aDieu. 
que de dire qu' il n' est pas Ie seul etre ne'cessaire et ind{pendendent ~I . 
1l.I't. ?o.uliciens. Diet. p. 2330.) In other \'Joros ':7e have to f,) cs the 
surilS diffi cult ies thC'~ t are involved in the orthodox doctrine of 
(Ithe Fnll of wan'" In both e;.;ses philosophy is begc;ared. 'Je may as 
well realise this impotency of our own reason -md h3.ve recourse to 
the li0ht s of revelation (lurli~res de la revelation) where alone \'Je 
can find a sure and firm 9,nchorage. (l'c.nere sure et ferue i ?). 
~his leads us back inevitably to the 3criptural doctrine 
of the essential Goodness of ~od. For Eayle there is no other 
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solvent for the problem of evil than the reiteration of this 
basic truth of revelation. There is no ~ay otherwise of meeting 
the areWllent of duulism. Thi s must needs be the ce.se for here 
philosophy is at an end. Lilld any contrary argument e.g. against 
Lanichaeism is equivalent to a h_Lre enunciation of a conclusion 
without premises. There is only one thing to do under these 
circurnstances and that is to ebandon all reasoninG and betake 
onself to Revelation. 'rhus ue learn that God is Omnipotent Goodness 
and that man has cone from his hcmds innocent and good. Thi s 
innocence and goodness he has lost through his own fault. This is 
the origin of moral and physical evil. (The best and only thing for 
man to do \7hen beset with the intellectual conundrum.s of the problem 
of evil is lise retiretf" dans son fort, c'est-e.-dire ClU'il devoit 
prouver par le.. pl:'lrole de Dieu que I 'auteur de toutes chases est 
unique et/.infini en bonte"'et en toutes fortes de perfections; que 
l'homme etant sorti de ses mains innocent et bon, 8 perdu son 
innocence et S3. bonte"'par S2. propre faute. C'est 1'8. l'ori~ine du 
mal moral et du mal physique fI .il..rt. V1Pauliciens n. Dict. p. 2325.) 
This insistence on the essential Goodness of God in the 
case both of Bayle and Leibniz is noteworthy. In the case of 
Eayle the truth is b~sed on revelation, in the case of Leibniz the 
truth is tacitly c.ssULled by the philosophical inheritance u.pon 
which he entered. For both the Goodness of -lod is the r:aster l;:ey 
to the mysteries of evil. It is t;;; truth to which all other facts 
must COnfOY£1 •. n.1ether in t Le C':,S8 of ~>-yle tt.ero is still rer.is.ining 
e.. residuum of mystery (flon ne peut nier que 1 I introduction du r:'..~l 
l:oral et ses annexes ne soient 1 'un des ylus inpEfhe'trables ;:,lysteres 
c.:,ue Dieu nous ai t revelez n .Art. "~'A::Hlicheens II Cict. p .:314G • I For 
1.ei bniz :r::e.n hirllself is tLe source of hi:3 fault s; such as he is, 
I 
he nas in idea. '~d, ~oved by certain indispens~ble reasons of 
'f... l7isdolTI., h'.'s ~ivGd tha.t he comes to existence such as he is. 
:Sayle, Leibniz rerrlnr~;::c, ni3rt l:~'ve understood this ori~si':'l of evil 
th:t lae li0:3 e~t(1blished. if he had united. the ';7i sdom of ,~~od to his 
p0\7er, to his :3;oodness _,nd to his holines s •. Jl.d God's holiness 
is nothing else than the S11preBe de,'~ree of Goodn6ss/ (lfL'horcme est 
luy r.J.-eme In source de ses naux: tel qu'il est, il etoit dans les 
ide~s. Dieu, mu pLlr des raisons indispensnbles de la s:::gesse, a 
"'Il,~nequlil passat'a l'existence tel qu'il est ..... r,~. Dayle se seroit 
peute~e apperqu de cette origine du m~l que j'etablis, s'il avoit 
joint icrY la se.Gesse de Dieu d. so. :!;lUissance, (i sa bonte/ et 'a sa 
saintete, J'adjouteray en p8ssant,J' que so. sUintet;;( n 'est autre chose 
que le/supr~Ii1e d~e6Sr~ de 10. bonte, COr;2:1e Ie crin'.e qui luy est / 
oppose, est ce qu'il y a de plus mauvais dans le mal n ?he'odicee. 
Par. 151. '1. vi. p. 200-). '}lhe reason for the permission of evil 
comes from those etern::?l possibilities, in accordance with which 
this manner of universe crhich amits evil and which has come into 
actual existence, finds itself the most perfect on the whole among 
the others possible. (Ilil semble que 10. raison de la permission 
du mal vient des uossibilitis ~ternelles, suivant lesquelles cette 
mani~re d 'Uni vers'" qui I' admet et qui a este/ adrni se 'h l' existence 
actuelle, se trouve la plus parfaite en somme parmy toutes les 
faJons possibles r1 Re\ponse aux reflexions contenues dens la ••. article 
Rorarius ~. iv. p. 56?) 
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~lc cording to 13£',yle rye cannot ar[;'Ue m.ulgre fact s and the 
supreme fact is a providence infinitely good and holy. (!fune 
providence infiniment bonne et sainte") Every thine; in the world 
must be subsumed under this major premise of all reaoning. There 
are thus two considerations of crucial importance (1) ab actu ad 
potentiam valet consequentia. (2)~this small enth~nene, as Bayle 
calls it,fY This has happened, then this is not contrpry to the 
holiness and the goodness of God. tl (,Icela est arrive, donc cela ne 
r~pugne point'e. 181. saintet( et "a la bonte de Dieu u .) How very 
Leibnizian these arguments are suggests that there is more in 
COlMlon between Leibniz and Sayle than is either generally thought or 
~ould appear at first sight. Eoth travel alone different routes but 
in the end reach the same destination. 
For Bayle there is no hope of reconcilin~ faith ~ith 
reason. Only the revelation of the 3criptures and V1the principle of 
submission?? (ille principe de la soum.issiont1) to their authority will 
lighten the darkness of these mysteries of life. 80n enim cogitationes 
IDeae cogitationes vestrae; neque viae vestrae, viae meae, dicit 
::ominus (ls. LV. 8.) is a verse that Bayle quotes \7i th evidemt 
ap~reciation (referred to Dict. y. 2325.) and it sives the keynote 
of all his ap~roach to t~is problec of evil. 
!t is for this re3son that so Larry solutions of the 
problen of evil It·md us in SiI'lilar or greater difficltlties. ~;:o 
explain evil e. ~. l,):T t::::.e ':ift of freedon'., invokes the re~ly tll;"l.t 
it is not usual even for a beneficent ~rince or un e&rthly p~rent 
to ;.:;ive to tt0ir c.epe~;.dsnts tha.t of ~hich they Ei~~ht IF::e f. hurtful 
use. ..Jld. c~s for tte ar:s ... l~1en t tt:lt-'od' s perI:i slilion of sin eno. bles 
hir;:l to reveal his attributes of justice and Y'ercy-,(Jh~;t 'ae !'li3ht 
call the "0 felix culpa ar.;'ument H_ this really, on the contrary, 
points in the 0P:1osi te direct ion as the HOllan GQtholoc ~9Mine of 
the :rf'..n1atmls,te Conception of the :Slessed Virgin L{ary P~g out so 
clearly. Fu.rther, according to Dayle I thi s "0 felix culpa arGument II 
is not so good e,g the"limi ted "are,'Ul1l.ent of L:anichaeisI;I. For this 
at least':.'e can ::,ssert of the ~._anichaean deity, thout;h limited in 
poner I=e Ili 11s the happiness «.nd virtue of mankind and 1:7ere it not 
for the untir~ely thuart ing of the ..2.,\;i1 One would succed in this 
object. Lut to refu.te this 119*$_ "0 felix culpa arGument~: 1:7e do not 
require metapr..ysics at all. For c. country yokel kno':rs clearly 
that it is ,9. 5':reater e;ood to hinder a flan from fallinG;; into G ditch 
than to let him fall in there dnd to drGlW him out at the end of an 
hour. (!lun villa2:eois conoi t c,laire:rnent Clue c' est une plus srande 
bonte d'empecher qU'un hom.me ne tombe dans une fosse, que de l'y 
laisser tomber, et Qt: l'en tirer au bout d'une heure." Art. 
~auliciens\l Dict. p. 2326.) This e~orl11OUS costliness of the 
alle3ed delegation to man of individual freedom must not be 
forgotten. The damnation of the gre ter part of the hUlJl.2n race is 
not a small price to pay. For Bayle it is definite ly'.' impossible 
to reconcile with the undisputed go dness of :tod. (i?Zamais nous ne 
comprendrons qu'on ~it pu lui conse ver ce privilec;e par un effet 
de bonte', et :pour l' runour de la sai tete". n Art. "Pauliciens If • 
Dict. p. 2326.) 
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~his enormous costliness of the alleged deleGation to man of 
individu~l freedom must not be forgotten. ~he damnation of the 
greater pe..rt of the hillflCl.n rt'.ce is not a small price to pay. For 
Bayle it is definitely impossible to reconcile this with the 
undisputed goodness of God. (viJamais nous ne comprendrons qu' on 
ait pu lui conserver ce privilege par un effet de bonte~ et 
pour l'amour de la saintet6. YlArt. iVPauliciens." Dict. ]1.2326.) 
~ll this leads us to that elevation of faith and 
abE,se:m.ent of reason (e'llvation de la foi at de I 'abaissement de 
la raison) vlhich alone can fUide man out of the maze of his own 
Ylleanclerings in the realm ot' controversy. For if the tee.ching of 
orthodox~7 is bee;e;ared, hO·v7 Lluch more is this true of the teachin.::; 
of the sects. iill old ,i.1.bbe', Eayle relates, saw before him four 
ways- the Calvinist, the Jansenist, the Thomist and the Ir~olinist 
and found theTI each one respectively conflictine; to SOllie authority. 
1Y\~uem fu~1il.arlQ, quem sequar, non habeo. -L::. prern.i~re route est 
contrqire au Concile de Trente, la seconde ~x Constitions des 
Papes, la troisi~me "?l la ~~aison et la quatriei1.e ~ :3t. Faul'! ~ As 
Dayle asserts again neither the method of the Scotists nor of the 
Fajonistes, nor of :.rather l.:c.lebranche, nor of the Lutherans nor 
of the 50cinians can resolve the objections of those \7ho i:Lu::/ute 
to ~od tb.e introduction of sin or assert that it is incOIIl.p[;tible 
flith his r;oodness, his holines::; or his justice. (Hni la r,.~ethocle 
des .::.icotists, :Ii celle des I"olinistes, ni celles des :.emon.trans, 
ni celIe ~es ~~iversultistes, ni celIe des rajonistes, ni celIe 
dl; Ijere ':~'lebranch(-), ni celle des LuthE'rj.ens, ni celIe des 
iociniens ne sont capables de s:}ud.re Ie;; objectiol'38 de ceux qui 
iIJr9utent'a Dieu l'introduction du piche, ou c:'J.i :?re'tendent qy.'elle 
n'est point COf,ilpo.tible c:vec S8. bante, 11i avec sa sC1.intetE!, ni 
avec sa ,~ustice. 11 Art. Pa.ulicienfl Dict. T'. 2327.) It Il.uy be 
noticed here that ~ayle fails to see that the difficulty of 
reconcilin,:;; the o:rmiscience of rlod 'tlith the freedom of W3..Il is 
l:1UCh greater than the problEm of the alle:::;sd concursus of the 
deity \lith evil. For the ar8Ul?'Emt of Zoraster (in lJ.rt. V? 
~ .. G.ni cheens VI), th2.t a.s the crea tUTS depends upon:}od, therefore lod 
is responsible for evil,h~'s the Ep!1ee.ronce of cO'jency only 
bece.use it confuses :;'1,S contr"dictory things uhich are quite 
different. :':'xister l'e.r soi l~me and Q~~ir par soi m-eme ce.n never 
be contradictory. For the fact of existence is toto caelo different 
from the experience of activity, thou~l'. Eayle equates the t'\iJO 
and passes the argument of Zoraster as valid. 
The conclusion of the whole matter for 2ayle is that 
meither the rationalism of orthodoxy nor the rationalism of the 
sects can lead us out of the crux of the problem of evil. There I 
must be a violent break with the ,:3cholestic tradition .... !. Thefodicee 
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must not only be built of other materials but also erected on 
other foundations than argu.ll!ents of the lumen siccum. But his 
attempted reconstruction is insignificant compared \7i th his 
remorseless cross examination. Faith and reason are as different 
as day and ni£;ht. In the last resort there must be an iSlct of faith 
and faith for 2ayle is ever a case of seein~ oculis clausis. Like 
the I}erm.gn theol03ian of our O~1n d~y I-:arl Barth, :3ayle insists 
that 3cripture is the ~~rd of 3001 and cotles to us ab extra. The 
principle of submission to the Revelation of God is the only way 
out of the jungle of confusion into which othen1ise re['Lson plunGes 
us. 
The Great value of 3ayle is in his mIn \'lords V'piquer 
d 'honneur<t !.fl1ose 17110 have the aeni us to form ner! systems and 
invent denou~e1l1ents as yet unl;::norm. (quoted by Leibniz Discours 
F::.r. 85. }. vi. p. 99.) J11zre can be no doubt tll~:t for Lei bniz 
~ayle with "sa Grande penetration" ~rar. 84. above} h~s this 
propaedeutic value. ~s Q reaGoner, consistent and tireless, ~~yle 
is more than the equal self of Descartes or Leibniz. :?ut ho'.Vever 
severe his dialect ic he remcins a trO.b son of the faith that besat 
hir1. re cOIi~bines in 1'.18 person the ~(eforGa t ion ~',nd the Senaissance. 
::ouhere is this rllade more pl!:\in thi'n in the question of the 
conforlili ty of faith ':7i th re3.son in general and in the problelil of 
evil in particular. 
.-
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c. vi. 
rJ.1he ::Tact of :3vil . 
It is a point, often overlooked, that to isolate the 
bare data of evil ipso facto implies a prior synthetic vision of 
the facts Vle thus isolate and, consequently, 0.. hope that we cen 
explain t11eir existence. It is in this sense 'lui te true that, in 
the words of a modern theolo~ian;'i ... LL attempt s to explain evil 
end in explainin~ it arlayrrv (Brunner). :..nd at times I~eibniz's 
solution of the problem of evil takes this form of explaining it 
('''1G..~r as due to lifc.uoses apparences IV (cf. Dicours Par. 44. ) cf. 
also Par. 82.) 
.30 it is that the approach of Leibniz to the phel1o:w,ma 
of evil contains in~licitly to some extent the solution he is 
coin~ to offer us. 1he stark inexplicability of evil in on ot~8r­
~ise uell organiseS world is a sufficient proof of its relative 
uniC;,ueness. :::'Vil, as Lei bniz SHYS, exe i tes our attent ion more th<ll1 
the cood. '.rhis proves thO,t it is more rare. (i"Le ~lal exc i te plustost 
nostre attention Ciue Ie bien; Huis cftte ][i~r;le raison confirms 
c,;,ue Ie Hal est plus rare. II ('lh60dicee. Par. 258. '-. vi. ,. 269.) 
~ut if leibniz n, sever tenpted to L~inimise t:::.e evil 
in the -"arId, the ~ictionno.ire of :.'aylo i.l.t his elboTI ',F~2 a: 
restr£:il1in".~ influence. "0 1 i ttle Lleri t of :~:J.yle' s i'l2!lC:liri:s of this 
issae is the reco~nition of the ruthless evil in the world. ~or 
Layle, as ue h2ve-seen, there is t stron~ a posteriori ~round 
for ti:e dUG.lisLl of ; 'anicflc.eism.. r:{his sta:in3 of tile issue h9.S had 
its effect upon Leibniz c'.nd helps to IX-ike hirr: on6 of the fundaments.l 
creatoEs of tlleodicean arc;ument. In this ':forld there is cluays 
[71e r~e12nc;e du naIl; (Leibniz to JSollr~uet .}. iii. :1. 558.). ,,8 
l;;:nmJ no \10rld th" t can be cle scribed c~.s C 7un mondo sc..ns net 1 \1 • 
It is one thin3, hocrever,to ~dmit the factual existence 
of ovil and 8110tl'lGr to D2i;:e a quasi-hedonistic calculus on the 
debit side or to say \?'lith Descartes (quoted with 8.p:Drov2.1 by Ieibniz 
?heodicl§"e :Fe.r. 255. '}. vi. p. 3(7) nque 10. raison nllturelle nous 
apprend que nous avons plus de biens Clue de r~aux en cotte vie:1 • 
?hat E6n Llalce up the books of life on the debit side in this l~:'itter 
of ~ood and evil is priro~rily due, suys I,eibniz, to the fact that 
refloction does not keep ~ace with our experience of lifs. :lessings 
unconsciously enJoyed are never reckoned. There are feIT, for 
eXaD.ple. i7210 l!Ould not c<::re to Ii VB the i1' life E~gain, VJi th the 
same proportion of ~oods and ills, alcrays provided that it DGS 
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varied o.nd its gen8ral conditions unchansec1. Thus Leibniz would 
hold his optimism in the teet:!:: of the Die-evricse Jiederkunft of 
::-ietzche. 
It is a great mistake to enlu1'~e unon the ills that 
man inherits, even though VJe may h'we apIlB.rent personal cause 
for so doin~. ~or not only are these complQints ill-founded 
bu.t in thus conplainins 'lIe are murrm1'ins a6ainst the providence 
of the goodness of Jod. It is imnossible ITith justice to be 
discontent e.s a member of the City of '"'rod. (~'ll ne faut pas ~tre facileI~:ent du nombre des me'contens d::.ns la ~:epubliqu~ 0\1 1 'on 
est, et il ne Ie faut point ~tre du tout dans la cite de Dieu, ou 
l' on ne le peut -etre qu' avec injust ice.?? r~:heOdicee. 1'ar. 15. G. vi. 
p. 110.). 'To enlar~e upon tr.E'l li;tany of mortal ills, apart from 
its having no found~tion in fQct, is psychol03ically ~rong. For 
the blessinGs of life are more 8i3nific~nt, as they Qre nore in 
number, than its Boes. 
:~uch of the ::.118'];ed evil in life is interminGled 1.:11 th 
lLPuch 30001. :,~~,ny 80 called evils in life ere often the Vla~Ts 
to\Jards zreater :~'ood8. ~i. :}en~ral of 8.i1 fiTLy Y;':;.J..:e 0 SO':::let ine s a 
},'l""''''y lfll"strl~e nhl"ch C'-'1"8-8 t'r-8 ,ell"n'~l"'''''' of " eeor,:J.~- '),""t+le (iF-n J,:'(...' lJJ::'"' '1 "",,,.J;,~ II'.I _~~_~~.,."~ .l)..L. ~-<-~. ~ '~L v v I:"':.. v • U· 
J.eneral d' :;.rmee fo.i t quel~ues fois/LUlf JcJttc h0vreU;'~,€, lJ.:.,.:i c:J.use 
le '''l"n d'~n'e '·'r~·1.r1e b""t"l"ll~·11 n~eoc'l"c"o -,,1' 1- '1 "Fl~ -.' ],'0') ~~... ~~_.::. _-"" :-.~.!! y. '-.:). ~ v J... 1.1 ,~ v - .l '-"\. - • v. v. " • .A.,"'. - v ........ 'J. 
"'* If there is 2ny truth in t~ec6 uor~s, t~en, ~Bib~iz 
3eer.:s to ::F,'j, "6 l''i.Ust l~eco.rd hi~tory ::.S the fim;'..l "rbi ter of v.:~L1.O. 
It is to 30L8 ,3t'.ch rrinciple 8.S this tlJct :;;.ny optici:..:tic )hilo;)o:)hy 
of lifE' tG in thE; 02:1d rcuuco(. It is the backbone of Loi bniz' s 
Gl,nsuer to t:~e prob16~,~'i: of evil :..nd tr.6 belief in nt:he best of :::~ll 
possible -:Jorlds l ! •• Leibni,g' s continuation of the dL.lo:':u8 of '.Tallo. 
Flal,:es thi s clear. "hen t1l.~ res.cl". the t~)pr'lost c.pnttr::ent of the 
pyraI.~i(~ the ,'2:0defJG tells t .;extus, L S histor~7 lmons hiE" r:as 
inevit(bly involved in the best of ~ll ~ossible ~o1'lds.n If 
Jupi ter h~d here t.21cen c~ ..;ex:tu8 Ylho ".r,'~S h::.p:?y at Corinth, or \7ho 
uas the kin~ of Threcs, it ~o~ld no lon~er h~va b~en this world. 
Yet he could not fe.il to choose this \,'orld, 1.7hic11 s;~lrp::.sses all 
others in nerfection, and c,7hich forI:' s the e.pex of the pyrc.n.id: 
otlleI'l,rise .Tupiter \Jould hese renounced his vJi.sdom, :}nd 'i70uld 
he.ve banishe(l. Jr:'l.e, his dC:1.:::;llter. ,tou see that r,~y fe,ther did not 
make .sextus rJic}~E-)d. :::s h~c1 been cJic~,;:eD fron" (;.,11 eternity, cnd 
tiluays of his OHn free VJill. :upi ter did nothin':3 but ~;rant him 
existence, which his uisdom could not refuse to the rorld which 
contains him. :Ie }!1ade him PL.SS from. the re:ion of possible to that 
of actnal bein::;s. The crime of Jextus serves~;reG.t ends : it makes 
Rorile free, from it is born :?c'rreat empire, which will furnish 
r;reat eXBIl1ples. But that is nothing compared r1i th the totality of 
this world, uhose beauty you will ~dBire TIhen, after a happy 
ps,ssinC from this mort:::~l condition into a better ste.te, the e;ods 
shall have Insde you capable of knowinc.; it VI (Theodic~e. Pelr. 416. 
G. vi. Trans. by ~orris.) 
·~'rhere is'the witness,too,of the ~reat Christian hynn' sun~ in the latin Office for Easter Eve:-
o certe necessarium Adae Pf:Ccaturr, 
Ouod Christi morta deletum ESt! 
o fel ix cu lpa,quae talerr ac tantum 
tv"eru it habere' redempto ran. 
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The truth, which this ~:reat principle of interpre'tation 
embodies, reninds us not only of the liJ:1i ted charactor of our 
knowled~e about the Dorld but also that our personal happiness 
is not nscessarily Vlthe one fE),r off divine eVEmt to which the 
';1hole creat ion :inoves f7. 0/ .. 180, Lei bniz insist s, spiritual joys 
have 2, su:?rem2cy of their ovm not al"'Jays reckoned in every 
calculus. ("Les plaisirs de l'esprit sont les Dlus Durs et les 
plus ut iles pour fairs durer le. joye It The-odi c<le. Far. 254. Ct. vi. 
p. 267.) It is no light IJ1atter to be content uJith 'J-od and the 
universe; not to fe2r 1.:yhCit is dest ined for us, not to cOl(~plain of 
the,t '\,1hioh comes to llS. (above). It is possible to have such 
serenity of l~}ind that Gve~ bodily t~lent s ~:e despi($,ed.0'or this 
reason He are often !lOOI' ~udrSeG, os ,:.lshop ~,lnr{ so.ys, of the 
happiness or unhan:,-)iness of our fel1mJ :wen. Foverty and ~;e",~lth e.re 
no cri terion':ls to the nresence or absence of ha1)1')iness. (iYOn se 
c~noi t peu aassi en. bo~hEJur, et sOUlvent la re'llci te' est 
lJleCOnnue sous les b~'?,lllolls d'un puuvre content, pendant qU.'Oi1 1& 
cherche en ,vain d:ms les :98J£JS cl.e qnelc:ues 1rc,nc.sn).~ • .:ad I,eibniz 
is in f:J.rhher 3.&reement ',7i th,.(_;ishop ~~in(; '::Then he :;oe8 Ol'l to c.dd 
that the zreatest ha~~iness on t~is Burth consists in tho hope of 
f'1.1tnrEJ happiness nnd th3.t thas one C3.fl S3.y thr:.t not}-;"il1S happens 
to the i.7icl~ed uhich Cloes not ,serve for their ar~endHent or 
pUniSf1"'::lcnt e.ncl t:r).3.t nothin;; h8.p';CnO to the :;ood ,\Tll ior. (1083 not 
se.rve for their rTE'J.t0r ',7ellbein~. (1) 
~h:!.8 irrefr:). ~~s,h18 interrelatedness of eVG1'7t;:_in-,' in 
the t·nj.verse :::'l1c'l. the :nrii1ciple tl,u.t v~).lne is ('.2;t-::r~::inE:C:i. ulti!'.:,~tely 
~s c~ retJu,lt of ;:"roc(:;:,' ~:GII' us to r:.nu<:.'rGt::::'r:c1 !:uch ot~~er.7ise 
i~1e::;::plic2blG. ~ut tl:e~T c ,;mot GX' L:.i'l ;),':J3.:1 t;::.e 8'\/11 f:.lcts of rlllicl1 
vs Gre conscio~3. For in spite of t~,eue r:~lliryinJ consiCa~~t1ons 
ther8?ra :.:;n'~ve evil thin:;::; in thE. IJorlG',. !t is r~liea '~.'6: as:\: '::hut 
is tbe cost1,ic si<;nificance of I:ihezEc facts t:;ut 'liE. 1'8,188 t~le 
question D111ch is the real probler~ of 8vil. 
l'he l1iliE;u in \;711ich lie Pls'.C6 theoe evil facts beco;-,les 
all in~ortant. It is for this reason that Leibniz is so insistent 
upon the limitation of our real kno~l~dse as T:ell sa the futility 
o~n anthropo-centric vier! of tile universe. ':i:he evils of the 
V'JOrld are evils in 8', universe ','here ::111 is interconnected (If tout 
est lle"'i) + rrhey rlUst therefore be brou:-;ht 17i tllin some kind of 
schema. For the universe is like an ocean rrl1ere everything is all 
of a piece and the least :uovement in one :91ace has S.n effect in 
another nlnce. (i'L 'uni vers, quel qu' 11 puisse etre, est tout 
d 'une pi~ce, COllll,le un Oclan; le r:loindre Llouvement ;,T etend son 
effect a quelque distance que ce soit, qouyque cet effect devienne 
Boins sensible ~ proportion de la distance"). ~hough no fact in 
the universe is its brotter's keeper, yet no fact exists in lonely 
isolation apart from other facts. 30 that ue can say if the least 
evil in the ~orld failed to exist, the Dorld could no longer be 
the S,Wle 'Florld. (VI.L~insi, 8i le Boindre c;.,u.i arrive dews le Iilonde y 
mc.nquoi t, ce ne seroi t plus ce nonde •••. 1~ "l'headi cee Far. 10 .1. vi. 
p. 108.) 
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::Jut the develop¢ment of astronordcal science has 
helned us to fOThl a truer perspective of the universe then the 
ancients. st. ~uGustine's preoccupation about the evil in the 
universe vJ"ould have been helpec~ by the illmninat ion that comes 
from tbe reading of the facts of evil ar;ainst a tlider canvas • .Ie 
cannot say homo mensura oumiurn. For the universe is wider than 
the breadth of man's mind. It is not enouc,:h to see the universe 
sub specie hominis,we must see it, so f:lr~as 1jJe can, sub specie 
dei. ~~d for Leibniz to see it sub specie dei is not to see it, 
as <lpinoza tauGht, sub specie a:eterni but sub specie uni versi . 
.;..\.t times Leibniz carrj.es this to extrellle lencsths,as \.711e11 he says 
that our rlOrld and its inhabitants is of sli:::;ht consideration 
in respect of tl:e great universe and all its evils are ahJ.ost 
nothin~ in thenselves and nothine in respect of the sood in the 
universe. (2) 
The above discussion illustrates the relentless 
difficulty of all philosophy that no sooner do ~e be~in to 
describe the uhenonena of evil jn the universe than ne find 
ourselves atterilptin3 2, solutionOfthe problel~l of tt'.eir existence. 
In the CGse of ~ "cos~odicy~ the probleu is not acute unless ue 
rerard evil ~s an inherent disordorlin8ss. ,~t in the c~se of a 
':21l~c1icee to dE::fin0 6vil io iDsO fe l cta to exrlc..in its existellce. 
::?or Le i l.miz it is h:passi ble to SPS::"ljc. about the ~E1i V(:;rS8 unless 
·:16 vic',;' it in dYileJdc r2fel'ence t() the o.oi t:r. ':"lhis theofcGlltric 
out lao'l~: of I.e i bniz ~,',::.~~;:es ~~Lll t: 1El difference in his :;.ns.JorJ.l1d 
aP:9r(,x"oh to tl,.o :r:rabler<~ of evil. :'e rer:'lrcls thE:, ~,)odr:(88 of'-~} 
Xl,uch in t!1o s:.::;;~e HC:Y 8.S :;,"·r6ok :?.:i t]:er insisted on thE: ~ ov'tl.fX /0( 
of-::od in conb8..tin~; ;~n,Jsticisn.~he existencG of '''cod is t:le 
decisive f0.ctor. For '7h8£1 it h''lpnens that tllere i3 T;lore ~vil than 
C~ood in reSG.rd to tee 11UBan r' ce, it is sufficient th",t in relation 
to 'i.o¢!. there is incomparably Jlore ::;oocl tilc.n evil in the universe. 
( 111"ta's quand n@'ne 11 sGroit ecir.l plus de m'o1l 01.''.1.0 de bien 8.u~enre 
humain, il suffit !)8..r re.p}?Ort)i Dieu, qu'il JJ 2, inoor.lpar:,~blenent 
plus de bien que de Ft?,l dc,ns l'universH. ~heodic-ee. J?a.r. 2G2. S·.vi. 
p. 272.) ~lse~here ITe are told evil uppears ~s notbin~ in respect 
to sood, uhen ne consider the veritable zrandeur of the city of 
,'jod. (ViiI faut dirs que le ms.l ne laisseroi t pas de ps,ro1'tre prcsc;,ue 
cor.Xle rien en cO:;-:l1?o.rison du bien, qU3.na. on coasiolerern la ve'ri te,ble 
erandeur de la 01 te' de Dieu l1 ) 
It is true that ~e c~nnot folloD those uho Co so far as 
to speak of Deus siva :':atura or to speak ofJod liS the anima nundi. 
Eut we can say that the world is an or~anic unity exhibiting an 
E'.rtifice ['nd beauty beyond the iY;lac;ination, thr;lt from thiils 
artifice and beauty rJe can draw important consequences for the 
wisdom and the goodness of the author of thin~G even in those 
regions where our oun kno~led~e does not extend. ~:ou different 
is thi s line of ar:~uEent from t ha t of t ho,s8 '\ivho are Fe; ready to 
disnarace the ~orld after knouing it three dJYs and who neV8r see 
beyond their nose. (3) 
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.Ie htive 3. kev here to unlock our nroblem. :ror if the 
universe cannot be regar~ed in itself us a subst~nce or an 
animal with their appropiate unities since it is not only infinite 
itself but also infinite uithin itself, yet it has an orcanic and 
teleolo:=:;i cal conpleteness of it s orm. 
leibniz Groups the phenomena of evil in the Horld 
under three categories (1) aetaptysical (2) physical (3) noral. 
It is a classific~tion which hus often been used since Isibniz. 
rrobabl~T I,ei bniz o\lec~ it to the teachins of ~ ': iraondes for 17hoI1 he 
had a ereat respect, ttOl1:h it 1s universally resarded as Leibniz's 
own. "aimonides srys there are three kinds of evil incident to 
r":CLn::·~ind and they can be thus classified pncler these he:.'ds (1) 
becauses man possesses Q body (2) ~lch as people cause e~ch other 
and (3) the results of one's own action (cf. ~hB Te~c~1n=s 0f 
l.G.irr.onides. b. Cohen (1927.) n. 39.) <,matever the source of the 
classification, it illustrates the impossibility for Leibniz of 
isolatin2; the 1')henol:1Sno. of evil i7ithout 2.t the Sa)[ile tir18 tryinz 
to e:;:;:~lo.in t>,er' • 
.... t first si2;ht it seerlS rt"t~1er str!in::;e thqtt ::"eitniz 
C:.oes not Z,dl' a fourth cateGory to this clc..osificCltion of the fs.cts 
of ECvtl, na:el~r the discI'epancy of nm:.ird :.lna. re:r'i t or "Gi::.e Ci',~estion 
cZ j''':.3t ico. :,:"ei bniz, hO\.'Jev'f.r, cClnnot be ac c:L'3e(~ ;::;f l'l8 .'lGct j_!:~ t:".i:3 
CO:i3icc ",-tion •. l'.t his tl-~eocentric trE,,;1d ofshQ~J,'::I;t lc~~~cl r-li1'1 to 
,3"::';Ji,."e -'..Ji~i~ 1).11Cor t:le prior~';),est ion of the ',oodness of --:~od. as 
i..eibni7. (;"'.0.Jil:c:-; j1Jstice-"la justice n'est s.utre/cilose (~').e 1.:.:. 
cl12,ritc;ra,,,-:1~ selon l':Jl sQ .. ~esse!! (Letter to ..... bbe ~,icCl.i8c lo93.~·.::'. 
p. 581.)- ue can e"sily soe tte C:irE'.ction of his thot~· . .'~;.t. ci'his is 
m:.c:'c even [·',ere cle:;.r in C' ~()'t3Su.:e in thej:~heOdic8e "'J:out 18 :i: ... oncl.e 
doi t convcnir CLue Dien est :x:.rfai ter.1ent bon et juste, qt18 S8. 
~ ~)J.t(...1'~Rl4it qcpt~ibu~ :L£Jl0ins Qt'-'il est possible ~. ce ~1J.i~~~ ~(:;;rt")~~ le-s1"S3,tv8r"';l JYOs:':;i'le, ~s-je, ~,>",.uf l'ordre cene1al des choses) 
c.;.ue sa justice l' enp-ecl-'!e de d::-.r";'1.er Qles innocents et de 13..isser 
&e bonnes actions ss~ns nfuOLperlSeS; et c.;,'lc' 11 '3aro.e El.E3'ne une juste 
proportion dans les punitions E)t d~ n8 Ie:] reco:mpGnGos1: ('..:'hEfodicl§e 
Par. 8E. J..vi. !). 148-9.) ::lhus so far frOlI!. Leibniz rele:3i:,~,tin2: this 
crux to e secondary ,1[c6 in his tre2tlrent of tLe ~robleTI of evil, 
it is, on the contrL".ry, the r'L'.i.n theme of tl16 '::l~'odic~e. This Bust 
be obvious because \1i thout tI just i eEl \I \~.ie could h2.ve no Divine ll1or:'ll 
tlctivity 'nd no '\;oodness" in God . 
./ (1) lVJ.etaphysice.l evil is the marl( of fell creaturliness 
("Le mal m.etaphysique consiste d:ms 1a siLlple inperfection"). It 
is that limit ITithout uhich creation could not ta~e place. It is 
the prior lOJical condition of 011 creation. i~less the deity is 
goin~ to reduplicute himself uhat he creates ~nst have a 
perfection less than the divine. 30 there n~st needs be metaphysical 
evil unless iod is to abstain from every act of creation. Leta?hysica.l 
evil is inextrice,bly involved in eVE;ry existent les8 than God 
himself. It is a prior losical condition attachin3 to the nature 
of every existent even uhen it hus beins only as a possibility 
in the Divine ninde 
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It is hardly necessary here to dwell upon the long 
history of this ideo. of ILetaphysical evil. By no one 'Flas it more 
clearly asserted than by the ,3choolmen. "Onme ens est bonum, malum 
est in bono subjecto1! or as Leibniz puts it in :.1 letter to Jolff 
(L. to Jolff. Dec. 1705. G. L. viii. p. 5C.) r'origo m.ali est a 
limi tatione creaturarum l ? But it is the influence of Plato himself 
that is probably here most dominant. In the rrimaeus, to which Leibniz 
refers, Plato finds the phenomena of evil in the 'I;-Jorld explained 
by the incalci trancy of uncreated ::.:nd inderendent ~).. k (matter) . 
And Leibniz believes that rrith reg8,ro to this and other similar 
lines of thouQ;ht SJle can give a sood sense. (VIGne y pent donner un 
b 11 Tl -' d· P "0"'· Ill'::) on sens Deo loee. ar.,;::;'. (.Jr. Vl.!). 0, 
~his netanhysical evil is the IDcltrix of all other 
evil, physical and moral. Both physical end ~or,!l evil can be 
traced ~ack ultir~tely to creaturely ih~erfection. If TIe care to 
use ?lQtonic lan3ua~£e rlEJ rL1Qy perhaps be c..lloued to speo.l;: of all evil 
3.S due to "mutt G:r i! • :Gut, of course, this "'rJ:z..tter[l is very different 
from the stuff ui th uhicl1 l'le deal in our eVflry day eX:9srience of 
life. Yor Leibniz limatter" is 110. medley of confused thoue;hts!' 
("un mel8.nc~e de pen~(t cOJl~~~s~~ 'f.'~ )},q. .... in ~ l~}Ii.t"'r(~or1r ,i~S to this 
than He can trs:.ce 311 otb.er em::. :?or- conftt'3e~C t:hill~dn~~defeWs t11c~t 
the evil p 8810n8 of CBn batten: Thus the fans at ori:o of all 
evil is nothil1~~ leas tr..o.n ,,,_ets.:)h;)TSicc1 i!,l.perfection. 6J.ilG. this 
inc1i apensable condit ion of 811 cre8.turliJ'l.6ss nust find L~ :Dle,ce 
even \'littil: t;:18 ::j_vine llL::cL :,,'ui; of thiE~ rie f)h'lll s:J..'] more 12..ter. 
(2j l'hysic::;;.l evil is ;.:0, ter-D) l'!!d,c~~ 8x!l13.ins itself .. 
Leihniz does not shut his eyes to the ~&aife8t sufferin~ in the 
florId but health o.ft6r 8.11 is Iiore COEO!) than dL':Je::.sc ju.st :~,[J there 
~re, es he s~ys, Rore acellin: houses than haspit11s. 
Phys i cal evil has it s root c~:.use 18.r:.:el~T Ll t:'lC 
fra.;.:ili ty of the l".l.:Ji'lan body Ullich a:"::::'..in is 2. conr-;e\iu.ence of the 
nature of thinGS (HUlne st;.ite de la nuture des c}~ose3\1lhe:J(Ucee. 
P~1r. 14. '1. vi. p. 110.) i:~~n is or:;a.nic to tl"!.e createC. univE'.rse ancL.I 
like the rest of creat ion. :tlUst suffer irlpGrfe ction h2T reQson of his 
creaturliness. Jhen the fra,,;ili t'T of man's boc1.y is considered, it 
is :::dv1.ost llir2CulonG thc..t, so fc.r frc)Ju CQIlrl,platnin:; that 111'3.11 is 
often sicl;: and ill, he is not in this sto.te?l.l'.JUYs. 
Leibniz is not l.)jli'indful of the nrotective v:;.luE) of Huch 
physic': 1 pain ..... ::;ain '~·e must not for:;et the ~solidC:.ri ty bet1,7e8n the 
::inGdOI.l of ks,ture and the I~il1s.:;dom of '~~race, "Jith the resultant 
:narellelism bet'Ceen physical and moral evil. 1?hy3ic~,1 evil is often 
a punishment for a Il loral L'pse and a \JC,rnin~); for tbe futurE;. 
("elle a coutume de servir plustost de cha'ti.ment de ce qu'on s'est 
ensace.l" effect i ve:ment dans le r.:al, et d' admoni t ion de 11' Y pas retomber 
une antre fois n Theodicee. n:.r. 342.1. vi. p. 318.) .ie micht even 
go the leneth of s~yins th~t if there ues no noral evil there uould 
be no physic2.1 evil (Iill est fort raisono.ble de ju~~er, que sans 
Ie mal J'1oral il n' y auroi t point de Llal physi~le des creatures 
raisonnablesi Ie parallelisme des deux, c'est a dire, de celuy des 
finetles et de celuy des efficientes, qui reviennent'a celuy de 13. 
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l':ature et de la :1race., Ie paroist porter ainsi.?1 Leibniz to 
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.:,;ourGue. .). _;r. 111. Tl. !J •• 
God does not rriSh antecedently physical evil or 
suffering. For this reason there is no absolute nredestination to 
de.rr,nation • .Ihen physical evil is not a punislment for a fault, rle 
:must regard it as a means to an end, tlle,t is to prevent :~reater 
evils or to obtain 3reater ~oeds. (4) In certain cases, too, 
p;.in serves not only for amenduent, eXoSHple and a ( .. ;ree..ter 
appreciation of the zoed but can also contribute to the sreater 
spiritual perfection of the sufferer similar to the gay a Grain 
of YiTheat becoFles corru:9t before (~err1.in:?t in-:: :;~nd beDrin~~ fruit •. ( 5) 
It is alonG these ~en6rQl lines of the ~reater ~ood 
tha t 7"'T9 7'lust explain tIle 2'.r~J<:.r'en t cos~lic ?ri at ion bet'sJGen I'1Sln 
on the one ha.nd and the larrs of ne.ture on the other. It is truo 
th.s.t in the I,eilmizi'3.n universE'; there is harr:ony 10eo'01':7ee1'1 efficient 
and final c,:,uses 8.nc1 ber:.ind the fin~~l 031.:1888 of the ',miv~'rse there 
is 9. Deity l'lholly ber..E·fi ctent to inan. :ut it is evitcnt (po.ce 
Lalebr~;mcbe) th:;,t there is c, certain roc:i,lci tI'~.H1CY bst-:-Jeen i;J,.f:n 
9.nd t;l'.e la,7s of natura. :loli\etL~(.s the inC,ividuGl I.lUGt be s·'.;.crificec1 
to t~e oeneral ~ood. Leibni~ nuotes crith annrovul the criticicE 
-" ~ "-by I ::~_il'lonidGs of thoce uho i:r.~'("'inc th'J.t :,;;~tu.re 11.:13 been l-,8,de only 
for tbm;l c;md oO.::1cluoc th9.t, \;;!len sor,ethin:.; h~1n:'cns contLl.nT to their 
11· ', .. n~·'" r~ 11 ." ... ~,., ro " ..... '~ t' c '].. ". (. ) 11,1. '-',t"",,,. lu "rvu',. Jl\.ou llc: ~"nlVCJ'.)E:.. u 
(~») : .. ol~al • :viI. j et~~I'hysic::, 1 evil is n. t:-"-(; :::oot of 
uoral Evil. It ~8 not 8nou~ to S2Y t~ t ti.e Devil is the ~uthor 
of .sin, t:18 or1 -:in of sin ~·.~u;:::t b6 sou:~:I-;.t in tl:.:.::t ,;;l:.ict:. 1',:.:1;:88 l'.~";.n 
assailQ~le b~ the ~evil, n'l~ly t~e ori~in21 iL~erf8ctioll of 
cro2t'urlL1e:::s u!ld the circl"'.f.lstancGs of tr:..e :nr.~t~J.l'G of thL1:"?[J ':::,1io11 
tr2ils12tes thic nOGsibility into &eed. (7) -
'Elle possibili tzr of nor21 evil is on6 thj,nr' ~,!'~d t 1;'0 
o_ctu~~lj-" tjT of n~!lor3,1 6'lil 8110trlE,r. I.orc:.l evil s SVL.cl~ 1:fl.8 :} L_:or~11 
CO.V.EEl. ',:h8 llQture ()f '~1G. CSl'~lose .:::orcll .:1-:,,:, IrEc11 x.;on,l () ~;G ~)h~,ll sec 
in f'Grtl1Gl~ det9.il leter. ~ut, bo,:revel~r;G eX91~il1. i"'or::J. evil, it 
is SOL1etl:.in'?, for '71;.ic11 ;;'G I'mst hold1i~6s!)on3ible. ,,'.)thE-~rc!iGE; ....-:'"8 
r·';J.1st say that t!'le sins of the non-rer~enGr8.te :::.!,E; G:;.~cnsJI,ble b~'CiXcl..SG 
they CO::1G f.Y'OY.! the '~rinci]:)le of oer r~iser.7, 17hich is('ori.cinal sin~(8) 
= 'orz:l evil for Lei bniz tcockes on t~,e t11eolo"iCt'.l 
Colo",lr of sin ....... 1d sin, ?s Leibniz s,·ys, malc€s u7/ the (:rf)~·t ~:J.rt 
of hUr':'.l1 uiser:r • :':'or, Si.S TiE-II ~. 0 thl;;''' intrinsic enorlnJ ty oJ sin 
(r:1S'. rc,ison vvl~-':;.;ire, (p.e Ii iJffense e s-t i;:,~f i.nl 'I ~,:'he'odi cee re.!'. 867. 
r~. vi. 11. 373.),tl1er8 are '::.180)2.8 \J(;) h(~VE': 8Eon~its !ll('in ev:tl 
sonSEV,;,Uei'lCes .. '...t"l evil Dill is,' in its onn s::;here, ')'hu.t the evil 
1()ril1c irle of tl':.e :a.nich'?.e.1.l1s nicht be in the 1,u-;,i verse 0 c:e",son, 1"y}' ich 
is the irC'18pe of~od, f1..l,rnish8c the ':7iCl'od ';.'"i t10, :re:::~t T:lGa118 of 
c9..'Jsin ": evil. L.I. single CC:.li~~1 :11 or 3. ~:ero has Made more than the 
ear"~l- c..112..!<"8 l7i th evils. ~:J1 evil man pl€):3ses hiJ.cGGlf 5.n r"ckin,::: 
p.ufferin?: :9. no. doztr1,1Qt ion .'1nc~ he fj,ndG only too nr .. ny 00 C -.si c:ms 
for them. (g) 
mg 
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E'ut even in this I;:C,tt~il, ~'le ffi8.1 de cot{ple n , it 
is e?sy to eX2~3Gr~te and to lose all sense of pro~ortion. =~yle in 
r:::d.rt iC'J_1:.::,r is ";llil t:r of t12is rfhen he s~~yG th:z',t hU!"Cll1 llistor? j, s 
nothin-; but a niscellany of thE' crimes v,nd nisfDrtun8s of the hWllsm 
rilee. ("un recu.sil des crines et des infortunes dUs8111'6 h,.7c1_'llain(1) 0 
If \78 '781'e to ('aulte the i11cio1ence of virtue A.l1d vic6 in l1t;1Y~ni t.'T ue 
should find tL'it thyrG 1;"'0.8 Dc certain m8cU.ocri ty. (Ivil y re"::ne 11118 
cert:;,.ine Eediocri tE':';" ). =~i stori C' ns, it is trlJ.e, ~1re oftsn LlclineJ 
to over-ea;:ho.siG8 the vi oe n:_tL~er the..n the virtlJ_G' of p:?::lkinc1. ~ut 
:ichave11i ':JC s e shremler ju.dn'e 'Jhen he .83.ic1 tl'l2;.t ther(J '",~::'0l fe';7 
peo)18 very b d or very ,';ood 1;lr:.d tl::is ':r s tr,o c use of t 1::e f:1il'Jlre 
of n9.D~r r:'1'8Cit en.ter;c)I'ises. (lic;tl' i-l ?'J. 1(8-:). d 'ho)'!:nes fort ';-:.ElclI11~ns et 
fort bonz, et Q.ue cel:::-. f t t y-]cl1o ... ")er bien de ::r!.',"lC1,08 or:troprisc s (1 
'..i,'heOdic0'E: P'",r. 148. r1-. vi.j. 190'.) 
If it is lS'id., <.G in;:~ee('1. i.eibni:;; S~,y8, t!C'.:':;lt Ilt:.:.0 ',IOrIo, 
espechl.l1y if no consid8r thE) "'overrul'ent of tIle In,,'.nan r;~:ce, fJ88HS 
re.tl~er i,~ confused chc.os th~~n ;;:lnyt~il1~': directod by h'J:i'~·:;,n 'lJisdom 11 
( '~n +-],'0 ~-'1+1'1'''>te "rl'nl'Jn~tl'O?1 "'I" 1"1)"1"""''' T>~-'-t, '1 "Z-iil;;; \ tben ,--r,-" v v<~~ ",,' U cl ';: '"" _"...,Id...\.,d. '&J. '-""' L ... 1,.. J.,I_~~~ • .J-,;j.,.. ... 1I J • V ",,-:v. ;, =- " .. .yo 
l~Uf3t rene"iber tlvt the ,_~1 r,~.c8, GO f(,-t' ;1.8 it is l:710'.7,fl to U8, is 
anI? ';" fr'-:,:'cnt "r t ::itv of:-J x1. ".hout t!-:;'ip, ~:~'!1·,).blic of .;;pirits 
"i8 :~i'W',i tC:YJ llttlG to be ,,:~~lG t'1 note tt :-:::-.riJellj~13 or,::'(;r. 
(n:""11e ~.;. tr-:;p cl' e'tC:Jr}'l:e ::::~"~r Dcn.::), c t nO'",3 en com:ois,3'Jns tro},; peu, 
!Y,)'J.r en -'~.::>uvoir re1'. r~,-' ',Gl~ l' orCl,r0 ::.l. r7(~ iJ le~J_~;:. :1 ) 
:',,-;.t eiJGn ill. :1i8 [Jt.?tt~r_(;)l1t :":'·.)'11~t t:.(~ f~"ct ,)f ;,OI' 1 c7il 
Lei~J,D.tz G7inccrJ :::.:;,~:J.et? to frOG J.~j? 1.;"'311' .fro~", c,~:y 8',1,7):,1e1o:1 of 
iE~tlt ill ' tIle usc ::;f t ~or,r> 1 evi 1 ::"3 UUC:l to ('oe1. ',-cd C~;,:'l ,,:i11 
':le+'-''''tlHP 1' ,,~] If or nY''''''l' c~l eVl'] "','=:-' ;'oe"'1'1'" to '! "renter '.;006. ::t is 
.!)..." v'--" ~/~~, U ",,,--,I, 'f, 1,J '~!...,.I ..... -"...../J > ___ f_ ~~ .~,t "-"'~ ~J \.,- ~ ..... ~ _ 
~_,ui te at ;'cr1;li ·se "~ii t'1 nor" 1 Gvil. 1 or8..1 (f'ili 1 C():;~GS i n.to :Clct;},~~11,ty 
because it is ~ sine ~ue nOD, Q ~Y7othctic~1 ~ecG8sit~ to the 
')8,8t. It C2;]1 ;~eV('lC t'j8 u~illod by tl~(.' :l]:tecc,OEnt "ill 0f~:-od :LlC: 
the cons8c!uent \,'il1 of r;-Qo. ryhich h'}s sin ~J.S its ohject is only 
perli~isni~e. ~)ut to d~velop this iSS'll8 further herE i;'3 to trs~n8~;ress 
• on the subjcct Llc.tter of l'J.ter ck .:r,;ters. 
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c. vii. 
':2he Fall of L:an and nOri:;inFl :jin 1V • 
~o ~art of the ansuer of leibniz to the problem of 
evil is of more im~ortance than his attitude to the traditional 
Christ ian doctrine of the Fall of r::an c.nd of ??original sin t? Apart 
from the intrinsic inportance of such an attitude in general, it 
8,lso provides 9. crucial test for the much noised subservience of 
Leibniz 9.S (:;I. thinker to tye dOGmas of the Christian Church. ~ ... slir~ht 
acqu2intance ~ith the Theodic~e or even Dith such an ~nti-~ridentine 
1.JOrk 2S the l;)ystene. th80loC~ictJJjt ')1i11 rsud1'ly show that the allsceol 
truckline; of Leii:)l'1.iz to the do~p~ s of Gc.tholic ortl'loQox:r is z~ ;:;Wth, 
even in an article of faith so cruci~l ~s this for the inner 
structure of Ohristian doctrine as interpreted by his a:e enG so 
~,lidely o.cCGptGd by hiG~enerf1.tion. 1'0 8h:.l1 find tl':21t Leibnj_z ilieets 
Ghristi~:"'l ;!~~1.0/£l.~  .v Olr~:1 ~. ;tS~lrJn 'TO~~C :J.nQ. is", QO~.t "'nt ui th nothin~~ 
1 th ~~::~~~ ~t . . t· . ~ ~ f 1 'h ess ~a snocrlnj~-n 01r s Ian I Ea or L ~OQ o· ove. __ 8 
criticul d~rin~ of Leibniz on this Doint has not yet had th~t 
rec03nition it deserves. 
r21".0 c~octrine of the :Tall fJl'10 cf 'ori';:ir:.:il sin' i3 on8 
of the t:lree cln831c:J.l C.nS'7er'J of reli-:io!l to tl::.c :;>robl(;):ll of evil . 
. ~lle otl:Gl~ t~70 ~-;~]~f~ t}~6 ~~11'l,:or~~,.1 rOi;.is-~ of tIle 7-~~I)C11iGo.(J..b of 'i1"\O~,;~is;~ 
~'.1l d. t}~ e d 1\::.11 i SIl ::8 GO c i:..: t e ~l '.7i t ',: tl-~G Il:Jl~'.e 0 f .J"~ r:.;. t 111J.:3r~ t r_~ [·lV;' ~)-: e 
roli:..:io:1s of ~a2Joi~3:.: ~·c.( : :...nic=):J.Gi3'~ .. '.tt it j.~> t~J:l Coctl'i:16 of 
th8 ~7s'l11 of Ilk'.:1. .:.:1CJ. of 'or1~i.1C:l sin' '\l;'icli, t!.J.ou~·;'. LU3t :i.il the ol'\1E..r 
of tirJe, ;:l.5 had tbe '~roatest i:1flllGLCe L~l)on tl'1.8 ~')""vl._'~;:t ()f tho 
~'"odc;:rn ~/OI'ld. :::)tressin~: on the one h".ad the ~,);c"OV~llellce of htl.: I~D 
\78:~~;:neSG :.nd. sin ...::.nd on tl:1EJ other the :Ji vil':e l~)liness of uonotl:.cistiU' 
belief, it fO'(lIlO, 8.n 2.l.PTn':.reLtly co:,'plete solu.tioll in the priori 
doctrine of tho ~'all of nan. 
Lod6rn philoso~hers in dealins crith th6 probleN of Gvil 
often fail to realise the i~portance of this ~nSP6r to the problem 
of evil both or.. the ~~round of '\'h:t('''iT(:::r illtrin0ic Eleri ts or deLlsri ts 
it Ll3.Y h:,l.ver::cs \,Iell ::.s of the tremendous influence it mas eX6:rteo. 
upon the 1'111ole field of l,lodern philosoph~l and not least upon fjuch 
thin}cers as l~3.nt 8.n61. ::e':':81, part icule..rl~r the former . ..c:..t the t iwe 
Leibniz lived it ,\72_8 CH'l anSDer to the probler'i of evil a1l2ost 
uni versally accepted by the inl:;!ortant theolor~i-}n8 of t he day. :;:n it G 
r.'lain essent ials it 1;'Jas 2dopted in 8.11 the syrllbolical books of the 
Reforll':eQl Churches '.nd it s elue ic13.t ion oe cupied five canons of tile 
Trident ine IVDecretum de pecc8. to originali fl (1546 .) ,:or \l3.S its 
influence confined to theoloi:;i ce-l and philosophical o2!inion. It 
coloured the I:7hole attitude of the 17th. century 1~7I1~~n to his 'v70rld. 
~'.l.'he :16 format ion, challensins: t:;lS it did the uhole f3.bri c of 
Toledi21.8val Church life and thou(3ht, had the remar:Glble effect of 
drar_"::;inc the doctrine3 of the Fo.ll and of ori~;inQ.l sin fron the 
cloister and the lecture-roo:~ into the 1.lnrlcet-l)lt:~ce, Clnd of r.1~'J;:ing 
the:m issues of the G.~reatest interest QUo. importance for tl~e ~~lL.;ious 
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lifE) of thousands of ordina,ry people!V ("The ideas of the Fall and 
of Ori2;inE.l din". ::.1'. Jillil?ms. l}. 419. 1927.) Thus in no \lay could 
Lei bniz be expected. to be irrJ1iilUne fron t}1ese pervasive influences 
und both in the I'heodicee and in his later correspondence, as \Jell 
as elsewhere, ua find abundant evid£nce that he had 10n3 pondered 
this traditional Christian solution of the probleH of evil. It ~ould 
be hard indeed to conceive hOB Leibniz could escape the challenge 
presented by such a complete Slnd a priori s,nswer to the nain ~robleLl 
of the ii'heodicee. 
In his modificetions of the traditional Christian 
doctrine Leibniz ShOV7S clearly enough the tension bet~Jeen hUl11c.nism 
'?lld the Reformation, ':!.s Ernst Gassirer puts it (v~!)ie Philosophie der 
':;\.uf}(lQruns~' 10. 1~5. f 19~j2 ,):-::.2he e:reet difference between hmlnnism and 
the :~eforJ\ation is founded on thoir C'.ttituc1e to ori-:cinal sin. ~'Ven 
h\)~[H:;mislil has nevcc;r d3,red onenly to attfl c::;: thE; dOrjL:a of the J!'~s.ll but 
it had to strive accordin:~~ to its spirituel dir8ction to loosen 
this c~o ,:ma tlnd penken its "DOVIel'. Even stronr:~er VJ0 see in the reli:~ious 
vimls of hU..hlanism the Felaeian spirit, c\S 8V81' riore consciouly they 
strive to tl:ro';~ off the yo!~e of .J.u:::'J.stinianisr.~. :.ot least the 
retur~ to antiquity is to Gorv~ ia this b&ttle. ~he Platonic doctrine 
of Eros and the ,jtoic c1octrineof the \iindenendence fv of the ::]111 are 
calleO up r.:>.~'aL1st the r.:~st ilrJ.roJ'ts.nt d.t'3ustinLn ViC,\7 of t{' .. 8 1',<.11c(.;;1 
C()l'lY·,:iit Ion of :-.:1;' n 11'.tl.;rc 3.n0 of it 'J ii:capa';ility to !,0et".H':: to tI-'~l 
Jivin8 b:T its 0-'71 r:>')e~·;~. (1; 
:\:tt t:1(~rE, is .·orc in ~~eF:r-j .. 7, t: :;.~: tl.is tG12sLm ~:"t',e0a 
tr-:e ~~~li ·'l,te.Jl.~ent sm6_~~:b :·:efol'p:.\tiolJ. ,:Ie:rr-: is ,), definite "rGtcl'odo:~ 
11o~Tene·~t <".') f"',' '"·Cr +:1"· Al'tJ'OY1"1 ,";'ri"t-l"f'dt'r l'c;. COnc(~,,··r'ir:r~ ".]'r·~'·it:°r> ~_ \. .le. _ .... b...J, _. ,_' ....... V "\,.,;;., 3,1" J,. __ 0';') .... <....~"",..L '-' ~.J \ '_, " • ........ . vi .... v 
in IlLs tllpm:t ~'~;:1t boo)', ('iI::Jh: ''-:}, 8010 'c). e (I E':C; LCi i ~~ n i z '1 • :t'.1i.C?·,,8::1 1. c: (J:.J. -J 01 • 
i. p. 319, :r'n~t 8 the CC;~fX, nor~e toe strJn :l:r -Ii C! >8 ,;:' Y'; ·CL1.~;!:.1R i:'1 
his C()r..ccT'tion 0'[' t~:.e J" .. ll of :'CiJ1 Ioeibni3 aoos :10t l)elolF' to t:'.e 
;nlUrc~1 doctrines ;,lna c],or:r;cG of hi s t if~:e IJut oOl,T'letc1y to t:18 11(;U 
scionce. ::;"he ortho(:o:: Doct:rine 1:,e~~""\8 otffj,c'':.lt: r on cUf?icn1tJ :'lnc1 
contJ'0c.iction on contr~:.(Uction::;,nc-:' cxp1::::i::s not":iil'~ but only c,~sil;)7 
Gnau inc't'eases tl:e ;~ondcr~Jl ,2nGi o()cret tr'llstfulnesr:J. i. e. to sUY 
considers it Df;lf t:c insolvent. :::'ei bniz finds the,t tJ1E: tr~'.e t,~'1(l 
oriGinal Christianity, the teachin3 of Christ -D~s81f about si~, is 
co~~nlete1'ir reconci11:::lblG ni t1;. science 2.:1d n;9.80n. Jut, 811 thG other han~ ~e i~ not coc~l€tGly in a~r6GFent ~ith the Trid~~tinon conception 
or 1]1 th t he concept ion conte ined in tl-~e sYl'lbol:tc:ll books 0:: tl:.c 
r;rotest:;"nts. 7~t At the s~-'t:e tiE1e,,,Jlo~:ever, his re(:;,;l strivin'~ is i10t 
to Illj.sune.erstand tl1eE:6 doctrines ~ : s :;"ar ~.'.:3 "'os ible to l"e:concile 
thE: doctrL'lG of the Uhurch ,(7ith:]'rTisti:::nit;: :l:ld ':7ith scionc8. (2) 
La i bniz, like ;-~mt, ':Je'.S nuture(l on tl::c Luthel'c"a theolo?y 
and 80 uas farJ.iliar 17itl:: that vier! of h1.u'~<.'n nature, to be described 
in the "')hr'.'.lse of .J.u:.l:1Jstine, ::~s \lnf'ss~ !leccat1 (). It ',.'0.:8 sCE!.rcely le[',;3 
th::n :::.. thinl~T veiled :'i:1!!ich2.e:i8L:. ]'01' it ~'Jas not I'erel~7 thc-,t Yllan 
'.,ss in l-,ir~~self inc8.pe,l,'lG of ['ny 8.:9nr05Lch to i-od (':ve::I sese et pro~lriL:: 
naturslibus suis v1ribu~, in rebus spiritu:lituG nihil incho.re, 
o~Jerari, E~.ut coo:~E:rJ.ri !lotest, non :nlus (:'0~:J.r: 1 ;;i8 tr':nct~s 'ut 1 ir:lUS VI 
as the Lutherl:,n :!?orl::mh.r~r of r,;oncord y>uts it) but t>'i':.t evil i tS61f 
~Ji?S I3L hynost-:t ic sO:~8thin ~, 7)re-eri:'lentliT 8l thin'~. It '\7C~S (:.. !)i')zi t i ve 
c1e"Jrcv2tio ret1'ler" ne """t l;'ve- iienrl'vatl' () '":'111' '" ",,:'!; "C":o r'}',rq'O, r:o~'rn. 
. ,~. _.." , ... --. ~~,~ ... ' ~.~' v~ "',,' I ., ,.. ~ ,1I""'~t.;.I • v ~ I..."o:.,''''''';;.l ,-<" _ .... _ 
nl::t ch L',.lthc;;r hir:solf stulLlblE;d. ::-n S~"li te of ~11 its of:C'ici;c~l 
Qn2t~e~rG,~-~inGt ~~nic~~6i3n I~th6ran13~ svar ~e~t ilnco0f0rta~ly 
near ttis'vie'.j of h:r'r'osts'; tic evi 10 "hE: evid8nt f" ilpro of Lei l)niz, 
~s contrl'sted iJitl'J ~'2yle, to do 2'c1 stice by the :")ostGriori stren;""th 
of the IeltensclJ'~UUP"~ of "anich''.eisl\ may pcr!'3.ps be c~:'!)13ined ::'3 J. 
reaction 23ainst the popular Luthcr€l'ism of the day. 
-~he C:)'l.)C~ 1 of ':'rent crystallized the issae for lej.hniz 
::.".nd r.lz,de 2tD;-t ev~}sion of the ))rohle-:,~. 1n:::08,<iole. ~..nd i t :;'~:S u!l0n t~le 
~octrine of the Jo~ncil of ~r?nt thr~ Leihniz conce ntr2tea the 
costructive 7'o-::-rcrs of.'l'lis o':"tjJ,°is:". ":~or( f,)lY1J.l~;ti:m of its 
lO,":icr::ll st2.tG[::ent offere(~ ~"(1):11811':(O c~ror"J '7}lic!' 11'= (U(~ {lot s":rr'ip~~. 
~'n tlli3 cr-:lC::"'o.l tlle~)lo',).c( 1 is,3'<': it L~ "'],8»,'7 :-L~':'iC~:.lt 
t,,) sT;JY'lt:.'nti~),t(:;.,.. thQ; o:)iaiol1 cf th.o:3e ,r;;'D holO t>.~t "oeis,1:' '0:!E:' 
0)::"<1':9::'on ofort~,lodo"~,TT :"\::";:',inzt tLf': (}QCriE,( ~,tl',ejst, rd:~ioG.iz sin':;~r:;~ 
fran the C0l1Deqnef1C6::; of :lis viei} D, ::m(~ t 001: reJ~'7:c; in t:-:6 i"e:::"'ot',,,,:l 
rE) i t 81');~ t i C}ll o.f cd i f~r i 11::~ "'i] rc~ 08 C 1'1 { ~. :::1.'.'1.8 ~~611 . • ~s: ~'~. ·~~",-)C)~lC A ~ .]0:: 
2'or0 ~~t Ci.'':c:' r:,tc thers j,s no 8triT1~~:Llc' frol' tl:6 10 "10'.1 cO:!"C::::~1.cn'Jes 
of Iii G conc: ,t iOI'! OJ' substC,:l CC :~n(~ uf "·()0. 
cor:c:~:"t;,()j:' (If . 
'"~ '-;j~ f~ t l~~-- (l it i 0 J ".1 
;;".DG i:~0ljv~.o: 1, ;)~",~8t,.~;:Ct: ~·':.ct '''.:TO' ver,'T iJ!_ '!it::-~ 
(~)c<trJir~,(:; o:? ~~::f; ::':tll of 'l:'-ln ~LJ:.d :.,)"("\ (';~ci ~)'-<1', 1 ,·.;i~l. 
Lei1,~~:i~ cc:C)t:::ltnl",'" 1_(",'-'"'f/(:~J "~lr-: i:'. ~1CI ::t .t~· ()? ~_~J~ '_n(~~~r~;r ~.r; to :.l:; O\.~::. 
o~,"\ tr: i ~)rl. ,- ~~~ ~~ ~i11:r ", ~"";'~ i t ,~ n:~' t E :-:t -:,';: G~-. rc7 t t ~:r t:) ::~: 11',8 ·1 ~ ~orG 
ee;"8,11(~e,1t ~;~, l.'.i::; flJ'ct 'J"l}:'C'nt;:; tl:'.:1 :~jJ] o'-m ,"';'re~tor b~lt it involve'-
''''. c'-;.lto fi,ort'llE: t~}';:~ c')ulcl ,')i)vL)p,,;l:r :'u-;"ve 11') yLcG in his 8?Gte,.~. 
".lso tr"r.'; :foro:~il~<"l(-':t'oG o~' <'-:iG _,,-(18 it cort,i:l t:"'t 't'\e ~'\Gst ;;f',11 
~ossi 1)16 c, o:"°lds" irlcll~c~ D t7'lC evil ~,E:' <'on,,: c;C-,) ilnc~ ':cH'ni t t8l~. Jul:r 
l)ee" '0',8(:;, Jt co\" leI 1)~ 'L,I':18\'~ into' TG ':;(::1" ';ood. In tilis SG1'l88 t;:'E:.r8 
r,-e~ fj,~ ;;l. ?ilnll of < .... c~.::J.-_· .• :701~ Lci'blli~ 1''', "'(J~-r""! C i,J€fi,:',l -'C() ~t~~te: ti};2~t 6.,::!'~~L~ 
.s j.i12, 0';" tis O"\7il free \7i 11 ~: :.1(1. not blS: C ~ nGE.~ l))" J.1~T ne Cl~ S 81 t :')U.':; 
pre-c16terrr.inetion. 2~t &t}:c:::ri:is(; ti:e ~71·iolc:. ere:' ',1 idee, ()f the FSLll 
of L8n one of thE: L~.ller~€(l conseq,lHi;:'1CE:S in 'ori~;in8.1 sin' conflicts 
'iii th the L1I1':tC idea of " . .06. COI';~~Ot;. toll ,en.. ':'01" .on tllis vie~! ':~od 
c~nnot be Cne tllut ':')itt(~tll ull'is childr'E,I1 e,nd only 9..3;:2 for tl~e 
recinrocit,r of T'is love • .LJt,rro.nt ~ie F:'..',St r)c ':rho nej_tl-:,er loves nor 
',Jishes to be 10'1;6<1 ..... ccord'i~1.(~ to do):, ',."Ie 1 est l'e::'Hc the t'!orld ClS 
tl"28 \~?Ol'st po,s,sihle. 
F ere , s ,--':.lr'sys)leio{liz tries to pursv,e Col via 12c(~c'.i'. 
The extreIT,e do'.:;r"c,tic :position needs :3 re-interprets,tion b6fore the 
doctrine of the i:;l<urcheG can satisfy not only t::e r8C},uirSH6nts of 
re8.S0n but :'100 the tes.chins of ori?;inal Ghristic..nity. Dr. l::.P. 
')illL'JT1s in his bool~ ;'The '.deas of the ~all and of Ori'~;ina13in\1 
(1927.) re::1inds uo th~.t since the times of 3t. rG.ul fjv€ r're9.t iSGU8S 
h:ve doninated the discussion of these doctrines. ~he issues have 
not all ·sot the S<'~J!rje philosophic:'),l relev' nce but sQr:Je :-:-.re vi t8.1 to 
the present context. ':lile q,uestions '.fG I;".Ust:;'s], <-Are tl1ese:-
[I (1) Is the ...... duLl-story historic truth or 9..11e:'~ory'? 
(2) •. :'h,a.t \las TC9.n'S 'lm:f\;tllen condition, non-!1lOrC"l 
innocence, or 'Ori,~int:',l 2ti,::~hteousness\fl ? 
(3). }hat ex:.,:ctly is the undesirable thil1~, stSLte, or 
qU3~lity alle~ed to hrve been cOITtGunicatec by the 
first c}n to his descendants? 
(4). '.Jl1at nas the mode of this cOl.lli!Unicatlon, pnysioloSjical 
or nerely social heredity, [,lys".:;1ca1 or physic,~l 
ident i t,V. 
(5) •. :h:::t is the resu1til1:':; st:te of hW!lan nature, with 
I:1hich F:ede!1.pt ion has to dee.1 (iis:'J18 ideas of the 
3'a11 and of Ori~in3,.l 3inl1 ~''''. xvi. and lEi8f.) 
It :;:.'9.y be intcrest1n:; to record the ~:'1l8' ers of Leibniz 
under these respective he&d~. Leibniz does not aD:ays speak pith 
theolo~ical precisio~, but he says enou~h not only to enable us to 
realise his mJ'l1 ViS'(,7S on this important QnS~J€)r to the problelil of 
evil but also to ad[lire the coUr3.:-s6 wi tIl \iJ~ich he defends his 0-,711 
oLlinions. 
(1). '~bere is no r::;round for doubtin~~ the relL;l1cE:J of 
Leil)l1iz "Uly>orl tli,e Cld ijrest'91~:1e11t stor~r of ,£,~d3.l:~ and :~i;;ve, es:neci ll~r [~S 
this is inter:nrGtec1 in the spiri tU:'ll eX:gerie,nce of thE:eT7?est:~lllel1t 
1,7riters c~nQ in n rticul3.r :.:;t. :r?au.l. ',..:ohare is no Ciuestion of : .. eii)l1iz 
ridin,?; loose to the c19ssical texts. It io in r:i~?,tters of exe~~f.sis 
thc.t he finds tllc,:· !~~(trix of en'or :.l~'lc1 coaf'.lsed t::'il1::i~1 :'. ::'l~e :;cri::rtU1:'hS 
arc li"ible to ~:~isinter~)l·et'.iti:'Jl1 e.nd th.eir tl'ue ],:8e.::lin~; is ',:oul1cl'.lntly 
co:wiste:nt ';lit~. l'e~SOl1 Gll.C t:le l13.t'_lre or ti1i:l'::s. 
~i'or Lej:c;ni~ ':<E.vEd?tion ~1D.S (:1: ~L"s 10S?0l1o. tb,e ;;o\iE~r of 
re~.son. ';"'krJ.S t:10 cO;,1te,ct of thE, ~"u.ll of :-~.1 is tIle :"7'3.11 of t!~e 
Aw:::els. Tn 2.ccorCLs,nce ""lith t}H; .:-ibltcl?l stor;.r, ':7hich I.eibniz acceptl3, 
the J'c:.ll of the l'J.tter \:::;:'13 tl'8 reHl0te C:~.1;.3e of tl'18 1'8..11 of tl1-:: f0r1'2r. 
:-:ut '.18 canllot hore to seE. T)enEJtl·~te tIle l!6n(;tr:o~lL, of tl::.e l:ivinG 
uisdom Q~d ~£st content ourselves uith the st~rv of the jcri~ture3. ~ -
(2) .~his «~u_estion r:"i:JG,s the 1111018 !>l'oo16,: of t:le 
st3.tus of ;.;l8.n in the leibnizian universe. ~l.ccordin~: to Leibniz men 
is ?itrs,ns-cre2ted". s:'he souls of t:~,ose .:."cestined to becoLe hU111:om 
have always been in the world but only ~s "sensitive:' souls. ~y 
creatil1[~' ',1.6.n lod introduces c, neu perfection into c1"S6nsitive!1 soul, 
"11ready corI'11pted physically or 5lnirl1Q.lly by the sin of ..... dam. l'his, 
accordine to Leibniz ,is Huch more in accord '(''lith :::ivine justice th('n 
the orthodox vieD that 2 rational soul is ~l~ced in a body u~ere it 
must become Iuorally corrupt. (4). \"Transcreation Yl in this nay both 
explains the origin of man's soul and Sives the E;l:l:i:tCl. qUietus to 
the philosophical diffic',llty of the orisin of ilFormsli. 
,Jhat, then, is man's unfallen condition? -::~ere Leibniz 
at once departs from current orthodoxy. Lan's ori[;inal condition \>!(.is 
not so anc;elic r·'md conseQuently his i1Falll/ was not so :;reat as 
reli6ious dOJ:~:' 'I!ould have us believe. 'rhere is no C8.t~.stroyhic F~ll, 
thour;h there is a Fall. The orisin21 He<,knesG of man is :;lS 
85. 
important as his ori~;in!'l perfectioU. 
':::he Fall doctrine recc i ved its '::rido e.cceptance bec<.;\Use 
of the cont in~ency of t he event on vrl1ich it baseel its do (';l:la • For 
Leibniz this event h~,s not the So'IJe cruci(~l si>:;nifico.nce, thou.::;h he 
is \7illin,:-,,; to confes;:: there uc..s 5.n eHpirical inevi tabili ty about the 
sin of ':l.daril and of his successors. 
Leibniz will not agree that man is born a sinner. Ori?;inal 
sin is founded in his nature, yet the "posse non pecc.9.re f1 of ~ ... dam is 
ila bsolULlent parlant it a real pas si bili ty. ::;'or rre cannot inpute moral 
evil directly to God, not to mention other difficulties. 3ince 
there \lere other pos,Jible pl:ms lihere our first parents ~,7ould not 
sin, tve cr:mnot Sf~~T that their sin Has necessary. ('lhe'odice'e Far. 233 
:"'. vi. ::.l.S{,.npu.isqu'il y c.vait des pl'ns possibles, ala les 1~)reI;li~rs 
)?arens ne peehert.J.ient point, le'J."r :;}e/che 1';.' etai t donc necessaire(!) . 
..'e cannot say that 1}061 was under a weta.physical necessity to create 
sinful TO.an as r:'Je ',moD him.:2here is a re3.1 contil1~'ency sbout .the 
ch/equered moral history of I::1~m' slife. Divine foresi.~~ht of l1,tl.daIil 
pezch~~nt li bre:r;lent 'I :!ne rend point necess'ire ce qUi e't oi t cont in-sent 
en soi, ny inpossible cs qUi etoit ~)oGsiblef7 ('J:hGocUcoe. }\ .. I'. 231. 
'}. vi.p. 255.) 
~ the S~~8 th~ Gin or ~orQl evil potentially belon33 to 
the n:.~t~lre of 1:J.2n :'S '..e ~:r!.on hir~. TithCl~'..-+; t":i3 'E; :3 h :)ulc1 bE: 
c~Jr<rletel? ot::er tl'~.::;':1 'fe ::.1.re. ,-:1 t~1lS other b:u.""!o sin is not, ::13 t}\8 
1 u tt.cr:' n:3 vctinly L'.r,:cc, t}~e very .3ubst:1l1c e of [,~Ll. . '1.Ull'.~l1 TIS!. ture 
is not d()r,r~,ve,-1 in tc;to nor ::. re tl:.e virtues of t):8he':J.~~l:Gni' ia t:-;.o 
._U',;ust inf n phrase f1s?)lendi.ie. pecco.tu." (f) .11 th3.t ~ .. ei bni 7, cJill 
pertli t is th t t:lcre is in Elan Uil inclir:.ation to sin :'.nO tJ1I.t this 
inc 1 iac.t ion '<JaS 1'ully rf; c:;;:on8(::' :7i t hill tl'e CQl',::"'~.1 t,::>t ion 3ti1d ti'~e 
pre-dettSrnination of the universe. r:::'hi.'3 eLl}!iri c21 inevi t;~"bili ty 
(:.:nc1 thE) eraph.:u;is i3 to be ph.cee oIt the Ji.djective) :)1' 1':'..111'S 
sinfulnesc './as in some way inc1ude(~ \7ithin God's idea of the universe 
before its orcclt Lm. ::-t rJ:;'~.C: only G\S Dotent 1::1 sinner"3 t:~;:;~t l'~len fit tGQ 
into the SChel!le for r?the best of '11- "'Jos 8i ble 'Worlc13 11 (0 I 
';'11is see's the l;:OS~ ~c18ql;"3.te -!:-:1:'~ of yxpressil1S t~1e vie:-Ts 
of rei bniz, not ah"l;:lYs very 0189.r in the [;:11e ')dic:e. ::t is tbe only 
\lay of ans';erinc; the dile;~'i.'G:. of ::.::",,16. ;'&S .c.d~m sinned freely? Tf 
you Sqy Jas, then his fall h~s not been foresGon. ~f ~ou S2Y no, 
then he is not blaneDorthy. ~o this ~eibniz r9Dliss as above. In 
s,i te of certSlin prev2ilin: inclinatio11S ~ ... d:'l{~~ sins freely, and for 
tl1is reason morits punishnent. (7; 
~ ~~ll this is reinforced by the consideration, eMphas1(ed 
by the 3cholast ics, that --:;·od does not create the soul in such a 
state tl~Ft it nill sin froY.:, the first l'OlJ1pnt of i tp 8":ic stence. (8) 
This Leibniz exp18ins by pOinting out that God creates the essence 
of a thin: before its accidents, its nature before its o~erations. 
1::1 tI'.is rIe oem. see hO"l the cres,ture c::.:n be the cause of its mm 
sin, even thons:h it ca.n do nottJin:2: '.:itllout the consE.rvation of ·::·od. (9) 
86. 
Ifud man been created otherwise, there should have been within 
him no mer0 inclin~tion to sin but sin itself. For man still has 
his freedor,~. Thi:::: is the re:;,~s9.rl_VJ.Pf~e st ill m.eri ts punislllilent, thougb 
ns his original state is not  y as orthodoxy m~kes out, the 
punishment must bear some I'elation to the crime. r;C'his makes it more 
easy to understnnd vlhy the decision o~alvation of the 'li7orld nas 
madE; at the sane time as the creative fiat. The incurnc.tion of the 
Logos outweighs the sin of .adam, just as the salvation of tp@ ~Q8e8 
lllankind outwei.:shs the treachery of ~udas. Thus it is that God judzes 
the universe by its value 'ion the whole n , tQ?::inG into account Eis 
pO\7er to tr~nsfor:ri1 the IrJhole ;;rhich contains evil to a ,:::::reater~ood 
thun Q ghole without evil. (10+ 
The imperfection of IDnn'e nature has a relevuncy in 
Jod's plan 0# the universe. In this respect Leibniz =oes beyond t~e 
popular doctrine that'J-001 IJsrely permits sin ~"l1d does not lend 7_:1s 
c,e-operatio.:1. '~od is c;uided by His ~ruperior nisdom not only 
Ii~: pernettre ces L'S.UX" bEt also 11mene a Yf/... conco'fJrir:' (Jee :lrevious 
note. lC) This is an important point. 'i'here are thus tt'ilO causes 
for tl1.e sin of IiIlc.n. The secondary and distant cause is his creoturely 
imperfect ion and the priYllary cnd prOXiIllGte c,~,use is the nisuse of 
his O\"Jll free Hill. (11) '::"ut the secondary cc,uses only ac~ by 
virtue of the priIil:?ry causes. fl'hus '}ad is freeG, frori·l the char~-;e 
of l:ein..:c tLe cc ~.l.:Je of sin. '.2h'.lS '!ihysicc~l "lna. norc.l evil c.:,n 
ultiuately be traced to t~le CI'b2.tlu-31y fLlitude of i..fln • 
. ;it~l tl.i;; rc::.:ote Ce.'ciSb of ::11 the ills of L:'.Cll.h:.& 
Leibntz is "1<:-lo.yS in SOhie dj_f:l'iculty. If:.J:L,e 1'60.1 r:)ot of the "l7a.ll:1 
is to be found in the ori',:incl imperfect ion of l:
'
8.n t S n:J.tr;re rIe 
sl~ould bE: c<rtSf~,:',.ll:o· ',/E-; inter,ret t:is •.. c r':lve lJ:'E:'ac:, 38e~. th:.:.t 
tt is iupossible fOI~ J.od to cTe::;,tc r,~Qn :''..1.; such sinful, for t~'-is is CA\.-
-consistent rrith I~is ~=oodness. , .. ccordin·-::l? in this natter ':;8 Bust 
s,ea~>: of :-eel C.~3 the caUSE> of p8!'fflCtioilS and r6&11 ties only.:2he 
Free ,Jill of lEan acts thro~'-'311 the pmiE:r of --focl'3.l1.Cl it is t:n:")'a~~h the 
lirnit3.tions of thcts'?ree ,all that sin COPles to birth. (12) 
.2he :.,.'.ns\Jer of Leibniz to t l~e ~1}e8tion of the ori,~~in:ll "unfc.llen n 
condi tion of 11a11. l~ecclls the: ',,'orus of Cr;:.:.r :~hC.JTy3.Y:l:-
eh, '::"11ou 17ho <Holst \7i.th Pi tf~ll :;,nd i:i_th 3in 
;seset the lio~.d I ua~ to '(JandEn' in, 
~hou uilt not with Predestination round 
:2;nnesh 1M.e, and iw!)ute IJy ]'all to Jin? 
(:3 ) • Jhen 17e come to t h5 question of the darw,10sa hereditas lile 
receive frem our first parents, the ansrfer of Leibniz is plain if 
1,7e call to I'lind his conception of indi lJiclual SUbstance and of:::od. 
Eere, again the heterodoxy of Leibnj.z becomes TI'.3.nifest. 'l'he sin of 
our first p':lrents \78..S not the decisive Qct of orhhodox}/ theology. 
87. 
For to follow the doctrine of orthodoxy in this matter qe should 
h;c,ve to ,iettison any idea of e, beneficjent Dei ty. Loreovel" the 
metaphysical considerations involved in the Leibnizian universe fficiks 
it necessc;,ry to scout the alleGed da.1Jlnosa hereGi tas of the Fall of 
man as a lllJth. 
Leibniz c,;ives de.rin'6 and pr8.ctical emphasis to this 
vie~ by his attitude towar&s unbaptised infants. Some theologians 
'flare led to teJce a sOl~e~:ih3t shlilar stand aGainst ",mgustinianisI:1 
froru~tives which did ~ore credit to their heart than head. Leibniz, 
hmJsver, crrives at his heteroc1o:;-;: ViSES by follo~1in3 the loc;ical 
sequence of his 0\,7n 9..r~':UT"ent .;)0 the de.r'llt:.l t ion of unb'J.7:)t i sed 
infant sis nloj.nl y stated. even in 311Cb. CL rJOrk as the ~,;uch trni ted 
SystEL i3, tteolo ~;i~t 0 be 7'')12.1n1y 'lH1. jU'3t. (13) 
~hus ieibn1z fells foul of ]o,ular orthodoxy ~nd esrecielly 
of the 'lriclentine decree in holc1il1~~ tl:2.t tr:ore c:.:.n be no reel 
herGditnr,~r (~uilt of r,'hich the :Cr:)it ts dRY,;nati)n. In e.n unpubli811(~:c1 
',]ri t in'-; 91 Llllnot::1. t:::c tld 80nc. 'J:rideI: t. (quoter c"J ri ch(£Gr in n::He 
I'heolo,};ie des Leibni;~Y1 p. 332.) Leibniz an[;;';ers 'the 'l'ridentine Gecree 
in 8011,(;; c~8tail. It is 8t),[}Y, he s .ys, to ·;nd'::r3t~'.'1d ho'; ,~in 
11.8 oe s s(;;X'i ly ~ril1~~3 forth ~~~I.il t 2.nd horr !n;,';.i shrJ,e~t L1evi t,~~ bl:7 S;:;,pfiTvene G. 
'":;',t ;:'0,.: ,3U01l "nilt'nD. 1f)'tdlL'}'lj.'c;~lt ct=m ':" tr:~'J3~.~itteC :=7 '" :1J"'.7;::;';,oo-~n"-"'l'l l"ol.·'t·l',on"~'l'n l'c' :\"'''01'7'''>1'''' "lne "'0 '-"'11"'" i'."'rl'''l'~'''(l 7,'1';.1' 1',<::: "~V.):..",,,._,_. ~ ,-J..Lt.JJ..""J, _J c_.h",,,,,:> ",-,,"'; 'i...J. ~~~ 0 v' \""\..( .... -J ..... ... __ >I 
:.ot rec',llrr sin :,t nll.::t e::.;r::1.CJt 1,',,178 t "uilt of Gin (]'6L"t':)"':!'.::it 
is or.:.l~r anotl18J' i:.~~G for ::'1.1:/'[1 il:fir-r.li tv. (14,: 
.~l::e d:?"I20S'} h'1f.:;:'C'i(iit,::, :";~'.11 i.~.i:eI'it3 is t;~e lic,oility 
of fE·.llin·c:; into Sirl '.':10 t~:L; i3 tJ::c: nc't~) .. r::;<ll :;'''(;'s',l.lt of tll. t i;lclin~tion 
t.o e1Jil 'H,l:.ic.:L ':J~~') o:cj."ir;. ,Ily ';I'8f]S:-;.t in .... d~.L. ;i1:,C8 tllP.J:l the 
ps;rc;:;'i.)lo~~ic2:1 ~,)I'OC~;,J8eS ')f ~l.'.1:;i t ':~n(l il~"ittiocl :,,'.vc' :.,cco;ntc;( for 
'u.e:h. - \,J.t i ~',~P. C2~ll !1('lVCr hE) 5u.d'::e(~ ;:'or '~l)e sine of l: 1;::; fir:;t ,,",rents 
ncr' C:.l~ it lle clc:::rly 8Coa ],>')\- ,n in<'ecti:)E of ·;Y.tlt C"ill :)6 tl'ia6 itteu 
in the ~~y po~ul~rly thounht. 
(4) :mG. (5) :::.'.118 ·,ll'e8/1~.T been ii::plicitl.:.r ': ~".E:,!el'c:,·. 
:';ut for triG S' he of dcfini tenee;"; ~1E- 1,'''<' tr:' to ehwid'lG8 fLI'tllGI', 
(4). 1,eibniz is f".'llr 2'.1)':1'0 of t:in (.uc8ti,m. ,e.3 )-IG 
h:i,:r:~3clf '::'.)~3 tt.G first diffic'"dty is tori tb;~ ';O"J.l CL;: Lc ini'uctoC 
with uri:;in":'l sin, r7tich i,q t 1"e rJot of :.~:ct':2Ll 81:1;:;, l;ithout L12"J_sticc 
on th~ p~;rt of ~d. (lE) "..:'here ~Te, sc:~rc 1.oi bnj;;", three the ')ric::' G 
inve-::1tecl to overcaLle this difi'icu.l t:i:-
(i) Pre-:~;;:j.st€noe. ':='his doctrine, OSl10.l8ed b,? ~;l:>to 
and Orir:en :-,nd, in thE:; tin.e of I,eibniz, b;r -rE-~nry ;ore ::1:0. ot::cr3, 
held t:ist 801.:,18 pre-existed. L1 ~ nothGr f,"orlc: 'r~d ~7ere b nisLed to 
thj.sorld of lJodil\T i::lxr:fecti::m bec'"'..'1.Df; of 8tl1o c _ 
( It) :'r::::,d,}.o L.ni G:.. 1hi s vie1:l, favo'..'.red 1r)~!:.'ortv.lli:-.n anc~ <~n::~~1.st ine, 
'1nd t8.u:'ht b:r ·:.;:le oro0ter rp.IIlber of the thsoloO'i!':ns of thE'J ,,~U;'Gb,"H'" 
Confession, held tllGt there -':JC S s. "s81'ninal idellti tyl/ bet'een L;1&.n ~ 
and his first ancestor. 
(iii) Cre~'.tionisL. This is thel opinion ~idely t3.Hsht 
in the Christian schools of thO'Jf~ht ane: as ",e 89X! above, ;:~ccordinr~ to 
Leibniz, hus the ~5re2test clifficl'.lty \1i th 'oriA;ilL 1 sj.n'. 
ii~r3.nscreation" offers 8. n8','1 alternc.tiv8 to thet,e three. 
It 1ives us any explanetion of 'ori~inal sin' better than all t~ree 
e:.nd. Ol'le nore cOI'lforcable to our idef' of Divine ,Tustioe. (Jee ;"ote 10) 
At t~1e tilhe of .,\.uaLl's sin :1ei tl:er Hill nor inte11i,~;Emc8 \7:0\8 
present uit~ his d8scand~nts. ~esson is [, ~€rfection adCet later to 
t1]6 "sensitive l1 or ?!anims,lil soul. ~ .. ccordin':;l.v rTe oo.n say tl18.t the 
trJ.,Gl1 sou,l in itself is not Fior;;,ll? corrupt, thc)U::h its illn0r 
connection IIith the 3Gl'H3itive or ::::.nin8.1 sO~L]l clre3.t~~r ;'il'eClel1t I_Lt the 
t i1,18 of tl:e sin of ',d$l leads it inevi tably to :::L" s .. nd 1.(1 this sin 
to make USE) of its nE.nl~r :~iver~ ,,;ift of re.'"so::::. ~~E.,t Lei1Jrliz ',7i11 
not follm-,- the lel3.d of ,; .. u. r :', 1st ine n.or of t 1,1,8 ,JOt111C i 1 ofI'rent in 
s;,yin'<: t:'l?·t 'ori;in:..l sin' C n GVE.r ill 'n:;T ,sHch ':3.~r 18:J,0 to t::.~ 
'd~ITnation'of the 'innocent'. On this u int Lsibnj.z is p~rticularly 
m'ts:~)o',"cn J.nd iil no ~CC:T cO,1ci11-:.,tory. "is ~(or()~s :;,re :t:Gf'r<oGhiJr~ 
(;Tv~iC:GllCO o i.) l~is r-~Q:ie~t;l :,'8 ,~~ t":~~i1~,~c;r. fI'lJ~ fQ_tJ,t c-~~V',:)t~,(jl~ '.!.')16 Of 
!~ C T~ t 'j -;Ol'lt 11' ~')C' i !1t c"\c <f.' 0 :?J:t:--tj,~ 3 n~~ '::!"ll ~~ ~i 3[~!-~ t~ ~l\r (J ~~ <-,l~] J=() IJ(-I i C 011, 11:7 
""'" __ -i, _ .... ~ Jo/... ~ I - -
d"'n~ 1'< cTJitf~l}P ~)t 'j1 cst (It·:)~~1(~ {~~o.l~E;tc; (icc; -:~~1~(i~~3 C~':~)(.:.i~s.r:te;:l~1 
( 
... '~ ,~_~ ~~~ ~ • ~:: k " :~,~ ~~~ , .. , C ~ ~~ - • ·1"'~ l ~ 
...... eOu.1Ct.e __ ."-. V·",o -. ·'11. '". ;i~. I 
( " \ .. f; 0 
r.2~ILC~ (l~,i _(lose, lwr8C~<t'.s of 'ori ~in'~l si.n' tpj10t t:-;on 
sll.fftci811t for ;,:r~lr\i::::)(Lle::t :)1' cl~)':1rlQtion. 7et t1':(:.'r~< i.,:: 7:;o~" a C0:1i3C'>c":'1e.1ce 
of t::!8 sin of ~.d(,:' .• :Leib1j?, lH,8l1s it to th.6 t~;:L.it of :l('.r,c;Qit:T {·,8 
in tllt:: c: S8 of tIlt if1n:~.t';; tr:,nCen.cv to il'lte""::-,clo :",.·C8 in tIC C~,S8 
of t:~c-o c)-'ildren ~f d.r'Jl.nl.:~rclc. (lu") 
'..;here i 8 sm:-:€ ~',c.Cj, tionc.l ir:fe. ct i:)i1 of the .·:~"ture of 
l~,EJl beyonc-=. ~'8 nc."~·lr:~l stc~t e. (17) .is e~ consoC'.::O.6::-l.C8 of the sin of 
b~Qe.:n the n3.t:ll~c1 inclination of )';;'.1: to':J3Lrd;-:; Gvil if, tncre,'.;'sE(l. r::he 
Hete2h~7sical i);1perfection of crE;,.;;1.tt~,rlin(;s3 leJ.J.Q ,.dCU;1 to Din. "'11e 
effect of 'oricina1 sin' is to inf€ct still Y;oru th€ ;30UrC(~ of y.v.;:\n's 
tllill}'in:~. :n this '."Jay 'urisina1 sin' te£ld3 to beco[,.,6 S",f! inioorn }1:?lbitU3, 
to r'~l8}::8 the conflict of the flesh ~:~'inst the spirit ,:c-;re(;teI' in 
deGree, thou~h not in kind. 
'i.' he point that concerns us Xllost l18re emd it is one thL,t 
Leibniz hims61f el'liph<~\si;-"es i3 ttat in all this the ·ei.--;n of i:::lture 
serves the T~ei:n of ~*race',nd that "J-od as i1.rchitect 1llSlS made 
evel'ythin::: n.s becon8s ~;od e~S Tonarch. (iVC:'.r la contemplation de 
la di.:rine -sa:~esse nO\:c~ !,lorte 1'1.. croire que le :i~:;ne de 1a nature 
sort 8,. celuy de ~a ~r;;:~e; et (P:~ DiJU Corilll'.~ nrchi tect~ ? ~ou} fait 
COr.-:1.18 11 convenolt a Dleu c0l1s1cire COI':ne lon~rquelV Tn.eodlcee J?c.r. 
112. :;'. vi.D.le'.);.) jiven the :c3ib1ical 8ccount of the ~;'2-rd~n of i!:den 
has some hidcen ueanin::. 'fhE; punishment of the 'ori,';;inal sin' of 
: .. dam t~rrived n3.turall~r Hs'.:.'..ns aucu.ne ordonnance d. 'un ler;islateur'l. 
The ultimate ~urpose of t ~1e ~7orld is rsood, bec9.u.se the Person 
behind the universe is Good. (18) 
3o~bniz rather tediously end with some obscurity 
defines his a-ttilo'--~de iolthe traditional Christian solution of 
"the ~roblem of evil". In the liaht of the prevalent teaching of 
the 17th. century they must hGlve had an important critical 
significance. ~or his attitude though intellectually conciliatory 
is brazenly heterodox. So much for Leibniz the charll:?ion of 
orthodoxy. 
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C. viii. 
FJ.1he 'Jrounr. S 0 f opt ir11i SIll. ( 1 ) 
3inC6 the dc.:,ys of '!oltaire the optir.~isr~ of Leibniz 1',8.8 often been 
regarded Y.lore in tr~e lL:sht of c. Divine JOMedy than as 8. serious 
at tempt to just ify the ps,ys of '100. to r,~an an(J. lmravel the problem 
of evil. ~ccordin31y it is not surprisins that he has in 3sneral 
been 3 iven such a bad hearins. ~e has often been caricatured by 
those who dissent frOI2l the conclusions of his c.".r{~U1(lel1.t. 
FS;jTCl'!.olo "i c:~ lly this ,:;,tt i tude to Lei bniz is e&sily 
understood. '.:211e problem of E:vll ts so <:lc1.l.te on ~:,llY reflEJct ion th~;lt 
instinctivel~T ne tnrn ,'c'.~,'a~T :'ro~n a.n~rOi:e wlo TlrOf6GS8S to ';ive us;, 
sOl1.1t i on ;;'.S the 1':11.0113 sUlbstant i8\ rerur;l eJ3eF~a:a s~)erQ.no ::;crtl>,.. '~'he 
latept fervour of r::uch Qf the \''Jritin::: of Leibn1z onl:' inCre~SE:Cl 
mIr iI,:.P8.t iencs :::.nd deepens our incredulity. ~Io1 taire' s CCli1dide, 'Ii th 
0.11 its s1,"c:)erfici:.:li ":-y, is ti ~,;t"j'nL1'~: to the philosoYlLer ,,'}10 ::3pea;,s 
'}.S 11 .sir Cracle Ii. 
)Oll'2.ny critics of Lsibniz are content to re:::;::rd his 
concluoio:r.s :'.,8 les3 hroI't::'nt th2'n l~i;~ pr0J!;"i~e'3. '='hus Cl nE'~', 
:IL€i:.mizi:::1'.isll" L; (;reatGC ~x1.d r.:~~·2:~ :l:.,ei bniz ou·;t.~s to "'J.,VG G[.~id Ls 
re 1'd6d ,,) of;:;~)":~l, if .c.Jt -TE'.:lter ;c~.1.tl-;orj,t:~, t~'~l'). '.7:1"":; 11'1 i\,ct 
1 d
· ~ , " - t' " / . I . "' . .L. 1" 0 •• 
. 1.8 1Q scy •. ,0 r8~"rc.,e::.L [:8.l'.U;),,1 58, "lCj: l:J.J I"1'() ..... l:nC;;r:.:nu. 
irl'81.eV: .. r,:ci.ee, ~)f;CO +;3 ,s.:f't of t 1~E. pro'ulf:r,j :)f evtl it :;elf. ::;:,1 t'ihl 
'~'2~c tte :D.S',3?: of :'('i~)1)i3 to t)'8 f.J.ct of evil ~,a8 8l'.fL'(';I'cr' :::. T(::~t 
discot:nt £..110. :i:'::.~,. ,'los::; 0.'.08 nJI'C COt·:<:. <j into }lis orm. 
e18(;::J~:ere , 
It j,s iLI,)01:tc.nt, t1.tC:.Icf.:.'r€, t~~:t 'e sho~.l,l(~ hel'Ec, 
all01l Ieibniz to intE'rYTEt :-i,'·"eli'. 
In & lott~r' to :rOo.CIler' (1-.>78; Lsib.r:i~7, ~jt, tro).::: t:,lf:.lt, 
unli:':G ~)escc.l't8s, y::,o he.s no lleGC of t 1.:C S'.1~''':08i ti .,,11 of 2.,':oin. fillO 
::'\J.::;:r:2.~lt66s '"J.s a;a.inst ~ssi'bili.t~T of \iGccpticm .• ::':'01' it is in 
Q UI> ""O-CTer to U 'l"eCf'l'vt" jn l"~·l~· t 1c'l'U':'S r'l1'~ Ylot le'·'~·G t 11E; 'OL~t ~J >IV ~ .ll...i. ~ _".I.. . __ ~· .. .J.. ... v ..l..i ..... ; ! ... ~ \.....'1.... J.,. c-~h.. .Ii ._ .. :;1 imrortcnt . ..:J."on~ t:l.eH(· I.lOr8 hmo:~·t~.nt t2:in:.'s are the proyfs for the 
existence of -:;'oCl. Leihrtiz affiri's the.t he c::m aer[10nstr~·tG the 
e}:istence of r<-od not only by 61.if:"erent ~·io.yS from those of l\8""ic::.rteu 
but also by scr-:r:.ment S th3.t lead nuch frJ.rtller.. (1) 
( .a c1etniled considers~t ion of ths ;]8 c'.r:2ll( 'ent s of Le i bniz is :J:;'.rdly 
relev~.at to our DI'8sent Dar-oost;. i'll.S Nore iIJ!"!or-Gant ~)ol.n.t':I involved 
ui 11 be encountered as y,Te proceE)·.) , 
Lil\:E::c,~if;e, 8.11c".. eV8n nore i:-.l}'01'tantly, Leilmiz 8';.,\;:S, he 
differc from S,inoza. Froperly speakinr, 3vinoza C~k8S no reco~nition 
of 'ete :~oodness of Grod since he te:.'cJ:es t)1at G:11 thin/'s exist tv 
the ne ce G si ty of nature and 1,-;ri tl':.out IV£l',E:j cboi 06~? of~,Od. (2) c 
.:6 ha.ve alre3.dy seen trlat the Divine ',':9turG is ulthlltely 
the sufficient re'.~son tor thE- c.ctnalis~~tion of the 1!orld. J.l.nd the 
sufficie~cy of this re~son de~~nas not only 8n the perf~ction of 
the :Ji vine,;i sdo:.:J. and povJer but even vora crew 1::,.11y on the perfect i'Jl1 
of :nis ~soodness. It tn not enou:;t. to sc.y til of f}ocl tba.t :-:.E:l is c::mSQ 
91. 
cauGatri~ non causatc. ~hl1S Leibniz differs elike from ~esc~rteB 
8.l'.d :3pinozQ, in rr",~dn~ eX:91icit the senze in vlhich he speaks of' 
tr~e perfect iOll of '!oc.. In the C::1se of ')esc:.:rtes SOYil6 such 
reco~nitiol1 of the nature of the Divine perfection u2.s3.1reE:.dy implicit. 
In the C1'~se of 3pinoz2. rwre,l (;;ttri 'Jutes as such cannot, of course, 
be ?[Sdic-.tee of ~1:Jeus sive ;ratura\l. 'J:'hus the forKulation by Leibniz 
of lithe princi::>le of sl-lfficient rec:son?7, pointin~ 018 it does to 
the ethice.l ne.ture of God, eno.bles hiI'l. to lay dorm tlrl.e foundation 
of his optiroisrn • For it is not enou2:h to say that ·'}od knOllS :).lld 
co.n create "the best of all possible ~7orldsll, ':'Je r.TLlst imo1f! ::LS 1';'ell 
th[,t he chooses to make this rmrld 2ctua.l. 
Thus ¢ in a S8n;38 Leibniz OSSUItlBS in thE: The'odice'e r;;hat 
he, in fact, trys to prove. It is clear tc.::t the h::u:1dYl"!ork of '}ad, 
as interpreted by Leibniz, L~lst be perfectly ~ood. If the ~arld is 
tIle h.l1dynork ':If '1od, furtl':;.er !ir;~:u..Hlent is otio'~6. 
''''QliJ does Leibniz prove ttat tlj,e 1;ifOrld 10 the handy,.fOrk 
of Jod? There are tITO ~uJs open to Leibniz- the a prioti an& the 
8 posteriori. :3ut by the a prj_ori ar:'::UJilent Leibniz virtr:'::l.lly 8.SSU!les 
tl-;.8 paint for nhic:1 he c:r{;ues. :"1'01' an e:bsolute e:,:ifJtant is not 
necessarily ~or2l1y ~ood. ]e b~ve 01ready Geell ~hOV6 ban L6ibniz 
il':':!,)Ol'ts 1: oral ;":redic:.tes into the l'lf;t:l1l1':."r,j,ca.l idE.:::' of Divii1E; :"~erfe,ctio~l. 
It is not Gl1:::)U~:h to S':~7 \lIf '1od iA pos'3iblE., 5t follol.3 t}lC.t ~~e 
exl3t.3'1 ar;.d lei. i2 ':G~:~.:c.~'l'his ar'~v:r2ent stJ.ll f,:rt"~el' by t}~e ,s,:~'~estion 
tY~/t tllis or.toLY>ic~'\.l <:'.1"' ,·1..1:-,cnt ;;i':tt 1)e siJ, 1rl1ifiuc: b~r tl2 ')1..:8.3i:)11 
Ql>co·:et:'lE.I' of [~D':,r refe:~e'.:;'cf' to ":'e:r:f6ction O at :'11. (~)) ~ut 
~SSL;l __ t!l ~ tl}~"t lli ,,}, I':.:~i:)l~i :~I'-~~-,U&lErlt ::~1;:; (;O'_~'t;rlo:T, it IJ'~.l3~v i\)llc"J 
tl;..:,;~ t:~i8 ~701'1c1 j.G the 1~DJ1,T7()rl\. of ,'AU)]; I: (r.:i t:r :'~:1C iL t1l6]2E;fol'e 
perfect, GVE:';::' '1;1.-,(}I',":: 4;:,P.' ::.:t~H"() cf its ');:::r';\,c~::Li)t: Jr; 1J8?,)11:) our 
cOF'j:)l'C;'E':rlsio!r' • 
l'tlC;;; :'(),:~terlo:r'i ~.l··>lF :O!1t ~,:tter1;tl-l to S]iOl.' tY2t t:k>~ 
tile ::!c'l'fsction 0:(' "00. follo"s fl'()Ll~;'lE: pcri'E;ction oJ' tPlf, r701'ld 8.ad 
rlOt vice VCrB'l. :'.l~t t£!E:;,s", 61!~rj,I"ic:~1 p]2oofs :::,:re v:tli6 iJec:.i..18e tlH)~T 
-;lirtl i Co<.ll? ~"I)eSu!!::'-'ose t:l.e p<O:'I'i'ectio"l of \;}:E - or16. ~)~:'m':: C~J t>is 
siJhstance j.B :'2 3'lffici8nt Io,:.son of : 11 this v' J'i(2t:r of'crticulc.rs, 
Hl~ich ore ~~lso conn8cted tOjGt~-lor tLr01),'J:011t; tl:,ere is ,QI:ly on0 
-:;'0·:;1, :,!1c1 this~oD is suL"iciel1~. \1 (:~on: .. a()lon~r. ::'1'. ;'59. Lc.tto 1) • .?,;9.j 
Lei bniz ls.ys:;Tes.t :stres",; on thE; r8velct ion of '}0'::; .. i8 
obtain. J'rori. the \wrlO of n8.tu,re. 6 .. 8 Pichler sc,ys iI'2ho ';7hole of 
seienc",) had therefore c, reli';ious :-::nd 'Jhrist ion ch'lracter :for hiEl 
beco:use it led ::::an by better realis,2tion)f tJ16 rJ~)rks of n2.tv.re to 
huzlc"nitv to\7~lrds 0.11 creatl:Y'6s 2,nd to love tO~7ards tJ:~e Jroator. 
"Ihile ortllodox: theolo'~:y, ~ii th their defence of certe,in ~ 
like absolute pedestil1"tion :.,nc inqv.L~it1on, tLrou::~~ ~Ihich the 
Chr1sti~n 30d was turneC into a :~loch or a J'turn, 0dS therefore 
ecting in ti:e contrary direction of 'carbarislll :::nd i111rtJi.I'1:lnit~r. 
'Die Theolo~ie des Leibniz" n. 27~.) 
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171rhere is also here D. non and sururi s in '1 ~l cleur uroof' of the 
Existence of ~~od. For this perfect <~~reeI:l~i1t of so Lla~y subst(,cnces 
~.Jhi c11 have no CQf;J:inJ.nic'-"t i.::m r:itl: one Ql10ther c~-..n only COl.:ce fron t:1eir 
COl;r:;:on cccuse li (:JerJ 3yster:. Fe.r. 16. Latta p. 315.) Thus l.eibniz is 
content to shut himself '.Jithin the assertion that the ,-!orld is "iQ8rfect . 
... .l. posteriori Droof of 'elle perfection of the ",orld ii'.ay be pos~3ible, 
but Leibniz ft:i1s to s'J.:9,:,ly it. :':i8 u,rr;ur;~ent f:"on ti_8 nrs-6st,''olishecl 
harr:.ony and his version of the c08i.:olo::'icD,l r';:~11rlent both a.suur,·'e the 
reality of its perfection. 
In t:;,is l;a;T ',,8 ,'Ire cE3.bled to 880 to -7hat extent Leibniz 
depends u::!on his cJ,octril1G of '-:<.od :'.8 "c!::() funda..tt6nt:·~1 3rm.md of his 
optiYr~is~',. JhOi':l,O, t:J. q1,~is es, (~:'li rCD;"'of!.dc:(s :Jeo? ur:quid dicit 
fi(~rl,entu:n~ e1 C1.t:i se finxtt: ~1.nid K.e f'ecistt sic? ,8 seo this in hir; 
constnnt 2~sseveretton t~l'C tIlE' DoctrinE'; of 'l't'r18 }jrG-6:Jt:::blished 
11 c rBony ,'I is thE: ::rE'J3.t bnl-::mrx ~\.-:ain~t U:e force:;; ,jf c~t>c:;L3J·. J 'orE'-
oV6r:pc J:t frOl,l this ide8. of "'lcod, inn::te in \;,8, thGre is 110 sound 
basis for a totalit~riBn vordict 2pon the universe. ?hc ~~ivur~e is 
so fer beyond mH' COl.1',9reElEnsion th£J.t j.t 18 nist~~kon to (;u'S'v~e to its 
QU8.1it;J :fr\)r.~ ti1e llltcro8c:)~'ic ;'lection :)f it fS1.rilic.r to J.S. !t i3 
true th::,t to -'uhe '··,n::.'.tori;}t Co. I~iec,J of ~J()n~ or flesl' r~' ~7 ~>3 :"li-·:.l~T 
.:;i·)1i:fj.CCE·lt, 't'~er6 to tt~e lc.Yl'~;.n:i.t i:::; d("!)j.cl 0<' n'.' e)=c(j~t:i.');-: 1 
r-c'~rli~"l'~. <'11-:( 51 --.~~- is ~l}i,l~C, ()f ';;>r~; i('8~'~~~ '(=J :Fn~~t-, :)f tl',f '(rllt.~i"jJo!~~_(":_:.)c 
of ~':4,'t"'~., t;~. c '~0£.J.:2~ is-l'nt l~I)~~') Cl .1:'J p ',S t-:) ]'E'CI) :;',t~ ~"f f"(,: ,,.~, ;'1 . ""( " I ,r fIi~)'~ "'j c,c . " ":) tr!C1ft~.;" ". -"~<1";' ',,·1')'1 
.... ~ ~__ J .. '_ ~ \..1 Vi '-'" <~" J c' _ ... j ~ 'J... ,J • ~~, ,_. ~ \",p .,Ii .. ,,~ u ~ .... 1 ' ~ .... 1. '"" .... v V " 
l' '" '>;') O~· :tC.r .... A"" ~\;''V. f"- i +'- -)"'" ,. "YV-' . ;-'-' ~"'-1' c');~-:''; "(0 1 .... C in -:""(' (Ll. " *~." __ ......... IJ, \J v U '-..11. ~'~ ~ ~ _", u ...... , \,,__ V ,-, "~_.!-v ".'. ... ... ..I...'~ ,.-" .. , .L.,."-"" \", .. '... ...... , 
i")~otl':in.' i"J i:: :2''J()lj.,~,~<~ ~\O r';~<:.(:;,~.,E" ~_.~~ "OQ{<:( ~~L:' \)J:~ ~-"J -. 1'( C"", l~,:~ ~r~i~ 
:,J2c\~:,cle~~>~(~. (f-5; ~"U.t ttl-iO jp l:;)t to G,t:; ~~:: ~ r~.c ](:'.?S lent ~1j~~-~8r:lf -;"~c 
1_"i1i3lCr~(i ,. it"'JD .. t '~(\'I-l~; r :~tIle;,;c: ,f.; ~~'J ~;~:~';; T"s:c:fce-~:i;)~l c)f t:",( -_h~~:~"'l;:,~~~~ • 
"8 -.","- ('.0'''''' .; ;>o~· Or> ,,~ ,,",tIl i ",J~i c;:' ·"("'r<'o·ct·olO'~ ,,;" t" c' 'l''l~'''r'''''c'r. 1~·.? 
. _'I;"--iV ~ ... ""!(O,, ...-I"l"""",~ __ ,'< /_~.~" ~\J .. ~ l"--'.J. "",.h~ ,).- ~-- ... , .~-~.~\I..-. ~,,\.-... ~"-
t"l~~e C'Q~~~8i.de?i'?t;i()rt ()1' ~vl:c "'=-( ',t"r r nJ~ \~'-I.',-~ <lrt:i <~~j~cc ()f t: e 0~)':~;1tT:,~cti -'1~~ 
of' ?, ~:l'~~.~-:~,~ ()r ~'.r: --'11j.l,-~ .. 1. i~,-~c~~ ~ (·:r,:"l':>~~.'.t 2C08_ ~"li\' :..::.: iO:~ -, t:' .. 0 ,:rf-:Y!~~,~ of 
od ->i\l8:~ i,-'~C :::~ 1',il~,t -·I.!l~" T (}_~C t~'~ _'J~ l--~t=.t,~ n t~ ";}:~~ "-c:~J';-~'<~~tl, ( 
'7)':.~lc::c3'J of t1 G ·l~iiT~;!'."'3(~. (l) 
.'Le inte'T' 1 1"~l.cu t:~ifc. 0.8c't):'it\(; ():f o,..,tL·j~8~'~ y,)lds in 
t'le ,..,°1 l-" of' Tr;'l'h y11':;' :.,. \T 1",..., ,~""""Vl 1,'7 t 1,.( " "1,' ,F] ,t'c . -'- '\'7"1 J~ it 
_'" pl'~l ,J80:':."'"e.T "' ..... ..kJ'- u~ t'.J "- 1/""" lJ'CY~.D..1> _.' v~ .. , I~ ~ ,', V'-'" J .-~ ... "" 
,c' """e ~,~ ~ I' n 'I) 1'" "".L~ 1° T. i 11 ,~ i"l' :', I'" ,~- er~ :.". c. '" + ;', C ,... "'0' i C'(;/0. ~J '7 r,'" ir "r '~p':-i Y' '" '....J~..::..J~"' t;AoI>.. U _ ,_) I,' v ~,_ • ~'I>..JI. _ J Y",,~ lJ v.;. , .. vV ~ ... I U.I.1. ""'-...1 ~~ ....... ~ -'-" J.J., "'-~" ,-. r:.:>. 
:~8 e 'r1:r rlS 1G73 1.ei bniz l1'iG, fori';:uL teo his ,::;:E.,t 0ll68L, )~}:",t 
'od. 11 "el crer-.\te(~ thj.s r:the best of ~ill I'os;i~:dl(., ';011.::"\$' ... n(~ it is 
fnllJT r8coe:;nised in tis corrGs1'1onClenc6ai t;: ~ ... rn:::.i)1u. (1(;23: ~;.:t.,e 
}::':,ve 8.1reCldy ',;iven Ebu.llcL:nt evidc:mce of t:''.is. 
I' I 
,;'Len ':Ie CO':6 tot he 6::::::':111 cit S-"ui" teLlent s of t r:8 ';:'>eJc~i eee, 
',8 l-.SlV6 t>e coni·,t nt :rei tE:::-ltion of tiLe trnt 1~ that r!::>d' S :let of 
creation ItJC'.S :", c{nice ~;!:.on~; I,Bony ,;]ol'ld["nd tl,:,o Cb.'lice l~l",dG \'1''',3 the 
choice of the best. (~he iS3ue is :!9:.'-t VE:r;T clGs~rly ~n t):~e.l' j'(?;r1y to 
the syllo~:istic ar'·:u,;::-,ent of thE' ~l.~l,endix to the '_'leoc'.icee. In the 
prosy11oSis!' of Cb;iection 1 the l"lj,nor pre~~ise r€:;.ds:-
tLJod has m2~de ~ lJ'Jorld Fhere there is evil; a rJOrld, J S3.y, \Jhich 
could be m::..d{-; ui thout any evil, or of '.711ich the rroduct ion could 
have been O1:1i tted alto,:retherl"1 •. }i th this l:eibniz is in COFiplete 
aereeGent. Hirer it r. .. ust be adni tted that there is evil in this 
vlOrld rrhich ~..-od 11:-:-,s [.lade, 8.rld that it ,,7ClS }Jossible to Hl9.l.;:e a 
world uithout evil, or even to cr6~te no Dorld 2t ull, since its 
creation depencleQ on the free l1il1 of '}od V! (see). vLrl.37G-7. 
:,:,uoted by R".lssell n. 295. I:7ho Oll]its this last clause.} 
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The creation of the ~orld is not the blind, necessary 
act of the Deus of 3pinoza. Volunt3.s non potest cogi. "his is 
clearly seen by the fact that VYthe better pc'trt is not clluays yk,t 
which tends to flvoid evil, since it nay be th::.t the evil is 
3.cconp"nied by ':' 1re8.ter;ooct~1 (above). In other V70rds 0. v~lue 
,1udC;$Ilent is at the founc1a t ion of the creat i ve act of ":061. 
I~reovcr if this is true, then, ue oo.n 82~ th~t value is 
prior to all existenco. ~his io a ~ost i[~ort~nt consideration 
and 8ssenti6.1 to t:18 Eoral theism of Leibniz. ]'or Leibniz :}cd 
exists in and for hinself. "I r~int~in that if there vera no 
cree:,.ted thin(~s, the i::llilensi t:J and eternity of Jed '.7011.ld none the 
leS;3 slJ.bsist, but i?i thout '~.ny depeno.ence on til;)eS ,'nel p1:;108,,). If 
tl:ere \,ere ~lO c E;c..ts<ol tlin,,;s there UO'lllcl be ao ti;:i8 01' ::.:)1':C6) c.md 
cons90uent17 ~o ~ctu31 STIaC8. ~he ir~~nsitv of~d is lndenendent 
of Sl""C8, p~ t>.G E;tcr:'::l_tiT of "'0:', is tn,(J.G:')e~1.eo·lt of tiL:On. ~'j_ftt 
letter 0:::' :CE_ib~::i~~,.. to;,:tc.r~·c=;. (:'::;v(.r:~~~T~ .'. 88:-:'. :'ec .• vii. 'Jl;. 
r, •. -~' "" "~1'~1 l'n ,·, 1 'e');:>1·c",r ) '~j,L .... i _,,":J~.J~ 11 ~ ..,.. .. \ ..I ... t ... L vI:"... • 
I 
'<::'a. volante Ii brb iAS ~'Ijceur' is llO:\; to ;)6 cOl1f;~tseD i t}~, 
Ill'. r.;<'1:.,J.e "TTOl-'l·'l·tS' .~p "'1'",,'11\ ,·11; ell '-:,,' E' s'11:>1] "fH" i1' ,': L:!tr·r 
_ ................ \l V v.....". ~ v __ , ........ ~ ~ ., <~" "J ~ .... ""'.. ~ "-' " - --"- .1 
Chc~~)tE;!:, I (-,i IJ::.t:(, C,)lh.l81d-:lC.J. ~o:S; is '; ;)1'13.1 >13:;::80:1. ..:'h'cW C .. 'E:: c, n I].::-J:e 
three Q6fiflite ~t~ tG1;~6:ltS:- (l} -:·od ts t1~e ,"'rh:s,r7 "T(),.md of ~',ll 
, t (r' ,- 1 " _ .. 1 ~ 1 ~ d ~ ~ ~ (r>' ' 
eX18 81' ce • C;;;.) I, Cl ue r".nc:. ,:'. U6S 'I'E, tj_~C secon Str?::::ro.<l1C,:.J) In 
80;,_(:; \,G;T t~:8se -~-I~,l~le;J in t:1eir rEfJ};r3ctivel Licr~'.l'c]lieG :l:::,VC beL~'.: 
or 'GXiSVI in tl:.e nind of1Dd p:;,:'ior to :)11 other 8xist8ncs. 
c ... lol'l:: t::1ose line c ':;8 ;:;:::~.ll find it e: sier to cl':',rify 
t:r~e thou::;ht of Leioniz llil.lself as \I0':l1 ['.S s~;ein? the I'clevc,nce of 
t~.e more theolo ,·1c:.::l 11<:',rt of his 1JJri tin". It 11'.8 the J.:8ri t of 
doin.J:', just ice to the f'~U1d~!"lont21 cont j.mli ty of ~1i [; thou;ht frou 
the e~lrliest to the L:test ',)rlt in":s in 11is correspondence '.lith 
Clo.r:(e clurin'~ the h13t dO~T8 of hiE: life. 11'or the ethical 
t~eiSD of Ieibni~, upon ~hic~ his opti~ism is based, is 3D 
essential· and fund~~ntal part of the inner structure of his 
thou:;::t. 
- -- --~--.- --- ~ 
- ----
It is vefO'hteneinilJ;J at tirroes to simplify f:eib~·Z.bY st.r~sin~ th~ rrona;;ti.c,princi~le at the af~t.se9shciJs Vl,tl?lttllrl~f!l.gs.thettrue oun tlO/1 ()fb,s optlf'fllsrr.ThlS IS done by. so oP~,~n¥lc cohn~18s~or olLe~~i~ Ifsa~ i~gfotaear~Jcenr·6J~s~n ~f~e.~A¥g~~~i~ct?b ~irt~h& the rrbna~s and t eJT,OraIJr.;urr.ent th~t,the lAaYS of nature lead to Jract3.But after saytn:l this 
PrQt
ect
• Carr l~tO ed Q ~ddl"lt IS not a little stran:Jethat.,the phllosodl~r who had··. ' 
reJ ~ $0 IOlte y an.Quts,je tlleory of knOwledqe and had enuncIated so cI~rly th~ ~lnCI plete t te seltf~ff1tra I \zat,on ot the rea l,shoulJ be, r~.~bered chIefly for a JU(j:JJlrerlt on lie na ure ° the un Iverse 'hfl,ch a~sUIT,es the posslb i Iity of transcendln~ It The 
n:.orpent we place.ourselv~ at that truer LelbniZ[~n standpolnt,adopt V(Jat we call th~ rrooadic pnnclple1 .... t IS ltT;oossoo.le to COItparethe rea Ity 9t the unlvers€ WI~h Its pOSSibilIty ~n::l pass a Va u6-Judglr.ent on It as best or.v.or~." elonl~1I 191>9. P.J81-2. 01 QUr Intenr~talion 9t Leibnlz thte ~rangent~ otfsuCh a, View dlsaDpears, tor tne theIsm ~n optlmlSTi ot lelbntz 
IS as prtor 0 III S dOc nne 0 rronacts as are hI s views on pre-estab II s 00 ham:ony. 
94. 
'l.'he optirllisr,l of Leibniz is essentially the verdict of a 
relisious ;;-lil1G.. ::is :"'.r7,r:,Emts (irE; curiousl'T in line {Ii th those of 
ti1e earliest Christi8.l1' apolo(';i::;ts. 'lIn the~ cosnolo,~Y of the ':l.polo(::ists 
the trlO f'Lmdamental ideas are thLtt~cod is th,~ '?ather and Grer.J,tor of 
the world, but that, as uncranted and eternal, he is also the cOffi~lete 
contrast ~i) itn. I~8.rnacl:~ compares tte o~,tlook of LGibniz T7ith tl:c,t 
of the ri,reek F:J.ther, Cri::;en. n:':'vils'i s,',ys Cri '~en in hi s anS"'ler to the 
~rea t a ttacI~ of Celsns ((lContra Celsurl. 6. vi. 55. Quoted by arnL:~ck 
11Ei story of Dogmsn Vol. ii.]I. 344. J nin the stri ct senso are not 
created by '}oCf; :ret some, th)u:::;h b'Ll.t fel? in co:m:parison 1o';i th tt.e -:re::t, 
\Jell ordered vl1101e of the 'VJOrld, hl"ve of necessi ty 9,dhored to the 
objects re~lised; chips 2nd sitdlar rubbish, or as arc~itects cannot 
be l"~'ldG re:;syojlsible :lor the dirty he2.ps of OrO;~611 stone's cmc' fllth 
one sees at thE; s:!. tes of b'lilcia':o('. 
1'0 8::'1' t:~~.t thE:: 'i7orld is 11the best of ,::~ll post;ible '.'Jorlds" 
ooes not Ge:'J1 ttxt it pO~J':es3es a static perfecti8n. Li:::it,tic)ll is 
inseDarab1e fron existence. ':"116 cre:'l,tl:,re c',n nevc.r becouG lE,e it::; 
,'re"'toI'>'! ''It'ho'l~''- t11e "'-'l·ve~>",r. ';"'~' eqqc'll'T nc:r.o",c+ l·t "-i]l ·-c~·, r> j _,( 0 "-~ ')'l. l.-~."',J"" ... '" VI,J.~ c v~ _,,-,.i>c: _,'.,:....:, ~ ",,"v .Lv v, ~ ~~L~,'v ........ J!.. 
1;:.8 s:'.'v0r~i·'nl\T Tlerfecti b6c-:~;,8e it C:l';:~8-' 1"~7s::C :-::::3</.~:',(',rf6cti():')s, 
'''It'ho''''''y, it'·, ]~"""-Cl'" .,},-'( '''",,\<::,,<,'., ( 0\7(,,1'8 1 "'?nl'ver" .n(:olt ro":'··r';;~' '~··'·l··""' . .,,-,, I.A. )l~ ''''~' ...... _ ~V,,) _ <_ •• >.::. -IJ ...... L_) ., ~ ',1._1. -'., .::J 1. "-' u .d, ,j~.-., -.:" _ ~a ~ '- '>d_.:L_ 
"':',rfai t, i 1 ne ser:.;l jC\,':::.: c S 'Y.:,\-f :'t.in€\ ',('; 'ot .>~rfci t; C:::',:C :L 1 c ~·I;';,l1.:;e 
t m~s jo'tlrf: et ~}::. ,':;:~e 0,1:; not:vclle S ::'f:rfo ct 1-;(1::3, (j,' O'7':l,-l' i 1 Ul p,rC:-
:~, ...... ;~.e~~I.~;:2~'lS,'S \I i.,E;tter t,~') ~-:Jtlr~'~:~lf~t 171.0. V:,.iii .:~ .~~'C:'.; :wei ~.Jllj_Z tcJ_l,~.l -
t=-,~,.t t~L~C.I'::' 'I~:; t" '>~ :::";""I:.::tl~e~:;8S~'Orl(-='l tl. ~.,t t-l_ .. t ~~ rc i~:;,-: 1,,1::':,~,7:J (;,".l. ~~,~~l,~r 
!l'CI":~)C;o-~, t 1 "c :)~:'(:r t:_" t it t~J 'l-·J,:;'~"'-: '_'r'c)"f,7i~~: in ::e~fcct2_~)rl.-::f 5.t i':J 
~.l: ;;l:"",] c\.6.1:1:.110",'" =:(;rfect, :,;r,~t '1 -,l~j~~~: 1 it j,:3 I ~OI'€, ~:'r)Q~~;~"I::1D tfl t t>,CI~2 
is )10 ')e.:inn:U:.: .. ~;.t j,f' :-~ i:; ::.~lqr::,:·'3 TTi;-:'~ in perfection (.:r: .. ',:::'~YJDirl·: 
tJ:1.,t it is not ~103, ibl:: tc:: :lvc it "t}~'"'.Jil-.l<?: IT:? :::,~)~~fE.ction ;.;,'.11 (It 
the s:.,~le time:, thE'; ;"·.ttCj- c:)uld 1~( icz,'l j,'::' in tlj:) '<.,Vs, 't1-.l:.~t i3 t;,) 
S:'i" b'lGr.~e oI'din2:~tF.s of t'x: 1'l·~"G::"')f)1. ~', or ~:," t:'c8 t!'L'i"~l- ~. ::.nk'18 
hypothesdls of the :~y:pE:rb()L~ ,;~~,el<f,.o·.lll; Le iJ()vue:~i:1r~jU":, ~~~lcl. the 7 
i('L3t'~nts or ste.tes of tl,;e ~,';ol:'le; ",.0:11d l"C~VS 
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tesl1 :·~rofJinC'.' in ,?crfr;ction frOE all etern.ity; but follm7La c: tJ:J.8 
hypothesres of the triar~:le, there '.'m'ld t,::,'ve be(-:n Q l;e':innin:~;. The 
hypothesEi:s of e~u::\l perf~'cti::m would be th:;;1.t of the recte\n.::le ~ ... 
ViI do not vet SE:8 the '.'Ja~T to S;101: der'onstrc;t i VE:ly t1111ch 1.rE' oU2;ht to 
cboose by pure re:',son. ~~o\lever, f:.'.lthouZh on the hypothesis of ::rov'lth 
thE. state of the world could never be perfect ~,bsobltely, t';';en 
at ~Jny sj.':Jen inst::lllt, yet the :lctu21 sec:uence ~-::J:l1c~ l"Ol1e the less be 
the nost perfect of all rosc:ible sP'c~l.,enc~.3, for the re~'.80n that ~~od 
chlays Qhooses the best p0.'3sible!1 (LE:tter to ~our,:::et ... ,u3')st. 1715. 
95. 
2:.veryman :? 246-7. Jr. iii .:'. 58~-3) .:;:hU,s. "'!nElther th. e world is a}IJaYs 
equ311y perfect. (it) or vlf1ether it is ·~TO'.}in'3 in Ylerfection C:pr C.) 
in neither of these cnses can it eVer be iiabsolutely perfect Vl • Yet 
in 0::.11 c'~ses it is 11 the best of t;ll possible 1:forld,'s". 10 think of 
it otherwise would be to ~ive men occasion for blasphe~ia c:eationis. 
~~od is not limited in mon;>,rchis ,'J.nd "the best of:.ll nossible TJorldsf) 
Eust be interpreted in an Ccbsolute and fins,l sense. "et:.;t~hysiC8.l 
il!1;,?8rfection is inseparable fj:>on concrete existence. ~:u.t this is 
altogether different frOljl si01yin.:.; that th~ "FJOrld £1.E1 cre!.:~teQ is a 
continual re:iroach to iod hl:r:!self c.'.nd to tbe soverLi~n h"p1)iness of 
the Divine 119.ture. (The'o(li cee P:;,r. 201. :::. vi. ~I. 236.) 
'1'he abovt; cons ider:'t ions no',y he 1~ us to avoid re'~2 rdin.:::: tJ. sk...:t..i. 
?!deisrn ',' £(8 the, Ll~t 'fJord of !..eibn~z. '-:'h~~i'~mi~i~n universe is ,not 
a r.IL'clnne. It IS L.1herently c1;)rnarilC, lor j;1g.:e ll1flTIltely pr')~TeSSlve. 
';'01:'lever Leibniz ir:si3ts that >'tout est 1iE{?, he .. 'ives no SE~~'Estion 
th:;: t thE:: CLct i vi ty of ~on~,cJs is povement in a circle. On tIle contr~~ry 
they ~.:rG Ili:-i::£ "i th the ir future n. ,tillQ of LC:{l it c.~n be s::::id '1,"e lmou 
not ~Tet • :hn, t ue 81:.[:,11 be Ii for it ts po ,;:;sl bIG th.t tte hl1!~ar 1'3.C0 1Till' 
reach .": ~rester 1JerfGct ion th0.n t]c-1.t ','c8 C6,n iI-':.a3ine no,,,. ("11 se re~lt 
"'" - ~ ,
r,;en;e que le -:enre hlU11Qin :?c;rVifll1ne ;~vec 1(0' tel~!::?S '1 ',m,e plllS ,::rcmde 
perfection, que celle Cl1:e llO'L~,S 2?CllvonS 110i)S ii':Sl(·:in~r !,resenten:ent 11 • 
lhGo(Uctfe. :~ r. 341. -c.vi.~.317.) ...... ven LL' the tmivcrc:e o.S 2. ::EJI'ies 
of E;vents :i.s tf1f:) be:3t t:: t is :~~8=]il;lc, (:".cl~ ::,a.rt ('I'" t}:E' H111VL:L'jfl !.:"Y 
not ;)8 tr~e bef';t. ("O~}.tl'e :-;I:'on no:rroit di:!:'~£ r. 1.1.6 "CJ,X1.8 1 i'3u:,itc. ('':':J 
" A·' -ch"~i~~~;3 '. l' Llfi "1j :':Jeut at 1'6 L. :;"c~ i 118Hre ~.:.uj S,) 1 t :}:)3 f:::1.1)lE. ,\;.'lO:'c;.,W; 
06 ~~'i e:xj,~t(: :.1:....::. t~), t 1 '1'.'1:t vcl':, 11"':::3 cr~lC':".l.e '\J,rt :i.8 c1't "eG. 1"S ~e ,s,ji t 
r'''' 1 0' '11 .' ',': 1 ! ," -' / c -;. '." ;,:' '9 'v . ;o~' r'" C C ., "~i; '.' 'l'r l' ,,- I' c: p,_ . ..:. e· Ell. e ... T •. ,.l.E:OU.JC, C ...... 1. ,_~" . .J •• ;r. 01., •. " .. J , ., .:1. CII.,_"._, ~ L. "" 
~'ossj_l.)lc'; t:::~t tl:e :.rlj.-Jc.r[;(C, :::.c1\l::'·,lC(,~' :'68 : jJ,lc~{ 0:';' ;LieUd::'!, if th.'.t i:, 
:..··1- .'" t,·.,,· of .I,.."il·U-'-· ,~·'·',e"' 1"'- ", '10·' """I"'l'tt c " .0'0 l'r' c~' J_~,_) l"<Q"t uL.e 1,,· '.·,I" u)" .;. '."'~', .!~q v :,~,~ I, J..~)! IJ 'J'-... ,-Jel" ,~... V «.X; ~"". 
0.11 ;;:,t oneG. :'ut tllE:.Se H, '~rGl~lCll~ r::'i::'fiC1l1~ to sol're. (1111 se 
c.'i',~~"rOl'J- ~(')11C '1'''-· l'·'I'I·'ro·'!"""····,l'¢t t.()'l,,,,i,y, I'" cl·· l' l'e')-·" Cl ;"l'F,r" 'C'l' ';:('11,'" ~.\",I:../_...I.. v ..... 'I"'..a. \l_".V ,""",~ \i".4le.JI ",~ ... .l..,-"" J l. ........ c:.IJ',=o"->il "=' _lL i,p".--\,. """''''.1. d'''''':''', 'I>J. y~ "--
e'toit 1:; !l~tvre de:-) cl"ose.c~, cL,'il It, rnt ':',oir:t 'lerr'is d'~,tt2'L:cc1rG 
:;tt·~ 1]61110\}.1" d 'i~d"~ seul C()~::". =~:::h~ ce sont Gel." nrobl$J,e~3 c~ont il f\~)US 
e ~/I(j c~';f)·01'C]"ln '"e'~ 1··1~·'L.r'i (~'hO"'c.11 ~ ""'" ~"""'" ... v\._ u,", ... --.:,'_J~ ....,'" Vv;. 
;]',1, Lis nDs .L~erUl1,i (:rt r.'inat1one rz.dicc.Li. V1 (1697.) Leibniz 
l?:J.s no doubt thr:-,t :)rO~~T6s8 is the very !1.,ture of the uhole univ6rsG. 
"]j11rther, to reali ze in it 8 co~.~plet8n8 ss thE:- uni V r;:1'S8,1 l083.Uty o.JQ.d 
!)erl'ect ion of the Horks of God, '.78 Irlt'.st r0;c02:ni SE; 8. c8rtain per·netuG.l 
an~ very fre6 ~ro=ress of th~ ~hole univ~rse, such th~t it is alDuys 
--:oin:: forrrarcl to ~:reatE)I' iI'.:/rovenent (cult;u~.,).:3o even nO',J f;' ;res.t 
part of Ol)U' e9.rth )r~,~,~1'l received cultivation (c'.lltura) Clad \7111 receive 
it more :.md more. 4UlQ ::,lthou":;h it is tHF true thc:t 30metil:u8s certe.in 
ports of it~ro\'f viild 8.:2. in , or e.:ain sll:l'fer dc;structJ.on or 
de:~;enert.~tion, yet this is to be unOtE::.l'stood in thE:,. \fay in which 
sffliction W88 explained above, th·t it to say, th2t t~is very 
oestruction ;nd de c:en6ration lee.d,-~ to SOrle i"Tc'ter end, so th~·,t some-
hO~J ~'e profit by the lOf3s itself. ...u1.d to the possible objection 
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thc,t, if tn.is uere so, the uorld ou=~ht lon(s 9;:':;0 to h..::ve become a 
paradise, there is a ready c,nS'f!er. Althou:;h mS.ny substances have 
alre~dy attained a «reet perfection, yet on account of the infinite 
olivisibility of thE; continLlO\~,S, there ~lvr~~ys rernain in the abyss of 
tbings slUYi~b€rin~s -part S vlhich he: VB yet to be auakened, to ,:;rov1 in 
size and uorth, and, in ~ ~ord to advance to a more perfect st&te (~ld r.}elioreEI. cui tum) • ,-wG:. hence no end of pro',:;ress is ever reached~'. 
(Latta.p.350-1.) 
It has oft6n been rel:j,ar}":6C that L~~i lmiz tdces t iLle for 
:::;rai1tee. ::;,ut the reason for this is to be found in tIle ~ynru,'cic 
I'slE',t ion b8t~7E;en thE; \lorld Cl.ud "00.. :::;'or Lei bniz '.~cl sees all t111n~3 
totUlU sinul. \i'~he best of all possible \"'orl6Ls;J is c verdict sub s})Bcie 
teu~oI'is totiu.s and l:~)t y"er(;;'ly z. VB2:d:Lct sub :JDccie teLlporis c';J.iS(:m,1. 
It ).-;::.iC;l:t be nOl"'e correct to c}3scribo :tt, C Sle 11 .ve i3l:erl,8.S ;:-3.. v(~rdict 
sub totuis ani vf;!':Ji. ~'...s Leib.1iz Sf2,Ys in rels~ti(m to the con'trovcrsJ 
bet-:-Jeen the Illfr3>12,~osari2\l1S and the 3nnr. ltccpso.:rLm.s, the YJc.y to 
nip this dispute in thcoJ blld ts to reL~enl;e:r tl~.8t G.ll OGCrols.s of r+oc.. 
""rEi sir~;:,lt:.meoufJ, not ollly in J'e~:.::.rcl to tiLeS ~)l2.t :::'180 5.;" Sj.)lO X'2"~tioni8. (~?I'6UtBt:.'(: G,U'O:.1 no~rrcit f(;ire cesser' cette dL:mn.te to:'.t 
<Q t ,.', 'i"Y" ," Pi· ",,(". t 1,-1"'''' t'· .!l~:' 1~· ~ -} ~,- 0"" 1~'-~ -l +.,.~ C! 1- C'l ""'I, j ,.,·_,,'t'-- 0 .r"": ) (,1, I,.ll CO,2!~" en "tl~'v."1 , '_" , C I.,leb~ ;:,J (.i .. OJ G, \;O.".k> G,;;; G.ec:tl, ,~ v.CJ 
DIi, U rl/,t "1 ~,' ·,'t ,,",,,,t o''''>'''''''''''-!co n D Qc->'l~··"r."~+· ""r,~~ p··!y, ..... -"t ''''·'1 '~e I...J.,)&~~ ..... t,:J "-- -:.., J~ ,.:.JVoiL~ 1:;.,1< h •..Ii... ~'" _c ...... '>...",J, ~ 0 ~- h-,,""'~ ~~_ .. _,"-J.,j. V ~"_~.b .- '~~' .... ~~ '-'-~~ t e.,:::8, e ~1. ~':,~ IO~;~ tOl).t CJ 18 l' Oll(~\;.' co:--;.vic ,1t, cl~2i.o:; 8~1(! ,:-,]' L1 .3 i '~';.') r ~Lt i Oi'lj, s , 
,. ,~."n l' .'"M" -=' .. 1" ." to ~-"! l',r.l;:· c:£.( .. ' -. '-.[ ~'. "'/~ ',~ "1.£.7 \ ~!.- v~..,.J....l_',:=;r '"""" \ I..!..l., . ..:. 't,. \,..J " 1.l.. l~'.',llJ • .;.,,~_,,>~-~;0,,- 1 ~'., *' .. ',~<.J, • ,,--~,',:.. t. t .~,. £: • J 
,-",coo::'('.).: 1;7' "er; -:7C ;::;;.;,:> ,)1' :'t::.,; ~'GGt 'Jf'11 cl,n:;;;i-.le:; ' .. ,)j'l(~;)~l !~ 
"~,'} .. Gt rec;l:.st) t::, t 'Ie:; j .. "!clt;(;(' the I~::.;)t :,,:,'\ t~;8 f;J·~·,>::"'CJ~"s :811 ;;,;:; t~:. 
',"'rc ;-;8Xlt • lId t >' .. t'110 (:;11e 0:2 ',1':) '~~€ ~:w i;; C'J~l~ ~'E..u.c:·.CJD'. _.': .(;,,) 
''''tl.r .. 'c,J'l"'TG;'." :;.It)'''o~:. ,'., '(;'- c~':~ '~(:~r"",,'lr:"rn 1\-- T'(--'·'-,r of:'tl'G ,,·t·:;l'.., if ",.I _~ ..... t ~ ~ _ .k-_. r ~ .3 ... ,,~1... .1' ... '> "~> t'.. _ 'tJ~1 .,,~ J vl......I_. " 10 , ~.I"_) ,~,....- , ~ 
t718 're'lt futl.:·,I'e\/ (:::¢t~;, ~,rp, I'C;U'vcC fox' X'SV(s::':: .. ,-tlon), ',:0 c),a be 
c 8GUreU ty t:~j,s ;3: C ~:E;~::30.n '~ll,:t t>ir:::[3 r r8 1'.:~'C-:'('. :Ln <' r1,7 . 'l'!:;Lc:' ~)zceeCG ChlT (-:(~2il'ef)cl (:i:;r1l1cL. of' ~'G.t. of "r' c(~. :r.'.l~ • Ir;;.tt:. .. y.4:<~ .• ; 
,,'e }l~"ve :;cll.'e:..~Cl:,- 888',1 t 11:e:t Lcit-)!"\i7J ;cCC0IYli3cLG _ ... P,-:':.itL1L~1;1. 
a.oct IS t' :.t }!'\T6~'Oer"~:::'.ti,):::-: ie; con~i:~;,Y1~r3 C:C:'C ,tt:x ..... n(~ 0:1" ~C=·.E~ ~\(·;i·:~y 
of Lf' t h.1.t z, ~ s ~~-lf t~_~) Y)f .. j~ t :07 ~1:l '~l';~e ")C:-lOO 11 ~cn., \ ~e :~ ~~ ~T ;J~~.\~{:­
"IntTe, c,~;::ct:::', l1.E':;C incl:J..i'i':jJ~; 
~~, :tr:?'. C\);,1ct., n~c ",,,;·':ch.wq.s" , 
a.s OIJ:)O seQ t ,:) t:1EJ:rinoz j, 8 tic COI:C82"t ion. 1·;:8 .... :'.:: 1 ~Hn(l.u;:; in:;: 1:1 (} j t·,;:,;::; , 
l\U.lJ.d •. 1S 1)eus",:~?lj_ci·c;J,sl:. T;~6 '/Jorl0. is Dot .. ! .J,c}'iLnc. 02' ,,·:....tC: .. T~-:i(;" 
l'ec;." ::~:-:os cOl'rE-ctio'''.. ,:;;till less C:::.l1 it ~=::;,;].~ ·.:it~.!.c'_:t tI18 contlnu'l 
8
" 1"Ol.-~t o-"'r r~rv" (7" ';"l~"i r' 7"~"-H,~,,,,"ov",ti 0'1 i,., ", CO~-'>';1""'10"':: ',).,EJl',c,jptE:ilCE [ 'L ,,_' ~ '"V \A. • I .... .IL1_!..) .,,/.)~ 'LJ [-.J v ...... ~ ", "'~ .I.. ...J" ~ '<=>~ \,. V ~ ~ ... '-J. , ~ t>.J ~~ ~ - _).J 
of crection 8..11C: not ~~b.rc- e.::dlf.)s:_' x'c)ctitiiTI::Jf d.i8crO~~8 or'c:' ti'IE) " .... ct;s. 
"et",Jf .. G.''1. <"<·oC! :C'Hld ':;~:e ':io!'lc1 t]"'.cr~ 1.'3 '? l'eL"tic)l1 of C ').i"; 1 
itr llGl1Ce. 'ror there c,n '\:.)G .120 'ctjectivc.l or ~;:~'.!:i)t"'Et2'.ti~re rel~tion 
1')etneen tl:.e:::·".~·iv~;n tl'lis r'81:;,tio,1 t~lo:t08' ri.o t~70 thin ";3 ::'.t 16:;~st 
(1) '.2Lc effect i8diffeI'Gnt frOTl t:::'e C'4.'_lSC. 
(2) ?ho effect rnst relJ(~.olc~ the C:~':~',8f;. 
I: ... ccordin~.:;ly there; is l',l.ore th ~.n r~crc ontol~Y'ic".l ;;C~ ·.r.'.~tiOl'l b2:C".;ec:n 
'<.od :.'nd the :Jor1(~. In some~J8..? tl}8 ',70).'1(1 ":llst : cj.rror t>::. ;}" r:fect i ')11 
of its CrE:g+v()l~ :""ne .. "'.1'nhol _ler -:",,~ tlle ","li8 '\J"i7 "'C ;,~'~.v;:C' ·:lY'e:·:)()v ~.. _ '---" _ ~~ CP _,)J.~~. J _, U'-.-,,-__ . -.A(J' 'A .">~-~ ~I ..... - ....... '--. 
S'7. 
'-et Ieiblli? refns6s to re::o.rc~ t:,;j.s correlation of 
cre,>,tion :'In.d :rre3c;:lv::~tion ;213 ;J.'yt?::iG~ Ll the n"tlu'E; of 8. Ctononstr3.tion 
of the exlstence of ":od.(s.sicUd tl~e C:lrtesians e.~s.:eir;e1 ).}for 
LlSic.i.J.iz it hs.s no 06U0l1itr.\tive y<:..lne 'j[~';.c1 involves (}ii"'fic,:lties 
:IIJO,,,.t t:~E; coc:tiru'.l1!' ,:f'l(~ tfl.8 rb1c:tion of the teLpoJ'2.1 to t:he; 
etel'ilRl. 'one tr:e 1er3c :i.'~ h; ;9. V( l'.".able tr"::,th. '1:11.8 Cl'S'ltlU'8 c1enends 
continw:'.ll:y :l;;on t~le Op8J::..::tJ.on of "'oa. It '.Jo'll{, ;-lot cor:tL"l\ .. i6 to 
e:;[L::rt, 1 f iod tUcI n,)t COJ.lt ir;,.tO to ~.ct. ~,ret thLs ,,-ct of~od is 
.l-'"'re c, <:\',,1 '1Jt " nr.,nQnC·'·JI"T 61 "n,·'tl'('D . V"'I'·rt·l'ina.-J""'~'l "'1" 'C'''''''l 1"'1 ~ -.; '-"'U U. !, \~, Y ,,\',..;) ':>''''" ',,". '-. ..I ... "~ v.:, "&'''jJ' ,-,c .;" Ll ,~> U Vic. ~ 
t:~e o-;ol'lc: depends '~on the CO!-:.til:'Ui.:,\l "concu'.:.rs ds Die'Cc. H • IigJ.1he 
concour;:;;E;; of "'OQ C011St;::;tS in ::-:ivi ~'t:cs cOi:til1"'C.:O',ll:., T,:'ln,t tl'.GI'6 js 
retc-::.l in 113 Ql-:.d in Oll,r ,-;l.ctiol1s, ;;;c f':~~r.;.lS it i::.volves T)GI'fcctiol1i 
};:,),t u:~c.J,t t::,erc is tl:erEin 0,::' li:',it or :i~.,~'")()Y'f8ctio.n, i;,) c: con;:.:o~ "enol') 
of tilE':: l)rOcoGi.C!lt lit~it,,'.t:i.o~;;.i · .. l:.ich ,=,rc oTi ., L'l;)'l 1 ,7 in ti~(~ cre~~ture'1. 
-'. '- ---' -- {~ -((llG conCO'.1,I'CJ c~e ~)ie'..l consistE:: n nous (~onncr conti.n-c,olleu(",:i.1t ce 
e2·]·! il :r 2' e,e reel en :10t,:;::; et (:~n l1os,·,ct ions, 9.Ut::ll,t (~'J,' 11 \;.E'.·Gl\'")p~"e 
0e 1(, '!')(,,1'-:'8ctio;1" 11":'-;3 ('~IE) eEl 01 1 'i'1 ~T' l~ G(;jdf,U1C~ (r- 1 i'Ge et d-,';i~~{",~;;"~t ~ ~~~t"1~i·;'_~'''~~1ft-''_ ,It-~<---~i·~lif~~\t·~,~ r' (~~{f--~-~i~-JC' r"'~-~i :, ~~~ .J .... r .. ,,1 ' 6~"J ,._."l, J,.l e ".,,-, 1.,,,,,.,.1,D.,, rec \c8.l1)('.", ...... "OL.) 
OI'1' {" I" >'1" l' rC"J~C e' l~!t {' '.' I'" : 1 '0, cV'~, "1' T(·~ '? ;P.., G~)fl:l cr!'" -P', r ~ I"J, n '~T i '" :'(0 J-,_ ..L .... ...A, __ '-"_ 'J ""''''=".0'' _"'. • e:o I «-~ .l!.. ~ "'.\A.-' ,,-~y ..<.~ _ <.~ •• • \. ~ •• _~~_~~ " 
C:)~,~;jC::~ ,:~,]~ 'tC(~1 ~.\1 ~",:~:i"~':lj_;#:, i'~ t eJ~c, '?~ t:" .. t; i.~.:; ~ r i:f'-~C~:,' (],":" ~t:)~; 
~~:CtJ ,I t~ ~~ ~:·;~L):7J.:Lr ," ~ ,,:~~<2,(~ ~):'I~ it,_." ~.~·d~~~~,':ll( •. ,""'~c ,)(.~:.:;.- .(:)( ,~) I':.:G:-'c 11':-:.;, 
t:,." .• '~'('ll""': <1" "r, "'111,-:11' ~v::.,l·lt.)·FP' "1..',; 1'),,-,.' 1:, "')'",'";",. ,.' (' '(, v ~V _,~ ,,~_ !."""'--~""- _, ----'~ , __ ",-,,,," ~' .. ,,,-,,,,,,_ •. v,,., ~ t. '_.1 __ '.'" _ .J. ~ , _" e 
:~,-,~-(:ri -~J:; :~_~'Y' f-. -'.\."~~t •• :~:~~.: -~,~ .~.~. ~' .. (~:~ ~;-~:~"~,\,, .. ) .~~" .. ;; ~.~~ 
1(; c~r~~:'-\i>:":.r~, l~~'. [~~: ~~.~ ... J;;;:-,_ ... ~C":# ~~<I i~ 
..; / 1j;, Cl~~. j ~" 1.1,") ~~ .. : ;_1,:...:<!~(1 ~~ 11 L:--~~~J QI~~ 
~ "' ") ,; '1/ 5 i 2_" '\ I=~ 
{; ::, \1 t,; ~ ~ :.-. J~~: ~'~' ", -C" ~~ [, (' 
-t io 
..t .. T11~J..Tl(1 
t.,C:.)v~-"},)(~:: ~~ .~_,~" t') C,~ :~:t:21~ '~ __ ,~~~ t:',] ~ "~/it,:-', -) ~ 1::)\~~ 
in r- J~ s c ~ l") J"G(~~~:)~~,,~, ~.r.~cr- <.-:ri t:~ 1 e i 'yj'l 5_?:, • ~C C~;)]:(l i "1--' 
to ",~I~~1':'V~~'::: t~:C'I~( "r~~ n:) ~'~'Il)ll' (;c~ ,~"'2:"l.,~ t~"\~~ "~2Tld. ~,,8 ~~ : ()"" it1t~40 ~r~":'-"l~i>~c:;. 
~-::lcJ c.r's'-:tCE; t!(.(~ r~t""f:~ cyf' t;"C .. ':"l"lc \~~·:ic~~ j.8 t~.'(;~.l ~·(p'!~d.c(' ~~';i;" :"ir 
t8 : is .~,(;,c;j .. r t1.'_, .. '1,',8 er~:~~,~ 0"[ t~ :in (l··)cti~ti~,C ils t'l-:c t~':(_\)I~"f )f [; 
;J~',::~1]2 of "::' )-;111 ~.~ 1i~ cl,~:--'I~ i!'I=:,~ C~:l tl,"_:-~ "\T~0'- ~)? t}~,,~ ;,-'(~"l\~~,tj,~~r: ,-).,~ 
~,·ocl t;) t ~ ~0 ~,7() l~ 10~ r',Gl"G j [~ -,;~ 0 lGr~ C14~~ )~~ :1'~1~ t C,I,l: t 1 ~~~ t?" ~~ ~-l (~ :f :;J:)t~J t ~ i ",'JL~~I1C J J 
not })rc.=]8nt in tJle TE:i~)nizL ,1 tUl.i'l0P;;C' 0 
c •• n':i. U :Pnrt~ it i:)\18llC"">S in tll,c n1: n 0;:-' 0rE: t 5,)11 ~:.c j 'l:'E7. '7, 
S Ol'l .<-1·t ,<", .• r-it 1~ ..7 .,. t- +. c, c> C' ';lr) "rJ ell' <"'ve "7; t'L" Cl ,t 011 q}, ,"" T \']' 1, I') I' ~ I'O?f' 'Prl "" c:'.s ____ ... ~ V"~', .. )II..lI..,," V ,'-'" ~ "-','J, ",J,Ji.V.!!.'_~'j,~,j~ .. _Jj4.~ .. 'V"f"", _ 
tl1(" l'1jr,.;"!, '9ri8st Ot' ce:i~:', t t re~\dcl1)st(jj~'8r"';s in the COSldic L:s.chine 
~r:'J.st bel ~'C' fro}':c th,·l.o to tir;le is to 1',2}S8 into ·~es3i,~i8". '~'}1,0 
irr::,'lcrfe ct ion 8 ;'1nd irre ~'lAl,s~r it i es of t Jre uni V8rSEl Cf)t1.St j, t 1lte' 
x-:::thJJr dO'-Jotfl1,l ~'ro17,nd-for tr~c~t 211E:-'cr;"'ctivit.'! of "'oil '-yj.t)aont 
\Thicf~ the u'1iv(':r~c f::::11'J to ~""iece'J. ---j;::tC)l':l Y,0,C';- [:}'~(Y!!1 t~8 trn,tl' :)f 
of this crttici~~;.· of V?i~-n~.z 1Jy t;~·,-=; "J.;:,rj.'3in-,: of the vic' ,,)t' :Lc.plcco 
tb:~t tl18 'J]or10. !,'()0~.V·'S:(;'S ,sHot i::l:-.EH'ont ana. s'~lf-~'djt,.::Jtin':' st~biltt=r 
tl::yt the l',.'7"0t]-'.E,3is of .~ ~ei ty i::-: Un!l~Cess::;;.r? ;1' t~":o cosnic 
~achi116 is .sElf-2~6L·L:';Jt in .. , tr!e C:1~:illeer ",.r t, ','8 s: boLd .. :;,:;. 
\VI 6.0 .il0t S3.~T tl:i.c.t tz's cor:'~ort·;c~l '.701'lc1 is a L:o.c~.line 01' ~7C.tC> ul1ich 
::06S '7ithout Ck)(l' s interpo:3J.tion, .: .. Ulc1 ! CJl j.i.1siste:;:rt eno\1.";l1 t~-i.,,'.t 
cre:.t8d ti!inc;;s stEE1d L1 neGel of '~:i1 continu.G.l influence. ~ l,-t ::.:: de 
1,,·'.:.~int(JL1 tiJat it is ',latch Y712io11 goes rlitr".out needin:-: ':is 
co.rrection: otilt;Y" .. ise ~e should ::8.VO to C:.ouuit t1::~c..t ','-eel :'681")3 
iniprovinc upon: is o'.;n \lor1\. J-oc1 ~'.'2.'> forseen eVfJl'~Tt}c,i,n2, Fe 1 ::'.8 
1Jrovic1ed a remedy for eVE-~rytl:in~~ in adv:',nce. '::'here is in ~~i S works 
an a lre~\Cl.y pree stabl i shed t,e..rr..J.ony :inc1 1.'e~~nty, \'~.nd • \8.Y61 to Ular~(e. 
;:. 19C..::.7. L)ver'jl~:J.l:1 'rans:; '-='o j\lCl:.;e other~,:ise :is to i!cQVG ~> ve17 
10',J iclea of t~-!e 11 L3 d OJ. :. G..i.1.d t ::J(:; !;O',7er of ' .... od o1..:;;:j j;:·~iraclE)~; perfon/sd 
l);r ~"-od are ~:.ot to ml.p~·)ly t1~6 needs of' 2,t';;,1'G 1y,lt those '}J~~r:;'C8. (8) 
":'-od has enOL1.~h -rrisdOl:c not onl,? to u:pholO the fixed 
st9.rs 1n t:::eir CO:'lrs"'s b':),t :elso to c:~'e::::.te c. :nornet-_'.m: t'.obile, if 
s'Jlch be re:.J.'--'~ire6. ;'t1.t the point to note is t~~t i'e j.B at Hucl'.'2t 
\)or~"\. in tl'.e universe as :'8 173.S at the Cl"EH;~tjon. ;'e is DO [.',ere 
s!!ect~'.tor of cos;.;ic life. i70r tl'6rc is a cOl~Jlete rc~rI,:JP~r bet,'e;en 
the world of . '.~ t-,u"e 2:md of 'raco. ,,~":'. tlUI? 1 t 3Glf lC:.).tlc3 to ~r~ CE: , 
t,\nd -,·~>G.ce, t~· t~'1e ".180 it LJ.:~es of u.9t'..~rE:, IJrin;s tt -:;0 };"16rfectlon fl • 
(r·,~~r. V. 2.ri.;.1oc. of . ,;.tl.I::CS ;::.nd of'r(':,C8. :.~~t,~2-. '-. 11,21. ).~0(1 is 
0110! t~·.r:'J.;>I-:::r:.lt ,#1) tl"6 U~'Jjv8rGC '.nd i:l:l ViC::\l of tflb css8,tt.l 
j'laI'!\!or!:~i l;(~t~.'rGe~1 '·atl1.:t"8 ~;1~16 "'rs',cE< "'is '.lctivit;.' io 8vGr.TJl::.ore. _;0 
cL-)~e js t;~i:'3 l'E-;lJti:~j~G!'d:r 1;i2t c 'E18:"1 "-:;(1 ;'~"ld t:-;c '.nrlC tl ::t '8 C 11 
~J Y' t"·~q":j ~ {)c: t~; ·t"'e EL-)le :::' (;~i·'.t·:; f;~~t'::3 rL 1 ~)l. :~ect :)f G~':iritrS 
'~.'lld t~',r~t ':c~'~ere if~ ::. 8t':11 r3E) :!,~} ""I'; j~DJ'j 1--C; Ct..1i~. ~):';',¥'f' \7it~(~. ~ 8_1ebr::,~nc:de 
t t 'll:8 GeE: ?ll i:1. "~QC' rr • 
. -:).t -,Ii t::~ I (~i bnt z t~· e int ell i'S,:lt j. 1~3;::';".'" ',[1(1.;,11;;;. C~,;il 
Lever i:'8C01"~C E:erel',T t~'G L:tell:i ~C;1ti r~;;'l'!.C:.;.~l:J.. ,::'n the CO;::tl'~',I'",r, 
i~i; ~~'':·.r; tile co::;')l'~~int of ::;L:'..r;~o t;-;t t':e e:~::,ru:c>3i·)):: ;·int(;;l:_~'. e·-;.ti· 
r:::u:r.:';:.unG') ,et> '·ver? :;ll)'u to 1(,;'1 .. (1 to :J. \lrO:"l: rutioll, '.:.'8 i-;:'roc1 " S 
l1nt r~Qll:l ;nd s_~b8ta~ltL,11:T ]!!:'E;;SO;:-~t 'avel'~~\.Jh8J'C:" (r,}. vit .''''.;37' .: 
:.ut to S'J,Y th'.t :cod L:.i tLe iJ:!telli 'ollti=. SH;r'>r:?'".vmd: 1n:i is not to 
<leny tl~C;.'.t '8 is ill tile norld. {2nd i:<'l'i6I' to \~lo.r;:e'~·.vii.'.300.) ~'od'<.' 0 7 r 1'1 ·t~' ·,·~·v~ .. -",,· "~l'-Pc'nt" )"'-n 1.0 t' "r "."", 0 ,/Y""tJ'''-'11 
.:; p p 1.,e 1 ,'.>e .. ".1.,.11;.,1.,;", b,l..lu .lv.'~ ,) .VdS 1. p ...... vUL, pv~v .. . 'J, 
i.l,edic.t8" C,lJec:. is c.lto-:,etJ.:cr diffErs~1t (3 .,:' frQT·~ the pr03GnCf; of tl'(') 
30ul tn tte body. :for t:~J.e cooperat ion of the smll is not :.16C8GS:;·l'Y 
to. the existence of the body. (Q) 
::et the 10 st r!ord of the o:"t ilS.i 8m of LG i bniz is the 
30vere i --:;TI rl'ranscendence of the Je it y. iiDieu est Ie seul pont l' G.ct ion 
est ~Yuro and SEns lii'lan7~e de CE.: q.u.';n c~nDe1e ;=,~?t ire; C.:'i1eocU cee l?s,r. 
32. "'·.vi). Cn this :nOi~1t Leibniz 17111 never co;·,(i?rord8e. ~~e r!ill 
not cut the knot of evil by the 88sy doctrine of either a limited 
::Jeit~r of J?atri~)a.Jsianis".o ::;e t2.1\:8s a via neC.ia :JetlJeol1 deisLc on the one 
hand and puntheisL.l on the other. h'or I.eibniz ";od 10 ~Jtill in his 
he;d.ve~1::mC, all I .. ust ~;E; rir;>tt ~:'i. th the 1.701'ld. ~ is final rJOrd is 5.11 
insittence ;mon t~18 ~:,ctanhysic[;),l e.nc1 rlorc.l ::",ttrib',1~te2 of t;-.c ~eit~o 
~.'b.is is t:t.e ulti11lO.te s8c-iir:Lty for t:-:.8 ~~OOdJ1e8 :J.nc1 ration(.:~lity of 
the universe. 
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The Grounds of Optimism. (ii) 
It is often alleged that intellectual systems of philosophy 
fail because they confine unduly 0ithin certain limits the issues 
to be considered. In particular it is alleged that those imponderable 
questions of value, which must be raised in any attept ata 
cOL1prehens i ve vie"I}' of reality, are often neglected or relegated to a 
secondary place. Such an accusat ion cannot be brought ag:;linst Lei bniz. 
The fact of evil for Leibniz is a problem in the relation' 
of values i it is somrethin,s which can only be truly envj_sR:sec1 sub specie 
universi. il..S we ,have already noticed the isolation of evil phenomene_ 
presupposes a background against which they are inexplicable enou~h 
to call for special comment. Jere it not for the Ia.gos(:-md i.& 
~7ephistophl-es of the world the problen I'JQuld never arise. ''''ut the 
anSDer of Leibniz is in part to point out th2t there is ell the 
difference between evils in the \"forld and an evi 1 world. 
:Tor this re.,son Lei bniz approaches the proble::L of the 
evil in the TIorld Vii th good courage ane.. With no desire (It evasion. 
For hilll it is a problem in the relation of valu.es. For no view of 
the universe is cOIIlpletely adequate unless and until it takes into 
account those imrondcr8ble considerations which, as practical life 
can shm"!, are of::.;reat 8.nd crucial importance. The mesh of rat ionali ty, 
through wlJicn \fIe sift the universe, must not be so close <;',s to 
leave out those considerations which alone contain fin~lity of 
explanation. . 
The universe, as Leibniz ree-ds it, imrolves much Plore than 
the mere conception of the causal relation. i~ohanism depends upon 
teleblo~y. Causal or logical necessity gives no finelity of ~xpl~nation, 
though it is true so far as it ::;oes. :~6:tura.lis:l, even rrher:. flritten by 
Spinoze. with a capital lette.r, is really a c.n1 de sac. :;Tor hO\!ever 
'.7e use the laws of causat ion and mechanics to expL:.in partic'..llur 
effects in the world of nature, the general principles of physics and 
~~chanics depend on the working' of a sovereign intelligence and 
canriot be explained Vii thout takinG it into consi d.e':rat ion. (Illes 
principes se'ne~aux de 10. physique et de la et de la me'canique nmme 
dependent de Ie conduite d'une intelliGence souveraine, et ~e 
s9auraient estre expliciue~ sa.ns laf&.ire entrer en considefation. 
Letter of Leibniz "sur un :principe general" G. ii1.p.55.) Eehind 
the universe t~8-wepkiBg-~f-sBeb-a-will- there is a Moral person, 
with a ';1111 that is crea"tive. r.,':echanisIi1 cannot explain the vvorking 
of such a ':1111. ViThe sufficient reason which needs no further reason, 
ioo. 
must be outside this series of contingent things, and must lie in a 
substance which is the cause of this series, or which is a being that 
bears the' reason of its existence'TIithin itself; otherwise we 
should still not have a suffiCient reason with ~hich TIe could stop. 
:And this final reason .of things is called God" (Princs. ,of Hat. &, 
Grace. Par. 8. Everyman p~26.)?1 It follows· from the. supreme 
perfecti~n of God .that in producing the universe He chose·th~ best 
possible plan, containing the greatest variety together with the. 
greatest order; the best arranged situation, place, and time, 
the greatest effect produced by the simplest mean,s; the most power, 
the most knowledge, the most happiness and goodness in created things 
of which the universe adIIlitted if (Above. par. g. p.27.) Thus the 
universe comes into existence as the result of a value judg¢ment 
by God. 
Efficient causes, then, e.re the final causes in the, 
realm Df ~race (.Causae efficientes pendent a finalibus" G.vii.:p.501.) 
and accordingly we must regard the creative activity of the Deity as 
the Sufficient Reason for the ~Jhole universe. Behind the universe 
there must be a ~Jill vlhi cll is not only 91morali tEl. tis capaxfl but 
"moraliter optimus" (G. vii.136 Guilielmi Pacidii initia et 
specimina Scientiae Generalis). These twin truths carry the argument 
a long way. God created tbe universe ,and all that is therein, for 
its values. Not only so but,being perfectly good~He made the choice 
among a multitude of other worlds. VlFor as all, posssible things 
have a claim. to existence in the understanding of ~od in proportion 
to their perfections, the result of all these clelims must be the 
most perfect actual world which is possible. Ctherwise it would not 
be possible to explain wcy things happene5 as they have rather than 
otherwi se ". (Princs. of Nat. 0:' of Grace. Everymsn p. 27 . ) 
The possible 'IiiTQ,Illds, among which God mal'C8s'a choice, 
"exist!! in the understanding of God. But as such they are nO,t actual. 
still less are they valueless. The truth that they have some being 
wi thin the Divine L:ind is 'Droof that they have value of a sort. But 
there is all the difference in the world. between flvalue ti and "actuality·i~ 
For tlactuali tyfl ,adds a plus to S01~e lIalue iJ'fhich already has some 
beine; in the ratio existendi o,f the mind of God. Yet actuality or 
"existence 9t as Leibniz calls it, is not a Ttperfection". In an 
important inedit Leibniz tries to clear up the confusion in his oVJn 
mind on the nature of the predici3.te of .e'xistence but only succeeds 
in revealing that confusion more clearly. Existence implies' 
something "amplius ll than possibility, as such it is either some . 
. "grade of reality" or bears some, relation t,o a "grq.de of realityil.~ 
Yet it 'is itself not .. "a grade of reality!!, for. such adiuit·s. itself o.f 
!texi stencel' and "]lossi bi Ii ty~'. Accordingly 1!Ve can say that "exi stence It 
is not a perfection. And this remains true though 1rJhat 'exists is . 
obviously more"perfect"than what does not ,exist.(S) 
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. . In the se WO~ds" and e~sewhere J Lei b.r;tz as~ure s' us that 
"exlstence" lS. a synthetIcal predlcate and, as. such lndeed, not a . 
predioa,te at' all. But .such a Kantian interpretation of Leibniz breaks 
down, not only beoause of such failure to apply this criticism to' 
the ontological argument for the existence of· God but also because 
of' his explici.t statement "When we say.that a thing exists, or has 
real existence, this eXi,stence itself' is the· predicate" N.E.4010 G.v.339. 
. . 
These possible worlds have, '\,7e must .suppose, endles.s 
gradat ions in value worth 0 Just as· there is an' infini ty of .possible 
. worlds that are good, so there must likewis.e be :8.n infinitY,9f ." 
worlds less perfect. In the fable at the end of the Theodicee Theodorus 
tinds a vision of all possible worlds in theapartmerits of a pyramid . 
. They become increasingly ~eautiful as one approach~s, its apex and 
at its apex is found the most perfect of all. The pyramid has a point 
. but no base. It goes up to infinity because there is an infinity of 
worlds possible but the pyramid has a point because there is one 
best of all. (2) 
The f$.ct that this pyramid has no base is interesting. 
The privative nature of evil lllight seem to make the pOint of the 
evanescence of all value the more nnderstandable. Leibniz contents 
himself with ~aying that it descends "tousjours 'a l'infini" and 
we cannot press the illustration. For the Deity it is clear th~t 
ssVlthe possible i"Torlds H decrease in value, so ipso facto do they 
become less possible Dorlds for Eim. For worlds are possible only in 
proportion to their total~ta~ian value and "the best" is alone truly 
possible to God. ~~ccordin§;ly we may disregard the other possible 
worlds and say with Leibniz the pyramid has no base. 
Behind the universe there is the ~urpose of ~Dd. For 
to say that G-od brings the v-JOrld into existence by the fiat of EIis;. 
will is to use a 'word tautoloD'~ TIith Purnose. There can be no act 
unless it is an act undertaken sub ratione"'bonj .• If the indelible 
mark of all theistic thought is Vithat the.Jill of .God is a :Jill for 
the best possible fl .. (Rashdall "Theory of :;ood and J:vil. 'lol. ii.p.292.), 
then there can be no two opinions about the quality of the theislfl of 
Leibniz. This is a very differnt prQPosition from "the iral110ral 
proposition that the ·:7111 of God, as revealecl. not in the moral 
cOhsciousnessbut in the actual course of events, is the ethically 
be st." (above). 
Leibniz,does, hmqever,try to lzeep this ireport~ntdistinction 
clearly in viei,7 • It· is one thi'n~ to say that YltheDestn is the . 
-determining principle of all existence for God, it is very different 
'to argue' from this 'a priori to the gOOdness of any -particular thing. 
T.he harmonious nature of rE.ali ty "emphasises the fact that ,the "goodness, 
of the whole doe~ not necessarily mean the goodness -of an.individual 
part. Pope's couplet occ~rs to one: 
ViAll discord, h(01.rmony not understood; 
All partial evil, universal good!!. 
As Leibniz .puts it, if the least evil, which happens in the world, 
TIere talten ai,vay , it would no longer be the sa.me world. This world 
all counted) all deducted, has been found the best by the creator 
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who has chosen .. it. (nSi le moindre mal; qUI erri ve dans le monde, 
y manquait, ce, ne' serai t plus ce monde, qui tout comptE{, tout, 
rebattu, a e'te' trouve"le meilleur par le cre'ateur qui l'a choisi" 
Theodic~e. Par. 9. G.vi.p. 108). Thus Leibniz reminds us that, 
the principle .of "the Best n requires interpretation and to apply 
it in an arbit~~ry fashion is ~irtually to abandon i~ altogether. 
It was .this point Plato makes in theopehing' of the 2nd. Bqok of 
the,Republic where he- says that as well as intrinsic goods in the 
world, there are also intrinsic goods wh6se results are good and 
things of which the results alone are good. In dealing with such 
a unity as the universe it is clear thai -some things which are 
not good in ~hemselves; nevertheless are good in a secondary sBnse 
as means to 800d. 
For Leibniz the world has an organic and inexpugnable 
unity. To suppose somB neW circumstance or feature is to suppose a 
different world. (I!~~~ais si vous poses un cas qui ne diffe're du 
monde actuel que dans {me seule chose de/finie et dans ses suites, 
un certaine monde detenlini vous re'pondera It (The'odicee. Par. 414. 
G. vi.p.363.) .Just as mathematicians speak of the locus of a 
point, 'BO we can envisjlage a number of worlds v1hicll contain an 
event and vary its circumst8.nces and consequences. ("une suite 
re{:;le'e de I'ondes, qui contiendront'tous et' seuls le cas dont il 
s' afti ~, ,let .,en varie~on~ les I'~irconsta.nces at les conse'quences. 
Theodl cee . Far. 414. 11'. VI.!) .30 ...... ) 
It is as such a unity that the world is knonn and 
valued by Cod. Therefore the evil facts of our knowledge do not 
necessarily mean that the universe is evil. God, as De have already 
seen,cannot will evil as such. What evil there is in the wor~d is 
never willed antecedently but consequently. Let us look at this 
in some detail:- -
(lH::etaphysical Bvil. The problem of metaphysice,levil is 
nothing less than the fact of existence. The world by virtue of its 
being other and less than God has metaphysical evil. In this sense 
evil,as imperfection, is plainly unavoidable. ~iithout this 
metaphysical imperfection the world could never attain to the 
perfection proper to .it. Just. as boats going with the stream. 
have different speeds bec~use of their weight and cargo and not 
because of the' speed of the current itself, so'}od 'is the cause of 
the perfection in nature and in the actions of the creature. The 
limitation in the receptivity of the creature is the cause of the 
shortcomings of its action ("Le courant est la canse duo mouvement 
du bateau, mais non pas de 90n retardement; Di,eu est la cB:Y-se de 
la perfe ct ion dans lao natu:r;e et d.~ns les act ions de la creature, 
mais la limitation de la receptivitE{de la 9reat~e est la 
cause de s defaut s qu' il y a sans son act ion f! (Theodi ce'e • Par. 30. 
G. vi. p. 120.)· 
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(2) Physica.l Evil. Physical evil is an inevitable consequence of 
moral evil. (viIlest fortraisonnable, de jugerfl que sans.1e mal 
moralil n'y aurait point de mal-physique des creatures ra.isonnables'f 
Letter to Bourguet. 5 Aug. 1715 ). Often it has an incidence which 
we regard as anything but just. To this the The'Odicee gives', a tlJO- . 
c fold answ~r. It pOints Us to,.a future life as holding the promise 
of some 'adjust0ment of this balance. In the wor:ds of St. Paul 
'Uthe'sufferings oft ha!sfi..wJ:t;,.;..c are not worthy, to be compared wi th 
the glory that: shall be rElve8.1ed ". ..;'180 , after the mcwnerof the 
seed dying in the ground, t;b,ey can be made .to bear spiritual 
,fruit and so ihcrease our happiness. On the other hand,nothing 
is more greatly eXB,ggerated than the apparent unhappiness in the 
world. It is Jalse that ordinarily there is more unhappiness than 
happiness in life. (vl,11 est tres faux qu'ordinairement il.y a 
plus de malheur que de·bonheur dans 1a vie n i?odemann p.112.). 
VlReflexions sur les grand homInes qui sont mort en plaisantant lt ) 
Le'ibniz never seems to vlea.ry of making this pOint . .t:.gain; Leibniz 
points out that ~hysical good is not merely pleasure. It consists 
in some middle state, such as /that of health. (".Te suis d'opinion I 
qu' ,il .consiste encor dans un etat moyen, tel que celuy de la santert 
The'odic/e .. Par. 214. 'J.vi.~.266.) ',Jith this interpretc::ttion of 
"le bien physique" many of the misconceptions of ~e.yle and others 
fall to the ground. Eoreover it Ls q,uitecontrary to the natural 
ste te of m::n to expect thnt he shQuld ever' enjoy a r'verfect 11 
har;piaess, either here or hereafter. (f'Car cort:le un .:::oindre de rll::;"l 
est une es~)~ce de bien, de :,~ffine un moindre bien est une espi3ce de 
I:lcJ:.l ~1 T. I?ar. e . ) 
~~et physical evils do abound. Leibniz '<'muld have us 
interpret their signific:=mce in the light of his grea~ major 
premise- the essential goodness of God. We ought to hold that 
physico.l evils helve a meaning and that purt of this I'leaninz 3.t 
least is to prepare us for a ereater happiness. (" lion doit tenir 
pour certain q1..l.e ",ces souffrancesnous prE{parent' un plus gr9.nd· 
bonheur" The'odicee. Par. 241. G.vi.p.261.) The reasol1why lile 
should reconcile ourselves to death is not the u.nh~~PDiness of this 
life but the greater happiness of another. ("La raison,qui nous 
pel.lt rendre la mort agreable ,. nl est pas lemalheur de cette vie, 
mais le :plus grL.nd bonheur d'une u.utre". Bodemann p. 112.).vle 
see that in this \:re.y the physical sufferinss of man;(ind are "de.ns 
1 i ordren of the univ.erse. 'I'hey are part of the unity of the ur1i verse 
and as such t hey must be judged. Just uS in m:~ther"tat 1cs r:e SOXJ1et ime s 
find what is app~rently an irrational surd res~4ve~its irrationality 
on fu~ther penetration'and become clear and distlnct, So with 
the pain and sU.ffer:ing of the world. They are the 'inevi table result 
o'f the TJorking out of· t he ::;eneral la'l;1[s of the universe. .b.nd to 
interpret this we must remember that all individual events, without 
exception, are the consequences of natural' 1aws ~ (i!dans' mes 
principes t ous les 8've"nemens indi viduels, ,sans exoept ion;sont 
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des suitesdes volontes generals li Theodicee. Par. :242. G~ vi.,p.262.) 
In all this Leibniz is impressed by the way in which the regular-
• nature of an irregular series or line can be expressed in a law 
or in an equation./~n this way "nous fait jouir; pour ainsi dire, 
de la veue des idees de Dieuf! (G. vi.,p.262.) The sentence of S. 
Bernard expres~es his meaning well 1I0r dina,tissimmu<est, minus 
interdum ordina.te fieri aliquid". 
'iNe must remember the' complete' harmony between the 
,world of Nature and theV1orld" of Grace., So that we can say that, 
while the laws of the universe are inviolable, we must hold for 
certain tbat there is nc) crime which will not' receive -its punishment 
in p~oportion t? i~s wrongdoing. present or.future. ("les}ois.de 
1 'unl vers sont Invlolables, et 11 faut tenlr pour a,sseure qu' 11 
n~y a pOint de crime qui ne recevra son chastiment a proportion 
des maux qufil a faits/ou 'lu'on doit juger qu'il pourroit faire fl 
(Y?Discourssur la G(neros~te'tI .8..F.de Careil.p. 172. above.) 
For we must not think tlthat it is enough for the wor.1d as a whole 
to be perfect, although it may be that the human race is wretched, 
and that there is in the universe no regard for justiceanl no 
care for us, as is the opinioh of SOOle whose judgement resarding 
the totality of things is not- Cluite just',' On the T:ltiruate 
ORigination of Things. Latta p. 348.) This is greatly extended 
when we are told by Leibniz th2t indestructibility is not to be 
confounded wi th il!lmortali ty. Imraortali ty is survival of personality. 
In other words it is that s~rvival of moral identy which makes 
punishment and reward possible. (3). :Jhat profit i:'Jould there be 
in becoming of a sudden I:ing of Chine. and at the sam-e time forgetting 
what manner of man one had been (4). 
From all this it is plain that God does not will 
physical evil lid 'une mani~re absolue" •• 7hen it is not a punishment 
merited by wrongdoing or as a means of preventing great evils or -
the obtaining greater good~::l, it serves for amendd:rlllimt and example. 
Often,too,it serves for the greater appreciation of good and it 
can contribute to a greater perfection of soul. (5) f!loreover the 
duration of physical evils (and indeed of moral evils) is so short 
in the light of eternity that they cannot hinder God from passing 
as beneficient and a lover of virtue. ("Les Inaux physiques et 
moraux du genre humain sont d'une dur~e si courte en comparaison de 
1 '{ternite', qu' ils ne peuvent pas emp~cher que 'Dieu ne passe pour 
bl'enfaisant et pour ami de la vertu!1 p. l73.1LF.de Careil. Origene). 
(3). ~J:o:ral Evi 1. 
"If plagues or earthquakes break not Eeav'n's design, 
~vhy then a Borgia, or a Catiline?" 
The conclusior). of Leibniz is not unlike ,this argument of Pope" 
though the former, of course, re cogni ses that- we cannot always 
"account for moral as ,for nat' ral things!!. For Lei bniz the crux of 
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moral evil is the delegated freedom of mankind. This 1s so 
important a sUbject that it requires. a"chapter on its own. (c.x.) 
r\'~oral evil has its place in the organiC unity of the 
universe. To eliminate the possibility of evil is to change 
entirely the whole world.The universe, we h~ve s~en, 1s like an 
ocean/ all of a pc!:ece; the ,least movement extends its effect far 
and wide. At ,times Lei bniz carries this view of the essential 
harmony of the universe to dangerous lengths and jeopardises his 
ethical theism. (cf. "La perfection consiste dans l'harraonie, et 
souvent il faut reculer pour IRe:i: mieux' sauter; il faut aussi 
" ~' '" considerer que le' mal n' est pas mal absolurllent c' e'st-a-dire a 
Dieu et al'univers,mais a celuy qui le fait!t,p.l~O. Remarques 
critiques de, Leibniz sur le dictionnaire de Bayle' A.F.de Careil. 
above.) Yet he is far from endorsing the famous9ipecca ,fort iter" 
of Luther 0 
The argUlIlent,ab effectu is vital in dealing with 
moral evil. Since God created the world such as it is, it must be 
better with all its sin and unhappiness than the other possible 
worlds. We cannot show this in detail and we must rely ~pon the 
essential goodness ,of God. (6) 
But it is important to see t hat ,Jed does not will this 
moral evil directly. Uor is it V'lilled merely as a Lleans to good 
or to hinder other evils. It is permitted only in so far as it 
is regarded Vlcomrne une suite certaine d'un devoir indispens,""ble"(7) 
Yet in a sense ~od co-operates with it. 30 we can S0Y, as we have 
seen before in C. vii. "Dieu concourt moralement, a.ll mal moral, 
c ' est t' 'dire a~, p e(c 116' , sans -etre auteur du peche, et meme sans en 
-etre complice" Theodicee Par. 107. G.vi.p 
It is in this light we LlUst regard moral evil. In 
an important inedit Leibniz says 11The principle of evil is not a 
substance, it is a possibility of things, it is that possibility 
which declares that C:"lilone; all the pos3ible systeHs that one, 
which involves evil, is the best.IV (flLs"'-principe du mal n'est pas / 
une substance, c'est la possibilite' des chases, 'c'est cette possibilite 
qui porte que ~arlily tous les syst~aes possibles celuy qui enveloppe 
1e mal est le meilleur'! p., :1-84-5., Remarques critiques de Leibniz 
sur le dictionn~ire de Bayle. A.F.de Careil. above.) 
The values (}od has in view in making the world,to 
be estimated in the light of His essential ,goodness, make it 
morally impossible for Eim not to give a reluctant permis$ion to 
evil. For to take away unconditionally the evil of the world is to 
take away the good as well. r:oral eV,il is a hypothet ical 
inevitability to' '''the best of aLL possible worlds II and G-od C.e,ould 
not have acted morally otherw'ise, thanEe has done 0 The sover,.ign 
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,goOdness "of Sod made' it that His. antecedent will repelled alL 
evil and nlqral eyil'more than any other. It was "only admitted for 
superior andiDvinci ble re(l,sons and. . its bad e:Cfe cts palliated by 
corre ct ives.; (8) 
. There is nothing accidental iil. man's' sinning. It was 
clearly foreseen by God when He. ' created man. Ttl's the practicai 
. working ~ut of t he metaphysical imperfect ion of creaturl'ines:s. (9) 
. But God., by His superemihEmt power, dr~\liTs )'rom.this' permi·tt~d 
'. sinning grea;t benefi t;s. ("Dieu par sa. sureminente pu.issance tire 
de la, permission des' p~cliEts des bffiens plus gnmds" Theodfcee P€!.T. 
11. G.vi. p. ],99.) Yet0-od can never .will moral evil as such. Ee 
permits it as an hypothetical n~cessity for the realisation of the 
best. . 
.rust as there is nothin3 accidental in man's sinning, 130· 
there 'is nothing uncertain about thecrea t i !te decree of ('~od. 1';0 
one would condone the ~lction of a ~u.een who, to prevent an 
expected rebellion in the st.flte, COITlJ'J.i tted or perini tted a crime .. 
But "Frith God ,nothing is doubtful or adventurous. It· is in this 
sense :that 'i-od permits evil. '-:;'od l1lUst choose the, best or deny , 
Himself •. ~:e must choose the best, even though ruortll evil is' 
somehow essent ially involved in it. (lOt }ad, then, permit s Ip.oral 
evil only as a sine qua non e.nd even 28 such it can never be the 
object of Pis antecedent will. The consequent Y7ill of }od, which 
hG.s sin for its object, is oniy permisGj_ve. (nil ne veut qlie / 
perr'lettre le ):nQ.l moral ~ titre au sine qu~ non ou ee necessite 
hY-0 0the'tioue, qut le lie avec le meilleur. C'est nourquov la 
voionte consequ/ente jle Dien qui .:;:. le peche/ !lour object, n' est que 
~()ernlissiveV1 Theodicee. Par. 25. :1.vi.n.L!-7.) It must be so,too, 
in the nature of things for evil is pr;vative and not substantC\ti ve. 
Bonum ex causa intesra, T'lahUIl ex quolibet defectu.. 
'}reat heIr> .is r;iven to the elucidE,tion of the ~,le,ce 
of evil in the universe of Leibniz by rer;ler;:t~rin~ thG,t it is 
connected yvi th his vie-;Js on the laws of movem.ent ol1::!'or the correct 
understandins of Leibniz's doctrine of metarhysical, physical and 
moral evi 1, we must ta.ke Lq.to cons idera t ion that this Ylhole theory 
hangs tOGether in connect ion ~!ith h1.$ laws of movement. For 
general developftment and in Order that the world ,in all its 
constitutent parts, according to its destiny, should be the best-
as it is the· best before God who with one ~~lQnce sees all-
antagoni'sm must be pre sen t. lillta(soni sm from whi ch alone FLOvement 
on physicc1.1 as on spiri t'J.al anq. moral' plane can arise and cont inue 
from the beginning of' the world, to the lastconcluslon of the. 
reE',lisat iO.n of the .. Di vine plan . But from. this it follovm· 'that 
ovrl'~ judgj3r,rentabout. evil is never right neither in c.onnection 
with physical or virith moral evil, as our knowledge of the' . 
developrbment as of· physical and of the moral or,der of things is<, far 
. too insuffic ie,nt [mo.. li111i te d:' ("Die Theolo~ie des Lei bniz ll Pi c11er 2720) 
'ID7. 
';Ie have seen t ha,t "minds f! 8.re 9;i ven a great place in 
, the universe. RI3SelJlbling most closely, as they do, the ir Supreme 
,:.l.uthor , "nthey are related to I~hl1, "not (1ilee other things () as 
machines to their constructor, but as citizens to their prince; 'they 
are to lo,st as long as, the lini verse itself, ':;.md in a manner they 
express and concentn1te the v7hQJe in the:rnsel ves, so that it may 
be said that minds are ',7hole 'part s (partes, totales ) YI (On the ' 
Ultim~te Origination of Things.I).349. Latta.), This being the case 
they afford us a,key to .theinterpretation of the reason behind 
the universe. If human conduct is action undertaken sub ratione boni, 
the samE::' Tilustbe pre-eminently true of the Divine initiative in 
creating the world. 
The vJorld is creat eo' by God because of it s value. t:oreovEE'r 
this value is not merely the aggregate value of its'parts but the 
v~lue of the dynamic and organic whole. Eere synthesis and intuition 
are bet ter guides than mere intellectual anaysis. L:ere inte llectudl 
analysis is the CGuse of the problem qf evil 100min3 so ,large in 
the eyes of many e. g. Bayle. -Ilfhen, viTe separate things bound together, 
parts from the lI"hole, the human race from the universe, the attributes 
of God the one from the other~ His power from His .wis&om, it is 
possible to say that God could make 'virtue exist in the world 
without any mixture of vice and. even that }:e could do it easily. 
:ut since Fe has pernitted vice, it is necessary to believe that 
the order of the universe, found )referable to every other plan, 
demanded it. (11) It is along these lines that even r;lorcl evil 
finds its cor:;,plete justific~ttion. 
The rat ione.l soul is the I!li crocosm of the macrocosr~. 
It is not merely a Hirror of the universe of cre2tecl thinG;s but it 
is also a.nd inperfect imase of the Deity. "The (hum,~n) mind has 
not only a perception of t he works of 'Jod, but is even ce.pable of 
proc1ucin~ something like tl1eE~' on :J. sNaIl scele?! !Vour soul is 
arcl:itectonic in its voluntary activities .. it ir.1it,::.tes in its OTIn 
sphere, and in the little world in which it is allowed to act, TIh~t 
(tod perfor:Gls in the ;;re'.:,t world i1 (cf. Lelhomme y est done comme un 
petit Dieu dans son propre monde, ou Licrocosme, qu'il gouverne 'a 
se, mode". Theodic€e Par. l47,G.viop.197.) 
The hedonistic interpretation of human conduct gives a 
further lucidity to this analogy between the microcosm and the 
macrocosm. nFelicity. is to persons what perfection is !bo things" 
ilDiscourse on n£etaphysics" "Car la fe'lici te/ est aux persohnes ce 
que la perfection est aux e stre s If G. i v'. p. 462.) Pleasure,bleexperience 
on action is a proof of the urge.to perfection within ourselves. 
"Everything pleasant is sought for its own sake and whatever is 
sought for its own salce is pleasantn (Juris at aequi elementa,~. 
Mollat. p.30. Q.11:oted Latta.p. 286. footnote). Even disinterefdted 
love (amor non mercenarius) can be interpre.ted in this way. For to 
love is to take plea~ure in the happiness of another and thi~ person's 
happiness becomes id,entified with our own. If this Utendency to 
perfe ct ion II is the key to all hurllari act ion, it also throws a 
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strong light on the frequent statement of Le~bniz that because God 
has chosen this world, it must be preferable to all other worlds. 
For if man cannot denyhimselT, this argument applies a fortiori 
to God. . 
If values ,then~are final in the huxilan· sphere, they are 
still more so in the Divine. In the last re~ort they.are televant. 
to Him in away they can never be to man. For of God we .can say, 
what we cannot say.of man, that it is imposstble for Him to have 
acted.better than ?:e has done . ("il faut juger qu 'i1 n~estpas . 
. perrois de' faire autrement, puisqu '·il n 'est possible de faire mieu:x .. TI 
Thi"odicee Par. '124,G.vi.p.178.) 
To say that 'lad has a "sufficient reason" for everything 
he does, is not to say that He has any ,,'?ant or inperfection in 
Himself. C'TOd is .absolutely perfect and self-sufficient . God acts 
from no other motive than to communicate His goodness. But, unlike 
King, Leibniz refuses to interpret this as a liberty of indifference. 
The qualities of the ob~ie·cts, comprised in their ideas, make the 
reason of IUs choi ce. (12). 
Further we must not assume that ali volues are moral 
. values, though these must h;'l.ve a predomim:mt place in "the plan of 
God II .The hUIllan soul h21S no windo\'Js through i.vhich to percei ve the 
world; it is a living mirror of the universe but it c~n only mirror 
the universe from a particular point of vieD. Only nod ~imself can 
have a complete knowledge of all the v:3.1ues of the universe. 
The reasons for God's choice of this actual universe 
cannot be traced to a single rp.le that we Cl.re c~ble to conceive.e.g. 
"dans Ie bon ou dans Ie mauvais naturel des hornr..i.es H ('rheodice'e Far. 
l03.G.vi.p.lCO.) ~Ir;len are chosen and ranged not so much accordinG 
to their excellence ~s according to their fitness they have with 
the plan of t'1od Yf ( •• les hOIllrleS sontchoisis et rangefs non pas 
suivant leur excellence, que suivant 10, convenance qu'ils ont avec 
119 plGn de Dieu" Theodicee Par. 105. G.vi.!,.161. ):[e have already 
seen that for Leibniz "113. perfection de ITuniversi' is the dOLlinalllt 
consider3.tion with God and t hat man has an importance VIi thin this 
ideal. The difficulties in this vie~ need no repetition here. Virtue 
is the most noble quality of cre·ated things" but it is not the only 
good quality of creatures. There are an infinity of other ~ualities 
which draw the choice of God. If virtue alone was consideead or 
reasonable creatures alone were considered there would be less 
good. rr'here is a satiety in the IllUltiplication of the same thing 
endlessly. (13) . 
But the infinIte !Yperfection!Y,.of God· is a safeguard 
that the, int'erests of man can never ultimately be worsted in the 
universe.- ?1fl'he Ha9 universe will not be sufficiently perfect unless 
the interest~, of individuals are attended to, while the universal 
harmony is preserved Vl (ViOn the .Hltilnate Origination of ThingsW p. 
348. Latt8 .. ) 
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God, then, for Leibniz is the connecting link between uthe. best 
·of all possible worlds" in'idea and the existing universe. The 
Deity is the guarantor of the clominance in the universe of the 
hftighest values. ::v'h~n we come to consider the relation of tb,.8 values 
of this and all other vyorlc1s of value to God we raise quest,ions to 
which .Leibniz· att'empts to provide an adequate answe-r .. 
W~ h~ve already seen that~ according t~Leibnizl values 
are absolute to God. Unlike Descartes he will not hold that litO· say 
that these truths are independent of .God is to speak. of God as a 
Jupi:ter or a Saturn and to subje·ct Him to styx and the Fates" (Letter 
to P~re Mersenne,..Cousin .. Vol. vi. p. 109 0 ) 
A good illustration of the mpinion of Leibniz on t,his 
~ point comes to hand in some remarks he makes in his Juris et aequi 
elemnenta . (see Ii1011at.· D. 24. Quoted by Latta .}). 283. footnote), 
H.Tustice consists in a certain congruity and proportion, the just 
may have meaning, altJ+ough there may neither be anyone who practises 
justice nor anyone towards whom it is practised, just as the ratios 
of numbers are t1l1ue, although there may be neither anyone VTho 
numbers nor anything which is numbered, rmd it may be predi cted of 
a house that it \"ri 11 be beaut iful, of a machine that it 1,.7ill be 
effect i ve, of a cOllJJ1lomleal th th~t it If/i 11 be hapDY, if it ·comes into 
existence, although it may never come into existence". The ssme !:lust 
hold true also of the whole infinite Gamut of possible vlorlds 
envisaged by God. 
For Leibniz there is no such thln~ as e. "bareY!possibiU.ty. 
Since possibilities as such hove 2 definite relation to a ~~cessary 
Existent it is clear that this C8.n never be the cC).se ... 'is C.D. Broad 
(in his "ExaI'lination of Ec 'raggart's Philosophy. Vol.l.p.55) ste,tes 
the theory of Le i bniz : - (1) ,There is one Existent 'whose existence 
is a necessary consequence of its nature. (ii) The bein3 of :::11 
possibilities, whether actualised or not, depends on the nature 
and existence of the Necessarily Exist.ent. (iii). r';ot all possibilities 
are realised. (iv). The actualisation' of those possibilities which 
are actualised depends on the volition of the Hecessarily Existent 1f 
il.Ccordine; to McTaggart possibility as such must have 
either an epistemic or an ontological me~ning. If this is so then 
Hit is not the case, as is sometimes supposed, that what is actually 
existent is surrounded by a sort of frapework of DOssibilitles of 
existence, which limit what does exist, end do not depend on it". 
(Par. 40, "Nature of Existence"). As Broad point s out, on this point 
there is a fundamental agreement between Lei bniz and 1':c Ta,ggart and 
"there is plainly nothing in ~cTaggart!s conclusion which might not 
have been cheerfully admitted~by Leibniz" (p.55. above.] For 
ac60rding to Leibniz possibility has a definite relation to the 
existent both in itself and ihthe mind of God. 
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Possibility fO'r Leibniz is not mer,ely a negattve 
sornetJ::.ing. "Possibles arepossiql,e before, all actual' de'crees of God, 
but not y!ithoutsometimes supposing the same decrees takenaspo,ssible. 
For the pO$,sibilitiesof individuals or of ,contingent truths, con,tain' , 
in theLr,n,otton the possibility of t,heircauses, to wit, 'the free·, 
decrees of God,; in which the"y are diffE;lrE;lnt f,rom'the possi bili ties' 
of species or ,eternaltr.uths.,which depe:nd upon only 'the' understand.ing 
of God, without involving ,hiswill fl G.,i,i.p.51.-'Q;lJotedB. Russell' 
p.27 above. To think of anything, save etern1?-l tTuths~' "sub. ratione 
possibilitatis,is 'to think "of a definite ,relation to things. already 
existing and t.o ti-me.' (s~e"G.ii.39o (14) , 
God's ,understanding "is the sour'ce of e'ssencesand iUS 
will is the origin of existences!! (Theodic~e ·Par. 7. G.vi.p.107.) 
Beyond this statement Leibniz never goes. Yet" this· does not imply 
th~t God is the Buthor of e~sences in'so far as they are only 
possibiLities, though it is true that 'upon .0'00. must fall the 
responsibility for the existing world. (The'odicee. "Par. 335. G.vi. 
p. 314. ). In other \~ords this 1!lorl.d is tithe best, of all possible 
.worlds" because 1I11'i th the Divine initiative behind .the . universe the 
bonum is co..,extensive with ·the faciendum. For.the causal relation 
bE;ltween the world and its Creator is synthetic and not necessary 
(though causality i tS,elf is necessary in all possible worlds). 
Moreover it can only be explained in terras of "finali tyfi i. e. by 
regarding the cause as in some way motivated sub ratione boni. 
In other words behind the world there is a Person. This is 
another way of saying that the world is ,the expression of (;l Purpose. 
:2ut the compossi bili ty implied hy such a purpose inevi tc.bly spells 
the possibility of evil. "There were en infinity of possible N~yS 
of creatinG the wO,rld. accord:i:ng to the different plans which God 
might have formed and ,eaoh possible world depends u~::on certain 
principal plo.ns or desj.gns ofG-od t.h2',t are his own; th~lt is to S8,Y 
upon certain primary free decrees conceived sub ratione J?ossibilitatis; 
or upon certain laws ot the general order of this ~ossible universe 
with VJhich they ;~.gree and I;"rh08e concept they detern::.ine .l;.t the same 
time they determine the concepts of all individual SUbstances 
which ought to enter into this sarile universe Ii. (Letter to .I.irnauld 
1686. Open Court Translat.p.J.,24.) It is,1n accordance with this that 
we find the creaturly imperfection of man making the inevitability 
of 1.i1or81 evil in the'universe. It is along these lines that it is 
possible fully to exculvate God. (15) 
Thus 'we find ourselves back 'at the major premise' of all 
Leibnizian argument, the nature of Cod. lFiTithoutHisUnderstanding 
values ,and possibilities could not exist, yet they do not depend 
.onHis will. iithout Him not ¢nly Could nothing exist but nothing 
would be possible. About eyerything/ elsewecansayv,'c' e'st parGe, 
qu~ Dieu a f~i t~ agLr to~te sa b<?nte" que If.exercice d~ sat?ute 
pUlssancea ete coni'orme aux 101X, de 10. sagasse, popr ob/te111r le plus de bien qu'i1 etoi t possible d! atteindre n ('J.1heodicee. Par.' 359. 
G.vi.p.-328~) 
Ill. 
c.x. 
La liberte( 
"'" No' part of the philosophy of Leibniz has been s-e,~ 
stren,eusly: attacked than his teaching on" the liberty of man 'and of 
:':'00.. Roth are specifically considered in detail in the Theodice/e, 
for a true idea of both is essential to anY' del1"ouement of the problem 
of'evil (as indeed the subtitle of the The'Odicee itself reminds us.) Iv~ore.over the two ideas o'f t he freedom of Sod and the freedom' of man 
stand or fall' to{~ether. 17hs,t IS true of man is true eminenter of (':<cd. 
l1.S man is a di vini ty on a small sCf~le (flli ttle n-oc1s, sub ject to the 
Grea tGod fi) ((1.. i i .125. ), the S2me principles and arguments which 
apply to him apply a fortiori to God. 
The evident care Leibniz bestowed in rebuttinR anticiD~ted 
criticism helps us to realise not only the intrinsic im~ortanceL 
which he himself attached to his beliefs but also their crucial relevanc~ to hi~ owri answer t~the problemo~ evil. The~e criticism~ 
bee;an, to teJ:e voice du,ring thE! l:::,ter years of his life. In almost 
the latest of his W~F writings we find him defendinehimself against 
these obj(~ctions. (5th.Paper to Clarke (1). This criticlsI11 of 
Leibniz results l~rgely from a ~re-occupation with his theory of 
knowlede8. The l~ns of contrQdictio~, sufficient reason ~nd final 
C2').ses s:re !;,eld to distin~uish three 1-1no.;3 of 1{'nowled1"e. :eha latter 
in particul£)r is held to troilsY;1.ute the s.p~::;~rent contill,3:ency of the 
V!TO r 161. into the ::!lle::ed necessity for the Hor1<:ine; oat of the purpose 
of '-:;'od. 
..;'nd ,indeed., if freedom is illusory then the problem of 
evil cannot arise, since it must be 8. vox nihili. For there c01J,ld 
be no other co~ulo for propositions dealing rV'i th conduct tJ1G.11 "iSli 
8nd lIis not ". l'~or is tl:ere eny help in speQkin[~ of ,;'l !Vriletaphysict:l1 
freedom~vand reaucine; both. uG.n and '}od to v'complete nudi ties. '1 
(Unedited Letter 1;7i thout address or date. :Sodememn. Tr::'ns. Everyms.n 
p. 252.) It is only 19hen ~?e g1:.'.ve a rational interpretation of human 
and Divine freedom ~like that we really c6~e. to grips with the 
issues of t he problem of evi 1. 
The question of freedom, then, is of ~ore than speculative 
interest,it is crucial to the solution of the problem of eVil. 
I"oreover, as Leibniz realised perhaps more than most by reason of 
the)ilany political and theological·interests of his life, it has a 
pract i cal relevancy to the tasks of de,ily life t:md theJ:11oral 
advancement of thehunian race. As we shall see, it 'was a question 
much "in the air" of the 17th. c . 
It is exceedingly difficult to regard I'1fatalism" as 
the ·last word of Leibniz on the q,uestion of freedom . ..::..s .A. Foucher 
de ;;areil points out in his book (lfHouvelles Lettres et ~uscles 
inedits de Leibniz" 1857. Introduction p~L.) Leibniz had~a~ early 
stage in his philosophical' career espou;ed something like i!fatalism~ 
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:".s his letters to Hobbes reveal. He himself tells us ttflilirifice 
mihi pla.cuerat liber Lutheri De servo arhitrio", (p.Xiix.). But after 
reeding the fragment De Libertate (aboveli.178.) o.,nd bearing in mind 
the explici,t statements elsewhere (including his disavOiin~,l of his. 
letters to Hobbes),f it is Bet difficu1t not to endorse the judg01ne,nt 
of p;~A.'!J'. deCar~il HoTe'ne puis lire c,es pa:roles~Si forteset si 
preclses s~s m~ etonner de la factli te QU' on a c~ans les expositions, 
de son systeme a lui imputer le fatalisme. En verite', s n retourne 
'a son anclenne erreur, apres une.denegation 8i fo~melle, 1'1 faut 
supposer ou bien que Leibniz redeviefidra fataliste sans Ie sBvoit, ce 
qui est equivalent 'a un non-sens, quand i1 s'agit d'un tel. hOIlJIlle, au 
bien, qu!apr~s avoir e"(!;happe"i;t cette premi~re crise, qui fut si 
terrible, il j"ra de nouveau se jeter dans ces abxtmes dont.· il est 
heureusement sarti". (p.L. above). 
In his teaching on freedom Leibniz is once again the 
apostle of a via media betYleen deterrl1inism on the one hand and 
li bertinism on t he other, :'lnd, in GOm:p8.ri son with the tenet s of both 
these schools ,there can be no c101,.lbt about the life and vitality of 
his' ideas. "The dead h&.nd" of the predestinarian doctrihes of the 
Reformers paralysed intelle ctually, ~"Jhere the reacti ono.ry Libert ini sm 
; paralysed morally; It is no dis~Bragement to the powers of Leibniz 
os othinh:er that the milieu in 1.7hioh he envisG..ied the problem and 
indeed the anSYler he gave it ;;Jas in some sense dictc·,ted by the 
controversial arc;unent s of the times .3uch is only uh:?t 'ae ?JiJ;ht expect. 
In his f'Theory of ,jood and l:]vil!1 (Vol.ii.p.308-9.) Re.shdall 
reminds us of three senses in V'lhich the -;-/ord Vifreedomli h0.s ~hilosophic­
al uso.J:e.:- (i) The :::.:€cntian sense 9f VVfreeV! as "rations..lly determined:' (2) . vVC!-ood and bad acts alike may be re:';3arded as free by all 111ho 
recognise 'G. difference between rnechani cal causcdi ty and the c8:us8.1i ty 
of a permanent spiritual self. Jnthis sense :;g'ree(loIrl implies the 
power of self-determlnation, but does not necessarily involve the 
existence of undetermined beginnings in the stream of volitions ~7hich 
make up a man's inner life" (3) ffF,reedom may be used to iIilly a power 
of absolutely undeternined choice ln the s~lf, a power of originating 
acts which have absolutily no connexion with or relation to the 
self as it was before the act ", According to Rashdall "Leibniz has 
also added much to the confusion by trying to persuade other people, 
and perhaps himself, that he was an indeterminist when most of his 
arguments only go to establish freedom in the second of the two 
senses distinguished in the text." 
It may be helpful to bear these three meanings of 
freedom j.n mind and especially (2) and (3) .. Freedom in the sense of 
(3) as the liberum arbi triuni. indifferent iae comes in for the' special 
castigation of Leibniz. He regards it e..s the fertile matrix of 
much loose thinking and the bane of philosophical argument. This 
false idea of freedom only plea.ses, according to Leibniz, those,' 
Scholast IDCS who take "the ~ of terminology for the grain of reali tyi7 
(fila paille des termes pour le grain des chases"). It is like the 
gift tli th which the Cartesians and the myst ics endow God, the gift of 
doing impossibilities. (2) 
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For Lelbniz freedom is self .... determinat ion. There, is 
always a reasOn which ffinclines <"the will;.:". To shov"r that the will 
ought to be exc~pted i twould be neces;:;ary to have a means of ' 
determing the limitation of.th's principle ~. priori. This we Gan 
never find; and any foundation which might be adduced for sucnA 
dist inct ion will always go furthertlian we wish. It" therefore, seems 
to me that 'we do -pot need to seek even this exception, and that 
free choice is not. incompatible with the general principle I have 
just establisbedn(Unedited letter without address or date. )3odemann. 
Trans. ,Everyman. p.' 251. ) 
-Bayle " aCGording to Leibniz~, hfJ.d stC'~ted the issue on this' 
quest ion of freedom imperfectly when he 'said that there ~ere two 
and only two alternatives. Either the distinct causes of the soul 
which concur with it, leave it the power to act or not to act; or 
they determine it to act in such a vray that it cannot help itself. 
In his I?De Libertate n eSee K., Foucher de Careil p. Lii.) Leibniz 
speaks of being delivered from this last fatalistic view as from a 
precipice "ab hoc praecipitio me retraxit". The study of ~lato 
had some influence in this di~raction, though Leibniz himself 
speaks of the influence of the mat heina t ical idea of infinity as 
affording an unexpected lisht 1!Tandem. nova quaedam atque inexspectat:J. 
lux oborta est unde miElime sper'ab,91n: ex consideration bus scilicet 
mathem8.ticis de natura infinita",(iVDe libertate i7 p.179-180 .. 1.oF. 
de Ca~il above.) To these two altern8.tives, Leibniz S,2),YS, there 
is an alternative. This is th:::'..t the deterrninatiori of the soul does 
not come from the concourse of all the dist inct C·luses of the soul 
but other considerations such as the state of the soul itself, its 
inclinations; the impressions of the senses have their effect as well. 
The soul is never necessitated,since it involves no contradiction 
to think of it acting otherwise. In other words it is inclined and 
not necessitated. (3) 
Freedom, then, for Leibniz is neither absence of 
restraint nor the liberty of indiffererice (nla liberte/est exemt non 
seulement de la contrainte ,mais encor de la necessi te, quoyqu' elle 
ne soit jamais pans ~a certitude infa.llibae, ou sans la d/t'ermination 
inclinante n Th~odic~ par. 280. ~.vi.p"288.) This is true both of 
God ahd of man, the only difference being that mf'..n's choice of the 
best is often superficial, _ if. indeed,in the case of man,.we can always 
speak of a choice at all. (4), 
This freedom is further clarified by psychological 
analysis. There are three }!artners in the soul's freedom- :Lst. 
intelligence which involves .8. distinct knowledge of the object of 
deliberation, 2nd, spontaneity, vlith which we determine ourselves, 
and3rd. contingency or the exclusion of logical or m.etaphysical 
neeessi ty. :Rut the intelligence is the soul of liberty? all the -resj 
is the body or base. (lfL' intellie;ence est corOIJ.e - 1 'ome de Ie liberte, 
et iereste est comme Ie corps et 18. baselY The'odicee. Par. 288.G.vi. 
p. 288.) In all freedom we find these three elements. For practlcal 
purpOs"eB we may say that ('Freedom is 3pontaheity. [;.intelligence 1? 
(see Latta. P ",145 ~,.provided 17e remember always th:lt we 8.re dealing 
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. with ~la C6ntingence~. 
Freedom in r::an. 
The L:onadicchara,cter of the· human soul malces . it 
independent of every thins in the universe save' (1od alone. 'I'hereis 
no interaction of any kind. "bodies act as if (to suppose the 
impos'si ble)' there were no soul, and souls', act as' if there were no 
bodies, 'and both ~ct as if each influenced the othern(Monad~ Par. 81.} 
v'Each mind, being like a small Ciivinity in its own sphere . ." (rvionad. 
Par. 83 ~ ) , 
Thi s !iionadic and meta-physi cal i solat ion of the hU.Il1an soul 
makes sure its inalienable birth right of freedom. 'For thi,s reason 
Leibniz asserts that his system of Pre-established :1ar!!lony is the 
great Cu4.todian of the independence and liberty of man (cf. vtJamais 
syst~me n'a mis nostre ~le'vation d2.ns une plus Grande evidence" 
System Houveau. G.iv.p.485.) Though all Llonads "have no T,vindOl:7S, 
through whiCh anythinG could come in or go out II (lv~onad. Par. 7.) 
and consequently "the natural changes of the Lonads come from an internal 
principle, since an external cause can have no influence unon their 
~nner beini;" (Ivionad. Par.if.), and though to this extent ail r;2onads 
have freedom of a kind, yet it is only in man and a fortiori in God 
that TIe see this freedom raised to its hi3hest power. The lowest 
freedom is appet it ion (Ivlonad .• rar. 15.) 3.nd the hit:~hest the self-
determination of God. In the ce.se of roan G.S an intelligent WId free I 
-SUbstance Viappetit ion" becoLles Ilun Empire sur ses actions Vl (Theodicee 
Par.290.~.vi.9 289.) 
The hVlilan Yiill, as ue have ;3een, h:::.s as its "soul ll 
intelligence. In this respect Descartes w,as mistaken in giving the 
primacy to the tvwilli? in evil. But lila ~3.ison\! between jUdQ;0rnent 
and will is not so necessary as is sometimes thou<;ht. In the second 
place the judg¢,ment of the human intelligence has its limitations. (5) 
So evil rears her hydraheaded body in the world. ·,ve find ourselves 
e.g. often willj.ng a temporary good instead of t.::lillin8 what lIvould 
really please us ,if the /yes/ of our understarrdins; were open. (cf. 
"Hous . ne voulon~ ~\ la ~eri te que ce qui nousplai t :mais J?ar ITl\3.1heur 
ce qUl nous plal t a present, est souvent un vray mal, qUl nous I I 
d{plairoi t, si nous avions les yeux de I' entendement ouverts. 'lheodi'cee 
Par. 289. G.vi.p. 289.) Thoue;h freedom is thus lir,lited in these two 
ways, it is not negated. It is primarily an achievement and not a 
possession. 
The freedom of the human will' is thus often "un cordon de 
soye" for man to. hang himself. (PQr.121~G.vi.po174.) It is only 
right that we should ask what justification there can be for such a 
gift. 'J1Je have already seen something of the general reply of Leibniz 
to this question. 3riefly the ans'wer is th3.t such freedom is an 
inevitable part of creaturliness (par. 120~). To take away freedom is 
to destroy rat ional creatures. I'.20reover God cannot preoccupy Himself 
with the concerns of man alone. 
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The true use, of the human understanding is the natural 
means for the good use of man's freedom. Unfortunately man has not 
always got the good will for such a use of his understanding and is 
oftenunwi lling to str~ve after those indirect ways 'in which such 
a good will can be cultivated. When we ask e.s.E! why God has no,t 
created man wi th suc,h :Iune bonne volonttn Lei bniz m~kes his usual 
reply ths,t it is not necessary and i't is not "faisabie u t'hat 
reasonable creatues should hc:ve a perfecti on which brings,' them near 
Di vini t y.. ( 6 ) , '.
, . 
If theeffo.r'tto act in accordance with judgEbment makes 
the e ssenee of, wi 11, as Le ibni'z says,' (V?L' effort/, d 'e.g,.ir appe s Ie' 
jugement fait a man avis l'essence de la volonte. TheodiCee. Par.311. 
G. vi.p. 301.), it also,in the case of man,illekes for its morally 
unsat isfactory quality. Unlike the clear and di st inct percept.ion of 
a truth which contains 17i thin itself an affirmation of that truth, 
in the case of the will there is a long journey.frmn the spirit to 
the heart. (tlil Y a un si grand trajet de l' espri t au' coeur''). During 
this process many delays, changes of direction and thwartings may 
occur. The understan&ing, for the greater part, can,only proceed by 
deaf thoughts, little capable of influence. (f?Sur tout lorsque 
l'entendement neprocede en bonne partie que par des pensees sourdes, 
peu capable de toucher~? The:'odice'e. Par. 311. S..vi.p.301.) 
.ficcordin2;;ly, apart from the limitations of man's 
understandine;, Yle must also recoeni,se that the psrception of a good 
does not alYiJays lead to its 8nactr1ent in morally .good conduct. If e.g. 
geometry opposed itself to our Olm Ilresent interests 2.nd :9assions as 
morality does, then ~e should dispute and transgress against it in 
spi te of all the dernonstrat ions of l!;uclid and ";'rchimedes. These vIe 
shOUld regard-dreaNs and full of paralogisms. {7} It is only in so 
far as man can overcome his passions that he begins to have freedom. 
In this sense as the stoics taught only the wise man is free. For 
he alone can act with deliberation. (8) 
, , 
In this wa.y Leibniz gives his explanation of the evil 
resulting from man's freedoDl. J:-;ot only the limitation of the uhder-
standing of man but also the lack of nre~olutions efficases" explain 
his failure to.~ better than he is. Lccordiilg;Ly VIe must strive to· 
D~ke it a rule always to follow the dictates of reason as the only 
sure and certain guide. (<.1) Only in this VJS,y is it possible to gain 
the mastery over one's passions and make virtue second nature. ~Ie 
must continually ask the question !ldic cur hic, respice dIinem" {N.E. 
Bk. 'ii.c.21. ).The free will of man goes naturally to the good and 
it does evil becaass evil is often hidden under and masked by the 
apparent good. (Ilce rna! est cache SOliS Ie bien, et comme masque/) 
We see the result of this distortion by the passions in the well 
known wopdsof OVid:-, 
Videomeliors proboque, 
Deteriora sequor. / / (See The.odicee Par. 154. 
'}.vLp.201. N.E.Ek.ii.c.21. 
G. v.p. 171.) 
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Thus Leibniz tries to explain how evil results from the 
nature Q.f man's .freedom. It is all capable of explanation. 'For 
though't~i;o man is never in a sts\te .of per,fect, equilibriuDl, there .'is 
no arbitrariness about his actions. If11e is not d'etermined 
une'cessairement ", he is determined tlcerts.ineI'1ent ". (Par. 371-
Theodice'8). It is quite another matter, hovTever, i'7hether man hj,mself 
can give ~naccount of the reasons for his conduct .. ic\.s 1"le have. seen 
it is nCit merely a question of the reasons of his understs.nding but 
hOVl those reasons appeal to him at the time, the mood. or whim of 
his soul. lilld this mood or whim of the soul is the ,result of past acts 
'of choio,e and the selective nature of his attention to the world 
around'him. It is an imperfection in our liberty that we cari choose 
evil instead of good, a 3rea.t'er evil instead of a iess. It is quite 
otherwi se vIi th :}Od Hho has perfect knowledge of the good and is 
iTOlnediately determined by it. (10) 
The question must noVJ be faced hal'! fZ',r there is scope 
for freedom in tbe Leibnizian 1..1niverse. In particular can human 
freedom co-exist with predictability? s:'he onswer of Leibniz is that 
the doctl'j.ne of the pre-established harrnonYli:skes no difference to 
the fact of f~eedom.The rational soul in its ideal nature has all the 
reasons for its determinations nit.hinitself. '':y this it is determined 
from all eternity to act freely phen it reaches existence. (11) In 
other rrordsthere can be no conflict between forekrtowled~e "and 
freedo~. The fact of knowled~e in advance cannot alter the n&ture of 
D. fu.ttu~e event and the s~;ll1e"'" is true of vIle Jl10t tont-};f'.J,issant de 
Fiat VI 0 (~9Ainsi ce qtli est cant ingent et libre, ne ,1e c1emel'.re pas 
llloins sous les dS'crets (6 Dieu, ·r..;.ue sons la Drevisiol1 r: i'heodicee 
PQr. 52.G.vi.pol~1.) 
It is to be noted .that ths position of Leibniz is that 
there is predict,::J)ility in cietcdl. ::~e is not content to sa:! that the 
total possibilities in ~eneral are fixed. !f there was fixity of the 
total possibili t_16S of t1:e i:'1orld in zeneral, then ·as .Jaro. points out 
contingencie~ y?ithin these ~:ossibilities Y'liZht be open. ~'ut this 
"Pluralist's Via =edi~H cannot be :pplied to Leibniz. 
This IiPlur,9..1ist' s Vi6. I,:edia 11 mediates bet"Jeen a conplete, 
and exhaustive pre-determination in det~11, like the creation of a 
symphony, on the one banCl and on the otr.f. r the adventurous cont insency 
of the actions of creatures to which no ptescience on the part of 
God can extend. 1118 ~od then not the composer it nill reasono.bly 
be' .:1.sked :s.re 'f.Te not assuming th:.t the world is his creation? Or has 
he only ctevised an Aeoli::~n h~.rp and'left tt.e rtinds of chance to call 
the t~lne ,beins himsel,f then on131 an audi ton'?" (I'Realm afEnas" 1'). 315.) 
'The ansvrer' of Jard is that neither of these extremes is adequate .. ?tAll 
is not decree.d:' the world i8not ere ated like 8 symphony. ~';'e;ain, 
all possibilities are not left open: the L':any have not severally 
unlimited freedom, that "freeder:l of indifi'erence' ViThi ch is 
indistinguishable from chance. S.od' s .creatures are creators, the 
'pluralist maintains: the 1r nature is partly' his dains, par,tly their. 
own: he assigns the talents, they use or misuse them. not ~verythine 
that is possible is possible to any, yet S0111e initiative is open 
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to eve'ry one ,: none are left 1.7i th no talent at all. The total 
possibilities, ·then, h01i~rever ,far back we go, .are fixed; but within 
these, uontingencies, however fer foruard ~e go, are open" .(p. 315 
above. ) 
11Ji.th Leibniz, however, it is hard to'see hC;)'Vl any 
p~ssibilitie~ are open in this ~ardian sense. The pre-established 
'harmony leaves ·nothir1cs to chance e.s indeed its v-ery n~lme implies .. 
So. far from doing ariy prejudice to liberty, notllin,Z aocordi"uz to 
Leibniz is more favoUrable to it. 
For according to Leibniz it is not enou~h to rely on the 
Carte sian cont en t ion of the intuition of freedolil e.s a proof of its 
reality. For one thin3e~f self-consciousness is not co-extensive 
~ith life. ~~reover we cannot say, as they did, thdt TIe knop by 
reason that there is a ,Providence s,nd Vo'e know by experience that vie 
h?ve freedo1!' \,7hile no :=:.ttelilpt is mS.de to reconciler these tvlO truths. 
(12 )r'ot so 'can rIe cut the Gordian knot. (Theodicee Far. 295.) , 
"-The soul,' then, according to Leibnizis "une €lapece 
d'au.toIlKtt8 s11irituel iY • "'Cut it i:; ililpOl'tant to bear in mind his 
distinction between "metaphysical" and "r1.or:;'lln detE";rmin:tion. '':''11e 
fu.ture is cert9.in but not 111eta:r:hysically necess~:ry. :-6i tJ:er the, 
f'u.ture, (;All cert2.in \'·'.S it is, nor the infallible foresi,:ht of '"',·od, 
nor the predeterr!ination of c~~ses no~ t~e decrees of ~od d8stroJ 
this continsency and liberty. (l~) 
Zver.,rthin'? in this fil'Uch Oesrisec'lrr.~l':'J'ient of leil:;niz 
depends '!...'cpon oneYs st!)rtin:::: :;oint. If ',78 ,stress th8 t:-:.cis,:- of Lei1::niz, 
such an arO;UYilent os tbe nbove seeD1S to be p8rfectly in line ~;itr~ tlle 
r;etCl.::,hyslc:,,'.l 2.ttri butes of t he Dei ty-Cr..nisc1811Ce 2nd C7";'l.i::,o:iJence. 
It ,is the old crux of the Lany ~.nd the One. '.~:hereis ','8.1' in the 
Leibnizi:;n l1eaven be,t'S'een ~Qcl and the ?"onads. -:n.o s .. t3..rh fron the 
lYonads in the VYi.!on0.dolo~ya e. c,:. can be !:1ade lO'l:icE'llVTlead to a 
_  .,' ( v/,/ 
cifferent conchlsion frOLl t~le ar'Z'U!'lent of the -::'heoc1icee where ne 
'3tart frO)~L }od. TI-:.is difference of ej:l:;ll,~\sis is E.xe,ctl:.r Hll:::,t ou.r I 
exeminat ion reveals. O\'fin~ to the cont inuec1 ne;'lect of the ~L'l~'od.i cee 
<:l.S 8 seriOUS writ In'~' of Le ibniz, many ~lhiloso",hers hsve been dontent 
convenient ly to reco,-;:n ise Lei bniz the !,ll'.Talist and for:.;et Ie i bniz 
the theist. 
t~oreover it is e.. lllist:1ke to reg:::.rd this problem ~'1.s 
~eculia~ly Leibnizi~n. ~he relation of t~~ Deity to the L~nads is 
the old crux of the relation oetr;een Omniscience and FreedoE. ,,','rit 
1I1FonG.dolo,g'ice.llyrl (so to say). It is ;' tb.eological difficulty 
debat~6 in Dhilosorhical terms .. 
/' 
There are some denouements of this problem IrlThich 
Leibniz mizht have ado"Dted but ref\lsect. ',':fe have seen b01J1l he refused 
to acce:Dt the Cartesian t:'.tti tl).de towards the problem. Other avenues 
of escape roere closed to hi~ by virtue of his suppositions. In 
p8.rt 1cu13r the 3upralaps~trian and, the tnfrala;)sa.rian ,teachinss are 
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rU.led out of court. The first is rio;htlycG.lledthe I:'loreloc;ical 
form 'of predest ine:t ion (,,&.rd. p'.31C.) '1'hi s was Calvin's nde cretum 
q'l1idem horrible, fateor tl (fnstit.iii.23.7 .rr~10,n is p-redesti:riedto 
sal vat ion or daTill1at ion in eternity and before' any li'all.iJ..s Q re Elu1t 
of God's infratemporal decree ,man is condem"1e~1 or otherwise?lsupra" 
any l&pse. The infr~lo.!lsari~m vie .... ! ,howeve,r, 'I.'Jas the more 
predoTIlin;:,nt in, the time of Leibniz • T:8JTit r:e-a-,-h2,v4nf;"!:o?:.' r€l~,30rl$ 
e-f-l-riooe-n--.j-tt-&t-i-G-e-,-&P.4 otbsrs. l;y,{t ,';ras held the view that (}ad, 
having re solved ;for reasons of hldclon ,ju.st i ce ,to permit the sin of 
J.idam: chooses in ·:r·~is pity to save SOI:18 by'an ac,t of grace und to 
:punish others by the damnation they deserve. (14) These 2nd other 
similar theories are ee..sily disposed of, accordin6,: to,Leibrtiz, 
by rern.embering ,tl::3,t they are concsrned wi tll the temporal IJrder cf 
'things. .fhereas the decrees cf :100. are si1'1111 taneo'\..ls, not only in 
respect of time which everyone acree~ but also in s18no ritionis 
or in the order of nature. 
The non-temporal character cf the Divine fo're si~ht (if 
cne may so spea~)safe§uards tbe Sovereignity of the Divine ~einG 
mcre than it elucj,d2.tes' the CCIi1:91e:;-c prcblelil of hUIilHn freedom •. It 
makes t-hevolut ion of the nni verse a1)1)e(:\r sbr.J.etl1il1'C:' in the mature 
0.1' the rehearsal of an already con::.]!c~eGl syn:phony. This iS3.pP()"Lrently 
the definite conclusion of Leibniz and one which, in his viell, does 
no despi to to the cause of freedor.c: but rather ,"ti ves it an dssured 
r2tion~1 foundation. 
The ~rave difficulties, if not inconsistencies, in the 
treEltr;:;.ent 1zrLeibniz of the question of freeQm·t '~'re fairly obvio'\l8. 
::ut tlley lend theL'~sel ves +'0 vcr,r diverse interDreta t ions. ~~ccord'1to 
I:r Eertra.nc1 Russell the :!~ iC3 of L8 ibniz ,~., 2- 1)),$,8S of inconsi3tencies, 
dne partly to indifference, :partly to a deference for Ghrj,stian 
I:lcralists Vl .LP.191. r,;he Fhilosorhy of Leibniz). Dtsputatious as this 
statement is, it is s\Jrely h;;rdly f'~'I,ir to continue to spea?<: of his 
"discredttable subtcrf'l.2;es H (2.19'7. abovE:l.) It is im90ssible to 
ccme to any conclusion of the insincerity of Leibniz. ?or ever_he 
conceived himself to be e defender of the Christ ian faith. ;:...nd his 
idea pf ':'rcd, the ultimate T:lajor 'premise of his crsmnent, is as much 
a vit~l ~art of his philoso~hy as any other tenet. ~ispreoccupation 
'f.'i th the' problem of freedom is a :.oroof of this. J.:;.t times the 
Leibnizian machinery raay creak and gro2tn under lithe burden of the 
mystery", but this is no. uni~\e stute of thinss. On the contrary, 
it is what we shculd expect to be the case. The pre-established 
harmony e.;;:,; .may fail to convince us of its usefulness as a 
philosophical theoi~y. But there is hardly any Ground fcr supposing 
that to' Leibniz it Vias anything but ~, ne,wand splendid hypothesis 
to justify the ways of Gcd ~ith man. 
, . A more balanced .verdic't , on this :par~~ t~e~hilo'sophY 
of Le 1 bnlz and one tha.t doe s less vlclence to i;.¥f€; lpSl ssuna verba, 
on which alone we can rely,is that of a recent cOlillllentator. f !-
'''Dans la pense'e de Leibniz, l'explication r8.tionnelle de 113. loi du 
devoir ne se separe pas de 113. foi chretienne, 'a laCl.uelle il etait 
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fermeI1lent attache, ne du sentiment de la"soumission due a l'autorite 
divine, L~ide'e,l qu t i1 propose a ia: vOlonte de '·1 f homme, cormue sa f..in 
supr~me ,n f a-t-il pe.s SQ. pleinere-alisation en Dieu,' en qu~ r~ident 
souverainement tout bienet toute perfecti6h? ..... ~ ... 1nielligence 
net·te, vigoureuse ,et largement compre-pensive; Leibniz, il faut; 
Ie rec9nna1'tre, fut Ull €'brivain man:1':festement moins desireux de 
plaire et de s6duire, que de convaincre. Absorb€! par de's travaux 
qui lui laissaient peu de lotsirs, :llne'disposait .pas t6ujours du 
tem,Ps ne''cessaire pour les parfaire da:t:J.s unere~a.ction pleinement 
adequate ~sa'pensle. Aussi est-il parfois difficile 'asuivre, 8., 
travers les. difveloppernents un peu touffus d 'une oeuvre. prodigiensement 
vast e et diverse II (Preface.1). vi. "La r<or,ale de Lei bniz n L; Le 
Chevallier. P~ris. 1933. r -
Freedom in God. 
'l'he correspondence between Leibniz and ~irnauld is, as 
T-r. 1 ildon Carr se,5rs (VIA Theory of Eonads". 1922. p. 108.)'/ 2,n 
illustration of the lVI::.\y the conception of (~od not only formed 
the Kain problem, of-tae but limited the horizon of the :;hilosophers 
of the seventeenth centuI:Y". J.l.rn9uld, the theolo-Sical head of the 
,sorbonn.e, singles out the peculiar leibnizian doctrine of individuality" 
J~"V shot'Js that it makes creation :;,S taur:;ht in the theolo::.:y of Christianity 
inconceivable and the whole scheme of redemption unrneanine;f1(p.109. 
Qbove. ) 
:7omhere is this remark more debated than the question 
of the seneral freedom of the Divine initiative. ~e have already. 
seen thc\t the arguments that apply to the case of man apply a 
fort iori to the c~se of the Dei ty. JF&n is the mirror of the Divine 
creativeness. As a retional spirit he is :2l, member of the ICingdom of 
Grace and sub ject to its la17s. Thus the relat ion of r:.od to man 
is the relation of a Prince to his subjects or a father to his 
children. "liJIinds or rational souis are like little gods, made in 
the image of God and having -wi thin them some ray of the Divine· 
enli:,:htenment n For this reason 00d governs minds as :J. prince (30verns 
his subjects, end indeedDSs a fatber looks after his children; while 
on the other hand, Fe deals with other <febstances as an engineer 
vJOrks vlith his L13chines. Thus minds have s-&j? special lavIs which put 
then above the revolutions of Hl.e.tter through the very order which God 
hes put in then; and i tmay be s8,id that everything else is lflade only 
for them. The revolutions, of matter being arranged for the felicity 
of the good and the punishment of the \"licked. (:New System Par.5. 
·Latta. p .304.) Because· minds are ~ot only 1 i viw'1; ima3;es of the 
uni verse of ~ created things buttalso images of the Deity or 
l::tuthor of nature Himself, capable of knowing the system of· the 
univ~rse, and to some extent of initating it through architectonic 
ensamples (~chantillons), each mind being like as small divj,ni ty tn 
its ov:rnspheref! (1Lonad. Par.So.Latta p. 266.), because of this' 
unique fellm'lshipand similarity the freedom of God must be simply 
the freedom of man.writ.large; 
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In his d.iscussion of the freedom of God Leibnizseems to 
have most in view the .Socinian id.ea, of the Dei t~{ . This teaching 
popularised in the 17th. century the 12th. century doctrine of Duns 
ScotJls on the primacy of the ,fill among the Divine .. lttributes. The 
'.iill,abcording to the Socinian idea of God, was an arbitriuru imperium 
and this coupled with Omnipotence meant that Jod did not require to 
exercise any fore~ight and still lessa.ny det~iled providence of.th~ 
fupure.'-:- (llla prescience des contingens futurs, et la providence qui 
re-gle e.tgouverne les . chases en detai 1 if). 5th. Fe.per to Clarke •. G. vi i . 
p. 390.) The sole difference on the Socinian view between the freedom 
of God and the freedom .of man is that the. Deity. has a:n absolutum 
Dominium, while ·man has not. The Racovicm catechism 81 ves a clear. 
statement of this tea.ching: - fj,J-od' s dominion comprises a right and 
supreme authority' to determine whe'.tso~-",everEe may choose (and FIe 
cannot choose wh8.t is in its mm nature evil and unjust) in respect 
to us 2nd to all other things and also in respect to those H8.tters 
which no other authority CQn reachi~ (P::-.r.3. :Eug. :!ldit.1652.) 
This ide~ of freedom in ~od had n great influence upon 
the 17th. century and it is iIliffi cult to see the point s Le i bniz malces 
unless ne re:mem.ber that lt is t~.lli;rc:t,ys in the background of ;.1i8 thinL:ing. 
It was a tenet that troubled t:t.e whole mind of the century. 80d VIas 
not Dnly obove but,also beyond,all doctrinal statements of 'Yis 
relations TIith man and the universe. Dextera Donini fecit virtutem. 
If IBihniz ~as op~osed to this doctrine of Sacini~nism, 
he we.s eCl'13.11y oprosed to the l,~ecessi tarienisI11 of 3pinoza and I~obbes 
not to mention otilers. :}od for Leibniz, 8.S Y!e h,:~ve so often seen 
already, can never be a synonym for an ippersonal and ruthless 
:iecessi ty. flContin::sencyf1 in the t~JO:r.ld is a fact. For this reason there 
Qre only Hconse'cutions V, 6.nd not "connexions m(cess.::.irs:J" i.Q the 
world of n~\ture. (Letter to Bourguet. 1716. 0-.1i1.:).419.) l];ven the 
lQWS of motion alone are a sufficient refutation of this teaching 
~or they thenselves are a proof of a wise Qnd free 3ein~ against the 
system of absoh.lte ,:;,nd brute l1Gcesslty of -3tra:ton or of Spinozo,. 
(flces belle s· loix sont tine :rr_~eve lJ~erveillE;l:,:se d 'un ~tre intelligent 
et libre, contre le 'syst'8me de lE\ nec6ssite absoLle et br'J.te de 
3traton ou de ISpinoz(~l!l The'odice'e.Par. 345. 1.vi.p".::a9.), :L'hey have 
no ;;eOIlletrical necessity'lt, "since they orie:inate from the 1Nill of J.od, 
re6ulated by li"lsdom". 
So far we ~ave considered tnoalternatives in regard to 
the Divine '\Jill:- (1)' The Socini~n idea of the Divine ,Ell 8.S "quelque 
chose d'arbitrdire dbsolument lV ,(2) The Eobbist and .3pinozistic idea 
~f "une ne'cessite' brute et : e',e(ome/trique 11 (rrh~)dic~e Par. 371.G.vi.:p. 
336.) whether in the case of Hobbes this is reduced to I'1.atter 9.nd 
the laTIs ofmathema,tics o.r. in the /case of Spif!.0za' !lune :9uissance 
aveugle. de .laquelle tout e'mane necesse,irement" (above). The third 
alternative(3) is "une ne'cessite'moral ll dependent upon fi~al causes. 
("une necessi te/ more,le, qui vient du choix .libre de la sagesse par 
rapport aux causes finales" TheodiCee. Par. 349. }.vi.p.321.) 
On mature consideration we r;mst realise, says Leibniz, 
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that (3) is the only solution . .d, liberty.of indifference is 
impossible . ,It cannot be found anywhere,' not even in Qod. For God is 
'determil1ed by himself to do ulways t he best. And creature s are always 
determined by internal or external'reasons (Libertas indifferentiae 
est impDssibli,s. 11.deo ut ne, in Deum qUidem cadat, nam determinntus 
i11e ad optimum efficienduTIl, et creatura semper 'e)c rationis ' 
externisque 'determine. tur" Inj,t ia et Specimena S'c'ient ianovae Generalis 
2:. G.vii.p.109. Short pa:?er'on Liberty ,See 'Russell p. 193-4.) 
Further the second alternative is 'equally ruled out by a similar 
arglmlent. For, God" being the freest and, most perfect substance, is 
also the most cOlllpletely determinec1' by himself alone. '(?fDeus cum 
sit perfectissilUUS adeoque liberrirnus, determinatur ex se solo" above. 
G.vii.p.109.) Accordingly ~e are left only with our third alternative 
as a means of, doing justice to the nature of the Divine freedoIr .. 
The confusiori of these differing conceptions of the working 
of the Divine ,j'rill is in, the opinion of Lei,bniz the most common 
\'Jay of darkening counsel. It is a mistake to regard (1) and (2) as 
covering the whole ground. "Une beurense' necessite''' is alone worthy 
of the Divine Perfectj.on. Qod is inclined and notnecessit3.ted in 
the Cr110.e sense. 
The "freedom" of the 80cinian id,a of the Deity in 
particular as-fYdemonte/ chaque jour par les eve"nemens, vivant au jour 
la journe'e" (J..vi.!1.331. )-1s unrJOrthy not only of the Divine Beine; 
but also of the ability and spirit of the \'Jri tel'S of this group. 
("ll:ais 1 T idE'?'e qu' ils ont de Dieu, est indi,<f;ne de 1) auteur' des choses, 
et r1pond peu'a 1 ,'h2.bil~te et B. 1 T espri t 9-ue le~ :C;cri vai~s d~ ... ce 
partl font souven't par,o.ltre en quelques dlSCUS810~1.S partlcul1eres ll 
The'odice'e 0 Par. 364; r;1- vi. p. 330-1.) To sU.ppose that the effe,9t 
cannot be seen in the causes-ce qui est une 'grande absurdi te (e.bove). 
For Leibni~ the~orlais the special field of the Divine 
freedom. and the world may be defined as the sum~ total of existing 
thin~s (~oute la suit~ et toute Ie collection de toutes les choses 
existantes" TheOdicee Par.8. 1.vi.:9.10?). dith this definition in 
mind, it is clear,as Leibniz says, that all tirnesand places could, 
be filled in an infinite number of ways and that an infinite number 
of YJorlds are possible. but 8-00. has chosen the best among a,ll these 
possibilities. Moreover if there i!Jere not a best among all these' 
possible worlds God would not have produced any. (non peut dire de 
me'iue ,e~i TI~ti~re de parfai~esa8esse? qUi n'est ~as moins r1,18'e que 
lea n,"a'thematlques, que 8'11 n'y avo1t pas 1e illellleur (OptllllUlU) parmy 
t6us les mondes possibles, Dieu n'en auroit prod~it aucunf! (~bove). 
Yet a mere mathematical maximum or mini.mum in itself will 
produce nothing. It is only when vverealise that this supreme 
wisdom" joined to a goodne~s which is not less infinite than itself, 
could 'not fail to· chose the best (!icetfe supr~me sagesse, jointe a 
une bonte qui n T est pas moins infinie qu' elle, n 'a pu manquer de 
chois.1r le meilleur") the. t we reach the soul, as it were, of the 
Divine ini tiat'iv.6. This is to be f9und in His goodness. As Leibniz 
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says everyone oU3ht to agree the phrase is noteworthy- tha-t God is 
perfectly good and just, that .His, goodnesl? made him contribute the 
lea.st that is possible to render men Olamewor.thy and the most that 
is possible to' that which can save them. ("'l'but -lemande doi t cOllvenir 
. que Dieu e'st parfai tement bon et juste" ,que sa bonte Ie .fai t,' 
contl'ibuerle mol.DS qu'il est possible a ce ,qUi peut ,rendre les 
hornmes ,coupab:ies, et 1(3 plO.s qu'il est possp)lea ce qui sert -ales 
_s&uver .The'odicee. Par .85. G. via]? .148. ) • 
It is clear that-for Leibniz liberty can be dl:efined as 
a modern writer. has ,defined it-illibert~Tis control of the parts by 
the whole 'whi ch they const i tue II (1.:ens Crea trix. ',jriTemple. p. 218.) It 
is along these lines that ':ie can explain the imperfect personality 
'cif tnan cmd the perfect personality of (jed. 
In expounding this view of the Divine freedom Leibniz 
,meets several criticisms VJhich ,readily sug?,e st themselves. These, 
answers ,\Ie' have alrea;iy seen in part. 
The most common objection to this arGLUJent of Leibniz to-dblY 
is that formulf-ted by }~ayle. ::;a~TleYs criticistl is that to Sllppose, 
the ['iv ins choice to be re;-:ulated by the opt ir:uJ'U of tl:e Divine wisdom 
is the virtual abandom~nt of there beins any choice at all. It is 
to rer"ard the ;':oodness and -~he Dower of (~od as shut un vrt thin narro~ confine~. "~le l~ bont{ ~t que 10 puissance de~Dieu sont 
renferillees de.l1s Ciesborr.e's asses etroites i ':;:'be/odicee. Far. 227.,;'.vi. 
p. 2~:~)') The reDly of Le i bni z is tb.:" t the p01,'!er ofJ-ocl extends iiad 
ll'3.1;:iIl1UL'?, ad ormia Ii so f:'-'.l' as it 1111,lie8 no contradict ion and. no 
lirlii t can be Zi ven to r;:oodness since i t:;oes 1:;',d optimu.m. ("1' on ne 
donne. point de bornes a la puissance cte Dieu, puis~"J.'on reconnoit 
qu Yelle s Yetend ad f,axirmlY1, ad omni:?, B. tmut co qui n Y trnp~ique auc~e c~ntrad!hc~ ion: ~: 1:, on r~' ~r:- d?nn7,C) :rOi~~ ~, ~c. ~onte, ~~uiSqu' e lIe VD._'ll mellleur, -,cd OptL1UI'l Theodlcee. F~r. '-'w7. -,.Vl.:::'. 2,.,,0.) 
{h;... 
It is God Y s goodness rJhicl1 leads~o.e: to create in order 
to cOInxuunicate sometI~in~..:~ of riJ.rnself ,'J.nd this same 000o.ness united 
VIi th wisdolll leads Him to create the best. This is 1:0 necessity since 
:nh~-t is not chos-en is not .irL_possible. ':;0 say that onl3 cannot do a 
thin::;;, solely because one does not ui$)h it is to abuse terms. The 
'l,Vlse r,ll:ll1 nishes tIle (Sooe: alone but he is not therefore a sl~~ve. 
Servitude comes frOl:1. wi thoFt-, it ir,lpels us to th~ t B11ich displeases 
and above 'all to that which displeases with reason. The force of 
another andQur p"ssions rend.er us slaves. 0-od is never moved by 
any thins outside Himself, he is.not ~ubject to. passions end never 
swayed to that I1hich o.i splec::\ses him,. (15) . 
50 ·far from :this overfloYl of 'the Divine nature beinr~ 
destructive of f,reec'oIn, :a is re::.lly its self-e]~9ression. Jith~'ut 
it (fad would be other th~ he is "mel \1ould contradict hiIllself. 
~-~.- -" 
/ : . A / (lice prientendu. fat1)~m, qui obl;Lge meme It;:, Di vini te, n' est autre 
~h9se . que la propre, l1G;ture de Die~~ '" son propr/e. entend..eJ~lent, qlti 
IO'..lrnlt les ret~les n se\. sagesse e1; ~, sa bonte; c'est une heurep.se 
'neeessite", sans lac:.'uelle; il ne seroit ny bon ny saee l1 7he'odicee P~H. 
191. ,'1. vi. y>. 23fJ.1 Formerly Fayle asreed \7ith L,Calebranche on 
this· question of God and lila r~gle du meilleur tl • But .L.l.rnaulcl' s 
criticism of ealebranche on this point, together 1J7ith?ayle' s 
penchant for doubt ine;, 17hich ase seer.l~Jto he.ve increased, led him to 
alter his opinion on th3zs matter. (:'son/Denchl',nt ~(:J.outer,. qui, s'est,' 
augment' en luy avec· l' ege, a. contri bU$, !'Tbeodicee. Par. '203. Cr. 
Vi.p.238 .. ) . . 
:3'0 fEu~ aS8.in from Heternal truthsH :pmi tin~ tllefreedom. 
of }ad, while they do not depend upon the mind of ~·od for their trnth, 
they do depend upon it for their existence. They make up10d's 
understanding (:'.nd he cannot but act in accord.ance wl.th his nature. 
(See Theodic~ePar. lS9.'1.vLT).229. ) ~hese "eterns.l truths~'liwou~ld 
not subsist~, if there UBS not a Divine ~nderstandin~, uhere tbey 
found them.selves realised, so to speal\:fI. 
In answer to the criticism of ,,:l..rnauld on the Leibnizian 
doctrine of individuality as mG.kin:-~ inconcei v~ble the, whole' , 
Christic,n .teachins on creation, 1eioniz replies th~:\t such a vie\7is 
inevi table. _lny other o~inion nould be tantanount to destroyin~ the 
whole idea of ";·od 0.1 toset1",er. ; .... 8 Le i bniz says if ~J'nauld 11.1.-':.3 the 
leisure to ponder uell nhct te Q3reed cbout the concept of dn 
individu~l substance, he ~ill find th~t ths rest of his interDret&tion 
of ''''·od and the univers8 uust follo:'! :f1'on this Dremtse. (" J1 vous 
1'Jouvie's aIToir le loisi'l'de I'Gv:)ir un jou,r, oe qr~e nO'.18 <;-<v1;)n6 r-:nfiil 
est~bli touchant l~ ·~tion d'une substanceiadividuelle, VOUS 
trouverie s peutestre tilt', en E8 donnr1..nt ces c01ill_~enCelJlens, on est 
oblie:' dans 13. suite cle fil'aecorder tOl:.t le reste fl• Leibniz to .J.rnauld. 
sept. 1687. G.ii.:;!.127.) ',In an earlier letter ~lrn8.uld h'lQ said that 
he had been much struck \'!i tl1 the Lei bnizian Ilrinciple th8..t in 
every pro:Dosi tton the concept of the t;i.ttributes is C01ilpr)sed in some 
way in that of the subject. ("J' ay sur tout esti fra~pe de cette 
raison, Que d,'ms toute .proposi t ion affirnat i ve veri table, m;;G¢essaire 
ou continGente, univer.selle ou singuli~e, la notion de l'attribut 
est comprise en. qu.elnue facon da.ns celle d.u sujet: praedicatum'inest 
subjectoil. dept. 16.86.·}. i~.:9.64.) Accordin:; to Leibniz the .. 
diff.iculty of Arnauld is that he fails ·to :J.fpreciate th:J.t the 
appli C,~\t iOil of the principle "praedi e8 tum ine st sub jecto Tf involves 
no othei connection between subject and predicate than 0h~t is 
involved in,the most contingent of propositions. ,J.nd that these 
reasons of contingnet truths bring about results without necessitation. 
Sub rat iope' generali tat is' it TIl8,y, not be certain that I will make 
8. jQurney' but a complete concept Of myself would reveal that I 
should do so. (16) 
., -
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.Accordingly we must no.tseeR: fo.rGilid a freedo.m o.f 
,u.ndecidednes's. 'rhere is a continuity in 8.11 His acts of :;lill as well 
as a universal scope. "Therefo.re to reason rightly we must think of 
'Go.d as having a certain mo.re general and more co.rlprehe,\:;lSi veintent ion 
which has regard to. the Whole o.rder oftl1e universe becc~.u$ethe 
universe is aVlho.le which God se'es throw~h and through vvi th a 
single 'glance . This mo.re genera.l i,ntent io.n embraces virtualty the 
o.th~:;r inten'tio.ns to.u'c'hing vrhat transpires in this universe and 
aTIlo.ng these is also. that o.f creatJng a pa'rticular Adam rillo is 
related to. the line'o.f his posterity which Go.d hc.s alreadY,cho.sen 
as such and we may even say that these particular intentio.ns differ 
fro.m the general intentio.n only in a single respect, that is to. ,say, 
as the si tU[,?,t ion of a city regarded fro.llla part icul~r po.int o.f Vie1,7 
has .its particular geo.metrical pl!Jnr? (Letter to. Co.unt E. iJo.n 
Hessen-Rheinfels. Lpril 12. 1686. Open Co.urt Trans. !'. 79.) 
" 
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C. Xi. 
The Solution of Leibniz . 
The.Frobiem of Interpretation. 
As we have already noticed in the Introduction the value 
vIe place on the answer of LeIbniz tq the problem of evil must 
depend on the precise interpretation of his philosophy we adopt. In 
particular it must ,depend on how far Vile rege.rd his ethical theism as 
an integral ~art of his thou3htas well as' its consistendy or 
otherwi se Yvi th his monadological outlooh:. ';1e have already seeh some-
thinG of the difficulty of envisaging the philosophy of Leibniz I,ls a 
whole as well as the ever present temptation to simplify the complex 
by way, of a bold and ruthless unilateral interpretationPJln 
assessihg the answer of Leibniz to the problem of evil we ourselves 
have encountered the same inevitable difficulty tl1rou{2:h from a 
different tlpoint de cons ideTat i on f: . 
,:Je may convenient ly ~roup the main, schools of Le i bni ziun 
. interpretation under tlTTO heeds. First there is the logico-mathematical 
int erpret13,t i on, o.s socia ted spec ially in our time wi th t he n·'J.w:~s of 
3ecret·3.n, couturat,Bertrand :Russell ~md Cassj.rer (in his ilLeibniz's 
3ystem in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundalgen. 18.rbur,!, 1902.) to 
mention only a few nGmes. Dr. F.C~3. 3chiller perhpps describes best 
the ultimate attitude of thi3 school of interpretation when he st::,-Ys 
ViLcibniz, ~.jho h:;,c1 every G,ualification for :QhilosOlihlc gre9.tness eXC8l/t 
COl.-crage, he·.d ne:.rked hc"nkerin~s after plu.ralislJl. ~'...t his magic touch 
atoHisI,l blosSOl-:1ed into r::.onndis::,l, and ruon'ldism ha.s ever since ret!lained 
the only philosophically respectable form of pluralis;cl. put Leibniz 
himself had not the. coura1e to enter the promised land, and to dispel 
the bogies WhiCh/were supposed to haunt it. 3y profession a courtier 
'?nd by temperament a conciliator, who if he had happened to be born a 
Parsee T'JOuld doubtless have devoted. his life to the reconcili13.tion 
of C)r,:luzd and Jiliriarn, he only erected a monument which faced both 
YiQyS. rris mon~:dology is. st ill the great landmnrk on the road to 
plurs,lisE;', but the true pluralist must resolutely pc,ss beyond it and 
disrer~ard the palimpsest inscriptions graven upon it, which 't70uld only 
COnd'llct him back to the rloni 81'1 fron YJhi ch he seeks to escape. The 
infinity of }od and the world, the absolute determination of every 
event, the infinite number of Hon:::.ds :::,nd their dependence on a central 
unity in whose magic 1".li1'1'or thE::Y discern the iflorkings of the worlGi, &re 
incompatible with a pl~ra~ist reading of the monadology, 0nd more than 
enough to demolish ,the very conception of the monad il (fIL:indi! 1909. 
;~.S,Vol 9.:9.109-110. 'RevieviT of !!La I;~ouvelle Fonadolgie Vl eh. Renouvier) 
It is. cl~ar ~hat f01' this'school o~ in-~erpre~atiOnt~e pr~occupa~io.n 
of Le1bn1z \"Jl th lithe problem of eV11 Tl 1S a v1rtuQI 1rrelevancy 1n 
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. 11:is thoushtand has no cla.im to 'Qe c,onsidereO as an integral part 
of "leibniziahisme essentiel". ~or evil,carl be dismissed by s~ying 
with SpinozartBy reality, cmd perfection:r understand the same .thingll (Russell p.201.) . ' 
'The'second school of interpretation is tbe traditional 
one. It is chiefly associo,ted wi ththe no.me s of Z.eller (:1eschichte 
der deutschen' philosophie s,eit.,Leibniz, r:unchen; 1879~ ),Euno . 
Fischer ( G-eshichte der neuren Fhilosophie', Heidelberg 19,0.2) . and " 
Er1ile :Soutr6ux (in his vlell knor:n. introduction to the r1Eona'dologie tt 
Paris 1881. ,a:no. ll]>fOtlvel-'1.Uz· ESSC2.,isfl Paris 1'886.), ~:..ccording tp the . 
teaching of this school of inter'oretation there can be no unilateral 
,interpretation of Leibniz but v>te"'l11ust regard the Ti~etar'hysical and 
theologi c~.laspect s of the thought of Lei bniz as complementary. 
Some writers of this· school follmr.rl Boutrou~ in 
regarding the metaphysic o~ Leibniz as the inevitable workine.out 
of tl1e views of Leibniz on dynaIllLi.c e. s. r::. Gueroul t. in hi S. ' 
nDynamique et :r;le'taphysique Lei bniziennes I!, P8.ris 1924. fll2< 
dyne,mique serai t 113. source de s concept ions nouvelles de la substance 
et de l'ha.rmonie preetablie V1 p.30Cfo also Goihilh:::md V!Leibniz et 
les Loi s du Bouvenent 11 iJouvo i;;tudes 0 1911;} and .A. TIi vaud Cl review in 
tlilevu6 de LEst 0 et G~e l.~or.21e. 19140 11 Others IH;:e Jean Baruzi in his 
tl.''fO well known "orks (IILeibEiz Gt l'organisation relj_zieuse de 10. 
terrell, Paris 1907 and "LE:ibni'z;,l, Paris 1909) ::'ind tl:.e lo~:icul 
doctrine of Leibnizian substance to enshrine ~ trnth l1 eSSel'itieller..lsnt 
mystique?! 0 Laruzi swas up his ViEiVl 0l the syster;', of Leibniz as 
v1llecherche rationnelle dtune realite mystic.2J.ei! (~~01310 ItLeibniz 'I ). 
:Out l,\!ithout m.akin:£ the extr3.va~G;ant claims of Dnruzi, ~,,'e can follow 
trro iT1portant c01Y1Itentat ors ~'1'e have consul ted in support inc; . our ann 
contention for the essential unity of the thou:::ht of Leibniz both 
theological and philosophical viz:- Dr Ao Pichler in his 6xha~stive 
t"l70 volUl:1.e vwrk "Die 'rheolo[iie de s Le i bniz 11, L:u.nchen, 1809 and 
the important historical monograph of Dr Joseph Iwenicki "Leibniz et 
1eB der,lonstrations rnathelIletiques 0.e l'existence de Dieu?V, Stre.sboure;. 
19330 The latter VJork proves conclu.sively and with much historical 
detail the essential theistiC leanings of the thou,3ht of Leibniz and 
at the S1:lme time does justice lJy that rationnlistic temper he ~ 
imbibed, according to r'ischer and Kabitz, from his teacher -Jeigel. .~ 
'. '. ~) 
Iwani cki 's argument e;i vesimpo'rtant ' historical 
vinaics-tion for that inter'Dretation of Leibniz ,.;e have advoc8.ted 
in these pE-lges, In particuiar he reveals the vital nature of the' 
theological preocbupations of Leibnizo All this 'indeed is ~lready 
apparent from the evidence ot the early writings of Leibni~ we 
. have already in p,3.rt e.dduced 0 The pro ject of the Societas. 
Theophilorum (mootecl from. 1668 onwards) and the friendshi!,), . 
correspondence and collaborationttith TheophileSpizel (Author ot the 
Scrutinium Atheismi 10(3), .to mention only one ·name out of many, 
confirm l..'?hat any .historical enq'uiry into the wri tings of Lei}:miz must 
revealo As Iwanicki re~l1arl{s the idea that metaphysics was anything 
else than natural theol03yn~ver left Leibniz. Hmetaphysicam esse ac 
vocari scient lam' .9/..o)..1,I( .. v n "Notae ad Dan. Stahli1.urr; 1664. quoted 
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by Iwanicki' p. 102. Leibniz t sconstant idea of phi,losophy is well 
expressed in the Bacphian maxim he placed at the head of his Confessio 
naturae (1668) "phiTosophia obiterl.ibata a Deo abducit, et penitus 
hausta reduci t at eundum tt ' 
Fu.rtt~er historical vindication for the essential 
continuity of the thought of Leibniz is to be found in the book 
,"Del' Junge Leibniz!!{19.c~9) by 1:Hlly Kabitz~, According to this writer 
theessefice of Leibnizcafibe diitilled irito five propositions, 
which Leibniz constantly affirmed. (.2..) So far as these propositions 
imply a theistic Weltanschauung they support our contentio,ns. As, 
~e have ourseives already seen, in adequate detail 'for our present 
purpose, ethical theism and its inevitable accompaniment lithe 
problem of evilll were constantiy present 'to the thought of Leibniz. 
The interpretation of Leibniz is such a livinc issue of 
contemporary philoso:phy that we Llust be excused for dwelling upon 
it futther, apart from the special reasons of our own. In the case 
of Leihniz historical enquiry must acco:mpBny logical el-ucidati,on. 
It will not do to follow the t0il s·o ably blazed by,Secretanin 
his book already cited and say that the opinions of Leibniz are 
on8 thing and his philosophy another~ 
Certainly Leibniz hinself was under nO impression that 
his logical and weta:'!hysical principles evac;uated of ld.eanj.ns the 
essential tenets of his ~thic~l theima. On the contrary the opposite 
is the c::.se. For Leibniz is just os a.nxiOl.),s to safequard ethics as 
the i Sll. (cf. Sans doute, et C test le fondel.;lent Cie la providence et de 
toutes nos espe/rances, scavoir qu til Y a quel-que chose c_e t·on et de 
juste en elle BeLle, et que Die'll estant is. sa~esse, m§\le ne manque pas 
de choisir le meilleur". Letter to Phil1ipi. <T;:'~l1. 1680. G.vi.284.) 
Only iti teleoloeY can we find any finality of explanation "Causae 
efficientes pendent a finalibus 'l (L. to Bierling, 1711. ~oiii.p.501.) 
and as Leibniz says CSest S2nctifer la philoso~hie, que de faire couler 
ses ruisseaux de la fontaiIle des attributs de Dieu Vl G.iii. p.54. 
For this reason Leibniz is tireless in pointine; o'Ut that the 
recognition of this truth is of the utmost value in the elucidation 
of our idea of God. ~e see this e.g. in the fact that the l~ws of, 
]7'.otion point for exphmation to fj.nal C2.uses. IIAnd this is one of the 
most effective and remarkable proofs of the existence of God for 
those who can go deeply into these thinp~s. II (Prince. of 7,'iBture and 
Grace. Far.iLp.418. Latta) It, is true, that particular effects of 
nature may be explail1,ed by efficient causes but the'general principles 
of physics &nd mechanics require the. explanation ofasovereign 
intelligence. So far from mechanical. explanation leadine; us away 
from (fod, as some think ,rightly considered it leads us to ·God. 
nmais les principes gene'f.aux de ia physique et de la l11eCanique m'8me 
dependent de la conduite dtune intelligence sOuveraine, et ne 
scauraient estre expliques sans la faire entrer en consideration. Gtest 
ainsi qulil faut r{concilier 113, piete'avec la raison" Letter of Leibniz 
to Bayle l'sur un princil)e general fl .G.iii.p.55.) God is then not. only 
the last rea~Qn of thines~utthe kno~ledge of God, is also the principle 
'of science since Fis essE;nce Z:7.nd will e.re the principles of existing 
things. (fiCtest Dieu qui est la derni~re raison des choses" et la 
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connois.sance de Dieu n' est pas moins leprincipe des sciences, que 
son essenceet sa volonte sont les principes des estres. A.bove. 
G. i'i i • 54 .) 
of 
-::Va neell not go the extreme length ,zG. E. Guhrauer 
"G.:;":oFreiherr von Leibnitz. Breipu. 1846.) or of D. Selver VYDer 
. Entvvicklungsgang der Lei bniz' schen Monadeniehre bis 1695. "Leipzig 
1885) in suggest ing that the preoccupat ion- of Lei bnlz' "7i th the 
proble~s.of speculative theology and in particular with the doctrine 
of Transubstantiation lead to the ultimate formulation of his 
conception of the monad ... It is true that in his letter to Arnauld of 
1671 (see (}.iii~p.68.) he mentions.the relevance of this movement 
of his thought to this very debe.ted issue and especially' its' 
superiority to Cartesianisn in this respect. (3) There is no doubt 
that Leibniz found this implication of the be~inning of his new line 
of thought a -useful side issue. But the extreme claim that here we 
can tr~ce the orisin of the Leibnizian doctrine of 'sub~tance can 
hardly be substantiated in the li0ht of the other evidence of its 
. iITJnwmental developement in his thought. Fowever this and other 
simil~r ultra-theological interpretations, u~y serve a useful purpose 
in helping to remind us ths.t Leibniz is a thinker of \7hom¢ such fI. 
sug:;estions as these could be made. Lotze once made the reF1Grk that 
philosophic:'.l theory i S:ln effort to justify fla fun(k'l:Iilents.l viev! of 
thine:s l.:rhich h"s been cldopted· in e8.rly life n and in the case of 
Leibniz there is D.bundl:.nt evidence foI' its trutll. In this respect he 
is 8.3/cor.~plete f', contro.st to 3pino~B~ :0.8 it is pOGsible to conceive. (4) 
It is vit~l ,ther:, to reii1.err:b8r the continui ty of the 
theistic views of Leibniz. Leibniz evinces a life lon~ hostility 
to &ny ateleolo(:;ical vieW of the universe. (if). It vIas in teleo!61os:Y 
where the crucial difficulty for Leibniz lay in the Batter 0f a 
religious interpretation of the universe~ For in teleolo~y Leibniz 
S::::1;/ a spendidl rapproche:w.ent betneen science 2nd relisimn ','rhere most 
of his contemporaries SG.i1 an internecine conflict. }here others saw 
G. criLle or a least ,<;m iI,lpiety, Leibniz S?3J a vindic['.tion of "irod. 
(l1C',T de vouloir tout ex:;:liquer Vecllaniqueraent en PhysiqE6, ce n' est 
pas un crine ny impiete, Dieu e.yant tout fait 8elon les loix de 
Y'ilsthelllC'tique, c'est a. dire selon les verite's e'ternellAs qui sont 
l'objet de sa-:-:;esse l1 LtI7tter to Philippi. ;rany.lo80. t'Lvi.!'.28C.) 
~ut Leibniz soes much fut·her than this. For he finds the infinite 
harmony of the universe a perpetualsourc6 of reli§ious eC8tas~. In 
this respect rle may compare Leibniz li7ith the Cambridge Platonists 
but he differs f'roTi'. them in a most inport-;;.nt re:ard.For while Eore, 
Cud'iforth::ll'ld P:;,rlrer looked 0.t natur'e throu:.7h the trae'li t ional 
spectacles of ~lsubstantial forma 11 , Leibniz 1'7as in cOI'lplete r8pport 
;":'i th the ~odern scientific outlook onm.\ture. ~;:r to the t iDle of 
Leibniz this view of n0.tlJ.re YJ::',S I'e~s;rdeO as subversive ·Qf reli~~ion. 
~ith Leihniz it was a conviction of'youth and one that ~re" more 
intense i:7tth the po.ssin;:sof the ye9.rs· that nQthing elevated, the soul 
li10re to a knowled,';e and love of ({-od as the wOrld of nature. This is 
a recurrent :theme of Leibniz to be found 1nhi8 early and his later 
t1r1tin~s. lI;)eo pulchriorhymnus cani non potest, quam si Cluod naturae 
BiraculU!;l patefh,~t II (l:..loop. i 1 i. 315. ~uoted VlDte Lei bniz' 8.([he . 
?eli5ions}!hilosophie in ihrer c~eschichtlichen Stelluncr:. " .l.J.. I:offne.nn 
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1903.p.44.) See -also Letter to Conring. 1~78.G.i.p.185.) As we have 
already seen Leibniz regarded th~ study of natural science as 
propaedeutict,o religion. For these reasons we may weel regard 
Leibniz as the father of the "God -in Nature"- movement of the- German 
Enlightenment "Er wur'de dadurch zum Vater einer die ganze deutsche -
AufkHirung beherrschenden Ueberzeugung: "Gott in der Nat).lr'das 
wurde der'religiose Lieblingsgedanke der Wolff und Reirriarus, der _ 
Brockesund Gellert, und das tonte fort in ungezah!tenAbhandlungen, 
Gedichten,_ Predigten, Briefen undTagebuchern des 18 • .Jahrhunderts" 
(p~46.'above.) , 
This reading of the influence of Leibniz goes 'to 'support' 
that theistic interpretation of Leibniz we have tried to vindicate. 
It is ~he only inte~pretation ~hicih unites the youthful and ,the 
older Leibniz and which as a consectuence does le,ss violence to his 
writings. We need ndt seek the source of these theistic views of Leibniz. 
It is enough to recognise them and to see how they polarise his 
thought. 
. 
We,see this especially in the case of his formulation of 
the doctrine of created substance (1686.). So far from this involving 
the jettisoning of his previous main convictions, on the contrary the 
idea of monadic substance seemed above everything else for Leibniz 
the new organon by which all his previous convicti~ about the 
universe and God should have that expression whicn~commend them to the 
world at large and philosophers in particular. We see something of 
this transition in the main philosophical conception of Leibniz-the 
pre-established harmony. (5) 
In trying to see the philosophy of Leibniz with some sense 
of perspective we must stress the comparative tardiness of this 
monadological reading of -the universe. e.g. The idea of the pre-
established harmony of the universe(though not the phrase) can be 
traced according to ~1. Gueroult as far back as 1672. ("L'harmonie 
pree'tablie etait de'ja plus qu' en germe en effet des 1672, 'l3.- tel point 
qu'Hannequin a pu voir dans la liaison etablie entre la physique 
nouvel)e et la sagesse de Dieu la survi vanceillogigue d '}In rapport 
pe'rime e!tabli par l'Hypothesis nova"p.17? Dynamique et Metaphysique 
Leibniziennes. 1934.) We have already seen in more detail how 
formidable is this pre-monadological Leibniz. Once we recover the 
historic-al perspective of the develop,¢ment of his thought we are able 
to discount a great deal of that unilateral interpretation of Leibniz 
so-ably but so unconvincingly elaborated by the adherents of the 
logico-mathematical school.-
By accepting this historical interpretation of LeibniZ we 
free h,lm t'rom the accusation of speculative legerd,emain'in the _ _ 
reconciljation of his philosophy wi th revealed religion. -his " 
Logodicee to use the word of Cassirer. This difficulty is ~ell expressed 
by Professor A.E. Taylor in the article "Theism" of the Encyclopaedia 
of -Religion and Ethics. "Unless one is prepared, as the present 
writer after long study is not, to avcuse Leibniz of insincerity, 
it seems impossible not to recogntse here a fund~mental inconsistency 
\ ' 
i 
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between his personal religipus convictions" and the logical 
requirements .of his m,etaphysical system. If all true propositions are 
identities,philosophy must be atp.eistic lt . (p. 273. Art. "Theism"). 
The answer .to this difficulty is twpfo1d. On the one 
hand we must realise that Leibniz is not a 'radical thinker like 
Spinoza. He .is thinker more after 'the 'manner of Origen,in that he is 
greatly'conc~rned to vindicate certain foundational and abiding 
convict ions about the universe and its Creator. The sourc'e of these 
ethical ideas and intuitions need not concern us here. It is enough 
,to, recognise their potency in the constant develop~ment of b.,is 
thought. On the other hand, we must avoid an.over~simpllfication in 
regarding the subject-predicate identity view-as the. sole origiriof 
the LeibniziaIidoctrine of "created substance ll .• Questions of 
dynamic and other co~siderations enter into it. ' 
This interpretation of Leibniz we advocate here has the 
.. singular merit not only of domng justice by his published works, 
including the only work published during his life time, Theodicee, 
but also answers those other problems in Leibniz quite, unresolvable 
on any other 1> hypothesis. Unfortunately it reveals something of 
the complication of thj1~ answer. of. Leibniz to the question of evil. 
Overmuch emphasis has been laid upon the logical 
foundation of the monadism of Leibniz. The doctrine of "created 
substance" is more the ,culmination of convergent lines of thought than 
the product of an insistence upon the purely logical doctrine of the 
subject-predicate identity. It is hardly relevant here to attempt 
to unwind the several strands that went to make up the rope of this 
Leibnizian doctrine of "created substance". Especially as this has 
been done in a~ important paper of the Aristotelian Society already 
referred to, ("Some Problems on the Philosophy of Leibniz" by L.J. 
Russell 1922-3.) where the writer sums up his opinion:- " in my 
view it is inconceivable that the pure logical doctrine of itself 
suggested the monadology. It 1S much more likely that with all the 
separate 'problems in his thoughts, his own statement is literally 
accurat~, 'I was conducted insensibly to a view which'surprised me'". 
(Quotat. from Systeme Nouveau. G.iv.p.477.·) In his earlier logical 
essays, as i~ pointed out, 1eibniz had not attained to the full 
fledged axiomatic truth for all proposit~ons':'''vera propositionis 
semper praedicatum inest subject.o"- but had co'nfined its truth to 
categorical affirmative universal propositions. So we can hardly 
regard this principle as having that basic metaphysical priority 
so often alleged. It does how~ver supply a logical basis for 
"created substance" once that doctrine is conceived. 
Again, even if· we grflnt the logical origin.of ~the_ 
Leibniziah "created substance", ,this interpretation breaks 'down 
internally through lack of connection between this rationalism and the 
spiritual nature of the monad. As has been well said "When his 
rationalism comes short active spirit is made to fill the gaps ..... 
'His rationalism affords the basal argument for his monadism, but· 
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the monad" being further interpreted as spirit, his rationalism is 
in'the resulting system greatly modified to suit this deeper and 
more adequate conceptionot the nature of the individual" (p.168,l.69. 
"Studies in Cartesianism" N.Smith) Thus logical explanation gives 
,way to explanatiori sub 'ratione boni. ie. desire plus perception . 
. If there are_a priori reasons then, as Smith says ;they are such as 
incline wit,hout necessitating. "But just as Leibniz fails to explain 
how the obscurity and contusion in the perception of monads should 
transform :the discrete harmony of the universe into the continuous 
form of space, s'o he fails to connect in any real way the laws¢ of 
motion (which must in the end be regarded as thephenomerial' 
manifestation of the inner striving of the monads.) with the choice 
of the good." (p.l?l. above.) This internal breaking down between 
the logical atomism and the spiritual monad might suggest a 
further argument against the suggestion of the one by the other. 
In any case for Leibniz the new idea of "created 
substance tl was a philosophical godsend. By means of it he hoped to 
clear up some unexpected ,difficulties in his views and especially the 
twin difficulties of explaining the dependence of mind-substances 
for their existence on God and at the same time of vindicating the 
self-dtermining nature of their evolution. Not only did it do this 
but it also gave a more precise and satisfactory explanation of the 
early conviction of Leibniz about the pre-established harmonic 
character of the universe. The claims of the Many and the One were 
fully met. Though the world was so interpenetrated by the mutual 
relation of substance with SUbstance in accordance with the Divine 
power and goodness, yet these same substances, so far from 
having a mere modal existence as parts of the Divine Being, were 
created substances evolving in their own right. 
'rhus the doctrine of the monad helped to give precmsion 
and intellectual support to the pre-conceived ideas of Leibniz about 
the nature of the universe and its Creator. In particular it helped 
to vindicate that teleological view of the universe'and the ethical 
theism which was, its basis. For only on this foundatiori could be 
built the optimism which asserted that this is "the best of all 
possible worlds tl • 
There can be no question that the optimism of Leibniz 
rests on his doctrine of God. It is true that a thinker like 
McTaggart states that optimism.as a philosophic creed does not 
stand or fall by the aff'irmation or denial of theism. tlMy position 
is merely that the belief in God will not justify optimism, unless it 
is supported,by other ~etaphysical conclusions (which, as far as our 
. investigation goes, mayor may not be true), and that. there are 
metaphysical 'conclusions (which, as far as present investigation 
- , 
....... -, ... " 
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goes, mayor may not be·t«:ve) which would justify optimism without 
a belief in God" (p.269-270. nSome Dogmas of'Religion tl ) The 
difficulty of accepting a thesis like this is'not in accepting the 
sense in which it 1s obviously true but to combat the suggestio 
falsr it. contains. When we use the termstlieism and God our "universe 
of diseourse tT is almost invariably the orthodoxy of historical 
Christianity. In thi~ case the omnipotence' of . love is necessarily 
involved in any reference to belief in God. So it is, as we have . 
abundantly seen, in the ease of Leibniz. It is quite possible to 
conceive a moriadologieal .universe sans Dieu which might be as 
"optimistic l1 as· say the 'sy~ten1s of Fichte, Bradle'y,or Hegel(to use 
McTaggart's illustrations). But such a monadological universe would 
emphatically not be "the best of all possible worlds". 
God for Leibniz is the ens per se and as such the ground 
of all possibilitY,"radix possibilitati~n,and actuality. Like . 
Aquinas Leibniz would say "Deus est actualitas totuis possibilitatis". 
It is for this re~son that we can relate the universe directly to 
God and say "dans un tr~s bon sensque tout est un miracle perpetuel" 
(Letter to Harsoeter.1711.' G.iii.p.518.) Upon this foundation of Gdd 
Leibniz built in his pre-monadological,days and it is his credo to 
the last, not the "natura naturans" of Spinoza but the "ultima ratio 
extramundana rerum" (G.vii .303) . . 
The The~dic/e is a writing with which every commentator 
of Leibniz must reckon.' It is a writing of' maturity (1710), even 
though it does embody some of· his earlier and pre-monadological views. 
If Leibniz wished to modify any of his theistic views 'as a result 
of his doctrine of created substance, twenty four years was long 
enough to think of such modifications. A logical victory might be 
facilitated by explaining away this long and rather exhaustive 
treatise but for the conscientious interpreter of Leibniz this would 
be a triumph at too great a cost. For there are special considerations 
which make it impossible to mete this treatment to the only work of a 
great philosopher published in his life time. Moreover the tables 
can easily be turned by an effective "Tu quoque". A strong case 
might be rigged for regarding the monadological views of Leibniz as 
an intellectual jeu d'esprit away from the safe shelter of his 
pre-monadological convictions and as such of merely quasi-transitory 
and quasi-tentative significance. For the important fact. is surely 
that the interpretative views of Leibniz about the universe have 
never varied. As a tour de force the significance of the philosophy 
of Leibniz might be written in such a~ way that the monadological 
universe might fall more or less into the ,background. We are far 
from saying that this would be an adequate view of the philosophy 
of Leibniz. But it would be at least nearly as adequate as the 
interpreta.tion of Leibniz which regards his. theism as a virtual 
irrelevancy. SUch argUments,however, merely expose the worthlessness 
of the high handed and'arbitrary method of interpretation. 
It is no grave accusation against a philosopher that he 
has more ~hari bne idea in his mind and certainly a philosopher of the 
awe inspiring emience of a Leibniz. If our deliber~teview is that 
the new wine of his speculation. burst the old wine skiils, we must 
I . 
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st.illask what ,was the 'view of Leibnizhimself. When one realises 
the focal and de,terminant nature of theism in the thought of Leibniz 
it is not easy to give 'a reply' which violates so-much of his 
ipissima verba as well one which contradicts the con,cilatory nature 
of his spirit. The machinery of the pre-established monads'may not' 
provide as sm09i;~h working or as sa~i!IJ~a'8esatisfactory a 
vindication ofJ:"fenets of his ethical thetsm as Leibniz thought., But 
Leibniz is not the, only one in the history of philosophy who ha~ , 
similarly entangled hifuself. Whether Leibniz might ever have modified 
him monadological views'i t is idle to conjecture. One thing, however 
we do know (and here a grain of fact is worth a bushel of arbitrary 
special pleading and forced interpretation) and that is the tenacity 
with which Leibniz held to his early views of God 'and his relation 
to the universe.> These were never substantially altered, and when 
the influence of Leibniz on subsequent thinkers is computed,' it is 
these views which have been not the least influential. And, of "course, 
it is these views which most of all decide the answer of Leibniz to 
the problem of evil. 
" 
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c. XII. 
The Classical Traditicn. 
It will be apparent frcm the last chap~er that cur 
interpretat icn cf L.ei bniz dc.es nct permi tus to give a quick and 
facile eluoidaticn cf his answer to. the prcble~ cf evil. In the case 
cf a Leibniz this might perhaps be ccnsidered prima facie~evidence 
o.f its prcbable truthfulness than ctherwise. It wc~ld have been 
much simpler to. fo.llcw the well trcdden path cf a unilateral 
interpretaticn and to. dismi'ss all else as irrelevant. But cur 
contenticn all alcng has beellthatwe must read Leibniz as he is and 
nct what we think he cught to. be. The difficulty' of cur task has, 
therefcre, increasing rather than diminished. 
Fcr these reascns it is no.t easy to "place" the answer cf 
Leibniz to. the prcblem'cf evil. There are sol1l1 ma,ny stands cf thcught 
interwcven with the warp and wcof cf his argument. In the previcus 
chapters we have givenscme acccunt cf these in so far as they are 
pertinent to. our present discussicn. Where these resemblances and 
reminiscenes have no.t been specially menticned, it is because they 
were so. obvious. E.G. the special debt cf Leibniz to. Stcic philoscphy 
either directly cr thrcugh Schclastic philcsephy must be ,evident. 
Such indeed must almcst necessarily be the case. Fcr the Stcic creed 
explcred all there was to. explcre in giving a basis for the 
ccntention "all partial evil is universal gcod". And Leibniz was the 
last perscn to. hesitate to. put o.n the pancply of Stcic philcsophy 
where it was likely to. prcve helpful. But, then, all thecdicean 
argument as well as the Theo.dicee cf Leibniz is under a similar debt 
to. stoicism nct cnly for its answer to. the prcblem cf evil but fcr 
the very fcrmulaticn cf the problem 'itself. It is nct therefcre 
supprising to. find in Leibniz so.mething cf the Stcic visicn cf a 
universe sub specie aeternitatis. (See next Chapter). 
'The essential triangularity cf the problem cf evil is 
the classical fcrmulation cf the prcblem in thehist~y cf philcscphy, 
at least frcm the time cf Plato. cnwards. It asks with Bcethius Si 
Deus bcnus est, unde malum and Bcethius-like it regards it as cne cf 
the consclations cf philoscphy to. supply an answer. The pCints cf the 
triangle are (1) the Supreme Beneficence cf Gcd, (2) His Divine 
omnipctence and (3) the a pcsteriori existence cf evil. The 
fcrmulatiqn cf the prcblem and ~ the answer of Leibniz fall within 
this traditicn. 
. , 
Leibniz, as we have pCinted out many times already, had 
no. hesitation in the categcricalaffirmaticn cf the Supreme Gocdness . 
'cf God. Ncr will' he allcw this "Q.'ccdness" to. be inte-rpreted sclely 
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in'a metaphysical manner.' He will have nO' truck with the naturalism 
·ef Spineza er with the supreme expressionef naturalism in l;ncient·· 
philesephy, Epicureanism. still less is there any supra.,..meral . 
. sphere in the Leibnizian heavener 'any liberumarbitrium indifferentiae 
in the Deity.' . , 
. , 
Again, Leibniz 'aveids the obvieus selutien ef' the cruder, 
ferms ef dualism. With Leibniz the preblem et evil is envisaged as a 
whole. There is nO' breaking ef the preblem ef evil ~ intO' parts. 
There is nO' questien ef a "struggling deity". Fer. pace Mc Taggart 
we must regard the fa.ct ef evil as the particular crux ef a theisl}l. 
BUt with "a finite deity" we can never reach any finality in the 
.fermulatien ef the preblem much less ef its selutien. Fer behind 
"the struggling deity" we mast seek fe·r seme ether veiled "President 
ef the immertals" whem we can indict fer all the evil ef the 
universe including "the finite dei ty" with his unequal struggle', ~ 
Ged fer Leibniz is clethed net enly with the meral but alsO' with 
the metaphysical attrib~s ef theelegical erthedexy. His censistency 
in this directien leads?-as'we have seen,te make havec ef the . 
erthedex dectrine ef the "Fall ef Man". 
X~t as we have seen in eur early chapters, Leibniz's 
dichetemy e~ill and Understanding ef the Deity dees suggest 
semething which saveurs ef a dualism. Seme statements ef it are 
embarrassing e.g. "The ultimate erigin ef evil must net be seught 
in the Divine Will, but in the erigina~ imperfectien ef creatures, 
which is centained ideally in the eternal truths C9B8~8t~ag 
censtttuting the internal ebject ef the divine intellect, sO' that 
evil ceuld net be excluded frem the best pessible system ef things" 
(G.·iii.p.33. B. Bussell.p.296.). 
A medern theelegianhas centended indeed that seme 
such limitatien.ef Ged,as 1's implied in the abeve argument1must 
ne cessarily be t he case. "And it is net necessary because we think 
ef Gedas limited, to' think ef Him as limited by anything eutside 
Himself. The limitatien springs frem His ewn nature. All the theeries 
by which philosephers and theelegians have seught to' recencile the 
facts ef the werld's histery with the perfect geedness ef Ged really 
invleve a ce~tain limitatien ef pewer. This is the cenclusien to' 
which the actual existence ef meral evil, when taken in cennexien 
with the cendemnatien ef it by the meral censciousness, seems to 
peint .. There is a sense in which Ged is finite. He is finite, not 
in the. senseef being limited by seme external .law erblind everruling 
fate, by seme thing er some persen eutside Himself, but in the 
sense in which everything that is real· is limited. It is difficult 
to' see what the'negatien ef this last prepesition weuld really mean ... 
The real is necessarily.finite. We may nevertheless think ef God 
as 'infinite inasmuch as He is net limited by anything eutside Himself, 
inasmuch as everything that is springs frem his perfectly righteous 
will and theught. When theelegians have interpreted infinitude as 
meaning mere than this" they have usually fallen intdJ ·that pantheistic 
optimism which ends by destreying these meral cenvictiens upen which 
all theelegy rests.· God is infinite because He is the greund ef all 
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that is; He is, 0mnipot,ent, because He. is the cause of all that is, 
He is in~initelygood bec~use He wills the best that He has it in 
Him to produce t!.' '(R.H. RashdalL. "Contentio Veritatisup •. 45-6.) 
,The last"phrase' of this quotation, is unconsciously Leibnizian aIfd 
open to the s~me etp-'criticism.ofd,ualism. And-along this argument 
of Rashdall it might be possible to rehabili tat'e the answer of 
Leibniz.As we: shall sE;?e in the ensuing discussion of this chapter 
there is no reason to suppose that this must invblvea sacrifice of 
the, ethics of Le,i bniz to 11is optimism. 
In some such way as this Leibniz the theologian might 
answer Leibniz the philosopher when challenged that this view of God~ 
as limited by "the original imperfection of creatures tl, must 
inevitably mean the virtual giving up of the theistic view of the 
universe and in particular that monistic view of thingsimpli~d 
therein. But it may be further argued that orthodoxy is en the side 
of Leibniz, even on this pOint. F0r it is difficult to see any vital 
difference between the ,argument of Leibhiz here and the well known 
interpretation of the doctrine of omnipotence by Aquinas. As 
Baron von Hugel says "Now ,it does not seem un:reasonable to hold that 
among the things, according to Aquinas's term outside the object of 
omnipotence, li~s the power, even for God, of creating afini te be.ing 
so absolutely unified within itself and so absolutely strong in 
willing just this, its utterly adequate insight, ahd entirely to 
love only in proportion to the worthiness of the object loved •.. It 
would seem that to be able to create a finite being of such a 
character, would really, even for God, be impossible, for it 
would be to create a finite infinite, a limited God, an intrinsic 
contradiction"!. (p.125. "The Reality of God" Baron Von Hagel ). 
Whatever the defects of Leibniz's rationalistic 
expression of .this point in the dichotomy of the Will and Understanding 
of God, it has at least as much merit as the despairing solution of 
Lotze and others "Let us therefore ••. say that where there appears to 
be an irreconciliable contradiction between the omnipotence and the 
goodness of God, there our finite wisdom has come to the end of its 
tether, and that we do not yet understand the solution which yet we 
believe in" (Microcosmos.ii.p.?l? Edin.lS94.) 
It is possible to find a further answer in the Philosophy 
of Leibniz to the p~oblem why God did not allow a mere possibility of 
ev.11 without its actuality. It may be pointed out, along the lines 
we have already indicated, that ".the best of all possible worlds" 
must imply a Divine' value judgement. NoW absolute' values as such' 
imply no negation but it is otherwise with their realisation in this 
world of e'bb and fl.ow. SUpra-temporal values can only be realised 
within a finite and temporal mode of being. As the "0 felix culpa" 
arguments remind: us history is the final arbiter of value. In other 
words the eVils of the universe can never imperil its destiny as 
conceived by God. The Immanence of God in the universe must inevitably 
mean that the value of the past and the present is in some measure 
condit ioned by the process of the future. Le ibniz' s e:stension of 
the verdict to await the gti judg¢ment of eternity gives great point 
to this contention .. 
" 
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But ·both this question of metaphysical evil'and the 
world as " a yale of soul making" and value making raises the third 
point, the a posteriori existence of evil. 
How far does Leibniz admit the real existence of evil ? 
This is a question which inevitably proposes itself .on any cosmic 
view of ·things and especially with any thorough going 'optimism such 
as that of Leibniz. As we shall see in more detail in the ensuing 
chapter an important and vital part of the argument 'of Leibniz is to . 
assert the solvability of the proble~ of evil by an insi~tenpe upon 
the solidarity and unity of the world. If God alone has the right to 
be a pessimist and is not, then we must try and gatn something of 
the breadth of His vision of the universe. 
But even if we aCCluiesce in the old Stoic viElw that 
evi.1 is only the villain in the play, Who, though offensive in 
himself, yet adds a spice to our enjoyment, the problem of the 
particular incidence of evil remains. Evil remains even though it 
is only a means to an end. This important fact of evil Leibniz 
answers, as we shall see, not only by pointing to the harmony between 
the kingdom of Nature and the kingdom of Grace but also by his 
doctrine of immortality. 
With Leibniz it is very difficult at times to resist the 
conclusion that evil is something negative and not positive. SUch a 
view is commonly held to sacrifice ethics to the service of theology_ 
A strong argument can be made for~~Q~._an interpretation of Leibniz 
but to ~e~eB~s-~ interpret Leibniz~his way is to read him at his 
worst. 
The preCise interpretation of moral evil in the philosophy 
of Leibniz is a question of unusual difficulty. According to Bertrand 
Russell &c. ":Leibniz' s Ethics, like many other ethical systems, 
suffer from no~:;;.existence"~p.197. above) Many texts can easily be 
~oted in suppprt of such a Spinozistic reading of Leibniz. On the 
other hand a m'Ore recent commentator has rightly drawn' attent ion to 
the fact that s consideration of the manifold works of Leibniz will 
reveal his constant preoccupatiop wi th the moral life. "Son oeuvre 
tout ent i~re . s' ins,pire d 'une preoccupat ion con)3tante des probl'emes 
fon}1amentaux de la science morale. Toute sa metaphysique, ses 
speculations sur la nature intime .dela force, qui est Ie fond et ' 
l'essence meme de toutes choses, ont pour fin, dans son esprit, 
dtassurer a la morale une base solide" -("La Morale de Leibniz tl • by 
L.Le Chevallier p.9.) Chevallier draws attention to the words of 
Leibniz, at the beginning of the Nouveaux Essais, to his interclocutor 
"Vous avmez plus de comnierce' avec lesPhilosophes spe'culat ifs et ' . 
j'avais plus de penchant versla,Morale. Mias j"ai,apprisdeplus 
en plus combien la 'Morale re~oit d'affermissement desprincipes I 
solides de la vsritable Philosophie; c'est pourquoi je les ai ltudies 
depuis avec plus c1' application et je suis entre{ dans des me/di~tat ions 
assez nouvelles tt (Nouveaux Essais.l.l.c.i.) Certainly Chapter XXI 
of the Nouveaux Essais does not suggest the alleged "dishonesty" 
of which Leibniz can scarcely be cleared. Chevallier, on the contrary, 
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s"uggests, that it was preceisely these moral considerations whi"ch 
really express the essential Leibniz and which are marked in his 
most diverse works in so far as he liberates h~§~J."f from the 
metaphysical influences of his youth. This vieiTndOrses in his 
"De vera Methodo Philosophiae et Theologia" 1690 which give lis a 
personal confession of. fai tho We neglect, 'the science which 
distinguishes for us the good man from the bad, which reveals the 
mysteries of· t,he soul, and opens the way to happiness. All our 
unhappiness is due to the fact that we gi~e thought to everything 
but life. ,So men are ,honest by habit or necessity, rather than by a 
reflective will.' ( "Mai s, on laisse ,fie' cSte' lascience qui nous apprend' 
'~ distinguer l'homme de bien du mechant, qui nous rev~le les myst~res 
de 'I '~e, et nous ouvre Ie chemin du bonheur. Tout notre mi sere vient 
de ce que nous pen sons a toute autre' chose, bien plus qu'~ la grande 
affaire de la vie. c~est/insi que tant de gens sont honn€'tes par, 
habitude ou par ne'cessit , plut''o''t que par une volont{ rEf'flefchie" 
Q,uoted.p.18. La Morale de Leibniz. above.) 
The primacy of ethics and the moral'life for Leibniz is 
further confirmed by'the consideration that action is the fundamental 
reality of the Leibnizian world. There are few diligent readers of 
Leibniz who would not agree with the ,verdict of Baruzi "Q,uand 
Leibniz dit constamment que Ie Bien g~neral et la gloire de Dieu sont 
analogues dans son syst\me, il n'est pas victime d'un verbalisme ou 
d'une habitude religeuse peu consciente;il exprime l'une de ses plus 
profondes intuitions. Toute connaissance, 'a mesure qu'elle s'approfondit, 
tend a devenir constructive; lorsque quelque intuition me porte vers 
Dieu, j'imite quelque chose de son ftre" (p.llO-lll "Leibniz" J.Baruzi. 
above. ) 
The ,relation of moral evil to metaphysical evil is made 
tolerably clear be Leibniz. It amounts to the simple fact that the 
limitation of creatureliness is not sin or moral evil but involves 
this empirical inevitability. On whatever grounds we may criticise 
this position, at least we must admit that it is an important 
distinction in thought. It involves a crux which every theistic 
answer to the problem of evil must face. With such a critic as Bayle 
at his elbow Leibniz was seldom allowed to forget its cruciality. The 
answer of 4quinas is the answer of Leibniz, God"neither wills evil' 
to exist, nor wills it not to exist, but wills to permit evil; ?nd 
that i)3 a good" (bum. Theol.l.19.IX.) cf. "Dieu est donc oblige par 
une ne'cessi te' morale, qui setrouve en luy m€'me, de permettre Ie mal 
moral des cre~turesn The'odice'e. Par. 158'. G.vi.p.204.) For if God 
were to abstain from the creation of a creature such as man because 
he saw the empirical risk o·f his sinning,' then the rebellion of the 
creature would be made to prevail against the essential goodness of 
God. Especially is this position difficult to hold when we remember 
that even the wickedness of the sinner can be made to serve the ends 
of God. How the good can efface the evil of the past is, of course, a 
question that Leibniz does not answer in detail. This, is, as we shall 
see, probably the weakest link in his whole argument. 
Q,ui te clearly .,then, for Le ibniz moral evil is something 
more than the mere fact of differentiation in the universe, though it 
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depends upon this fact •. nEor we must c'onsider'that there is 'an . 
origina,l imperfect ion in the creature,' anterior t·o sIn, because the, 
creature is essentially limited; whence it come's that the creature 
cannot ~n9w every~hing, and can be mis.t~ken and comrni t other ~~nil t s~' 
("The'oQ,lcee. G. vl.p.114-5. Q.uoted Russell". p.198.) Beyondthls' , 
statement Leibniz hardly advances. For Leibniz metaphysical evil may 
indeed be a problem about finitude, but moral evil is not a problem 
about nothing. Malum est in bono subjecto. f'Origo maii est a 
limitations creaturarUIri". . 
It is difficult in some ways to resist the conclusion of 
some commentat,ors.that,by his recognition of the inexpugnable nature 
of eVil in the universe,"the best possible world" of leibniibecomes 
the supreme embodiment of corruptic optimi pessima. Dualism is a 
diffi cuI t ghost to lay when we deal wJ- thtl the problem of eviP'. It 
is the skeleton in the cupboard. of eV;FY Theqdi cee. It appears in 
lei bniz, ·as we have jus.:); seen, in the doct:rine that, Di vine Omnipotence 
is limited by an Understanding which involves the €oncomitance of 
evil in nthe best possible world". Thus apparently after dualism is 
banishedg through the door it re-enters the universe through the 
window. It is interesting to compare le1bniz in this respect with a 
Church lather like Anselm who gives in some ways a similar answer. In 
the cas~ of Anseim the problem of evil is answered in the dualism . 
implicit in the Divine Nature through the interrelation of the attributes 
of Justice and Mercy, instead of the Goodness and Understanding. 
But to regard this criticism of leibniz as serious is,p!as 
we have just seen, a mistake. It is a criticism specially levelled 
against leibnizby Schopenhauer. "Even if Leibniz's demonstration, 
that among the possible worlds this one is best, were correct: ey yet 
still it would not amount to a theodicy. Fer in truth the Creator is 
the author not merely of the w:orld but of possibility too: he ought 
accordingly to have devised this in such a wl:±Y as to admit of a better 
world" (parerga und Paralipomena" 11. par.15? Q.uotedby Ward 
"Realm of Ends" p. 354.) But as Ward, in agreement with our own Views, 
points out "MetaphysiC of this sort is'not to be met by argument. It is 
sufficient to remark that at any rate so long as there is no difference 
betwe~n possible and impossible so long omnipotence can have no meaning: 
two and two may be four or it may.be five .... To proclaim creation 
restricted by determinate possibilities to be an idea derogatory to 
the soverign majesty of God is but blind adulation; for it really amounts 
to denying that God ,is himself a definite being at all, is either 
intelle; ctually or morally consistent .. All determination is negation, 
Spinoza has truly said, to find in this an evil, a ~o-called ' 
metaphysical or logical evil, only shows what ambigu'i ty the term may 
irivolve" (p.354-355.) , 
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_ Leibniz, of course, avoided this difficulty of Schope'th~H.f} 
by considering the Divine Understanding itself as the source ,of the 
"eternal truths". In this way those "eterna.l truths fl , wn,ich made it 
inevitable that evil should be a concomitance of "the best of all 
possible wOrlds", are themselves in a different light. (cf. . -
"!mplmus. Kestnerus vester nonnihil pufendorfianis praeoccupatus mihi 
. objici t, si Deus aeternas rationes sequitur, aliquid datim iri prius 
Deo. Sed respondendum-est', rationes aeternas es'se in Divino intellectu, 
nec ,ideo quicquam esse prius Deo" sed tantummodo divinam intellectlonem 
esse natura priorem divina volitione" (Letter to Bierling. 20 3une" . 
1712. G.viLp.507.) So far as it goes this answer is a successful 
endeavour to show that God, though limited by "eternal truths", is 
in reality only limited by Himself. 
The difficulties of Leibniz were increased by the static. 
and ultra-rati2Ifalist,ic manner in which ,he sonceived the Divine Attributes 
and. especiallYT'this dichotomy of Will and Understanding wi thin the _ 0' 
Di vine Being. On such an~ interpetat ion anft. internal dualism is almost 
inevitable ,and Leibniz,as we have seen, has great trouble in trying 
to extricate himself from ,its toils. It is inter:esting to compare this 
apparent Leibnizian dichotomy of the Divine Attributes with the 
remark of Archbishop King "These Attributes"- i.e. Omnipotence and 
Goodness- tf amicably conspire together, and yet restain and limit each 
other. There is a kind of Struggle and Opposition between them, whereof 
the Evils in Nature bear the Shadow and Resemblance. Here, then; and 
nowhere else, may we find the Primary and most certain Rise and origin 
of Evils" ("Essay on the Origin of Evil" p.296.) In addition,the 
unconditioned validity of the causal prinmiple even for God leads 
Leibniz into trouble. So that as Clarke said this argument would prove 
"that whatever God can do, he cannot but do; .•••• Which is making him 
no Governor at all, but a mere necessary Agent, that is, indeed no 
Agent at all, but mere Fate and Nature add Necessity" (4th Paper of 
Clarke G.vii.p.385.) In other words, as critics of Leibniz sinCE? the 
time of Clarke have often reiterated, there is very little to choose 
between the God of Spinoza and the God of Leibniz. We know, however, 
that such a verdict .on his philosophy was anathema to Leibniz. 
Difficulties like these would have vanished'if Leibniz 
could have ar~ived at a more vitalistic conception of the Divine Nature. 
In this way it would be possible to conceive sf the Divine Attributes 
as a dynamic way of expressing the Divine All-inclusiveness. Only in 
this way is it, possible to avoid the pitfalls Of Leibnizand to 
substantiate that qualitative reading of the Divine Attributes, as the 
Omnipotence of Love, which Leibniz accepted as his own view. 
The weakness of th~ theism of Leibniz in other directions 
may be traced to somewhat similar aauses. The anxiety of Leibniz to 
conserve the Sovereignjty. of t.he deity lea,ds him into other short cuts 
in his theism which become evident on close scrutiny. These difficulties 
are so serious that many commentators have spurned the thE?ism of. 
Leibniz) without any effort at interpretative reconciliation. For 
reasons which we have already given it is impossible for us to take 
such a view of Leibniz, though we do not hesitate to agree with some 
of the criticisms of his theis'l',patently obvious in themselves. 
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To begin with, owing to his mathematical idea of knowledge' 
Leibniz gives an interpretation of Divine Omniscience which many 
theists are more concerned to deny than to, defend. According to Leibniz 
the bmn:iscience of God is a knowledge in detail "of the future" . ,The 
difficulty on these premises is to se~, how' the time-process can have 
any value. And if history ha.s no meaning, quite clearly the world 1's 
denuded 'of moral yalue. ,The conception of Leibniz regarding the self-
'evolving character of <the rational monads does' seem to exclude an 
element, of contingency in the world which most, theists are much, more 
'concerned to assert than deny. According toLe! bniz the historical 
process is the mere Darstellung of a cosmic drama of which every detail 
has been pre-arranged. But the difficulty on this view asserts itself-
-"unless creators are 'created there is no creation". If we are to 
regard the time":'pro'cess as real and if "creators create", then,we must 
suppose that God has determined that the contingent future as non-
existing shall not be known.'This is the point Arnauld tries to make 
but does not quite succeed (see lett,er to Leibniz. May 13, 1686. G.ii. 
p.25.) "I ought to regard as invlovedin my individual concept only 
what is of such a 'nature that I would no longer be myself if it were 
not in me, while,on the other hand, everytning which is of such a 
nature that it 'might either. happen to me without my ceasing to be 
myself, should not be considered as involved in my individual concept" 
p.30-31. above. (Open Court Pub. Co. Translat. p.95.) The anxiety of 
Leibniz to avoid anything like' the voluntarism of Socinianism leads 
him not only to say Ilthat it is little consonant with the dignity of 
God to conceive of him (under the pretext of safeguarding his freedom) 
in the way that the Socinians do, as a man who forms his resolutions 
according to the circumstances" (p. 27. G.ii), with which Arnauld 
agrees, but also to interpret all reality in terms of the subject-
'predicate identity view, with which Arnauld has some difficulty. Leibniz, 
however, will have no evasion. "In my opinion each individual SUbstance 
always contains the traces of what has ever happened to t'it and 
marks of that which will' ever happen to it (Remarks upon Mr Arnauld's 
letter. May, 1686. G.ii.p. 39. Open Court Trans. p. 107.) 
Further this view of the'Divine Omniscience must reduce the 
Divine Experience to nothingness. For on such a view we are deali~g 
with a dramaturge and not a Deity. "Fore knowledge of the future is, 
we may contend,something of a misnomer. It is either not strictly 
FORE-knowledge or it is not strictly knowledge" ("Realm of Ends'! J. 
Ward. p. 478. ) If Divine Omniscience has such a,knowledge~ of the 
detailed future as a consequence of his preordination, then,Divine 
Experience is a phrase without much consequence. But on such a view 
we are far removed from "the God of t he living, the' God who is Love". 
-The solution of this crux is to distinguish between the 
creative intuition and the divine knowledge. This is a ,distinction 
,which Leibniz cannot'make. But as Ward points out p. 478 (above) " 
epeatea ' knowledge presupposes the creation, and the relation of 
creator and created involves just the dependence which the relation 
of knower and known excludes. For knowledge does not posit or 
constit,ute its objects, which for spiritualism are the manifestation 
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or utterance$of free agents or subjectslt. Only in some such'way as . 
this cart Leibniz succeed 'inretrieving that ethical th~ism h~ is so' 
'. much concerned to. vindicate. The element of contingency in the world 
depends on th~ action of free beings~ Th~ actual course of 'this 
action is nOt part or the Divine' Creation, still less is it part of·, 
His knowledge. Within a wider teleology, there is room for another 
and smaller teleology. v 
Leibniz?her~ as else~here,6verreaches himself in his 
anxiety to avoid dOlng any despite to the metaphysical attributes of the 
Divine Being; But with the qualitative reading of the Divine Attributes", 
int,egral to the Leibnizian laea of God, we must interpret these Attributes 
in terms of the self-limitation of Love. F9P-QR±9s8-taeNot to speak 
of that other limitation necessarily involved in the idea of Omnipotence. 
For unless the world is to, be deprived of all moral value and the 
conception of the Deity almost otiose, there must be not an element of 
contingency in the Deity Himself but an act of self-limitation and 
abnegation. Thus while the general purpose of creation is fixed, yet 
within this general purpose ,the actual process of its fulfilment in 
detail is deliberately set outside His knowledge. 
But this is an admission which the rationalism of Leibniz 
would never permit him to make. In this indeed he is not alone even 
among many moderns. In his "Moral Values and the idea of God" (1918) 
W.R.Sorely writes "I confess that the ancient arguments about the 
inconsistency of freedom with foreknowledge do not appeal to me. If we 
remember that the infinite Mind is not limited to a finite span of the 
time-process, we must allow that, notwithstanding the free causation 
of finite minds, the actions which we call future are yet eternally 
present to his knowledge. To a mind which transcends time there cannot be 
the difference which exists for us between memory and foresight; the 
past and the future must be equally open to his view. Universal deter-
mination contradicts freedom, ~niversal knowledge does not". While 
there is no way of denying the logic of such an argument, given the 
premises, the more excellent defence of theism seems to be the one we 
have suggested (following Ward) and one which,above all,will commend 
. itself to that view of the universe sub specie pluralitatis •.. For more 
than any ethical monism it enables us to assert (1) the moral value . 
of the universe (2). the reality of the time process and (3) the meaning 
we attach to the life of God. Leibniz might have avoided the more deistic 
implications of his argument by a more courageous application of the 
qualitative interpretation of Omnipotence and Omniscience. Instead of 
a "block universe" we should have a universe of "creative synthesis fl • 
We should have God limiting Himself by the creation'of the World, His. 
world and in a very real sense waiting upon the fulness of time for the 
fruition of,His purposes o~Love. 
',. 
'In thus critiCising Leibniz we 'mast be careful to pOint out 
t.hat it' is not merely the idea of created substance which is at. fault, 
still less the subject-predicate-identity view of propositions. 
~The view then of the universe in its relation to God, that it was 
pre-established in all its detail and yet contained,in it, not only 
matter, but also. active created substances, ,was one whi.ch Leibniz' held' 
quite antecedently to his monadology, and would probably have continued 
to hold had he never been a monadologist, as implied in the rationality 
and goodness of the universe. If it were only pre-established, the 
world might be rational but would not be good. 'If it was to be good· 
it would have to involve active ~reatures. It was in all literalness 
Leibniz'smeditat'ions on the'.problems of 'fiXE?d fate, free will, fore-
ktiowledge ab~olute' which led him to this vie~, and set the problem 
which his doctrine·of created substances was to solvettSome Problems 
on the Philosophy of Leibniz" by L • .T.Russell.Arist. Socy. Proceedings. 
1922-3.p.2D3-4.) This is a point of view to which we ourselves have 
been driven though along a somewhat differBntroute. Our study of the 
answer of Leibniz to ffthe problem of evil" has emphasied the essential 
continuity of his thought both in youth and maturity . 
. The Leibnizian doctrine of monads is not therefore the' 
fons et origo of his offending as is so commonly supposed. For the 
doctrine of monads is merely the intellectual expression of the 
convictions and intuitions of Leibniz about the universe. It claims a 
verdict for what is primarily an insight. The doctrine of the monads 
simply exaggerates the difficulties already involved in the Leibnizian 
Weltanschauung. This statement of the problem the monadology was 
designed to solve has an importance not yet sufficiently realised. The 
pre-monadological vievis of Lei bniz called the tune for the monads. It 
was thus inevitable that the new doctrine of created SUbstance should 
only serve to vindicate and justify these opinions. As we have already 
seen the monads also writelarge the defects of these opinions. 
This is especiaily s~en in the difficulty of the place of 
God in the Monadological scheme of things. Most commentators have been 
content to repeat the blunder of Hegel and to state that Leibniz called 
God "monas monadum". It is true that the completed series of monads 
seems to demand a theist ic summit, just as their mutual 'pre-established 
harmony seems to demand a cause outside themselves. But there. are 
serious difficulties in this view of regarding God as a monad. For 
if the monads have a continuity of their own, then on this view we 
must be able to think of a monad that differs only infinitely little 
from God. Again, if God is the highest monad, it can only be against 
the rule that "monads have no windows". Further there remains the old 
difficulty of the creation of monads. But as Bertand Russell po.ints out 
(p. 187-188. above.) there is no textual autho;r-ity in Leibn~z .forhis· 
use of the phrase of Bruno' "monas monadurn". Morel4{)ver there is some 
ground for regarding the two places where Leibniz speaks ,of Gos as a 
~onad as, slips. (G.iii.636. ; G.vii.502'.) Though Leibniz does not 
, p,.esitate to approach pantheism with the words flThus God alone is the 
primary unity or original simple substance, of which all created or 
derivative Monads are. products and have their birht, so to speak, 
through continual fulgurat'i ons of the Di vini ty from moment to moment" 
(Monadology • Par. 47. Latta p. 243-4.), yet he will do nothing to 
impugn the substantiality of the Monads. For it is this substantiality 
which alone in his, cbpinion will rescue us from the abyss of pantheism .. 
;' 
·Nowhere .is. his criticism more Feel resolute than when reviewing the 
doctrine "d'un Esprit Universel Unique" ("il me semble qU'une opinion 
de cette r~rce doit estre prouvee, et oe n'est pas issezd'en avoir 
une imagination, qui en effect n'est fondee' que sur une,comparison' 
fort·clochante du souffle qui anime les organes de Musique" , 
'C.onside'rations sur la doct.rine d'unEsprit UniverselUni~e.1702. 
G.vi.p.531,.)"... Whatever else Leibniz will say about God, he will 
neVer adniit~od, who is in!eality ah'intelligeritia extramundum, can 
by any 'alchemy. ever b.ecome .an. anima mundi. NQr will he allow even 
a Newton to say that the idea of God is a superfluity.inhis system 
. (-"Ille dedit· Serenitate Suae Regiae schedam Anglico sermone a se 
conscriptam, qua Newtoni sententiam tueri conatur meanque impugnare; 
'libenter mihi imputaret Divinam gubernationem tolli, si omn1.a per 
'se bene procedant, sed non considerat. Divinan gubernationem eira 
natura11a in ipaa sustentatione eonsistere nee debere eam sumi 
Letter to Wqlf. 23 Dee. 1715. G.M. viii.p. 180.) 
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C. Xiii. 
The Interpretative Pr'iilciple of Organic Unity. 
The punctiform nature of the monad has often'been the 
means of obscuring th~ vi tal truth'that to see the world sub, 'specie 
pluralitatis is not the last wo~d of ~eibniz. It is true, of course, 
that nothing for Leibniz is absolutely real but these created substances 
and the ir states. As we have alr'eady seen they' a1;'etbto cae10 
different 'from the individuals of which they form a part and so from 
the created world considered as an individual whole. In this respect 
they are quite otl).er than the corpora simp1icissima animata of 
Spinoza. 
Yet there cannot be an infinite number of such monads, for 
an infinite number is a self-contradictory idea. Again, lfhere must 
be indivisible substances, for if there were no parts there could be 
no wholes. Now the only number that can be applied to the real is one, 
for any other number implies that there can be relations other than, 
qualities. This Leibniz denies. Thus we must not say that there is an 
infinite number of monads, though we may admit there is an actual 
infinite. 
Accordingly the notion of whole and one can only be 
applied to substance i.e. the monad, A totum aggregationis has no 
real unity. Their reality is the reality of the individual¢, monads. 
and their unity is merely "semi-mental" .("Et ipsa aggregata nihil 
aliud sunt quam phaenomena, cum praeter monades ingredientes, caetera 
per solam perceptionem addantur, ec ipso dum simul percipiuntur" 
Letter to des Bosses. 29 May, 1'716. G.ii.p. 51'7.) tlThis unity of the 
idea of aggregates is very true, but at bottom, it must be confessed, 
this unity of collections is only a respect or a relation, whose 
foundation is in what is found in each single substance by itself. 
And so these beings by aggregation have no other complete unity but 
that which is mental; and consequently their entity also is in some 
way mental or phenomenal, like that of the rainbow" (New Essays.149. 
G.v. 133. Quoted B. Russell. p.116. above.) 
Now the assertion that there is a plurality of 
substances does belong to the synthetic activity of. the perceiving 
mind. For this reason too Leibniz denies that the world can ever be 
one save ill a verbal sense. ("Hinc etsi magnitudine infinitus esset 
mundus, unum toturnnon esset, nec cum, quibusdam veteribus ~ingi posset 
Deus velut anima mundi, non'solum quia causa mundi. est, sed etiam ' , 
quia mundus talis unum co,rpus non ·foret, nec,' pro animali habere 
posset, neque adeom.isi verbalem haberet unitatem". Letter to des 
Bosses 17 March, 1706. G.ii.p.305.) In the The'odice~ he makes a . 
somewhat similar remark that "1' amas d 'un nomb),e infini de substances" 
is not a whole. "c' est cela memequi sert a refuter ceux qui font . 
du monde de Dieu, ou qui cOIlcoivent Dieu comme l~.Ame du monEle, le 
monde ou 1 'Univers ne pouvant pas ~tre conside're comme un animal ou 
comme une substance t'. Theodicee Par. 195. G.vi.p.232. Elsewhere 
he defines the meaning of the world for us as "l'assemblage entier 
des choses contirigentes". 
':: statements like these are apparently very damaging to 
ail'y asserti'on of the unity of the universe • And we must not try to 
make, Leibniz more consistent than he i~ in fact .In ,Chapter iii of 
our argument we, have already seen some of these ·difficulties. We 
saw there that,.though the universe is not a substance or an 
animal, yet it has nevertheless a certain inexpugnable inter-
relatedness for the, Divine Mind. It is not a "multiverse tl , for "tout 
est lii". It is not" a ~trung along universe" for it possesses a 
certain "holistic" character. It is a un,ive.rse so rich in harmonic 
possibilities that we can say in the words of Genesis (as Leibniz 
quotes) "God saw everything that he made, and behold it Was very 
good. ft. 
It is along these lines Leibniz believes that he is able 
by virtue of his monadistic interpretation of' the pre-established 
harmony to make a positive and distinctive contribution to the 
problem of .evil. To show e.g.that there~i a rational basis ~or the 
truth of ~he "0 Felix Culpa" argument. is to add some.thing other 
systems of philosophy have gri~vously lacked. To do this is to 
remove oneself from the small orbit of all mere reasons and counter 
reasons and to deal with the broad issues of the general harmony 
of the universe. God must permit "evil" because it is involved in 
"the best of all possible worlds". Sometimes it is necessary to 
run backward to jump forward. Without the sin of man there might 
have been no incarnation. (Thebdic~e Par.ll. G.vi.p.l09). In this 
way Leibniz approaches the Lutheran doctrine that the su~sta?ce of 
man is sin. He even goes the length of saying "Snas Ie peche nous 
:rrremes ne serions point; il y aurait des autres cre~tures.fI 
(Foucher de Careil above. p.lSO. Q,uoted Pichler "Die Theologie des 
Leibniz" Vol.l.p.32?) 
'Thus the monadological interpretation of the universe 
must emphatically not be allowed to take Us further than Leibniz 
himself intended. To do so is to read Leibniz at his worst and to 
caricature his philosophy. As we have already seen the doctrine of 
created sUbstance was the handmaid, as well as the vindicator, of 
the essentially harmonic nature of the universe and other early 
correlated opinions of Leibniz. For the unity of the world in the 
mind of God as a system of inter-relatedness is the ultimate 
presupposi t ion of the argument s of Lei bniz. "eTe .l'ense done avoir de 
bonnes raisons pour croi.re que toutes les differentes classes des 
Etres, dont l'assemblage f"orme l'Univers, ne sont dans les 
ide'es de Dieu, qui connai't/ distincte~ent leurs gradations essentielles, 
que comme autant d' Ordonnees d 'une meme Courbe, dont l.'union ne 
souffre pas_,qu'on en place d'autres entre deux, 'a cause que cela 
,marquerait d'e de-Sordre et de l' imperfection. " Letter to unknown 
. person. l~ dct. 1?0?~. See "Leibniz" Bar~zi (above) p. 297. 
The .fact that we cannot always grasp the preCise nature of this 
inter-relatedness does not alter the fact, we have similar. 
situation oft~n with the individual and the laws of a benefictent 
state. 
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It is this which sdpplies the thews and sinews to the 
theodicean argument. And it is upon this battle field that any 
Theodicy can best give an account of itself. For any verdict on 
"the problem of evilt? must ultimately rest upon some totalitarian 
judg¢ment. We. must approximate in some way, as Leibniz so often 
Teminds us, to the judg~ment of Godin Hlscre~tive fiat. This is 
the C(jp~ician revelation of Leibniz to consider things'frolll 
the point o·f view oft he w:b.ole. . . , . 
We can illustrate this c,attltude of Leibnlz to 'the 
facts of evil by comparing it' with that of.a recent writer. ~ 
Me C.D.Broad (Symposium:- "Evil and the Theistic Hypoth~sis" Arist. 
Socy. Proceedings. 1929-30. p. 262-3.) argues for the following 
propositions:~ (i) That good things and evil things are just facts 
which we recognise as we recognise black things and white things. 
(2) That we know little abamt the nature of the universe as. a 
whole to make any significant assertion about it. (3) That from 
the fact that among things that exist some are good an,dsome are 
bad ·we are not justified in drawing any inference to the effect 
that the universe is fundamentally the one or fundamentally the: 
other, or that the one preponderates over the other" 
It would be difficult to imagine a position furhher 
removed from the contentions of Leibniz. "The Problem of Evil", 
is virtually set aside, for the good reason that it ceases to exist. 
For if we can make no significant assertion about the universe, it 
is futile to argue and we must merely concern ourselves with some 
practical creed. 
But for Leibniz process is not everything. God is 
Sovereign over all and there is "one far off Divine event to which 
the whole creation moves". Accordingly no verdict of ours on the 
universe has any validity unless it recognises the essential 
partiality of our "point of view" and unless it follows those 
principles which lead through the maze of experience to some 
recognition of the symphonic solidarity of the universe. It is so 
easy to judge the world on a few thousand years history, Yet from 
this we bodly judge the immeasurable and the eternal .. Like men 
,born in prison or in salt mines we claim there is other light in 
the world than the false light of lamps. (De Terum originatione.w... 
Pichler p.266j 
Like Chrysippus Leibniz would have ~s to s~y "The 
world is a perfect body, but the parts of the world are not perfe~t 
sincethei exist relatively to tb,e whole and are not self-
SUbsistent ".In othe:r words so 'long as we' can be content with. 
explanation in terms of efficien.t c'ausation there can be no problem 
about evils and certainly no problem about ,evil. But when this . 
explanation is 'found inadequate and some hint of final causation 
is admitted, we must be prepared to give a reason for the faith 
that is in us. The prob+ematic quality of evil is the register of 
our inveterate tendency to make, some comprehensive vero-ict on 
the un~verse .in otner terms than that of mere process and efficient 
causation,. So we ask if there is some soul of goodness in things 
evil an~ with Leibniz we stay for an ,answer. 
"The extrinsic teleology of the ,world imp1,ied in the 
phrase·that God choose "tbe best of all possible worlds" helps us to 
envi sage something of it s unity and solida:ri ty. For the world in the 
Mind of God before creation and after creation does not differ 
in idea but only in existence. The quality of its unity is unique. 
We' can understand,too,something of its value, for God is no mere 
Unconditioned nor can we speak merely of a Divine incognito. The 
modus agendi of the Divine Mind is reflected in the mind of the 
rational soul, which is a mirror of God. The urge of creation for 
God is the same sub ratione boni principle of action in man. 
Accordingly we must content ourselves by saying that the world 
possesses the greatest possible perfectioh and so the greatest 
possible unity in v~riety. . 
The moral quality of this unl tY"in variety is seen in the 
essential at-one-ness of the Kingdom of Nature and the Kingdom of 
Grace. For this reason a "miracle" is' no more remarkable than a 
"natural law". The interpenetrative nature of these two Kingdoms 
means that the Kingdom of Grace explains the Kingdom of Nature. In 
other words this means the conservation of all the true values for 
which the world was created. Only in so far as man can align 
himself alongside the supreme ethical purpose which tranquilly works 
behind the world will he obtain that serenity and peace he covets 
so earnestly under the guise of happiness. In this way man learns 
to know God and knowing God to love Him. Thus we can say of the 
world "11 nous 'accommodera s:i,. nous nous en accommodons; nous y 
serons heureux, si nous Ie vou10ns €tre" (The~dicee. Par. 194. G.vi. 
p. 232. ) 
I I We have already touched upon Baruzi's contention that 
the Theod:i,.cee ,of Leibniz cantains a subtle pessimism. "Le j>essimisme 
n'est donc pas arrache, Nous revenos a la doctrine, du Timee. D~s . 
que l' entemdement pose un objet, i1 pose le mal. D~ 1'8. resu1te 
cette idee que de toute m{ditation de l'univers surgit un pessimisme. 
-')(' D~s que{loi, de l'ensemble, je mutile, j'ane'antis ma nature propre, 
je subordonne'a l'Etre total mon -etre partie1" (p.95. "Leibniz" 
Baruzi.) The answer to this is simply that God cannot deny Himself 
according to Leibnlz and that the notion, of "the best" does 
necessaril.y imply for the ethical theism of 1eibniz that, man is 
more than a mere incident in the epic of creation, though we may 
not dogmatise about his being the final end of creation in the w~y 
heapp'ears ·as its proximate end. 1ike Cicero Leibniz would say 
"if the Gods 'care for all men, it follows logically that they, 
care for each single man ("licet contrahere universitatem generis 
humani eamque gradati()tl ad pauciores, postremp deducere ad s~ngulos" 
.Cic. N.D.ii 65 164.) And the difference betwee.n the Th~6dicee, 
where the happiness of men is not'the "dernier but" of God,and 
,the Discours on Metaphysics,where "seul esprit vaut tout un monde " 
. is, as Baru'zi himself pOints out, not, a contra~ict,ion but a 
_'/,.' j- I ~~ ...-... ~ A ~k Li1.<.C. c4 ,f I~ I ~ '.il.4~'o..-~ ..I.R. k 
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difference in expression. But though the happiness of rational beings 
is subordinate to the general harmony of the universe, this cannot 
mean pessimism. The reasons for this are abundantly and carefully 
given.in the words of the Monadology. "This City of God, this 
trul~ universal mona~chy, is a moral world in the natural world, 
and is the most exalted and most divine among the works of God; and 
it is in it that the glory of God really consists, for He would 
have no glory were not His hreatness and His goodness known and 
admired by spirits. It is also in relation to this divine City that 
God specially has goodness, while His wisdom and His power are 
manifested everywhere." (Par. 86. Latta.p. 267-8). 
There can be hardly any doubt that this is the true 
Leibniz speaking in these words. At times, of course, he uses another 
tone of voice. But,as we have already contended,we must try and 
read LeibnJt at his best. Apart from this oeeamen -sa occasional 
variant in~expression of his thought, Leibniz like the rest of the 
philosophers was rather bewildered at finding himself within the 
spaciousness of ta a new heliocentric universe. In trying to avoid 
any taint of that unclean thing for the 17th. century anthropomorphism 
Leibniz may' overstep the mark. But the principle of continuity 
saved him in advance from this dreaded pitfall of his century. For 
it made it necessary to say et non magis datur vacuum forarum quam 
corporum. Accordingly within the gates of the universe we must 
assume the possibility of being higher than man as well as beings 
lower than man. 
In the end, however, we must always fall back on the 
ethical and spiritual implications of our idea of God. This is the 
solvent for the most intractable questions. It helps us e~g. to 
answer the question of the coming into existence of a .Judas in " the 
best of all possible worlds". To this question,however, we can expect 
no answer here on earth excepting to say in general that it is 
because 'God has found it good that he should exist notwithstanding 
that sin which he foresaw. This evil will be more than counterbalanced. 
God will derive a greater good from it , and it will finally turn out 
that this series of events in which is included the existence of this 
sinner, is the most perfect among all the possible series of events. 
An explanation in every case of the admirable economy of this choice 
cannot be given while we are sojourners on earth. It is enough to 
know the excellence without understanding it. It is here that must 
be recognise,d al t i"tudinem di vini t iarum, the unfathomable depth of the 
divine wisdom, without hesitating at a detail which involves an 
infinite number of considerations". (Discourse on Metaphysics. Par. XXX 
p. 50-1 Open Court Trans.) So in the same way as we leE!rn to love God 
we reach a certain assurance as to the position of mortal man in the 
vastpess of the universe. "Although this love is disinterested, it 
constitutes by itself our greatest good and interest, even though we 
may not seek these in it and though we may consider only the pleasure 
it gives without regard to the advantage it brings; for it gives us 
perfect confidence in the goodness of our Author and Master, which 
produces real tranquility of mind, not as in the case of the Stoics, 
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who forcibly school themselves to patience, but through a present 
content which also assur'es.to us a future happiness. And besides the 
present pleasure it affords, nothing can be of more advantage for the 
future than this love of God, for it fulfils our expectations also 
and leads us in the way of supreme happiness, because in virtue of 
the perfect order that is established in the universe, everything is 
done as well as possible both for the general good and also for the 
greatest individual good of those who believe in it and who are 
satisfied with the Divine government" (Par. 18. "Princs. of Nature & 
Grace". Latta p. 423-4.) Whatever conflict there may be with this 
"general good" and "the greatest individual good" must be referred to 1k 
goodness of God. 
This love of God which "constitutes our greatest good and 
interest"wields a dynamic influence with Leibniz. It illustrates again 
the difficulty Leibniz had of fitting his idea of the purposive nature 
of the universe within an intellectual schematism. For Leibniz the 
love of God is inseparable from any knowledge of the true purpose of 
the universe. And as he remarks ~ propos of the application of 
knowledge to the most spiritual problems "Enfin, je trouve partout Dieu 
et sa gloire" (Unedited Letter to Morell. i. Oct. 1697. Qmoted p. 13. 
"Leibniz" J. Baruzi, above.). 
This "Gloire de Dieu" is also given a particular Leibnizian 
interpretation. The theological conception of the Glory of God ( to 
which Bayle clings-see Theodicde. Par. 109. G.vi.p.163.) is transformed. 
It is no'longer regarded merely as somet~ing belonging to the Deity 
and not to the world. On the contrary it~not only this but also 
something which realises itself in rational spirits. As we have 
already seen God " would have no glory were not His greatness and His 
goodness known and admired by spirits" 
Analagous to this Glory of God is the General Good. For this 
Glory of God is a dynamic initiative in the soul of man that leads him 
to self-ntrWiation for the General Good. nJe crois que Ie renoncement 
total~soi meme n'est autre chose que de pr~f!rer Ie bien commun, au, 
ce qui est la meme chose, la gloire de Dieu, a son int~~t particulier •. 
•... ce renoncement ne demande pas un repos¢ , mais plutSt une 
activite'''. Unedited Letter to Morell. 29. sept. 1698. Thus knowledge 
is not the only way to realise the Glory of God. 
In this trinity of the Love of God, the «lory of God and the 
General Good we reach the foundations of the City of God. For thus is 
realised the possi bili ty of an amor non mercenarius. !!God can be 
loved with the happiest result, since nothing is happier than God and 
nothing more beautfful or more worthy or happiness can be conceived. 
And since He possesses supreme power and wisdom, His happiness not 
only becomes a part of ours (if we are wise, that is, if we love Him) 
but even coristitutes it" (nOn the Notions of Right and Justice" 
Lattap. 286~) For the world is so ordered by virtue of its pre-. 
established harmony that "all spirits, whether of men or of angels, 
entering in virtue of reason and of eternal truths into a kind of . 
fellowship ·wi th God, are members of the .Ci ty of God, that is 
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to say of the most perfect state, formed and governed by the greatest 
and best of monarchs: in which there is no crime without punishment, 
no good action witho~t ~ proportionate reward, and in short as much 
virtue and happiness as~s possible; and this, not by any interference 
with the course of nature, as if what God prepares for souls were 
to disturb the laws of bodies, but by the very order of natural 
things, in virtue of the. harmony pre-established from all time 
between the realms of nature and of grace, between God as Architect 
and God as Monarch, so that nature itself leads to grace, and grace, 
by the use it makes of nature, brings it to perfection" (Princs. of 
Nat. & of grace. par.15. Latta p. 4a~.) 
From all this. it is plain that the Le1bnizian universe 
has a singular unity and solidarity. In an early. letter to Foucher 
Leibniz has expressed something of the precise nature of its unity. 
"Vous aur(s vu que tout mon syst~me, fond~ sur laconsideration de 
l'unite:reelle qui est indestructible et sui juris et dont chacune 
exprime l'univers tout entier d'une mani~re qui l~y est particuliere, 
et cela par les loix de sa pro pre nature sans recevoir de l'influence 
de deh9rs, excepte celle de Dieu qui la fait .subsister depuis qu'il 
l'a cree par un renouvellement continuel" (Letter to Foucher 5-16 
July, 1695. "Lettrees et Bpuscules Inedits de Leibniz". A.F. de Careil 
·1854) From this view Leibniz never departed. It would be hard indeed 
to see how any such departure was possible without a complete 
bouleversement of his philosophy. The whole of the Theodicee would 
have lost a great deal of its point. It would be impossible to 
speak of "le meilleur plan possible de l'univers" or to say "il ne 
luy ~toit pas non plus indifferent de cr~er un tel ou tel monde, 
de crrfer un chaos perpetuel, ou de cref'er un syst'eme plein d' ordre" 
(ttRemarques sur le Livre &c. ft Par. 21.G.vi.p.424.) or "La sagesse de 
Dieu ne permet point qu'il y ait un chaos veritable, ce serait un 
de'faut de son art; i:~ s' ensui t qu' on ne sau.rai t point assigner des 
parties qui n'aient rien d'organique, parce qU'une telle partie 
exprimant les autres qui sont organiques aura de l'organique" 
(lne'dits, Theologie XX. "Leibniz"J. Baruzi". above p.296-7.) or in 
the words of the Monadology "this connex:ion or adaptation of all 
created things to each and of each to all, means that each simple 
substance has relations which express all others, and consequently 
that it is a perpetual mirror of the universe'! (Par. 56. Latta p.218.J 
The question of the precise nature of an organic whole 
raises important philosophical issues which are germane to the answer 
of Leibniz to the problem of evil. The principle of the organic unity 
of the universe has been extensively employed in this way. It is a 
principle which requires careful elucidation unless we are to find 
ourselves in a moral scepticism which makes our last state worse 
than the first. Lotze e.g. goes the length of giving an exclusively 
logical ¢rigidity to this Leibnizian conception of the whole. "The 
whole world has its reality from God, and indeed in this way that 
in the mcbnd of God· there existed many consistent schemesI;l among 
which He admitted that which contained the smallest amount of evil 
and the greatest perfection. Such a scheme he could not alter or 
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improve, but only admit or reject, as a whole. We see from this that 
also with Leibniz the whole content of reality resemblesa mathematical 
formula in which each part is rigidly determined by others and itself 
determines them, so that not only does .. the past include the future 
but also the latter the past" (Lotze. Syllabus of Lectures on German 
Philos. since Kant:'Q,uoted Merz " European Thought in the 19th C'! 
Vol. iii.p.334 footnote.) 
. There are two senses in which we can speak of an "organic 
whole". They are :- (a) "Nothing which is a part of a whole :We would 
have been a part of it if anything else which is a part of W failed to 
be a part. of it" (b) "w is such that no part of it could have 
existed unless all the other parts had existed and had stood to 
each other in the relations in which they in fact did stand fl ("Examin-
ation of McTaggart's Philosophy" 1933. C.D. Broad. Vol.i.p.3l6.) The 
first meaning (a) is, as Broad remarks, true for all wholes and is 
for that very reason entirely trivial. The second meaning (b) is 
the more crucial. The impo~ance of distinguishing between these two 
senses is due to the facility with which one can pass from the one 
to the other. This is the charge that Broad brings against MCTagg~rt. 
In the case of Leibniz there can be no question of using 
the idea of organic unity in a trivial sense. For,according to Leibniz, 
the whole of the universe and its parts are equ~lly f~Raam fundamental. 
In other words the world could not have existed~the absence of anything 
which is in fact part of it. And nothing which is in fact a part of 
the universe could have existed unless all the other parts of it had 
existed and had stood to each other in the relations in which they do 
stand. Therefore nothing which is in fact a part of the whole 
universe could have existed unless the whole universe existed. 
Leibniz does not hesitate to affirm what McTaggart calls 
two plausible but misleading corollaries from organic unities viz: -
"the whole is in every part" and "the nature of the whole is expressed 
in every part" ("Nature of Existence i.t Par. 146. and 147.). Each 
simple sUbstance is " a perpetual living mirror of the universe" and 
"God in regulating the whole has had regard to eavh part, and in 
particular to each Monad, whose nature being to represent, nothing 
can confine it to the representing of only one part of things: though 
it is true that this representation is merely confused as regards the 
variety of particular things in the Whole universe, and can be distinct 
only as regards a small part of things, namely, those which are 
either nearest or greatest in relation to each of the Monads; otherwise 
each Monad wo~ld be a deity. It is not as regards their object, that 
the Monads are limited, in a confused way they all strive after the 
infinite, the whole; but they are limited and differentiated through 
the degrees of their distinct perceptions" (Par. 60. Monadology. 
Latta p. 250.) 
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But for Leibniz the guarantee of the value of the universe 
is that it is God's choice of the best. Other possible worlds, and 
they are an endlessseries, have an "intrinsic teleology" of their o~n 
and the fact that they have being in the Divine Understanding might 
suggest that they have all some value. Yet just as we can imagine 
"the best of all possible universes" as the highest limit of perfection 
and reality, so is it also possible for us to think of a series of 
worlds in the negative direction. But the metaphysical attributes of 
God and their inseparability from the moral attributes make this last 
supposition a vain imagination. Be this as it may,the extrinsic 
teleology, implied in the choice of God, <makes it certain that the 
actual universe has more than the mere value implied in its pre-
established compossibility alone. 
The ethical relevance ofq the principle of organic unity has been stated by G.E. Moore in his Principia Ethica:While not 
attempting to criticise his particular contentions, it may be he,lpful 
to consider it as throwing an interesting side light upon the argument 
of Leibniz. 
The general argument of Moore is the familiar one that 
"The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as ,the sum of 
the values of its parts" (Principia Ethica. 1922.) In a sens~a 
somewhat similar argument runs like an undertone throughout the 
Th~odic~e. Our ignorance of the unity of "le plan de Dieu" leads us at 
times to wrong conclusions about HiS goodness and wisdom. Yet in 
certain complete wholes we have abundant and clear indication of His 
infinite wis~on in the creation of the world. "11 est vray que nous 
en avons de'ja <des preuves et des essais devant nos yeux, lorsque nous 
voyons que,lque chose d' entier, quelque Tout accompli en soy, et isole, 
pour ainsi dire, parmy les ouvrages de Dieu. Un tel Tout, forme, pour 
ainsi dire, de la main de Dieu, est une plante, un¢ animal, un homme". 
(Theodicee. Par. 134. G.vi.p.188) In the same way the complete story 
of the history of the world would reveal the beauty and order of the 
whole. . 
The particular interpretation which Moore gives to this 
principle is that though the part is part of a larger whole (and 
therefore in every way different from a mere means),yet the part itserf 
may have no more intrinsic value than a mere means. In other words it 
is necessary to the whole just as a means is to an end, though the 
relation is toto caelo different. Yet the whole has an iatpisi 
intrinsic value and the part has not intrinsic value but without it 
the whole would not exist. On the other hand the part itself may have 
great intrinsic value positive or negative and the same law holds 
good. 
< The most important application of "the principle of organic 
unities" occurs in what Moore calls "Mixed Goods". i.e. "things, which 
though positively good as wholes, nevertheless contain, as essential 
elements, something intrinsically evil or ugly". Here we mast 
distinguish two valuations of these wholes:- (a) the total value of 
the whole, "on the whole" i.e. both the sum of the value of the whole 
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plus the intrinsic values which may belong to any of its parts. (b) 
the value of the whole "as a whole". 
From this principle we can draw a number of important 
conclusions. Thus the mere co-existence of two or more evils can never 
be a positive good ON THE WHOLE. On the other hand by cancelling out 
one another they may have great intrinsic value AS A ~VHOLE. ~f Leibniz:-
tlNous savons d'ailleurs que souvent un mal cause un bien, auquel on ne 
seroit pOint arrive sans ce mal. Souvent meme deux maux ont fa.it·un 
grand bien" (Theodicee Par.lO. G.vi .p.lOS.). 
Again from the existence of the virtues we seem inevitably 
driven to conclude that they could not exist without the COGNITION at 
least of evil and the ugly. Where such awareness of evil exists we 
can but conclude that the whole "on the whole tl has grea.t positive 
value. On the other hand, if we substitue for the knowledge of evil 
and ugliness ,·their corresponding actuality, while the actual evil or 
ugliness may add to the value of the new whole "as a whole", there is 
no corresponding reason to conclude that ,we have added to the value 
of the new whole "on the whole". The opposite is the more probable. As 
Moore illustrates "A conscious compassion for real suffering seem to 
be better, AS A wrIOLE, than a compassion for sufferings merely imaginary; 
and this may weel be the case, even though the evil involved in the 
actual suffering makes the total state of things bad ON TEE WHOLE " 
(p. 219. Principia Ethica.) 
The main principle of this argument is plain and of great 
importance. It lies behind the familiar argument of Leibniz about the 
concomitance of evil. "Ainsi Ie mal, ou le m~lange de biens et de maux 
ou le mal prevaut, n'arrive que par concomitanc~, parce qu'~ est li~ 
avec de plus ?rands biens qui sont hors d7 ce melange. Ce melange donc 
ou ce compose, ne doit point ~re considere comme une grace, ou comme 
un present que Dieu nous fasse; mais le bien qui s'y trouve mBle ne 
laissere pas de l'~tre. (Theodicee. Par. 119. G.vi, p. 170.) 
The precise application of this principle to the f~ct of 
evil requires much more care than is customarily given to it. The 
point at issue is a simple one. Is it necessary that evils should EXIST 
in order that the corresponding virtues should exist? Would not a posse 
peccare be enough without concrete sin? May not the actuality of these 
evils outweigh the value of the corresponding virtous attitudes towards 
them? Can we e.g. defend the existence of war beaause of the 
corresponding virtues it calls forth? According to Moore this line of 
argument is totally invalid. "Accordingly we have no reason to maintain 
the paradox that an ideal world would be one in which vice and 
suffering must exist in order that it may contain the goods consisting 
in the appropiate emotion towards them. It Is not a positive good 
that suffering should exist, in order that we may compassionate it; 
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or wickedness, that we may hate it. There is no reason to think that 
any actual evil whatsoever would be contained in the ideal"tp. 220 
above. ) 
This warning may serve a useful purpose if it reminds us 
of the facility we take for granted the acutality of evil. But Moore 
himself needs a similar warning about the facility of building up a 
philosophical Utopia without actual evil. Have we any more right to 
assume that the intrinsic moral values we recognise could exist of 
themselves in'a world without evil? 
This question was answered for Leibniz bu his doctrine 
of "metaphysical evil" and also by his reiterated conviction that the 
goods in the world far outweighed its evils. Moreover the fundamental 
nature of his theism placed an emphasis on the actuality of the 
goodness of the world we know which was final for Leibniz. When the 
godess Pallas leads Theodorus to the palace of Fates she says:-
"Here are representations, not only of what happens, but also of 
everything that is possible. 3upiter reviewed them all before the 
beginning of the existing world, arranged the possibilities into 
worlds, and chose the best of them all n. (The'Odicere Par. 414. G. vi. 
p. 362.) For Leibniz the actual world of our experience is "un certain 
monde dete'rmin{n and so far as, WE are concerned no other world has 
relevance. About the reasons for such "tout un mondel! we cannot add 
more to the earlier dialogue of Valla when he says of the Deity's 
choice of this world "We do not know what reasons He may have for it, 
but the fact that He is very good and very wise is enough to make us 
judge them good tl (Theodice'e Par. 412. G.vi.p. 361.) This is the reply 
to Leibniz to the contention "it might be the case that the existence 
of evil was necessary, not merely as a means, but analytically, to 
the existence of the greatest good. But we have no reason to think 
that this IS the case in any instance whatsoever ll (p.220. Principia 
Ethica.) As has been well said tiThe method of Utopia, which is 
somewhat discredited in political thought, deserves summary rejection 
in metaphysics or cosmology" (3.L.Stocks. "Evil and the Theistic 
Hypothesis" Arist. Socy. Proceedings 1929- 1930 p. 272.) Ignorance 
moreover offers a slender foothold for any positive thesis. 
. However this pOint may be considered, the principle of 
constructive and organic unity does offer us a solution of the obduracy 
of much of the~vil in the universe. It is along these lines that the 
problem can be most effectively tackled both from the theistic point 
of view and also without pleading the cause of God at all. Thi~ is a 
point Bergson brings out in touching about the problem of evil in 
physical suffering in his "The Two Sources of Morality and Religion" 
(Eng. Trans. 1935.p. 224)."It will be said, of course, that if life is 
good on the whole, yet it would have been better without suffering, 
and that sufferiQg cannot have been willed by a God of love. But, 
there is nothing to prove that suffering was willed. We have pointed 
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out that what, looked at from one side, appears as an infinite 
multiplicity of things, of which suffering is indeed one, may look 
from another side like an indivisible act, so that the elimination of 
one part would mean doing away with the whole ll • 
For Leibniz the world becomes rather than changes. The 
state of the world at any given moment is no argument against the 
perfection of the whole. The apparent cruciality of the problem of 
evil is largely the result of looking at things ab extra and from a 
finite point of view. As what we have called the "0 felix culpa 
argument tt so forcibly reminds us process can never be the last word. 
Thus Leibniz seems to hold not only that evil is inherently 
necessary to the highest form of universe, that as such it is merely 
a temporal aspect of the time-process and overcome by the good of the 
whome. But the difficulty remains on the theistic hypothesis how God 
must work out His divine purpose in the world through such base 
instrumentality. So we ask if evil has taxed the Absolute's powers of 
assimilation, is the Deity better placed? For however evil may be 
viewed and however much its conteRq may alter its character .evil . 
in some sense it must remain. Sub specie temporis we know that the 
very pea- recalcitrancy of man's environment can often lead to 
spiritual attainment. But sub specie aeternitatis the issue seems to 
land us in some form of dualism. 
The traditional answer to this is to say that though 
evil falls within the Divine Purpose, it does not fall within the 
Divine Will. This scholastic distinction between the ttantecedent" and 
"consequent" Will of God is the backbone of the laborious argument of 
Leibniz. The stress tbat this distinction lays upon Itcompossibility" 
is only another name for that unity in the world which is foundational 
for the doctrine of optimism. AS Leibniz says God wishes order and 
the good, but it sometimes happens that what is disorder in the part 
is order in the whole. Such is the witness of the legal maxim 
ttincivile est nisi tota lege inspecta judicare. (ltDieu veut l'ordre et 
Ie bien; mais il arrive quelque fois que ce qu~ est d~sordre dans la 
partie, est ordre dans Ie tout. Nous avons deja allegu~ c,t a1iome de droit: incivile est nisi tota lege inspecta judicare" Theodicee. Par. 
128. G.vi. p. 182.) One recalls the description Mephistopheles gives 
of himself to Faust:-
"Ein Theil von jener Kraft, 
Die stets das Bcise will, und stets das Gute Schafft". 
(E.T. Studierzimmer. i.B.T. Vol. Lp.544) 
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C. xiv • 
Theistic Monadism . 
: ,-,~~,,- .• ~: ,I; 
With all its inconsistencies "theistic monadism" is the 
phrase which must remain as the desc~ption of the answer of Leibniz 
to the problem of evil. Its inconsistencies and diffi~ulties are 
fairty obvious and have been the bane of most commentators. An 
additional complication is added by the method of his working 
illustrated by his remark rTQuand j'ai fait quelque chose, je l'ouqlie 
presque enti'erement .au bout de quelques mois, et plut'Ot de Ie chercher 
dans un chaos de brouilions que je n'ai pas Ie loisir de digerer et de 
manquer par rubriques, je suis oblig6 de faire Ie travail tout de 
bouveau" (G. Mathm. Schrift. ii.p.228. Qouted "Leibniztr Baruzi p. 12. 
footnote.) One result of this last remark must be that ,there is no 
short cut to the thought of Leibniz by the concentration on one or 
two of his writings to the neglect of the rest. An over simplification 
of the thought of Leibniz is to do him grave injustice. The tangled 
skein of much of his thought and the loose ends must resolutely be 
faced. Arbitrary selection of the texts of Lei~iz must be avoided. 
There can be no excuse for the obliteration Of,lpsissima verba of 
Leibniz to discover a pseudo-Spinozistic palimpsest beneath. 
The neglect of the The~dice~ of Leibniz has already been 
mentioned. Certainly the difficulties in grappling with a theistic 
monadism make such neglect an almost irresistible temptation. But 
this is a way of darkness. What Leibniz has joined together, no 
commentator has a right to put asunder. The historical priorityof the 
Theodicle to the lVIonadology (1714) and the references in the latter to 
the former are enough to show that Leibniz was never conscious of the 
alleged discrepancy between a publicly and a privately circulated 
book. Moreover the incorporation in the Theodice'e of the early thinking 
of Leibniz is enough to clinch this argument for good. There is, 
however, little need to labour an issue the answer to which is written 
large in practically every writing of Leibniz. and not least e.g. in 
the Discours de Metaphysique (1686), written for Arnauld and the 
letters written to Arnauld. All we can say is that Leibniz has taken 
such precautions against the divorce of the monad from God as lay 
within his power or at least the explicitness of the written word. 
We are far from suggesting that the philosophy of Leibniz 
is a perfect Weltanschauung. Rounded completeness and philosophical 
fecundity in ideas do not always walk hand in hand. The reliance of 
Leibniz upon metaphors to cover up obscurity in his thought is at 
times disconcerting. To say e.g. that the Monads have "no windows" 
and then to say the yare "fulgurat ions II from the Divine Mind is not 
as helpful as it looks or.sounds. (see Monad. Par. 47.) For whatever 
else "fulguration" may mean, it implies no speculative doubt as to 
the inexpugnable reality of relations apart from qualities. To speak 
in fact of a "t"ranscendent Monad" is to reveal the difficulties of 
Leibniz d'un. coup d'oeil. It is hard to resist the verdict of 
Alexander that such immanent theism creates a suspicion tlthat without 
much regard for consistency it sieeks to combine the religious 
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attraction of theism with the speculative attraction of pantheism" 
(Space, Time and Deity" Vol. ii.p. 391. S. Alexander. 1927.) This 
fundamental inconsistency is the inevitable result of trying to make 
God at once the summit and completion of the series of Monads and 
also the source of the other mutually exclusive Monads. 
Sometimes Leibniz has been accused of making God a mere 
deus ex machina in order that the' monads in this way might have some 
inter-relation. So the universe becomes monistic not by the conversion 
of the Deity into the Monad but by the taking of the Monad into God. 
Thus God would reconcile the conflicting legacy of Aristotelian 
metaphysic to the modern world lt the conjunction of attributes and the 
disjunction of primary substances tl (ttAdventure of Ideas tl p. 171. A.N. 
Whitehead. C.U .P. 1933.) 
But something like this criticism might mutatis mutandis 
be applied to the Monad itself. Nothing is more clear than that the 
atomic conceptualism of Leibniz is not firm enough to carry the 
elaborate superstructure built upon it as foundation. Still less can 
any philosophic wizardry evolve the concrete and manifold world of 
space and time from such a source. As we have already seen Leibniz 
fills the gaps in his rationalism by the doctrine of active spirit. 
The great question is how far the doctoine that God is 
Substance can be reconciled with the doctrine of, God as Creator. How 
are we~' to interpret such terms as "Monas primi t iva tt (letter to 
Bierlingium. 1711. Erdmann p.678.) or "la monade primitive" (letter i;)(b 
Remond de Montmoet. 1715. Erdmann p. 725.)1 If we take the expressions 
with any logical strictness, then clearly we cannot speak of any 
"fulguratfons". How far can we escape from the pantheism of Spinoza? 
Is it true of the God of Leibniz "ex necessitate divinae naturae 
infinita infinitis modis (hoc est omnia quae sub intellectum infinitum 
cadere possunt) sequi debent? (Ethica. Prop. xvi.) The influence 
of Malebranche as well as of Spinoza carried Leibniz perhaps further 
in this direction than he realised; But in no case is Leibniz ever 
conscious of jeopardising his ethical theism and if we are to follow 
him we must be prepared" not only to speak of God as "the primary 
unity or original simple substance, (Monad. Par. 47.), to say 
"the ultimate reason of things is called Go.d. (Prince. of Nat. & of 
Grace. par.8.) but also to speak of God in such personal terms that we 
can say "Dieu se /determine par luy m~me; sa volante" est active en 
vertu de la bonte" (G.vi.Par.21.p.423.) 
The surgical method of dealing with Leibniz practised by 
Renouvier and others in more recent times is to introduce indeed' 
"La Nouvelle Monadologie" instead of the old. To say, as Renouvier 
does ,that we must abandon "les principes d' absolui te/" et d' infini tit' 
in the interpretation of our idea of God as "en opposition avec la 
personali te', la Ii berts' et la crdat ion" is to cut the knot instead of 
untying it. (see: "La Nouvelle Monadologie" p. 535. Note 102. 1899.) 
The essential theism of the thought of Leibniz reveals 
-~------------~---~--- - ---
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itself in many ways. The phrase "the best of all possible worlds" 
shows us something of this. For the vindication of such a thesis is 
for Leibn'iz a Theodicy, where it might otherwise have been a 
flCosmodicy". God for Leibniz is ITa home for intrinsic values". God 
for Leibniz is the' guarantor for .any moral overdraft there may be 
in the bank of the universe. 
The idea of "the best of ~ll possible worlds", an idea 
of great historical importance for its influence upon Kant and 
subsequent thinkers, is a conception more familiar to the 18th. 
century than to our own. It implies a universe where virtue not 
only merits but ultimately receives its reward of happiness and vice 
the reverse. The world must vindicate the moral order of things 
and man must not wash his hands in innocency in vain. Th~re must be 
an at-one-ment between the Kingdom of Nature and the Kindom¢" of 
Grace. All other "bests" are ruled out. In the last resort justorum 
animae in manus Dei. But it is only "in the last resortt! that this 
is so. For Leibniz endeavours to keep in the main stream of all 
theodicean argument by stressing the fact that it is in this life 
we already discern the beneficence of Divine Creative Love. The 
question of compensation is not so much raised as the fact that no 
judgEbment can be made on the worth-whileness of "this present 
world" which does not take all the evidence into consideration and 
in particular the transitory, though necessary, place of evil in 
this world. Accordingly the apparent imjustices of life in this 
world are transfigured by the fact that, besides being inextricably 
involved in "the best of all possible worlds t ', they are merely 
incidents in the time-span of just men being.made more perfect. 
This is the answer of Leibniz to that very important 
part of the problem of evil, th,e discrepancy in the world between 
the incidence of reward and merit. The idea of a future life 
provides the great sanction for the virtuous life, for as Leibniz, 
quoting Archbishop King, says "the greatest happiness here below / 
consists in the hope of future happiness" ("la plus grande felicite 
icy bas consiste dans l'esp{rance du bonheur futur" G.vLp.436.). 
In an ea inedit he puts the issuie with admirable lucidity by 
saying that the eternity to come reserved for all souls will provide 
a field for the giving/. by degrees the greatest possible perf~ction 
to the ~ni verse. ("L' eterni te a venir rlservee ~ toutes les ames, ou 
plut~t a tout ce qui est anime, est un'vaste champ p~ur donner, 
mais par degrls, la plus grande perfection possible a l'Univers fl 
In~dits, XXXVII, Nachtrage. Baruzi p. 296 "Leibniz".) Moreover this 
idea of immortality, contrary to the opmnion of some e.g. Socinians, 
the English Deists, Bayle and others, is innate in the human soul. 
~ It is included in the human' soul's innate realisation of the 
idea of God. For it is unthinkable to contemplate a God who will 
leave any virtue unrewarded or any vice unpunished. "II n'y a 
point~d)injustice, quand la continuation de la peine n'est qu'une 
suite de la continuation du p~che1,. Moreover other innate ideas7 
such as the desire for happiness,inevitably demand the idea of 
immmrtality. Accordingly we are inevitably led to conclude the 
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truth of immortality as adjusting the discrepancy in the world 
between reward and merit, and to say that God has made the world 
such that to be happy, it is suffictent to be virtuous. So if the 
soul follows reason and the commands God gives it, it can be sure 
of its happiness, although it may not find enough in: this life. 
(ItMais Dieu fait que pour etre heureux, il suffit d'~tre vertueux. 
Ainsi, si l' Ame suit la raison et les ordres que Dieu luy a donne's, 
la voila seure de son bonheur, quoyqu'on ne le puisse point trouver 
asses dans cette vie" Remarques sur le Livre &c. G.vi.p.420.) This 
is an argument which,in the opinion of Leibniz,has not only the 
greatest cogency but also the greatest evidence. For the idea of 
God is innate in all men and as a consequence neither it nor the 
idea of immortality are merely truths of Revelation. 
Unfortunately the approach of Leibniz to the problem 
of evil interpreted in this way leads him at times to espouse, to 
the great detriment of his main argument, some of the eschatological 
views of the Schoolmen and popular orthodoxy. To say with the 
Psalmist, as Leibniz at times virtually does, "Convertantur peccatores 
in inferno, omnes gentes quae obliviscuntur Deum" is for Leibniz 
to make himself more of a pessimist than Schopenhauer. For 
irreparable evil has no place in the philosophy of the latter. At the 
same time it must be noticed that this is not the final view of 
Leibniz, though he strives hard to justify the traditional Christian 
dogma, and clutters the The'odicee with rather futile and hackneyed 
theological disquisitions. There are an infinite nunlber of ways 
by which God can satisfy His goodness at and after death and our 
only objection can be that we do not know them. (till y a une 
infinitE? de chemins ouvert s a. Dieu, qui lui donnent moyen de 
satisfaire ~ sa justice et ~ sa bonte~et tout ce qu'on peut objecter, 
c'est que nous ne savons pas de quelle voie il/se sert; ce qui 
n'est rien moins qu'une objection valable" (Theodicle Par.g8. G.vi. 
p.157.) 
The theological environment of the 17th. century 
dispensed Leibniz from the disciwline of formulating his theistic 
beliefs in more detail and with more clarrty and precision. Broadly 
speaking Leibniz inherits the tenets of Christian thei~~ as is 
proven by his early works against the Socinians "quorum paupertina' 
semper fuit philosophia!l- and other important works. (See J. 
Iwanicki Leibniz et les d~monstrations ~~. de l'existence de 
DietL) 
The emphasis Leibniz places upon the'pre-creative 
existence of the Deity shows the unconscious extent of this 
indebtedness. The pre-creative existence of God &s the embarrassment 
par excellence of the philosophical theist. A modern writer illust-
rates this point. Prof. A.N. Whitehead e.g. in one of his books is 
forced to assert thlt there are two natures in God:- (1) "the 
primordial nature" or "the unconditioned conceptual valuation of 
the entire multiplicity of eternal objects" and (2) "hi's derivative 
nature consequent upon the creative advance of the world;". In 
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other words the pre-creative existence of God is a rather verbal 
idea. For God and the world are inseparable. The reasoning of 
Whitehead is the fallacious argument that because the world must 
have been created by God, therefore God must have created the 
world. This is a line of reasoning which the tradition of Christian 
theology Leibniz followed was very mu«h concerned to refute. 
For Leibniz the relation of God to the universe is 
nothing unless a unilateral relationship. God is primarily Creator 
and secondarily Substance. The existence of the world in no way 
detracts or limits the Divine Nature. There is no moral or dynamic 
exhaustion in the Deity and no moral or dynamic accr~tion to the 
Deity after the creation of the universe. For the world exists in 
God eminenter. God is "maxime ens" and not the "maximum ens". He is 
infinitely more real than the created universe of His hands. Of 
Him we can say in sober truth "s'il n'y avoit pas Ie meilleur 
(optimum) parmy tous les mondes possibles, Dieu n'en auroit produit 
aucun II (The'Odi cee Par. 8. G. vi .p .107 • ). His blessedness is always 
perfect and can receive no increase from within or without. ("sa 
beatitude est tousjours parfaite, et ne saurojt recevoir aucun 
accroissement, ny du dedans ny du dehors" Theodic{e Par. 217. G.vi 
p. 247.) The entia o~ created things only enjoy a participated 
reality. In other and simpler words Creation implies a unique 
relationship. 
The difficulties of Whitehead illustrate the difficulty 
of postulating a monohypostatic deity without embracing at the 
same time pantheism or theocosmism. Leibniz avoided this euthanasia 
of all theology by his tacit acceptance of the current orthodox 
view of the Deity. This is the answer to those who, like Se~retan , 
assert ·,that Leibniz made no use of the Christian dogma about the 
natur~ of God. The identity of Leibniz with the theological 
Zeitgeist of his age enabled him to speak with freedom and confidence 
not only about the nature of God but also of His pre-creative 
existence. With the current orthodoxy Leibniz could say t~ere was 
a time before the world was and yet God is actus purus as eternally 
He must remain. Both before and after the fiat of creation the 
essential nature of God is not changed. Omne datum optimum, et 
omne donum perfectum desursum est; descendens a Patre luminum, apud 
quem non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis obumbratio. God' for 
Leibniz is ~ actively transcendent above the universe and at the 
same time$ immanently in it, without being servile. 
There are three main foci in the answer of Leibniz 
to the ancient problem cur mala fiant, cum sit providentia. 
(1) his theory of optimism (2) the order and interconnection of all 
things in ¥ the universe. (3) the privative nature of evil. Round 
these points his main argument moves but most importance must be 
laid upon (1). For this is the a priori and basic answer of Leibniz. 
Curiously his argument on this point bears a singular resemblance, 
if not identity, to that of Malebranche. a "God, as an infinitely 
perfect being, can accomplish nothing that does not bear the 
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the mark of His infinite perfection; so among all the works He 
might perform, His wisdom always determines Him to choose the 
most .p.E?rJ'eGt . r.t is true that He is free to act or not act outside 
Himself~ but supposing He does act He must p'roduce whatever is 
most perfect, being thereto invincibly determined by the order of 
things. It wele unworthy of Him not to confirm to this order" 
(Fenelon's Refutation du systeme de Malebranche Ch.i. quoted p. 314. 
tlHistory of the Problems of Philosophy" by P • .Tanet and G. Sealilles. 
Vol. ii.p.314. Eng. Trans.) 
How far Leibniz was directly influenced by Malebranche is 
an important problem and one not too easy to resolve. The identity 
of their views on questions of theodicy is remarkable. It is only 
necessary to read the 9th'lDialogue of Malebranche's important 
work tlEntretiens sur la Metaphysique et sur la Religion" (1688.) 
to see the extent to which Malebranche anticipated the theocentric 
opliLnions of the Theodic6'e. "Do not, therefore, imagine that God 
willed to create the most perfect world possible, but merely the 
most perfect in relation to the ways worthy of Him, for what God 
wills simply, directly, and absolutely in His designs is always 
to act in as divine a manner as possible, to make His procedure 
as well as His work bear the character of His attributes, to act 
exactly in accordance with what He is and with all that He is. From 
all eternity God has seen all the possible worlds and all the 
possible ways in which each of them could be produced; and, as He 
acts only for the sake of His glory, only in accordance with what 
He is, He has resolved to will that work which could be produced 
in ways which in conjunction with the work should honour Him more 
than any other world produced in any other way. He has formed a 
plan which is to bear, pre-eminently, the character of His 
attributes, which is to express exactly the qualities which He 
possesses, and which He glories in possessing." (p.241. Eng. 
Translat. "Dialogues on Metaphysics" M. Ginsberg. 1923.). "To 
God nothing is difficult; but observe, all things are not equally 
worthy of Him. His ways must bear the character of His attributes 
no less than His work. It follows that God must attend to the ways 
as well as to the work. It is not sufficient that His work should 
RB honour Him by its excellence; it is necessary~ in addition, 
that His ways should glorify Him by their divinity. And if a world 
more perfect than ours could not be created and maintained except 
by ways which were conversely less perfect, so that the expression, 
so to speak, which this new world and its ways would give to the 
divine qualities would be less than that of our world, I do not 
fear to say that God is too wise, loves His glory too much, acts 
too exactly in accordance with what He is, to be able to give it 
the preference to the world which He has created; for God is 
indifferent in His plans only when they are equally divine, equally 
glorious, equally worthy of his attributes, only when the relation 
consisting in the beauty of the work and the simplicity of the 
ways is exactly equal'Y (p. 241-2. above.). 
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These and other resemblances in his teaching on 
providence with Leibniz are very striking. Leibniz's criticism of 
Malebranche is at times beside the point e.g. the occasionalism of 
Malebranche does not involve a miracle at every moment any more than 
the pre-establsihed harmony. As Leibniz himself admits the transition 
from the one to the other is both simple and easy. ~n the main issue 
there is a fundamental agreement. (cf. ".Te ,i1lis tout a fait de vostre 
sentiment, lorsque vous dites que Dieu_agit de la plus parfaite 
maniere qui soit possible. Et quand vous dites dans 'un certain endroit, 
qu'il y a PEUTESTRE contradiction que l'homme soit plus parfait qu'il 
n' est par rapport aux corps qui l' environnent, vous n' avies qu' a. , 
effacer ce peut~re". Letter to Malebranche. 13 .Tany. 1679. G.i.p.328. J 
The fundamental difference between them is that Malebranche as a 
theologian relates his views more closely to the dogmatic and 
soteriological basis of the Christian religion- in the words of 
st. Paul"God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself". Leibniz 
is more inclined to insist on the infinite perfectibility of the 
universe, While, however, Malebranche never approaches the Latter 
doctrine, Leibniz at times writes very much in the mode of Malebranche, 
especially in those inedits to which Barzi and other writers have 
drawn attention. 
It is sufficient for our purpose here to note without 
explaining the fundamental agreement of Malebranche and Leibniz. 
Unquestionably Leibniz was influenced by him¢, the extent of that 
influence lies outside our present scope. Leibniz himself had no 
apparent desire to underestimate the extent of the inf~uence of 
Malebranche upon himself. '''Vos beaux ecri ts, mon Reverend pere, ont 
rendu les hommes beaucou~ plus capables qu'ils n'estoient auparavant 
d'entrer dans les verites profondes; si je pretends d'en profiter, 
je ne manque ray pas aussi de le reconnoistre". Letter to Malebranche. 
Oct. 1698. G.i.p.354.) We may, however, note, as an ill~stration 
of our criticism of an extreme kind cancels itself out, that the 
alleged plagiarism of Leibniz on Malebranche goes some way to refute 
the alleged plagiarism of Leibniz on Spinoza! But, as we have 
already remarked, the lover of plagiarisms will find good. hunting 
in the works of Leibniz. 
Pichler in his "Die Theologie des Leibniz" Vol.i.p.326 
sums up the argument of Leibniz on this pOint. In answer to the 
question why moral evil should ever darken the face~·6fthe universe, 
he says:- "To this Leibniz has on innumerable occasions a double 
answer: the best world demanded this, and, God makes no mistakes, He 
always does the best. We cannot wish that things go better when we 
understand them. On the contrary it would have been a mistake on 
the part of the Creator of all things, if He had wished to exclude 
sin. (Th~odicie Par. 125.) At the same time we must always realise 
that Leibniz does not take it upon himself to explain these secrets 
completely and satisfies himself with de~ending God against the 
accusation of injustice and cruelty. From a thinker like Leibniz 
we would wish to obtain explanation of everything. But this also is 
an important and useful explanation the fact that Leibniz tells 
us that he does not find everything completely understandable for 
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the human reason and on the other hand nothing in contradiction with 
reason. Rather the latter can be quite calm, by reason of that which 
it does know, about that which it does not. For there must be in 
,the work of God something incomprehensible so that we may remain 
conscious of mur dependent state as creatures. The aim which God 
has set Himself consists in activ'ely making use of His goodness, and 
His wisdom has caused Him to choose the most suitable means to 
reach this goal. A Will which finds it essential to choose the good 
deserves to be praised. It is sufficient to gain for oneself the 
assurance that a thing comes from no one else but God in order to be 
certain that it is the best" 
(2) plays a vital part in the answer of Leibniz, though 
commentators have not yet perhaps assessed it as its true value. It 
brings Leibniz directly into line with the great heritage of Christian 
theology from the Platonic tradition and the teaching of the Stoics. 
As we have seen it constitutes the backbone of the answer of Leibniz 
to Bayle. It furnishes the outer defence work to all his optimistic 
belief. It is an answer to the problem of evil which has been pilloried 
in the welt known words of Lotze as "a condolation the power of 
which depends upon the arragement of clauses in a sentence~ {Microcosmus. 
ii. p.716~ 
According to the Platonic tradition the ~niverse was as 
near perfection as it could be considering the recalcitrancy of its 
"stuff". But according to Catholic orthodoxy the universe is an 
absolutely perfect organic whole. Leibniz by his view that this is 
"the best of all possible worlds" inclines somewhat to the Platonic 
tradition but he is at one with both in stressing that the world is 
the best of all possible organic wholes. Like Aquinas Leibniz would 
say" It is part of the best agent to produce what is best in its 
entirety, but this does not mean that He makes every part of the whole 
the best absolutely, but in pOPportion to the whole, in the case of an 
animal for instance, its goodness would be taken away if every part of 
it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also made the 
universe to be the best as a whole, according to the mode of the 
creature, whereas He did not make each creature best, but one better 
than another:' (Summa Theologica. Pt.I.Q.47, Art.2. Dominican Translat.) 
And like Aquinas,too, Leibniz expounds this broad principle in terms 
of the well known aesthetic or dramatic anaology of Plotinian and 
Stoic theodicy. "We, are like those who know nothing about the art of 
painting, and find fault because the colours are not everywhere 
beautiful, though the painter has given to each part of the picture 
the colour appropriate to it. Or again we are like those who find 
fault with a play because the characters in it are not all heroes, 
but some slaves, and rustics, and rough-speaking fellows. But here, 
too, the play would not be beautiful if one were to remove the meaner 
characters and the parts they playtT (Quoted by A.G.Fuller. p.209-210. 
"The Problem of Evil in ;Plotinus n 1912~ 
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This provides the answer to the objection that because the world is 
"the best of all 'possible worlds", therefore each part of it must 
necessaily be the best. For as Aquinas adds "The whole itself, which 
is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if 
some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God 
not preventing this. It (Summa. Theol. Pt .i.Q48. 'Art .2.) 
For Leibniz the organic unity of the world is impervious 
to any mere mathematical explanation. The ~eoffietrieal illustratiga 
~ Dayle) of tho straight lin@ ~o. The goemetricalillustration(1~A) 
. the straight line from A to B passing through C is the shortest 
distance between A and B, therefore the same must be true of the 
straight line to C, does not really help us. Geometrical ~ illustrations 
do not help us here. If the straight line A to B is the shortest 
distance between A and B and if it passes through C, then we can say 
that the line A to C is the shortest distance between these two points. 
To argue in this way Leibniz points out is to confuse quantity with 
quality. The part of the shortest road between two extremities $8 also 
the shortest between the extremities of this part: but the part of a 
best Whole is not necessarily the best that one can make of this 
part; since the part of a beautiful thing is not always beautfful, 
since it must be detached from the whole or comprised in the whole 
in an irregular manner. If goodness and beauty always consisted in 
something that was absolute and uniform, such as extension, matter, 
gold, water and other supposed homogeneous and similar things, we 
should have to say that every part of the good and beautfful must 
be good and beautiful, like the whole: but this is not the case with 
relat i ve things" (Theodi cee Par. 213. G. vi. p. 245-6.) Like August ine 
Leibniz has a strong aesthetic feeling for the unity of the universe. 
It is this which makes Leibniz, like Augustine, insist so much upon 
the Omniscience of the Deity as ruling out all mere indeterminacy in 
the universe. 
In the same way it helps to place in a true light the 
critical remar~s of a theologian like M. Diroys and others. In his 
"Preuves et Prejug(s pour 113. Religion Chretienne" (1683) M. Diroys 
criticised dualism on the ground that it is impossible to demand that 
the good principle should produce nothing evil, since by the same 
reasoning we must also demand that it should produce the greatest good, 
the lesser good itself being a form of evir. It is necessary then to 
establish as a first truth touching the conduct of God towards creatures 
that it is not repugnant to this goodness and wisdom to make things less 
perfec';; 'than they can be. (till faut donc itablir comrne une premi~e 
v~rite touchant la conduite d~ Dieu ~ l'sgafd des creatures, qu'il n'y 
rien qUi repugne ~ cette bonte et a cette sagesse de faire des choses 
moins parfaites qu'elles ne pourroient ~tre. Theodic~e Par. 198. G.vi. 
p. 234.) The answer of Leibniz is to point out that the dualists are 
right in their contention that God can only make the best but they 
make the mistake of th'inking that the best in the whole is exempt from 
evil in the part s. (t'le me illeur dans Ie tout soi t exemt de mal dans 
les parties et qu'ainsi ce que Dieu a fait n'est point Ie meilleur" 
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Par. 199~)We must not lose sight of the order and connection of things 
("1' ordre~ la ~~ltde~~~~:l..t ..J.:JJ.l§ A-.s.A1l-~MJ!er to t.he 
objection ~ Q.. f;f . ~~hoUl."cr'Con~ainGods. For if this 
werl'apart from the fact tha ,(lmpossible to create Gods, all the 
sUbstances would be alike. 
This whole line of reasoning, based on the organic unity 
of the universe, has, as Leibniz himself remarks, an obvious affinity 
wi th the teaching of Stoic$ monitism. ("11 se trouve que les anciens 
Stoiciens n' ont pas ete' fort e'loigne's de ce syst~me ". The'odi cle Par. 
209. G.vi.p.242.) According to Leibniz his monadological interpretation 
of the nature of this unity makes it one of the most original parts 
of his system and in his own ~ords supplies what is lacking in other 
syst~ms. ("c'est l'uniqu,remede qUi remplit ce manque -a tous les 
systemes, de quelque maniere qu' on range les deeretsll. The'odicde. Par. 
239. G.vi.p.260.) This whole approach to the problem of evil still 
supplies the thews and sinews for most theodicean argument as a 
quotation from a modern writer makes abundantly plain. "The solution 
that has been presented consists in showing the tenability of the 
belief that in our developing world all possibility of moral evil 
and the actuality of its consequences are inevitable concomitants of 
the 'best possible' evolutionary world. It is not maintained that 
everything is good, or that 'whatever is, is right', ot that partial 
evil is not evil because it is a condition of universal good. Nor is 
it implied that every particular evil is directly essential to the 
emergence of some particular good, or that it has its necessary place, 
like a dissonance in music, in the marmony of the world-process. When 
it is asserted that all things work together for good, by 'all things' 
is not meant each and every single thing, but the sum of things 
regarded as one whole or complex, the universe as a coherent order". 
(p. 197.Vol.2. Philosophical Theology. F.R.Tennant.1930.). It would 
be hard to imagine a more Leibnizian statment than this and one 
which reveals more clearly the extent of his influence. 
(3). The privative nature of evil makes it impossible to 
think that there can be any principium maleficium such as Bayle 
imagined. Evil has only a causa deficiens, non efficiens. God cannot 
will moral evil. It is only permitted because of a greater good on the 
whole. To permit evil. as God permits it, is the greatest goodness. /. 
("Permettre le mal, comme Dieu le permet, c'est la plus grande bonte" 
The'odic~e. Par. 121. G.vi.p.175.).Thus Leibniz follows in the steps 
of Plato, Augustine and the Scholastics in saying that the material 
cause of evil is positive and the formal cause is privative. To use 
the words of Augustine, often quoted by Leibniz, "Nemo quaerat 
efficientem causam malae voluntatis, non enim est efficiens, sed 
defi ciens, quia ne c ilIa effect i 0 est, sed defe ct io" De Ci vi ta Dei. 
xii.7. Thus God is as little the cause of sin¢ as the current of a 
river is the cause of the slowness of a boat.. (nEt Dieu est aussi peu 
la cause du pe'che', que Ie courant de la ri vi~re est la cause du 
retardement du bateau."The(odicee Par.BO. G.vi .p.121.) Thus evil is 
essentially parasitic, the opposite but not the equal of good. 
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("Le mal vient de la privation; Ie positif et l'action en naissent par 
accident comme la force nait de fOid" The'odice'e Par~ 153'. G.vi.p.201.) 
What is positive in Evil comes through concomitance. 
The great difficulties in sustaining such a privative 
view of evil are well known. They have already been commented upon 
and they are not peculiar to Leibniz. Such difficulties really reduce 
themselves back to the Thomistic assertions that there is only a logical 
distinction between goodness and being and that existence admits of 
degrees. Leibniz cannot easily be cleared of the fallacies consequent 
on these opinions. Like Aquinas and others he finds it easy, as we 
saw in our early chapters, to make the transition between the 
ontological and ethical meaning of perfection. But as we have already 
seen it is very difficult to take this interpretation of the nature 
of evil lH~a pureply Spinozistic manner, especially in view of the 
emphasis."we have seen, Leibniz places on the importance of "la 
mo.ade~and in view of the organic interrelatedness of the universe. 
There is one difficulty arising out of this last issue 
which must be faced. Namely how the universe can ever have any 
perfection, when it essentially involves the taint of creaturliness. 
How can we avoid Neo-Platonic dualism? The answer of Leibniz is that 
what can be said of a creature or a particular SUbstance which can 
always be surpassed by another cannot apply to the universe which is 
an infinite extending throughout the eternity to come. Moreover there 
is an infinity of creatures in the least part of matter, because of 
the actual division of the Continuum to SUbstance ~apt~e~±~epe, 
infini ty. ("Je re"ponds que ce qui se peut dire d 'une cr4ture ou d 'une 
substance particuli~re, qui peut tousjours~tre surpassee par une 
autre, ne doi t pas '8'-tre applique{ a 1 'uni vers, lequel se devant ltendre / 
par toute l'~ternit' future, est un infini. De plus,il y a une infinite 
de Creatures dans la moindre parcelle de la mati~re, a cause de la 
division actuelle de Continuum ~ l'infini". Th{odicle par.195. G.vi. 
p. 232.) The defectiveness of this answer is apparent in the light of 
the infinitesimal calculus. For there is always the higher infinite 
above the lower or created infinite. 
The more satisfactory answer of Leibniz is to point out 
the infinite perfectibility of the universe. The whole infinite series 
of things might be the best that is possible, though what exists 
throughout the universe at each point of time is not the best. It ~ay 
be that the universe always goes on from better to better, if the 
nature of things is such that it"is not permitted to reach the best 
all at once. But these are probl~ms of which it is difficult for us 
to judge. ("toute la suite des choses ~ l'infini peut ~tre la meilleure 
qui soit possible, quoyque ce qui existe par tout l'univers dans 
chaque partie du temps ne soit pas Ie meilleur. 11 se pourroit donc 
que l'univers allat tousjours de mieux en mieux, si telle etoit la 
nature des choses, qu'il ne fut point pepnis d.'atteindre au meilleur,,' 
d 'un seul coup. Mais ce sont des probl~IItS dont il nous est difficile) 
de juger " (Th{odice'e Par. 202. G.vi.p.23?) 
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, This last answer of Leibniz reminds one of the view of a 
modern philospher tlgood and evil in the future affect us quite 
differntly from good and e~il in the past .•.• if, therefore, we 
arrived at a theory of the universe which was unable to deny the 
existence of evil, or to assert that over the whole good predominated 
over evil, or that it did so at present, there would be a chance for 
optimism. If such a theory were able to assert that, whatever the 
state of the universe now, it would inevitably improve, and the state 
of each conscious individual in it would inevitably imp$pve, until· 
they reached a final state of perfect goodness, or at least of 
very great goodness, surely this would be accepted as a cheerful' 
theory" (p. 153-154. tiThe Relat ion of Time to Eteni ty" . Philosophical 
Essays by McTaggart 1934.~ 
This raises the important question of the meaning of time 
in the philosophy of Leibniz. In some respects it may ~ppear to be 
a more remote problem than the problem of evil but argument might 
ea~ily be made to show that it has a philosophic prius to the latter 
problem. In the case of Leibniz it raises a crucial issue for the 
estimation of his philosophy. 
Alexander says with reference to evil flOur revolt against 
the existence of evil appears to spring from two sources, a theoretical 
fault and a defect of temper. The theoretical fault is that of 
emancipating God from time" (ftSpace, Time and Deity" Vol.ii.p.420.) 
Alexander would solve the problem by baptising the Deity in the 
ceasless transiency of time, Leibniz would solve the problem by 
stressing its virtual unreality. 
Unfortunately Leibniz forgot that while process cannot be 
the last word, yet it is in this flux that we apprehend the universe 
and it is in this flux that we live and move and have our being. 
The universe, as he himself so often reminds us, is not stationary. 
The rational souls inhabitating it pass from evil to good and from 
good to evil in an endless variety of ways. While the deity is no 
officious Pariah verger;t:,0r whom nothing can be done unless by 
"volontes partlculi~res" ll/SUCh. as Malebranche seemed to suggest,. 
(par. 206.), this is very differn~ fI2P saying that time and prpcess 
do not matter. This was the morass/too short cut of Leibniz to ethical 
theism landed him.Time for us does matter, though God is outside its 
ebb and flow. ' 
For Le ibniz space and time are ent ia mentalia. 'I'hey have no 
final reality. In this respect they~iffer from phenomena eene fundata 
like Itmatte~ .In his lett.ers to Cl'}:'ke and Bayle Leibniz speaks of 
space and ~~ mere ordines coexlstendi in contrast to events in the 
space and time order whlchare called entia semimentali or phenomena 
bene fundata. (See "History of· Philosophy" Erdmann. Vol. ii. p. 185.) 
This view of space as mere appearance and quite inapplicable 
to the real nature of the monad adds some serious difficulties to the 
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exposition of his monadism. Theologically it ministers comfort in 
avoiding any difficulty which might ariBe in the doctrine of the 
omnipresence of God "corome centre partout, mais sa circonfe-rence est 
nulle part". But other difficulties suggest themselves. If space is 
to be conceived on almost Kantian lines, what meaning can we give to 
the phrase-and is it not mOore than a phrase?- "point of view". Yet 
to give up the punctual simplicity of the Monad or to make that 
simplicity qualitative, as Herbert did, is to go back to Spinozism 
on the one hand and on the other,with the Herbartian alternative, to 
imperil not only the Pre-established Harmony but also the foundation 
of any theistic belief. Bayle's criticism of the monad is one that the 
subsequent history of philosophy has justified. The difficulties of 
Leibniz about space affora an interesting example of the defects of 
his merits as a mathematician in the field of philosophy. 
The same reasoning applies, Leibniz, states, to the 
problem of time. It is something ideal:'" "unechose ide'al". For this 
reason it is foolish to ask why God did not create the world a 
thousand years sooner. For time is only this relation of succession 
and the difference is only a fiction badly understood. Otherwise it 
must be confessed that God made something without reason, this being an 
absurdity, we must come back to the doctrine of the eternity of the 
world. ("J"e dis encor 1'8. dessus, qu'il en est de l'espace comme du temps 
que Ie temps separifdes choses n'est pas'un ~tre absolu, mais une chose 
ide~le; et que pour cette raison on ne peut point demander, pourquoy 
Dieu n'a pas crle Ie Monde mille anS plutost? car Ie temps n'etant que 
ce rapport des successions, ce seroit la ~e chose, et la difftrence me 
consiste que dans une fiction mal entendue. Autrement il faudroit 
avouer que Dieu auroit fait quelque chose sans raison, ce qui etant une 
absurdite', il faudroit recourir'a l'e'ternite' du Monde" Letter to 
Bour~et. 2. J"uly, 1716. mH G.iii.p.595.) 
Time for Leibniz is not a phenomenon bene fundatum. It has 
not that independent reality Newton claimed and which Clarke was so 
much concerned to defend. As space is the order of possible coexistence, 
so time is the order of inconsistent possibilities, which have yet 
some connexion. So the one regards things as simultaneous or existing 
together, the other those which are incompatible and yet existing. This 
explains succession. ("Mais pour parler plus juste, l'Etendue est 
l'ordre des coexistence~ possibles, comrne Ie Temps est l'ordre des 
possibiliti6's inconsistentes, mais qui ont pourtant de la connexion~ 
Ainsi l'un regarde les choses simultan~es ou qui existentent ensemble, 
l'autre celles qui sont incompatibles et qu' on conioit pourtant comme 
eXistentes, et c'est qui fait qu'elles sont successlves" Repon~~ aux 
reglexions ••. article Rorarius, sur Ie systeme de l'Harmonie preetablie 
G.lv.p.568.) . 
From this the conclusion is inevitable that whiie the 
world is in the flux of time, God is out side it. fTThus the sufficient 
reason, which has no need of any other reason, must needs be outside 
of this sequence of contingent things and DIUSt he in a SUbstance which 
is the cause of this sequence, or which is a necessary being, bearing 
in itself the reason of its own existence, otherwise we should 
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not yet have a sufficient r~ason ¢ with which we could stop. And this 
ultimate reason of things is called'God" (Principles of Nature & of 
Grace. Latta p. 415. Cf. Monad. Par. 45, Theodicee Par. 8 &c.) 
But we have already seen how difficult it was to fit the 
fleeting world into the timeless machinery of the Pre-established 
Harmony, unless indeed time and process are really unimportant. The 
Pre-established Harmony murders time. Yet to view the wOlld sub specie 
temporis is not meaningless. To call time "une chose ideale" is to 
give it a definite meaning in condemning it as having no final reality. 
However time still has its serial element. Though time has no absolute 
reality, we can still say that the future will be better than the past 
or the present. 
Thus though time is !Tune chose id(ale", we must conclude that 
this "chose ide-ele"is n'ot itself in time. In other words, if as Leibniz 
holds the future will be better than the past or the present, then the 
time series must inevitably close like an inverted telescope, so to 
say, into a series of adequacy. It becomes not only a series of 
adequacy of representation but of progressive adequacy. 
On this view the only significant meaning we can attach to 
the future is that it is a more adequate representation of reality 
than either the past or the present. Clearly on this view the universe 
may appear to the eternal and synthetic contemplation of God as "the 
best of all possible worlds", while to the purblind eye of mortal man 
it may be a vale of misery. 
From the above discussion we see the relevance of this 
discussion of the meaning of time to the problem of evil. Discussing the 
problem of evil Alexander remarks fI ••• the problem is indeed insoluble 
either so long as, on the purely pantheistic conception, deity is 
conceived to animate all parts of the world alike, and not rather that 
part which in due time is fitted to carry deity; or so long as, in 
purely theistic doctrines, God is regarded as separate from his world, 
and existing independently of it, and for imaginative purposes before 
it. But the problem becomes less of a mystery when Time is conceived 
to be essential to God, deity and body alike, and when deity is 
regarded as an outgrowth from lower empirical qualities and succeeding 
them in time". (Alexander. above. Vol.ii.p.420.). Unfortunately the 
answer of Alexander involves difficulties almost as great as those it 
solves but which are hardly relevant here. The answer of Leibniz is 
along the lines of theistic doctrine but his view of time., must prove an 
insuperable obstacle. Perhaps the best way of rehabilitating the 
reasoning of Leibniz on this matter of time is along the lines of the 
argument of McTaggart. On this view we avoid the mistake of Hegel. For 
even if evil is to be condemned as illusory, it is nevertheless a 
painful illusion. So we are little advanced. But by regarding the future 
as "the progressive manifestation of the EternaP' we may combine the 
teaching of the unreality of time with an optimistic view of the universe~ 
.}. 
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The ethical theism of Leibniz really breaks down on this pOint. For 
no answer to the problem of evil can be considerate adequate which 
regards time and process as mere cipijers. On the contrary any ethical 
theism must regard them as the stuff of life. 
Just as the theistic belief of Leibniz is historically 
prior to his monadism, so must we also give the former a logical priority. 
For this reason there can be no harmony among the monads unless by virtue 
of a common cause. ("car ce parfait accord de tant de sUbstances qUi 
n'ont point de communication ensemble, ne saurait venir que de la 
cause commune. Syst Nouveau. Par. 16 •• ) For this reason it is very 
difficult to conceive how monadism can escape incoherence unless by 
an insistence upon this Supreme Mind and Being of the Deity. So Leibniz 
may well say "There is also here a new and SURPRISINGLY CLEAR PROOF 
of the existence of God'!. The logical outcome of "window less monads" 
is the irrationality of solipsism. The theological dogmatism of Leibniz 
saved him from a situation which otherwise might have been intolerable. 
As it is the ethical quality of "the best of all possible worlds" 
differentiates the monad ism of Leibniz from the more thorough going 
forms of the same philosophy. This fact alone, apart from the historical 
and metaphysical priority of the theism of Leibniz, is enough to show 
that all verdicts on Leibniz which fail to give some reasonable account 
of these views are at least over hasty, if they do not raipe a suspicion 
about their essential truth. The character of the Th~odicee as the only 
work of Leibniz to be published in his life time, as written at a time 
when maturity has come to the minds of most men and,above all,as 
incorporating so much of his earlier thought must add immense support 
to this view. 
The theology of Leibniz is as much at fault as his metaphysics. 
The dramatisation of the Divine Choice of "the best of all possible 
worlds" led Leibniz into the more rarefied regions of theology where 
he was hot really sure of his tread and pitfalls awaited every step. 
The great difficulties he encounters in his doctrine of God have already 
in part been mentioned. The prius of eternal truths existing "in the 
understanding of God" and yet governing the Deity is one example of 
this. Yet it is here perhaps that Leibniz opened up the most fruitful 
line for philosophical theology and not least its answer to the problem 
of evil. It has shown that to imagine a different world is really to 
imagine a differnt God. For possibility must depend on some knowledge 
of the actual. The nature of God must be the sole arbiter not only of 
the aptual but also of the possible. So the diagram thinking of the 
Divine choice becomes meaningless and unintelligible. 
The short cut of Leibniz to ethical theism in his 
answer. to the problem of evil leads him to lose his way and find himself 
in the valley of the dry bones of deism. In this way we re-discover 
the truth of the verdict of one of the earliest critics of Leibniz. 
"En 1739 Jean Georges Abicht, docteur en the-ologie de Wittenberg, dans 
sa dissertation intitulie: Einige Mangel der L~ibnizischen Philosophie, 
welche der Theologie zuwider sind, souligne tres bien que le point 
essential de la conception leibnizienne consiste a concevoir le monde 
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comme une machine et Dieu comme un mecanicien, et gu'ainsi Leibniz 
se croit autoris( a traiter Dieu comme une realit{ math'matique'/ 
11 a~ublie, observe Abicht, que les id~es mathematiques ont Ite 
fOlmees par notre intelligence au moyen de l'abstraction .... la 
realite metaphysique ne se plie pas e la riflueur des sciences/ 
math{matiques" (p.307-8. "Leibniz et les demonstrations mathematiques 
de l'existence de Dieu." .J. Iwanicki). This gives a newi<feeper . 
·significance to the remark already quoted It.Je commence en philosophe, 
mais je finis en theologien". For in the last resort there can be 
no final separation of philosophy from theology. "It is plain that 
what must be discussed by the theologians must be discussed by the 
philosophers also" ("Scilicet quo.d Theologis, idem et philosophis 
agendum est." Letter to .Jacob Thomasius. April 1669. G.i.p.23.) 
And what Leibniz wrote to Spizel as early as December 1069 supplies 
the key for the full understanding of all his writings and not 
least his answer to the problem of evil "Ego tametsi non theologus, 
nihilominus, quando ut Tertulianus ait, adversus publicos hostes 
omnis~ homo miles est". (Quoted p,69. J. Iwanicki. above). 
} . 
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'lNTaODliCTION. 
Notes. 
I (1) The .whole inadit is vvorth Duotation:--
I , , 
"On nscpeut rien deguiser dans mon systems, car, 
tout JJ a .. une parfaits ,connexion.. 11 femt des d.istin.citions bien 
justes DUG bien exactes .,par example. il fa:ut d,istinguer entre 
l'infini at Ie. tout; Ie tout est oppostf' au riGn at l'infini sst 
oppos~ au iini. 11 faut distin:-:-uer aussiantr€- uns substance at 
un a"ggrege'd.e. substances, inter substantiam et substantl~1s. Les 
distinctions des 8chole,stict-1l9S ne sont pas \. me~;riser tousjours; 
];:Is.r €J xeml=,le c€J11e qu'i1s font entre l'un vehitab1e, UIlUii1 per se, 
/ 
at l'un argregative. L.ies remarquGs sur L:. Gassendi, is, P. 
I~IalG~or[lnche. 11. des Cf.:rtes, Spinosa, 1:":. Lock S6rvent'a p::CBI.l8rer 
IGS esprits. Je ne puis pas tousjours m' Gxplinuer aInp16lnent, 
mais j6 'tS:che tousjours de parler juste. Je commence en 
phi:Losophe, mais je finis en the~logien. 'Gn <is mes' .crands 
principes est que rien ne sa fait Sans raison. C' €st un principe 
de philosophie. Cepandan t cLans Ie fondsce n' est 8.utrs cbose 
aue I' aveu de 'la sage s sed i vine, ~uo~gUG j en' en parle pas 
d 'A,bord. de10n moy, I' organisation ne sauroi t commenc( r que par 
miracle auj ourd.huyou au commencement d,es choses. C' est p~irce 
cu'elle est inf1nie at aue 1es partes des machines nature11es 
scmt ancor des machines. Jj)picure at 1.1. des Certes se sont 
. f 
trompas en croyant un ~orps d'1;I1l homms ou d'une bestE se puisse 
. . . / '. 
former nature1lement oumecaniguament d'une masse organique. n 
Fragment without tit.le p. 58. Die Leibniz8chriften in dar 
'Konigl1chem :3.1 blioth(]k, zu Hannover • .ril. Bodemann. 1895. 
Introduction notes. 2. 
The incomplete character of the publisb~edwri tings 
of Leioniz has alw.ays proved a stumbling bloclr to any ,attempt 
at a comp'let'e"and 'comp:rtehsl1sivereview of hisphil,osopb:Y.The . 
.. definitive ,edition of 'his works n.ow being ma,de by ths'Akadamia 
del.' Wi,ss!3l1schaften ,of Berlin \I1iiilput all students of 
, . ~ ~ 
Le:ibniz heavily in its de'bt. Gerhardt's ed.ition of the works of 
Lei bniz (G) "Die philosophis cheri $chriften von G~ VI. JJei bniz. 
1875- 1890' I' is used in the text,supplemsnted 'by seyeral 
. " 
collections, of ':fragment·s, and in.e;di ts. asw~ll as b;,y wEill known 
translations •. ' 
(2) 3ertrand .. -{ussell. p. 202. wIlhs Philosophy of Lai bniz" l~OO. 
(3) "La philosophie de Leibniz, appara,it &insi conlTIlsl'axprGssion 
, . / 
la plus complete at Is, plus systematillu6 du rationalisme 
/ intellsctualiste: i1 y.s; ~·ccord parfait entre la penSGE' at les 
h t 1 t t 1 , . t 1 I 1 . t / t 't . " t C oSG's. enra a naura e 6spr~; a rea 1. e as . en 16rsmen, 
,/ / 1\ I / '/ 
pEnetrable a la raison. p~rc~qu'alla est panetree de raison. 
Pour caractafiser cetta ffia~aphYSiq,ue d'un saul mot, clast un 
panlogisme" p~ xi. ilLs. logiaue de Lei0niz". Louis Couturat. 1902. 
/ 
Couturat lays some strElss on a foul' page limad.i t of 
Leii:miz. part of it raads:~ I1Sempcr igitur :praedicat.um seu 
conseauens inest subjecto se:u antecedenti. at in hic ipso 
consisti t natura VEritatis in universum s,~:u conn6~xio inter 
terrninos enunth.tionis. ut etiam Aristot.slas observavit. Et in 
identici.s QUi,d.am, conn6:xio . ilIa atgue comprahensio.:pra~'dicati 
in subjecto estexpress8, •. in' religuis omnibus imJ)licita, a.c per 
~t).alysin notionum ostendenda •. iII' qua demonstratio 6" priori sita 
sst. 
Introducition- trotes. 3.' 
Hoc aU,fern v6rum est in omni lProPo~itione}~ve:ritf,.te) 
affirmative [~"iye necGSsar'iaJuniveraali aut singulari, ,ne,cessaria , 
" " " " 
aut cont~ngente<et in den'ominatio~e' tam iritr'inseca Quam 
, ex~:rinseca.' ,"p." 518~9. , "Opusdls's at FragI:!lents inedits, de 
Leibniz l1 Louis Couturat. 1903. 
(4) It is not n9Cess~ry to seek back stait~ influence in the 
case of Lei'bniz to realise how exceedingly diffi,cul tit is to 
reconcile this rationalist pur sang interpretation of his 
philosophy with the profoundly relig~ous (not to, Say mystical) 
note ~f many of his 'IIvri tings. 'ilJe notice thiS, 6. g. even in his 
/ 
most systematic work the flDiscours de LIetaphysioue ll B,S well 
as in the nOr'!,%' 91'1 vSit, foX't elaiJ:'cB1cnt que tS"J:tss 1GS t:.l'bltX'GO 
SUGS:' BQ,@~ L;onad,olog;y and c;:lsGwhGrG paSSim. In a.n unedited 
letter to LIorsll, lOth. Ds'csmbor 1696, Leibniz 'IIvrites :'_ 
iI('Iuant a sainte ~lhGrese vous avez raison d' en GstimGr les 
" I A ouvl'ag:6s; j' y trouvai tin j ource tte belle panses, aue I' arne 
doit concevoir les chases comma s'il nly avait que Diem at 0'1161 
au monds. Os qui donne m~me una reflexion consiae~able' an 
philosophie, aua j' ai employe~ utileme:nt dans de mes hypoth'sse;s" 
(cluoted by Jea.n BB,ruzi "Leibniz at l'Organisation ~teligieuse 
d.e 'la rrerre". Parls.1907 •. p. 494.). 
It .,is a mistakE!!' to underestimate this 'side of .the 
philosophy of LSibniz. "Qott istmir naher angeho1'ig als dar 
Le i·b" (quotEl~d Baruz.i above from "Le i bniz IS deu.tsche Schriften ll .) 
In a let tar to Princess Sophie he gives us some. more clw:, s as 
to other influGnces upon his thinking not usus"lly reckoned 
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into account. (G. vii. p .. 548". 550)' tlUne. ds,s plus fortes ',marques 
I 
d'un t>mour de" iJieu Quisoi.t sincere at desintEireSS6, .• est 
/ ' d 1 €Istre .content de cequ' il a deja fait. dans I' asseuran~e (tue· 
clast tousj,ours' Ie m.eilleur: mais de t~,chGr cia rendrE:' eEl. qui sst 
. \. ...,' .' . 1", I. 
encor· a :fairs aussl,bon et aus'si conforms a sa volon~'e Rrssomti va 
oU'ii nous est. possible. ~our 1'8im~r. ., " i1 faut applaudir a sa 
/ , ." , / 
volonte. certaina qui parois,t a I' ega.rd du passt. at t~chE7r de 
..... I "/ 
satisfGtire a sa volonte presomtiv(;; [l'sgard de l'8venir'l. 
. ./ 
on to state nMais c' est ,d~S rna jeunGsse. q1J.6 j' tlvois forme 
He floes 
'" / ces l.Cl8es. 
I 
lin grana prince qui €Jete) it en mema temps un grand-praIa t. lima' 
I 
recommand8,nt Ie livre .hllemend du P Spes sur les troiS V8J;'tuS 
chr~stiGlnnes. imprime at reimprime plus ci'une fois a Cologne y a. 
Contri'Dua beaucoupl! 
(5) "Les monades :pa.rt icul:lere spe sont pas plus distinctes de Ie. 
monads centrale aue les rayons du solail ne Ie sont de l'astre 
/ / 
.lui-rllii'me . .ti.U fond la mona6.e primitive est l'unite at la.totalitE 
/ . 
au monde comme la. substanc~4 de clpinosa., car'Son infinite' consiste 
pr/cisimsnt dans Sa fulguration. >ipinosa ~xprim6 Ie. liaison du 
,. t d' ti d /. I . t' / t· .Les prl.ncl.'I)e GJ esc OS'::"8 erl.v€'as par una una."e rna name. l.m.i6. 
chos'2 s rlsul ten t de lJiau comme i1 re~ul tci Ubi la, nature ,du tr.iangle, 
que s~s trois an?'les sont €~aux ~ ~Sill( a.roits. l' image ph~}si{'m~ 
d.ont sa sart .Le,Loniz Gst pl1:'S radoucie.· mais c~ n' est au' una 
difference de style. !~uant a la realit(2 d,eis choses finie's <it \. leur 
ra.pport . aVEC .\)ieu las qeux phi,losophGS: sont au fond du 1rame 
sentiment'! "LE· Philosophie de Lat:bnitz.I',}y. 138-9. '/ C. i:>e cretan. (1840) 
, , 
, , 
'"t''' v·'· '.ii<'. ·.L· ""II,:l'i"l.'<!I 1'" 'ji··· i6f-iiiO ".fiio M"'.nt'l" 1 1"'1 '1"" P.~ ou., ,~ya.rht ~.'~ ~i OP~~Q.'()g ... ' ;p~'.'u~ ,,~, ~:!Ii!'_oli',~ #A$" ~a.J:t! '.' op ,:~: !!oft) 
(l8 Lelbnlt. ~ f.~t P".i '¢$,4Qtrt~1;&.iagl ~:~o1 ,;,;r'o~tnlOf1 atx..1b.n,t., 
M'$'le~r$" n ',.,atp •• ; :,,& pbl1Q_QPbl'- .LA~ QOtl.'~tl$l1(\f: ,at :*~,: pt ltlO'il)l". 
\ . (" . ' \. vOl1~ 0'0.11,1 ./;It Olu,n interet ~1.'J:'.'l,.Q11 .. c.'qt11 P.ut ~.T'n1t 
1,.8 p' oInt a- a J.,.pat't ... ~.: In.'''' . a., 'bil "0 'bi •.. " ba/.t·" ,J' H:" 'ot, ... 1 "'o,u;;. ~ el '"'.. ~ ~'i!I poe p. a~, .q,u, .. ,n4, , ,o ... ~ .. ".' .,.,\1 ..... "'~. 
. ", . ~ .. ' I" t I, ., 
un anneau a~rHl1.a Ch~lt1$.g$s.' penBQeaaf 1.-' ,bwna111:.·~ .. OtJ,t\ 
C(mSe~l1enQ$<l'8.! pt1tl91.P$~l; no.u.~o' l·.TQt.l~.Vt$" t',monaoah, •• at 
Di'e . 11fl . l' te, ~... latlat·@',.d·, D~'· , .' ans '··otEP '0.;" a+ ~h'iia' st)ftoia.·· . 
. ,11". '. ,ell., \0\,.,. .. , '-..... E) ,~ .... eu, :fit ..... 3 .. ,., .""~ i~~ y."3- ........ 
/ . .... . ". . .... ,., I a'~lJl$llatlCitl~ Pt;l; ~tilPQ~t~;$pre8.:,Q~l~ ,qv.$ ;r.."1..bq."t~~alt; ;4'~u~". 011 
~on ,Son .fa1. $,pt1n\(tt.ft ,gaf)$ 'la~Q'Qdl<).'fJ:tl: p! '6$,; 'till A Pbl~QiO~bl' , 
de; lJ$lbnlt~" ~ '"I!a 'lilQUTQ1;Le: r4o~ac1Q1Qgl"" '·Qt cth J~'~()u~l..'r~n.4 Pl.t 
. "k:&e tbes' .' ",' lnt < bout the mh/ ~'c/e,. ;L"sser 'c" ent'~to~s ~.. . .. , ~ PQ. ~ .' ,,' .', ,a.Q·9~ ... ,,~..EL .. , ,QlM1..cr,~.> 
. bavel'~'pe~tf)4i~t1t,al,Q$.' rQf~.'~t.h 
Pll"li~s$~e~8v"s.pr'lats<,a~1~'b'-~e'-t ", !'r~-f} ·i;·,sur, iaea i ,. tl."' 
.  .. ,~+ .. ,.,.,,, ,0 .. , .. ',"'" " ... ~~~fI .. J.l ... $I p. ,JLPtI "."""._~ ~ .. ~f.S 
ass (8' ;afocba tEis .a-: ,"$1\1' 'sde',' 0', ,1.1. 1'"e: .. rat ... ej"' '1'''~ ,d···~l~.· d" "e. .PP.. "tl ,," ~ Q .«J. . .m.n "",~ " .~~ ",t"o~ ,~r ... . e 
sayol~ s,·· 81 118 . una ,des, ,Gxo'6'llens,"omMl!O'l:lIi,'C, ~·t~"'''t a" til' ii- " 
.'. . ...... ~ Q,u, . q .' 11;1 , . ., ,.,' ,.lrl'If' .... '. ~ ~~ q~~,~.en_~~s i+'~ 
, ,I .... " ' . . ". <I "'~"'. t'" .'If . 
aEu3tmbl$$:, Qnt 'Y'Q, mon l..~"r~! !Qit o.,q1;l,t'~1$.i iQn iiI~~n.. li'tte~ tQ 
6. 
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Hemond. 10'Jan'i1$I'Y, 1'714. G. 111,. p. ,606. 
() '/' I .. ' I' .' 
. 8 .' "L$ Theodle$e$et 1Ul$', oeuvre· <le tbe()logle$u ,.molns autant que 
, , .'. " ."" .' I. . .' " . 
. dEl pbllo$oplU,:e ••• , ila, ~et$'·PfEls.ntQ1$.~e'.$ S()u~, 1& r.llbl'.tque, ". /. . , ,  ' . . 
TBEOLOGIE.ti . o~elle,' 'eet e~t01ir"e a"oe~vl"s '_na:t0lu$$ etoOl,ll'l,~eS" 
p. '. x.' . pr.,taeQ .riO~U~c):l'$'~ g'agm,:nts ·tnia't.sdEl £.lbn"," z,. couturat 
1903. ·!beo'ifce.,~ J?$fi 21l .. G. 'ft.,. 2$'''. ',";' i' . 
( 9) \~tAnt'.n 'liliane''', ... ·.·O'·ri\Mi'''''P· .. :~ ~ l( ,u. au-A ·'··D"iIi~'O' ua .ue "'. 
., .'. ,... . .. 0, I."" o~~. .. 'I... ,. ~f,·tl",,,, 'Qll .• @..a; g .., II .. 
. ' . ,. . . 
'ayo1s fait en 1.tlfl, etgt 'l;.oauf;H.4·u.~1 ,.t8~, 1_ lusts-oe 4, 1)1.u; 
o:'etolt non'se1Uement .Y.t.lt~~'e i4t·$put."" · .. :teo' lea.·p.4.' ~lJebl'ancbe~ 
. I '/ 
mals u(eme' .. 'tent q,. 1" l$'ttede 1. R,cbet.obl, oe 1. v •. ~~t.'!parut .• C. 
p~lnolP8 que 3eeoutlens io", aat'oll1 q~ ~. P80bt •• ott .t. p.rD)18. 
a oauIJe ql:1' 11 aTolt e'te Eltlvel.OPpe' a.ne 1. ~1114t\UI J>la.n·ct. 1 1 1ll)1 •• re, • 
., itol t Q(i.' e_p107.'; et' K. 4rcauQ,ne pa,~·t POint '·'.ne', .. rouOllet'. 
b1s1es petl ts aemel/s quIll. ,. eu, cJep1il ... .,.~l c. I.te. lV ont 
donni eujet a ·examlner ·e.·tte matiere .",eo plu' ai.tt,ntion, at .,' en 
'. /\ . ..,.{'"./ ':'J< e' 3ugel' pl~aae.erementn.. I~. r~.~((· 7' ,,~. f·1-!+~. 
Fort4notber t.tel'.tlPG .lto t.",s DitA:a.ogut;..:s •• G .1. 1> ~ '031. Letter of 
LeIbnll t·o¥f,l:.btanoheti Dat.,1- ,22 J@tit167~·., If'J'. t~o~,.. aU8pl fort 
/. ..' . . . /. / 
.... 1'1 tablEt '0' qU8. TOUS- 41t.~g91.· alOlPllo.fit. 4es4eo"ete de. 
Di.u, 'qUi est· C$us' ·C1.0.q~ i' ~i- ,a ~'Q..lqu'a ~_ ,Partlcull.te: 
. / 
autl"emen't Die'll .".01 t ob)' '8' . :4$ <¢"'.ngef .. lea, 1 ol~ ·48 ·la natUl'e 'a 
tout mome,nt.;a.i ,f.lit POl1t;c;ant ·4,1,;:. 1-&;488811S queique obose 4e pl.us:' 
et 'je .'souvletlft d'aV:Oltr4Qn8tr'~ jolt, un,P$tlt· '41"lQgUI a ROlle • 
. Al"llaueJ et'i <MOlla;J. 'd.es BJllie'bte$. Qll1al1ot:t fort ava.nt. at', qu1. 
"-- .," 
Int~od~et1on- Notes. 7. 
~ rnon ~v.ts, rrQ l§;i.~$O:lt1>l~$ d~'a.Qtlte sur la libert{, a1. ~e n*est 
I ., . . 
qu' on ~:p; ·V~u,~ll'e· 'etabli:i;' _ Wl® notlon abeJu.rde et Qont:rad1ctoi;re. 
(10) Se~ G"Yil .. P*. 262(~\lod Ell.s P$.~f.$¢t1s~imwn exis1i1t). 
"Oi:ft~P.d~ ,lla~~ r~1!1onat~on~m, .j). S1>i~(,)~ae,cQ,PlH~~e..e, 
Com1tls:~fJS$~··t q~1 :§Jp:}.i(t~e$i$,~:~~t~v1.t~;&~ :'~~1m ~:q~~~.9~Q~:~r~diQ:~ret. 
sori to. ,'mre enal ,e't, 'hat!' ,sOhad- '. ·-~1 '1' a].'l". 
. 1>. QQ1LJL,._ ...... _, .. Q T-' __ ~ ~ .. p.~"._e€?, .. 
(11) tlN '.'" /t 1>'1 .. "'. D' i~' f' <It if; t'4 " "11" a .o~~.~vo:p.~, e. ~,,~, :qu;e. .... J~~"'~~, ,,0\1. '~:US;.~ p, .u,s .sr~ e 
perfectio~dQllt: l;.'~1"~t'$! iept:Q.~l>Q.bl~'. lnt: ~~t lqOl'J.$e9,\lent ¢llaque 
choeea ·$11 ~~le) Q~ :~~W~~"t~t 4.~1 ~~rteot1Qn:~w'Qll$$~t ()apable 
de r't· a e ""'ro or+- ·on ,'~ ,c-li,·\,"f:'lle, .:'<l~~asan' f·a1re tort peen r, .$ J? .. "P' .. y~ ." (i" .. ~., e .~~ e.;. ~, J)~Lv ". ".-~ . ..' '., .. 
a~xautres. OJ;! lot l>la;~Si%' ilf.e$tMt~'I;I.t;t;'~: '.qhQ$~i qq~'l$ :e~ntifAent 
<\, UIl $ooro 1$setn.entd~ la perf~ct~o~11 :$' ~fl$~i ~l qli~])1$u, donnera.du 
ple.iair"a toutes leS o;r4tu.rEH;1fJ.u.tant quiel.le~$Xl $on'ti capable$, en 
. 6.o1't$ qu.e celles qu.i ,$,Oilt r41aonnabl.e$ J~f} tto·u,v,$nt tQ\4tesl'lE~~reuses 
autant qu.'11 ~$t pO$S1ble$a~ (1.) l.'ha.rmQn1~ 4~' l'@1v~;r;'s qui veu.t 
. qu' 1l sa trQuv~·~q :toutt (l~, IOOtipt~ l~ .plU,,$ de perf$otione't 1e plu.s 
de bonheutq~"'l $o$,t PQSSlblQQ;'obtenlften$omm~, C$ 9,u1 noee 
-~, ~ 
peut te.~r~p$u.t~ee,tf>e.ee.~~ J"am~aer~ de:q~elque$"'~$; qu.~ l$. IQer1tent". 
. . ~ . ( 
. Theophl1~ at pOli.Q.Qre.. p~ 3~. nT~o~s 'g,1alo~~s, JllY$.t~qt4e$ inecU.ts • 
.;' . . . 
Fragments pu,bl"es ~veo u,ne 1nt;o(luot1Qn pa:rc1eM ~~ru,~in Revue de 
/. 
Met. et dEt Mi, 3erlv$.$r l~05., 
(12) Vie must $nterpi'~t 'tib,$§,p.Swer ,ot t~!bn1~, tn tile S,P~;t"1t of his 
remark "~ou;t ;~1:f$et :$~"'~tne $fj; 'Q~u~~ ,~t l~o~q.~e q,$ Q:naq~$' $~beta~oe, 
o'eat l~ ;~ol~t~Qn <l~$ :pieq; "~~r-1S( d~l~ ~i"$1';m,a1$ o$tt.e 
re;;Ol~t10X.l$nV~lQPp~Q.es r~p:po:rt~ \. tQQ.t ~'@~v~r$, ;Dj;~u ~a.rlt le 
( . '. -
tout en v~ue ~n prent;i.nt t~S()lution sut¢h~q1,l,~ pf;i.:rt1e. O&;t- plus on 
x , ~ ~, 
~---- ,,-.... .: - -
Int~oduotion~ Notes. 
est .ea~e. ·at plu.s on So des 'deeSei,ns l:l~ltLetter of Leibn$~ to 
',', ... -
8. 
/ ~ . . Foq,e~e:r 168,6. )Lett:r~~ at 0l>u::JC1$$ i¥l$dita de Leibn1z. A. FQqQ):ler de, 
c~el1. p,~ris. 1854:.) 
,. 
j 
,1. 
Cha.pte~.l. 
Not~e.·-
(1) 'ilV~l~sphil~~o:ph~am in<liper@ a creaturi6» ~aX"tes1um a mente, 
$~ inoille~e ~ Deo n C::Bod~msJl'm .. p.103. a.boVG!o)· 
( ~~ .. . I I. .. i'I ., '~iln the R~l$ume 1);rLG)l"bn!zof D~ ;\lIon~olat1on~ b1 Bo~ce there 
o~~u~ these .t~Or.a8::'" flJen$·m t /tOXU1l0 l,)'as gadjou:t~!OOte.il t q,uo les 
/ 6 . I ' . 
ml$chans, t~Qh@ntd0 f~l~~ dU; mal» m~ira.~$m 'etonne> c),\l' 118 Y 
~1u6~1~@ent $0\1.3 1$$ UIiil~dEJ Diceu; de; ~o1rt~ ;q,itoln.$,' l"uisOn de 
d®mand6~~V0.~ l.ln ~nC!'0JP, ei;;.5~; ,S'il¥ .Ql' \l1n])1'~"pdf.O\l, vient 1$ mal? 
S'11 n'y ~n o.POilllt, :d' oq. vi0nt l,OJ :bi~n? it (l:h26't, J;uF • de. Ca:fi.>s11. 
e.botr~. ) 
(3) Th~ ro.tioi1l~l t;)QU}.lt}~nIrl~t lQ8~ lt$ ft'o.£iObioe· tn t:beCit~of God. 
titTh1e ls wny overathi.!le 1000 ,~on~t].luoted tho/~ tile lat7s of forc'e 
or the pu.l~e11 t:l~t~r1al l~ws W01-lttOGe"tho;r in thCvl1l,~le, un1verse to 
earry out the laws of Justioeor CIt love;. so tjlo.tnothine will be 
able t@ )};nJure tI~e :sou.ls, tho.t o.~:e in t~le llau(1s0f GOd. and so that 
evel'1th'1ne olloul.d result 1n 't1)$ ~0o.te$t aOOd ottllot)c thQt love 
hla; tb1s 1~' Why, tU.rt~el\OO~Ot .it mu.!1:it be: that $p1~lt$ keep their 
pezasonc.l:tt1eG o.n6\th¢i~ ~olL."o.l g,\lo.litiQC ~o tho.t tbe, city of God 
shall lO~~ nQ f;1erJb<;;~ etl{!thOY mutlt in J?a1t>ti~u.la~~ l;l:fe8el")'V~ QO!il<1 
lQort Qf iia.§)mOl'jf @~ ~Olfl$@lo1,l$n~~!} O~ tb.0 PQrJeJr to knori \7h~t they ai>e, 
upon tJhlchdGPOlUd~ ::l11tl~o$.r moi>a.li t¥» penalti0s and ~bast1ment$. 
aontl~~\;Lentl,~ thOY ,mUoEll·t, b~o~~$0Pt f1"QID tbo~e t~~@lf4)l1a:,)t1~ns of the 
vm1VeJfS0 ~h1¢:$h \"70u.ld~@J(}.d~ttf t~Gm un~~co~i~o.bl~ to tll1ral®\selves and, 
mQ~~,lly sp0f,tk!ng;~ tJOu.ld. mWt~ anoth~:r :per$ono~ thom l ' L.$tt~&" to 
Al"nau.10,.. O~t .. 6·.1678. (O:pGltl CQu~~t f~an$latlon 1>. a~i~232.) eX' 0 also 
».1:95. L~tto~to ,"~na\l,l«, Ap~il 30 1687 !I Q,uot$d 01 L~tta p. 1,17' 
(Go :U .• 99.) 
2. 
Cb.apt~~~. 
Notes. 
(4) i~D®us non e§1t .quidclam :Meta.phys~oU1M imag~nariumli in~.ap~ 
cog! ie-tioniS!) vol.Uniatis ,a<?tion1~ l> qu~l$E!ll l110nnulli faciwat ~ ut. 
1d~lQO.fv];'tVl~ eit~c ~idiGQ£'al13 D0Wll). 'e$$@natut~,,~utThDit fortu.nWlll> 
nc~"tiJ~it~tli<1.m~ MwaaWin~ $e6t pe~s '~,$t ~ub$t~nt!e;q\ia~~ilo.m~ Fel"sona., 
M~UlI$, ~~. LGl ibn! t i&4na{ l~go~i~iSky) P., a4;. 
(5) CfVOu,S aem\:;ID~~ )90u~quQyil{$etoit b~~ni Je / t~PQndsqu' 11 as 
~Olf~O$:t)t;1.!0 $~ Pl'OpJi,~0 J(llQ.t~l'fO :~,u 1r(ol..QJ1t/. Comm$ en effet D1e~ 
101 t a poim.t" pU'~Gl.~~~ tout <1i)O q11;l1. l' !l;pouvtQ i tft,;ti:agm$ln.t ... (tSutt: l'E~isten~~ 
d~ D$;ea. (l>+> 247 .A.J9.a~ C~ds,"e1i) 
(6) nAte~&br.\tQ Det ~~1t1nlto.t flOQ. 'CO:F¥l!.' lQ1ullW:;1 $S$<Jt!t1I,!l.m Dei. 1nV'olv1t 
tota;nj !lam e$ee~ltlu Dei 111 e~ cOllsiot1't, t\tsl t ,$u,bjocttlID ornniW'!!l 
att~:iJJ\l,tOf'W:} cor~pQ.t1\)i111lrll. ~ta.elibet "101'0 proPl.')iet~S: sive ~feotio 
Del tot~ e1~~ ,emse.ntta':) itlV'olvit;, utDetwcel'tt1n~l$.quod nobis 
S8Jt!6uC0t1etQllS p'1'Oa.u~:4 SDO; tj.Uo,n.tttlwn<..ouro.qu.e ~;b t ~t 0 t G,lll 1nvo 1 vi t 
na.t\\J1·~ DB't,.; (j,n,;i.~t9t~'1 $~vol. v$.l o®t"iom ~e.cum ;1111\13 eenG~!SJ it. 
, 
(7) p. Gl. Bodera~:nil. ct. ffCe~li,~~la ,J~~t5f.~qu! pons~ {:;llpal'ta$t¢mellt 
'a tout iSw'],o q,ue S~~ :POllt;JO~~ :0 QYBJQ.t, tlfQ.V~l.'S~$ ~ @t~u! :produ.it (luesi 
tou.t $ttiv@t Oo,penC3'e-;f~1t l~$chO\$ee '~Qmm~ 11. ~Otl.t, c>'f~et). c11l"~' 
~elollq~' 1.1 tt'''~v~ t~"uhOn, 1S41~pje!iJta qu1 il fa1f]o:lt, ©e, q~ til 
t~ouvo1t bO~ 190\!~1.~ ~f;:Je?) B~i~ ·Jp).01£li :pQ.Q. POlAt· 6$tte' ';pour ~OUts. 1e 
r'p()na.1~ ,q~t $.1 n~ ,~¢jfo1t p",nN)$. po.irg~itnY h~b1l~ ~ $';11 '~~. ~0ndoi t 
tout bOXl.$itAC9jr,'J P'QU)'J '!El~($ putr~;~O;$~($» ~t qu.@j~ (iJ1'O¥O~G Vq~~ .$$t 1~ 
f/"':!S4M4GdP.~~ ~~~~~'~'~I~U ;' 
m~~ eJtH~se Ii 16l@ l~ $G~Ol~1ait 19~~(il;(~Hil@~.Qa~ c~, q,ti.1$<$l~Oi,t on~or bon 
'pouJr (nixp~~~~i t m1$u:~f p~~lunt a.b~61Wlil~iPlt It p. $0 <> ~ (ti'~gm~nt tni.thou.t 
title ) :aodaliiil~~. 
J • 
Chapter 1 . 
. ' , .' Not@s. 
(8) "A\L fond~ la l>0nsle, d@ ,J:,~~lon1~ p~t"'$.'it avo\ir Jt~ ql;l.~ la Raison 
, s~f:t!~ant~~stl~ pxo,ixM~i.l?e ¢i.u,mQn<l/~)~1nsi q\!l,'~ll,~ l'~st de, 
,. 
1 '17lAtQll!~GnQ~ 0 Pa1i?l~ ",,@xot~ d~c@ Qonc~:pt p on pass$Jfa~tt d@ ~@~ie~ 
l'!d~; ,01$' l~ p'Q~tjd\bilitb/ $n B'nei.,~t~, l'tdi0J Ql.$ 10! ?@'li:i(?/ univeE'selle 
, -"" ' .',,' "',"," q~" ,<®$,t D1q~. mtd® l~ :tiQVJ.~ l~s j,nf,ini!$lo J;.~ 'Q~Jr~©t$~G moral de la 
,p~~t~otlQn QS,t~l.'~m.~O!; ).~Q,tt0 ttQ.ck~1~(P .,310). 13o~t~QQ.~, "~9 
ohomn~n9U.. vle~IfQ.~~l.t'q) ~ '8(lko 0 '4®imi lo..!f jj;()so.rk. ' 
it .. H .,il ,n',~f,;rt 19,a,$ ,oQilii\($ vt'~i, ·qu<;),D~,~CQ.:i;t~S,t o.v~t 'LQ1b~iz~teuivant 
l~ t~~Ut.!~u :t!m~Q1QS!fJU8" a fOtitGJilt~ex>'~~s lf1,a'~, d@ :p@~f~ction 
:G,'~~tl't~ Qell'Ol,(!Q' 10;~Q~.,tq¢tiQn «1' etjj1~. 0'11 $'trOOtl),OOl\l.~a1!(ea les' 
at$r~tRttS' ~t~tUl1s ,«l(!), 1Io.~tl;o ,;cell(j; des. ~el'feotions, mQl.~alef:1 ~ sans 
montr~l" qu.' ~llt:H~ ~e pu,1SZel'flt o,llieX' o.vec la premiere; bien plu.s, 
en -Qon$e~va.nt;a1n~itoi,ttes ,1$$ oQutraa.1c,t1ok1sdes docteut>s 
soolas;tl~tM~$~, $a:fiS .les VQ1~. ou s~nBeGsaye~de s'y. f;lQustto,lre" 
( p. 311. abov~.) 
(9) ilJ§) C>t:r~~vo que M. ·Buy:i~' p~~'>l~· tre$ biE;1D. alliOl.lir~ do :J;,'o.pp11oation 
I -d~ nOll$ not1~n$ (1$ l~ b©nt$ 4u:s: ,aQtipns de D1@u.~ (aep. o.~ Provinc. 
ch. 81.p.l39.) ~ 11. n\3ta~t.l>¢int ~QY ~l'~ten(t~.,~, (<lit ~l) q~€) 10. bout' 
. ," 
" ,~ " d@ l'~(lt:r$ lnflnd1. U'e$t p'Qtnt O~~~$;)1®~ ,~~~QQO ~,Qgl@f;J que· l$. 
blOntt d$ l~ ~1:'t1t~~. C;:;i;:r:' ~i',11 y 8.$uDif9)u, ~n'~tt~1 ~utCl.u.', on pulsse 
I " ,,' . " ~'" "/' , '/ / nomm$~ Bonte, tlfU'l)l,i1; qU$ l$~ @~ts~©te~~~d@ 10. Bonte ~n ~ellO;li:al luy 
.' , " ',I, . . ,I'. , QOXllv1Gli'm@nt. O~~u.8.7t1itl no~~: ~0Auiffi!O{tll6 l~ boniO ,a l'tlIib~t~(,;j.~t!Qn la 
plu$ goh@~qJ.le, n~uS y ·t~O~V(()niS, 1~ vol~n:~$ /de tail'; du. bi~nw. 
I /(.. (Th~o~U.ee~ p$~. 179~ G.vi. p.221,,) 
Chapte:r-l • 
• '0; ' •• 
ilrotos. ' 
. ,'/ 
- .,-(10) ·"Apres avoir p~rle d®, q\lelqu.¢)sa~tX"i bu.t~ ~e D1.eu, 1 "Au.teur·, 
r~o()r.uio~st que Diem 'ag1tpur un© fin t" qui' est 1~ oommu.nio~tion de ea 
b(()ntQ~' ~t ~u.0) ses ou.vrages sent bion diSPosls~ ytG.vi. p .. 406. 
" ' (11) ~'Ca~ 11 [$1$ 'plai~a1t al$ U .• () .. D$,~u) ,QOutem:pler d?one, l~a " ' 
. , m~~eill~(j,aE), la n~tu~et' 11'tudia1~ i~'$,simpl~s p<l~nt 'il ~oav~1 t 
t1~~~ (los :O::iSJ~Kl()l·~:;JQ.dm1i:'~bl'$~~, ~t toufHi;SCQS belles oOnJQ.~lesauoesqu1 
, /0" l' Q.va~0nt tQf1t'b~i'11or d~s' lo,mQnde, In!r~e$i;l de CEll flU '©11e~ ava1ent 
de p'l:offij.n9~; ~E> lUi! ¢$t'~1ent'9.u.fa~ia.ntd0 £',e:pr~~.na1i~ti()n® <l1vE;)J;s!s 
de lOt' ·gl'j~d0U~' ot, (!¢ '!a bQ~iit":a:G ,1>10u" ·6lont ~l $~il1t ~~rllSp 11 ava1t 
en' Q..!Q. t~e!lt rJO~Y~ill(JtPt l/louJ>" li:ile 'mat4'at1~u,ers, @t ;i,J,. VQulQt 
e$sQYel"'s't'l ~~l PQu.~~l,"a1t imitQlV l~~()l.,ti\.tV1de dWle' 1~~m~t1~es plus 
:relev/osn 
(12) !1. Gl1S0n l.n fiLe Tbom1$oe It p. l30-bOos a revea11ilg not e on this 
paradox". (ete 'b1~n'est l'abjetpl,"opl">e de 10, V'Olont/; Q'est dono la 
'bont( de D16u,eil to.nt ~utelleest VQuluo$t a.1m~ par lUi, qui est 
cau$edeOla cria.turo. Male e110 ~')l,e l',eot quo p~r ltint~rmid1a1re de 
I " " " ' If;;i; volon:te. 4'ns1, IlOUS POSOllS Co la. fo1sqU.' 11fo.en 1>1$1.1 una 
"'.... , 
tendan<)() 1nfin1m01(~t !n~1SG!lnte \~G d1ffUlO~lrhol,>s clc,7J$oi 0\1 'a!;Je 
oommun!qU(,i)11ot ca.uo eep.end~t, il ne ®~ CO~~1.que Q1.1 diffus.e que pa~ 
un 'aqt~~ov~l~nt'.13t ees deux aftiriOmation~. b1ell l,Q,1n de ~e, 
eontl:~dl1~~ ~~e 00l~J.r9~Or~~t ~.f 
~.- , -" ' 1. 
Chapter 2. 
NOTWS~ 
'j' 
.(1) 1~.[a!S is. veI"it?libl~. philosophie nO\lS dQl t.doilJCHrr Q,n6 tout@ autre 
not'tQ~ae 1~P~~f~~t1on ,c1®»!e\fl., quin.o~s l.>u1$$e sel.>V1l" ~t·en 
Phy~iq~e et¢~~oJC."~l~i~!i ~,"L~ru;t~:r t9' l?h!p,l,!:P'*J~/lGL •. l,.680. G. IV. p, 284;) 
. I 
(2) "SO;' bonto e:t:$q. ~u:~t~~$ ~·~u~$.l bl~n ql;l$ :sa.~a$et$S$~j.i.~c1ifterent 
fle(';l) '~9tt,~®,. Q.~e· l1o,~.QQ tt~t,GllQs~t9:nt. int~n~t1t$l'At·plu$parfelilt®f;l" 
(0) tJt~ 'V<flont( csans. t'~1Sbl\:}~01'Q~t. ) .. ~~o.~~14>~a~~, Epi.e'lU'ien~. Un :p~eu 
qu,'~$~~oilt.l PQtt \Ule. t().41e ~Ql~~te',j ·~erQ.i,t ~ :Dle~de· no~. ;La .$pu;,ce 
dE;) ~$O ~tr~·ur~ est. .qu. t t>Jl n.; ,$I :polE.J.t.d~; ~.Oli1) (8, t /Vi.. 'tQ~ ce Q,yt1 ae~o(Je 
au.~ p~rjt~Q.tllQne dlv£nea:" 
,(~) "L' ():ll:J@~ df1; P'<$~ a Q:u.el.qu~ Qll,Q8~ (t f int1n1 t· ~e~ aQinlS enfb~~fiI~ent 
l'UJl1ver$. 08 que nOaa encontlaissons n'est pr.esqu,e~;i.~net 1:10U$ 
~I . 
vou.<l~ionS mEH$\t1~e;t' sa eagesse ~t~a bonte pal' notr$o.onna1~(Jan<)~; 
r II . ../ I I . 
q.u.elle te:tt~~lt~Qu. plutat qu.elle .absu:rclj,te I.t TheQdicee Pt. ,2. Par. 
1,34. G. VI. Ill. lSS. 
t;rou,V'~ !em)1lie!A;~e~1/t .. $n lu.y 
36 G •. 11'" p. 461. 
(6) It 011pe:ut dono '4~r~; Q,U,~cbilq~e ~Ulb~tan~e e~t1pl$e$.t. une1m$.ge de 
l'twi1fer~, mQ.l~l q~e. (i'IJ."'~ ·.$Spr1t ¢fiJt pa~d@OQu.SQ$l~un~ .1m~ge de 
Dle.u •. ~1(;l.nt ~Q~no~;,~s~nQ~ nOn .1geu.lOfllent: des taitset;(le leur liaiSons ~ , .." . ... -.. '" , ." ,. ,..,. -, , "-
~X»Grtmetlt~le$~@Q~$ l$~ ~$@$~n.t;llr~1$Q~h q,\\~ ne ~Qi1lt. qu f; 
~mp1r!qUJ.$s$ m~,:i$ ~~ut~~~$1 ~Qnno~6SaTM~$ ·4e 1~ J4;o.ell~1tides vir1.tts 
.~ .. ~ 1"1'" '~<~ed\.ne· . 'e~ , 
,', 2. 
Not@s. 
'/ ' '.' 
(7) vJll y'~'l~ (u.'I.l!\?l~nJP.~> ~ ~ut~~.q~1a. ©1000IDQxit~, f.3u.r putfe]4doX"f' 
d'lLJl)~Q~ t a"'N~t~~ ,,~tliliA' ~fal,tnD.p~'>¢©~~ ~m>t lamani)r$av~© 
. " ' " . /. I' '.' '. , 
·laq\lell®~g.1?'~l"l~ $np~fi)I$,~t (q;s.n~ l~~heOal~$e (l~·fe9JD; AU);t.~u,:w» l~qu$l' 
., I ".' .. '. . / 6o.at~Hint C1~¢ lq~ V~jf!t{~; ;m()f.!'\l0~aG~9to.d~r;.t~e. 10. V9l~xit~ a~ D~~m., 
, . ,. , 1\.. '. .! ' 
~oct~in~; q,~iO'~ tO~$'J~\)j,~~l?o,jf~ 'O!~tl>oo~tt>¢iilt,a~rQ.J\soM~bl$, ~t, J lay 
, '. .... A.. .. , 
. ult l~ ... aQ$f2l\l~ qUQ ~1;r ~ff$naO~f ne (l~v~~t l:1Q.~·et~~QQjQ,te~u~eette 
mo.t1)t0'~ L~tt~t't. to JS9tl~;~~1\e,'ti- ,l?l~, G<> )~1,~ ;p .,5~O,+ 
(S)t'CoCDO je, 4i~bSO ~~~ Di'~u,e$t 101 'PQt1lo :~u1JGltQ.#1~H~l 9..~j.~o1t 
1 t(>bj$t.:~rt.:)(o.~Qt, ~~t~t-~)~ aeliJ fZj~prl t~" et qui l?\i1sse'asi~ l;Ju,l.'eux 
., It . J.. . .. .p t· d~nr.i l~ ~1~~t1~ (Jo~PhU'o.1qt,to. ~liiC0ffi.'ne. ,tQ\.ltoo l.~u.» per",ee1Ql'll;J ,le~r 
V!e:Jlntut (l~ lU3;j~ . Qtoi$, Q,ts.t{)npeut fort l:)iell ~outen!l' o.an~ oe 
$t~l.Q.Ut flOU.S V0'3011~ to~t $nD1~u. et qu.e 41013 percept1cm~ Ollt pour 
objet 'r..~}~e:t~t ~~t~rn$ ',fo):\mel l:~$ ,j;,dle~ qui .SOntBl1 l:tl3 * .quolqu'11 
y a.it Q.1!lGS' f:b neue t)¢S mOd1fi(}o,tiollS ~u;i. elQ:\rG1oppei1t Ul(l ~Q.pport 
, / . 
o..©$C ld~~Gt ~t ¢.~:S' .t~\lIPQ);f;S; sOZ;'Ol~rJl,toe q\ll.tQt~ ;pou.rrQit fl.ppel1o~ 
18m lUM$ ~~ ,UOuS, Gt qu.1 ~ot),t ?I1Qtr0.~'bJot, 1nter.3~: fot'm~l. C~O 
IilM)a1fl~a.t!ono ¢o.fi.$' nos ~$l.>rito sont t'OU\:ljOUi'>~ Ulle f;uite JillQ,tUl?elle 
d~ o@ll0$qu'1 {(t(}1($1JIt; Q.Q J40n nOUr$, :(,}o)!f.J)0Q ,lOiS, m.()d.$;fi.,Q~t$QtJ.e pl..;e'entes 
d® 1m mat~~~~. ifil\Olft!.t 'm~ o~~te ~q.turell~} ae$mo4:n,~ic~t1,on§) p~e~edentes 
de lQii¢Cl.tl~~.@'; pa~t..l~0' PQ!i.lS~e;~ ;(Ptmlt4t: "4l ;iQ.~tre~r;.as. V$; tons jQurs. 
p~tsr l' :t1nlt~w~nt1Q,~ <lGD.1~~i qu.t· pl,>Qa~tt t¢Vlt$: ~®},'>f$QtiQtg.en llllOUS 
" , 
. ~t ,~11.1$u,r$'" "aQa§;'ffi~. F~~fJWelllt., t~Q.~~tl~"!i p. ~~'~ Ct? R~m~fqU(f)$,' 
. ," . ~ , . 
$\1u:.~ lf$$ent~1in!~tnt ·a~ .. ~ ~ Uale~l1"·~~h~ ;(~70ah' G~ v1~, Ih ,578:.( ~uot~fi, 
@y L~~tOop. 63ofQlOtuote •. ) 
.(9) UlDeumD inqu.1t ~ '\9IEi~~ omn1wmpotent(BliMne~Qdu..bttaV~:K"j. i. Qui ~ 
qu.1d~m, i~~\l:am,m$.n.t~ qQ~$~~.t~t. n~ll~C$ P~9§\i~;~b1.e;~t.! ~\+1 v~to 
Cbaptiex- 2:~ 
Notas. 
3. 
eat,. inqult' p orooniwn ,~otan$p nihil @~t, quod illa.non, pO$sit!i Nihil, 
. . 
inq.ttam.l\JWIil :tgi tmJfl)ail\lJ.a t~~~r~!oo'~l~ potast? Minbl~ inq~~" MalUDl 
1~ituJfJ, ,t.n<l,l!l!t g u'1h111 :~st'~ ,~~ iClte.~¢Jfe il~$li'lQn~o'~$lit Cj,ui 
. , . 
. nih11,1t!QID; l?ot~et ft; D~ ,CQJ,l~OlatioJ())~ :Ph:tlo,~oPbit;le ;L,1'b. 111 i, ,p~o~a. 12.!" 
( (10) v'!l'Q~t Qe'qllJ,1 nO\l$: 'vl~to.ta.u. lhP. M&l(f)b~~G~Q e~t p~Gtieux.Je 
eouh&.l,1tt~qu~ 1$$ l>h1iol!1opb.0@. ,Chi:uQle~~¥Qmrt~ loepenl$l/of;l, qu.'on 
1~q.xo~tt~1tl~$~l4~ 1~ "~'(;1Qtra$ QU.~ 10 .Pl:j.}(l~:tplS d¢; 1.tQi:dre :~t 'de 
, . -l~ '~~~e~~~. Jf): '~¥;Ql1~~t~' ap!,;es cO.le,; OlD1 los tei'Q1t, ~a~"ve:n!r alsGment 
, . . . '. I. . / 
a l~ '~QM~!QOQt~c~ 4lQ)lo., weJb?1t~©1't,1·a1vilil1t() 'PQ~l f'I;l~~1Qm~·, que ~ :' . . - . "' ~ 
~ .. ~.~tQl Wl '~r~'l!v~' ~~m:':i! ~~ ;t/t.\it'1'Qo.1:1t J?ou:r g,UOy. Stj~"~()ll.t<;)" fo~t, qu'11s, 
avent 1~va1~1~ ;subt11it$ ~:fa.i1rdettr0W!e· oae;esseSilns au.mettre un 
saoe tt Cp. 29},aQtl~m~i1lh $'raonel1t.)' 
(11) ttl:nt~QQ.uQerea11ud, ,cenus reru~ p~d.stent1wn, a11umque:v-elut 
iUW!lduoetlo.m S.nfi.~l1tu,rn. Est abuti ell:istentia~non1ne, neq'lle e:n1m 
(1S1c1 PQt~st. an ~1t~t10 ~;J;1ot~t illa~I'.S; ~l)l,nOn. txt~rtenti.a ~u,teru 
~t flo l'l(1)1s 'GQJ:lci»1tu~:tI1V¢lV'1t; 41iq~oa t~t.lpus. aete):'mlll~t~m; 01ve 
ho~ fi~m@ 0~Gte~o:<liQ.1wU$. dQq:Q.O :cett~ o.11q~o, t<;)mpOl'i$ mom~nto 
, (U.©i»Qt,~~t; 1t)·t~ .t@['J lll@~, 'QJ~1stJrt~~!;p., 52~.Op. ,~t rJr;~$.1lli$d~t;S. 
COtl,tu:t,-'e,t ~. 
, 
(12) l'tM~ ,l>fJQ.~;tq,u.$; ,a,~t~c~!na0.r.Qit~n.o\l.v;t~rZQ ;e~l'~$J ~,~J~; p. ',tJ(f P~IS 
f)nco~~ tQut ·d1t~' ~~~mW!!i-q~( ~Q: ,~~$ J',~ 'q dl~~· l~d~f)ii;l~t$. ~QUS 
avis Jr~1~on~ M01QS~GU1V:;:a$j~g~r q~~ ~·t~§t .~t), ~QMe, partl~- l<? 
," . . . '.. ,", " . . , . ,. - / 
f6nd®.~nt' ae' ·m.OEl ;!$.Yst~me .• pe,~~Qqt!.'Q~'y~'pp~en61 ~$ dlfte~$ncG 
/. /. .. .- '-.', -/ ", . /;-
ent~Gi l-esL '~@rite~aQnt l~ ne()~ss1teE>~tbruteiet geQmet~1que,pt 
®J4t:re ~~s' ~(Jf~ t~, 'q~1(()¥4t leur~oWfOQj'A~s la oonV$n~ceet claps 
1~~ f1n~1~~:t' L~t~~:rtQ :R.~mQp.ct.J\l~~' 17l~.G •. ~li.p. 64;5. 
(15) "'Recta a.1!Sl, E~~entiamcreaturarum all' intellectu divino pe;ndere, 
. 
.. EJCistent!am·8I;voluntat$.Interim divine. volunt~s rusus ab intellectu 
regu1wn a:ccip1t" ;Dau1iJ en~m b.onvu,lt» niS1 quod optimum e$~e ejus . 
1nteliectu$J ~~~~H~e#:$: ~O~O~H~jttfr Lettel"to wol,t .. ''PeQe~ber 17Q}5. 
Vol" vii. otia.t~ S¢hritt~. '.:P" 50. 
(14) 'vi FrOWhth,c;¥ VQ't:!y fo.~·tt!i$l.t 'tbe~@· :exii3t~~tPmi,jthin$ X'~th~j;i th~' 
nothing, we, ·rn..mf)t~e~~tZn10~ 'that ita pOQrG'ibl~' thlng$, 01& in po~~1bility 
-or~~~@nQ®,1t~fJlf ~ tuer<l i[) 'I$; ¢0~"'t~i~ ¥H.1€Hlo1 .(iilJ,~§t@Po@p Q;k.-;, (SO, to speak) 
a aerte.iu ~gJ»1ir~t1on to :0~1st» ~d~ :in. ~G(1 t70rd»tb~t.®~S@fi~~' 111, i tS)elf 
, , 
:' t~nds to ¢~til!Jt.~fri¢()9 tJti~~¢o1t fU.:f!.'tt1'0:t'fol1oW$, tha.t~ll pO~$l1()l~ things 
1.e,.th1tl~$i0XP:i;·$s~ell1€$ ;eS8en<teo~ !,lQt.wll)lG', i:$o.11ty, ten(l \11thequal 
right to ,e~'$t~uc~inpJ,"yp()rti()n to, th,e qt~cmt1ty of eosence or reality 
th,ey o()nt~$nQr.tQ tbe1r dE>Ci'>ee 'ofper:fection; for perfection ;i.s 
nothing but quant1. ty ,of eO$~nQe I' Ultimate' OriginatiOn of things. p" 340. 
La,tta. 
~lfn r'Q,ua.ud j$ a.!.S', qU'11 :ra. une 1:uf1nit/c1e rZQn(les l>o~sible:O,j'entends 
qui n'imp11quent pOint de Q¢~t:radiot10n, QQ!liilffia Oil pelJ1.t fo.11'e des Romans 
qui n'existont¢ J~al$ ,e~qq1$():Ptl>Ou~t~t ;po~Sl;tbl~$. PO\U" 'St:r~ . 
poss1 b1as, 11 ~uff1tdei l'intelligib111t/i $ais pou.r 1 '$;Jt1E1te;nce, 11 . 
·taut une Pirlval.enced'1Il't~t~ig1bib111t' o~ d'orara;c~r 11 y ~ .. ordre 'a 
. , -
inasure qu:'11 y .~. b,ea.u~Q~p ~ ~~m~~qu$l' (lan,S) une fD,'),Vl,ltitu<1e n 
(16) ~Les pos~j,Q16s d~p~nd~nt d? Di..e\il. $n ¢~ $e1O.8. Q,ue c'~et ¢ l'$ssence 
, ,. m~Ine 'de :Pi~~ .qu.' 11s ~xprim$nt, chac\ln ~. sa 'ElfAa.ni$re, cJq.~cun dan$" l~s 
.r .' I I , 
11m! tesqu1 lui $on,ii PfOPl"l);ls l' 1nf1n1~ vaJi?l$te d' aspect$, <:l.u.~ com.p.o~te 
l' essence ae DieuI\H)n$tde,r~ d~ tel PQint d$ V\le particu.llel' ,t~l est 
I 1e QOl'lt$i1U das. pos~'"bieS!.,Ces essenoes de~ivee$., en nombre infini~ 
.. , 
Chapter 2.~ Ngte~. 
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resident de toute ete~nite<lans 1 'ente~Q,emerJ.t div1n dont: sIlas 
. sont l'obj~t; ,$t la. VOlont/d.ivine ll'interhent que pour susciter 
. Ie dtvelo~peIn~)(lt ,d~s ~n$I$'" d@ PJr~e(Qnae '~~~utres " .. 
• " 0 • " • 
. , 
p .16~ <> Gt;ta -Mon~dolo~! e rr.:tle 13Q~t~oux ~ lS8l,;. 
, , 
5 • 
Chap'ter iii. 
·N9tes. 
(1), ns! Deus Mens at persona, sequ.itu~ ratione Dei et €Jaeterrarum 
mentium lOQWJJl hab@l"s'debel"e qu,ae©u.nqu.e iVpOss\Ultn~demQnstra.l"i a,e 
optim~ ~epu.bliC~»©u.j\4(~t 'Rex ,at ~t:1pe.ntissim\;il,e :~rt potentis.~imu.s. 
It~que !n Uqna,o X!(;)1llli\O ¢eb~t f.Qj.~~t"es$e ~ ni@i qui veli t. Unorationa 
videtulf ~Qns@ntaneu.m, ~t n~, rrnanaQ.t ~uidGmE)ttt!SH~r, m,lsi, qui v611t. 
l~n'C1. bon~ sU\.nt ©~~aOnt~, ,DOWQll ·tLlii!)o.nti, Deo~op;f1denti., Omnia non 
tantWru,1t in wa.:tV0X>$\1ffi bijno.~~nt$ $$d itJ;?aJl.~,tit0U).ltlt1n~1t ~\lLivifS hoc 
int@111$0nt~V!., Le.ttE;ll" llta'l~' F®"b. 1676 .. l.a(?O,cl1nlJky p ,,36. 
1. 
(2) nE4~ Pt@vi1il,G)nt1Q1 DQl ~equ! tu.x> t"~~1n©au.t$ie ~uis 0e)S<;;i de.texominate$. 
IlJwn oc!:r~ ~l1.quid Qst n6Sl~0 ,\t0Eite:t~ml.)l"oposit~on1s, nos~e ~\lt(i,Jm 
vO~-'1to.t~)iiJiJl p~';\opoS1t ~o~li8 est ~cl:rt) ita. futul'.a 811 t. Si i taqu.eDeus perfeote 
pl-'u®v1aet ~OOt prAev~aet)$.t ;n(i)ll taIl~~?.lill qu.o(l futUl-U$ sblt, sea ~ti~ 
©WL" sin.t f"t!l~a~. 1d est 1;lo.botGe10ntlo.o oU(le:t .. ~t1one~ sol1das eto 'f 
p" 86 i Bod()f}o.Ul];, Fr~;;J"~ent. 
t!ewnt;)ontontico, ~1Q),~ 'ooni& f:;)~1: pr~0iJt~bi11tQ 'benop:rocott¢u.nt ne© opus 
est ~Qlrl?o©tlon~ ,. sed tQnt~m (;J\ll;ctoJ.!],t~tiomV3 DiVino., m.o~1s potf@Qt1onin,us 
D~i ~ongr~$tO patut. 1110 d~~1t S0r9ntt~t! Su~e Rociue Gche~~ 
Anglico {;JQ~l8QJ4~ Q ,(;')0 qq;mscipto.-f»l; qu.G N~r:tbn1SEJnt~Jtlti~ tu,e~1 ~onat~l' 
meamque ' ir$pU\~o.!\~~; 11 bent(i;)~m~n1 impu.to.:r~t D!vin~~~bo$'nat!oJ/},e!!7Jl 
,tolli» S~ omni~. p~l,i $0 lG<;n~'1>l"'O¢0Qt~nt, '~Gd noii\©oJlif$.1derat Divinam 
gub€X:'nationomQi~a·nat\1l.w~lio.'1tl iI>saeu$t~nto,t~on<$©on~1et<;;~~ iJileQ 
deber® '0o.m~u.m1. VUt~ttet to rJo1f23 DOo .. 1715. t~at]am. ,Sohrift. vol. 
viii .p .. l80~1 Q') 
(3) "Ce¢t a1'>tif1Q~· diitin P~Q(lu$.t ~ng1n une li\1ison~t b~lill1lon~$ 
,. 
pa1?ga~to ¢).0 to\At~s ~hos~lEl, e~ SOlrte' qU>'j,'l ~st .impos~ibi~ 'de' ri~n 
Q()!iM~~v()1:r d€ll m1~u~ nid~ plu~' gl'and. Et ~'est c~ q,u,i paroist plus 
Chapte~~~ll. 
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que Jamais pal" le systeme nouvea.u del i,harmonia preetabl16, e:x:plique 
. . \. .-.. / . al11eur~ p\ qu! donne une tout,~utre tao6'a 1 'mHi,ve1ff3, $ussi clifferente 
, \
aaon ~;tr~.at~<$e d0\Cwlle:q,u 'onlq.yuonnoi taupal'avant pque ,11$ systeme 
de Oo.p~rniQ 0$t!(!!ff'e;.ent' 4e G61U;¥qu.. f on donnQit'o~dinairernentau' 
moncil.0 'Xfi~~bl®n 16950 B(Qd~mann :p .. 62. 
(~) "M" EaylGobjG~tG qUG ltauteul" des (}hos@~ ~stwatinf1nlment 
bi0rc£~is~nt ,61~~'Voit, p1i\.-;6dllJ.l1f6r 61u.m$l.1; 'IDGl.Y J@ d1@ qu,0.1si av~@ lG> bion 
pU11:' p© "QO~~~61il:'0: ~~s dO\ll~Ul:r at ·tJ~lS IH~~b' plS. I?el~t\;H~t1on deS 
I. / 9hgs¢~' no so~o)lt q~6,~~Clljo6.~t.13i ~:tre(.il 10' :peal1e @t lCj; 6l0uleu.:r 
00];to pOJPf,Q.GtiOl'll O$t.CQld2Q. e .. 'D1~une peut @G ,ai~pek1s~r ti€;) I>~:rmott]L>e 
le P6<;hi. La PO~:fG0ti@:&'i\©onoiot0 «lOons ], '1181.l'illonie ~ etso~vent 11 
faut i1ec\tl()~~ pO'J)l.l" mi0i!~ $f,Wl.to!';ilfo.uto.uSGi COnQid~eJ: ~U~ 1e mal 
. , , . '. , 
n'eDt PQ;D r~o.l a'b$OllUJent, e '~ot'!"o.-(].il·e aDieu. et ~ t'tJunivel-O, maia 
2. 
~ celuy {:lUi l~: fo.it!lReiQ~:u~q~Gif,J o~1.tiquC8 'do LOibK!i~' s\U; le<11ct1onnaire 
dQ Bay.lOE~ p. 160. ,tftott)1"OO ot 0puQcnles IRI,{aits d() Leibnizu A.F. de 
C~~~110 le5.~,~) 
(5) T~»Ou.ro 1ntoll.1.ao)UQ lllOllilr;lolumOtr'3l1o. ctuo.$ount@X'untCl,UQ. sea et 
olTIi)l1f!ia p©Qotb1.1$,Q,~ 01~Oo;n0e~0~~tGndi pot~tZJt. Sit liq~Ol'l~liq\!1s 
pre108vtoGt <lu~ ~:i~1~"0: ~OlrJ1Cl.tu~'. r;r~1tQ¢tu..1ili)\ est tQK,ltal\t ~0mp(f)ra.b 10 
, ,; 
Q!l@iwn g~~i111o.m9 00<1 ,qBOd.em~~p. 74J, Fl"~emeXl!.tL71th9Wt T,1tl$o< 
(6) ~'LOf$J Thiol@Z!0Ja$' xi? deme\l.i,1'0£'©Jtllt po1t61'~ .d'fo.CcQ~a 6l¢ l~ These 
. / 
qu.' Q!il avan~e ©¢nt~emo¥ tq,~fji.l n~yi.fi4 :pQ1ntd~diff~~~XJl(lepa.~r~ppoX"t 
" , 
a Di~up Gntrt'e l~ n~tU:1{:'~l et 10 ou~naturel.. La plti.spa~t d?s pbilosophes 
"/ . . 1 t apPj];o\)J.\i'orN)nt en~O~mO:hls6 £L y eo llne d.!t'fe11:'~nce infinie; mais 11 
Chapter~1ii. 
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I. I 
. p~~Oi6t bien qu'on ne ~~a pas bien considerGeo La surnatu~$l su&passe 
toutea l®® for~Gs descX'/at\A~€iS 9 llfGhut veni.~ 'a un@~©mplG 0 Et en 
. . I. 1-
v01©i UJa o qu.e j'~¥ $Qnv~nt .~J!l~ploy® av~c /3Iucceso 51 Dieu. vouloit 
fa:ll,r@ en ~o~~t~ qu. 'wa~Ql"P~; 11tbJf~ S$ pl'Qm~~t (],~n$ 1 '~ther ~n ~ound 
" , . ~ . 
, - '. / 
- ~ l'Gnto\ll"'~·un ~e~tQ;1n ©ontlr~ t1~~, sans. qu¢ quel~u~ autre ~i>eature-
ag!ot ,EH.l1l' lu,y ;j~ d.$f$ qme ·9~1tJ. fie $0 PQU.t . qu.~ :PUIf lflU~"a~l®, Xl 'el3!tan:t 
I 
P~~,··0:~11q\l);ebl-() l?~W lao ll'lO;tul>0m 0.0$ ~o~psQ Cl;;l;t~ \t~~ ~~Oi>P$ libr® s'o~~rte 
natw:)¥.'llQOent dO l~ l1e;tiQ oO'l4rbep~:r lQ, tClncGl!.Tht~ j) C '0St alnsi que 
jQ'. $o\)lt~¢n~ ·q~0 l'eitt;;C}~t1on pl1"()pr~m0i'l!.td1t0d~~cor'pS @lEJt nne chose 
m~:ii:o.()~lQ~'10Pd, ~o l>OlQV011t po.~ 00t~e ~JtPl!q\\~O posr." lorn," ~lltu:rr,->e "0 
~l:61. tetter to C~~~2{o. G.v;t1.p~a66 ... 7. 
(7) "t!tlnd\1S esteft'eotu.s Dei, VOJ.,'lUit~l"iuSGed 0'10 rationes ino11nantes 
seu. praevalenteDt Et licet f1i\'.>:)1~otu.r mundu:;,: perpetllU'~, tameD 
nocos~ar1u~ nonforetG ?ot~io~ot DOUG aut non ~ut aliter creare, 
sed nOll erst facttJ1Jr:us uu p. ~G • .A.nime,d:v0r;:;;i.ones :;;,,<1 Joll. GeO~g. Vlactf)ri 
libru,m de. ~eCond1t~ Heb~a0oruD philoso:phi~. A. Fouohor de Ca:r:e.il. 
abo1tQ. 
(8) tfa' oot pou~qu'o!t.. mi Dieu. e~t, laeOu.ver~1ne ~o.{:;0So.a, Q~tJ'jl~~ seSJ 
~ 
ouv~agQo adm11"ablee 10 font "11'.0:13:, e,t 016 Qagesse ohcel'che 1~ pox>:t'ection 
pa~tOttt tlu;tQnt q,u'11o@t, lloss1ble 11 n~ fautll~s doutel? quo l®s 
@stJre~ l~~ plus: :p~rf~i te. ·~t lG~ plu~ appi'OQh~1l.t~ de l)1~~ ue e3oi~nt 
loe plus ~Qhii$id~r~~ (l~s l~nQ;tu.Jre at qu~ ))1$u nt{;l.it. GU :r~g~~d 'Q. llF)llt 
bCM~"1!.-; !>4C'£t*abIGm$nt). tonttautJfe cbo~G,1. Car ~nf:ln colase pout 
san~ Q.ue lto~d.re Cl$ 1:'lln~;v~n~s sly 0PPOs~v'o Th~oph11e ~t Polidol'e. 
p o34" ·ab@ve 0 
/ 
- ,e ... ~p Cnjpte:ro vi. 
No'teso 
If 
(l)f'Enflu 1 '~ute)ur ~e![KHl:rqUi.e, 9.u~la plus grande felici'teic;y bas 
1. , 
./ , 
dire, q,u' 11 ~'a.~~i tr.~ :rt;1enauJ!:me©hal1$.q\lin$~eJ~'irea l" amendementQu, 
.~hQe·U,mGnt~ et <tu'!l nt~rJf~v~ J01en~u'x bon~g,u! no e$mro \. leu.:r 
plu,s ~and bionitQ G.t'!<lp.430o R~ma1"qu$~ ~u.r 10 Livre &¢,,) 0 
(2) QUiO aQv10na;~ 1~ ,cons1d~~tion llQ nQ[jtJi~~ el©'be ~td0 mas 
ho.bitQn®? ~o $0~~o. co :pia~qu0.1qv"G~hg$e .(l,' i11!\©()lQPQ.~')o.bl¢mC!i~t moindre 
.. 
g,u Ip,np\\!>ilrmt pby{'j~g,u'0~. l?u':iJj9.tl.~ nost4t'G t04r~@ Got '~OaDo Th!J1 pOint ~u. 
p~~tc do la aigrt8l.!ilOO~O q'\,1}.o;tqThG!Sfi~~QS'? A1lO.~i 1.>0. ~!>oport1on dG la 
. " 
po.rtio, d~ 1·UJl14i.'O'o:t'd qno: m,(li,,'J;O, ,~o¥m~~i;J$onr.;l ,o¢' POJI,"5tl,Q.";!}.tp1>O$9,U0 do,ns 
o .!' .' .. 
10 no~nto.'~ prix deoe qtU •. n~ue QSmiiDl.GOmlU,' ot qt~()l:.iiOt;1G /lV'ons 
p@~Z"tcnt. OU~0t o.'tlt1~ettl"e.; 'et tOu.s leE) m~til:{ (j.u'on neu.e peut 
objeetoa: n' 6,tilnt'" <1u.ea.~J.o {~~ :r~n~8oCj,.t\e"':i:l6~nt: 11" 00 pent q'Q.t;1 tOUG 
100 t1~l\X1l1e OQvout ,at\tlD1q\)],'1.iUl pl~emq'~te.,.J(10Q!Q,teIi.l, eODPQ.r~ioon (leo bj,@ns 
qui .o((?)~t -d~1G It\V:ls.VO~'o.n The©~$($~o P§:i: •. ,190 G.v!.p.111.) 
(3) ttVouo 1010. ~Omd'01iJS~ le· r~Qnd0 qt1.0 '~QPV11(Ei t~~~llSJ©ur~'~ Vi(mo u 'y 
: /,- ." . .... . . . . I 
V@Y0Q ~G$G'OO pltil.0) loin quo, vost:lfO n~. ee V~U$ '9t~ouv\:)$ .~ ~e(u.ii:~. 
~ , ' " 0 ," I' 
Att@iC1td0aJ \ le ~Q~Qit~e«lo.tra111i~3~.» :Qt 1 t0olrloide'1"00®u~tOu.t 100 
Pel.~'>t!G~ qt>1i p~·&[)0ntont ~ tout @OmlQlot( ()om~1\(7 font lQ$COppo 
" . ~/, I . 
o~g~1q\l0®), jot ~O\ll,S 'I t~@~'VO!?(Js \iln a!:tif!Qo @t u,t,io beo.'4to qui v~ 
au (1~iaClG' l' imQzim.at!~u~ Ti~Qn@ ~Ut, UG~CQn~'qU~nQ.0S ;pout" 10; aag®sse 
. I . 
et P@U~ Ie bon~$. do liautoUl~ d~~el\'!()$~$ t'~h~9~ d~~ l~$~JtwSGS 
quo nons .ra.0~onnoSosone pti,4S,. If ~:n(;,)od~~~e ,peif.194':. G.~l.p. 2~~ 0 ) 
Chapt~r,.vl~ 
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. ' (~) "Etpou~ ce -qui est dumal, DiGju ne veut point dUo tQU.~ lel mal 
mo~al p~t i1 ni@ 'V'$ut pointd f'l)11M~ manjj.'eE~ abl§101u.e 1e m~l physique ou 
2. 
~ .. '. . I 
. 'la.s sO,utf~M@~~: Q '0stpOll~ c~1e. <aUl.'il n'.¥ ,?l! pO~llltde p~Q)destinat:i.on 
~b~olu.e "a l.~ d$mJ(l~tion: et QlP\ p~ut clil"6 du-mal pb.y~tque; que Die'll 
.' , 
Ie :r~ut f$ou.vent <H).m1OO.e.~(3 peine' (itie a l~ @¢;m.lp~» $t$()uv@nt au.$lsi 
~" . ~ .. ~ CO~E) U1Q. ~RO¥Qn. P~~l?~~uWO;e ~!l\I:~ <© foot o..d!t'~ PQu,Jf0m;P@Gb<J,~-'. ([$ plus 
'A1 ,. - I.! . ~o.nd~ m~m~~ 4)" »Ot\rr.~obt~uj,R'p.!,) P1VLt!J ~"o.llldS: b~~n~nq. T1l9o¢li©oe, Pair. 
23oGo'\rjj,6p.~ll~~) .~tv4bsoluobnt pCi.;i£'<lo.ut on pO\dl.~rC1it S~t)\tGni~~qu.e 
~ . -
. 
(5) "m pei~le- o.~lit~Bio.nooi pOU~1' .1' Ct~JQ .. nae[,1ez~t ot pour 1 'OX00ple, et 
10 mOil ot;~t COtlJ,vont )?On.t' {al.o1.Ut g~utor 10 bi,B!Dl~ f;;ltqtJ.ol.qli.lQ~ foilS 
\ '. . 
auool 11 ·co~lltr1bu.e ,~ u,uopltJ,d Gt"'o.l:1c1e port'o~t$.Q!r! clG©eluy qui 10 
'. , 
fiWU:ft'Z-0 ~eo!rt:no: le Q)?~1n t.l",t Olll [JOI1Jl(iJ t 00t OtlJet (). v1t!$ 90}?e.ee:t1e 
o@r~Thpt1©u P©\\~ Oi);jC'1l1o;r: Q' f'~pt utie belle ~otnpG.rt~Ol!~ p;ot1t,~tlSUO Christ 
. 
'ft' est sel'vl1uy men~¢ '. above j) (h, Vi .,p, 117. ) 
I r ' (6) i'11e o"tli:'ju~lfiont qu~ la N~'\';\.1}."9 n'& ~to,:ra1t~qu9~O!.:W ~U:it,ot 
qui iis CO~l?t~nt pout .1'j$nQ~ qul ~~t distinGt d$'leu..t ;pE;)~lFtoAne; <il., at&. 
I 
ils i1Q\t~]f;ent qUQ qUl.tlnd 11 ~t'>r~ ve9.\l.~l'qu~ ohOtl$ oontl'~ l~ur ~rG. tout 
iram~l d~~ :t-uni:\7Q):.-'>Si'. ~htrQ~~C/Q P~:r. 262. G.vio~.273,,} 
(7)" Et qu:ant \. l~ Q;:4~~~ ~u. mal, il., ~i;lt V''Eay ?qVJ.~le: l)~~bl$, ~ot 
I 'r" . ,. " ,. I ./' , '. " ..' 
l' l;.\uteuX" , dup,0Qhe :m~ls J.t-o~11.~~n€ d-q;:pCP~h$, vl~nt d.$ .p'lVl.Slo~i.Jc!', ~Q. 
sou.~ce efSlt c1~nsl'$.i:1iI~e~tect.!o~ OW1g$.no.led€s ?'~~a~tl1t?§ls::"~~la les 
rend capabl0s de l>:~hel"; ~t il "9 ~. des G!~oonst@G$Sa~S 1~ suite 
des choses» qui font qua cette p\l1sSanQ~ est mise enacte. 
l I 
Theod1 cee ~ p~X" • 156 •. Go v1.p • 203. ) 
II 
. .-. 
ahapter.~.vi • 
. NotGS ... 
6\ I', ,,' ,,-,, 
\leU n.ll~st V'Jfay~ 'lu.®. Ie pecha fait une granda;r;>a.Jet1e dE) la mis19x-e. 
humalne ~ et,~m~ lfl plusgirande; mais cela n 1 eIDp~che. p'~int qu' on ne' 
: ' I 
'puiS$~ d~JI>e que le~ hOJil!llJliH~S sont naeoh;anset puniss~loles :aut1f$m®nt 
:~l fau<iL:rr,>,o~t ~~~0' qu¢' 'le3. pl~b' ,Qotuel$d$ ~o~~~e~$nerls sont 
. , " e:lt~~s~bles p p~Je~Gl qu'!l$ 'I7!Gnnon~ <iu pJrilq.~ipe. d~ nostl"e ml$leJe@, qui 
:( f ' ' , 
efalt 10 pech0 o~'o!g$tIQ1.01uRGmaJrques ~u~., 10 L~vX:'(i))d0 l"'o~igin.~ du m~l 
/ 
,( 9) all (Jot ~ncor bon 61.~ ~on~i·dG~o$." qu<# .10 mo.l. mocGJ. u'~et un 81 
~Q!!ld mal~ qu.o .P~X:'C~ quti]. 0st u.n~ ·SOUl.~~O d¢ mp.mt: p~lYe1quO~, qui j . '" ' " 
se trOu.v0 d.~s une ~~0etu.:r~ de:el plV.6, pUlwour.rt<;.)[;J ~t.d.el$ pl.u.~ .of.lpablee 
. / /,. . 
dtotm f~1re! GQI' \W,~ 'oau.v0i1s~ volO~~~~ 0$11 db."ViO sondiJ:po,r'tlCDent Olill que 
l® m.auvais· pr1ao1pe ~es ucw1one'ns ~8j;oit do.'UO ltU:l1vera; ·at la 
Ra18on~ q'ij.l est une iU1&ee de la ~j.Vit11t'JfOU1~),(J1t o.uJt OOEHJ mC4'.l.v.aisea 
de ~~QnaS e1G>yens de- 'OOl'.:l,rJe:e beQu.c~ulf· dQ mal. Ul1 a~~l Calisu.lo. ,ou 
mG~otQ\ (W~ OJ t?o.i,tpluo qu 'un t~~mblomlDntaf) te~!"~h Un Dau.V'~1s homroo se 
, . ,'. / ' :p~Qit Q ~Qiro s@ufg:r1~ ot Q. 'dot~u:tl'e~ at 11 n'sn tt"OUV0 que tl~op 
';.'J-
; . 
.-
. " 
Chfl.ptero·-vii. 1 •. 
Notes. 
(i) nDe~ j'f~fo~ma,t©lJfisQb~ Gl$.ube blei to ~ sein¢WL Urspmng t71e 
seinG1lli! }31G],6 ;n~ch~ von ao~ ~o::tigiosen dldee11en des, Humanismus 
g~)'t~enntQ :PaJ;k-' Kern dioseb G?n81StJ.t~G~, liisst· ~1ch rot t einem norte 
be~~ichen: ,~~ .. li¢ght in de~ rc.dlkt11=>veJfsch~ede1aenSt~11U]O.g, <ii/6l 
tro.m~fiiQmus, und Rofol.-bjililution .~~ P~obl@mcl0jf $~b$l.Ulcl®· ~i:rata@h0m. 
Amo1AdGt> RWBK~nifJOus DOG11Q, dos:i' SUndonfo.llS, niX"g0nd$. (()f.fOJaL 
7eLlClZ~JJ;el!."01fon COt'j~gt; obog," e~ f'JUsstG {jQ1n0~-' eOil$tiGGll G~~Q1fiQht1J.mg 
;1'QlQ.0Itl ~b01>'>LJll; ~O;llq,oh \~tl"0b01.Q;~ &10000, l>o~~$0t'JiQ$Ii},ii,-;K;2~I$r:Jon 
Q~fg;ul~~kO)j.°n wil.Oll ,tJ0iiI~O Gcmu1,t ,~10::;U$«.H].~~hQI()l<> lmQ~" ,~t~l"'l~e~ ZGigt 
O~($tl1li1 ti(JJr1i~"ollG~©00ICl Gj£iw1lHIQli1oCh(;Wl.\,!'JJillc;Oa U~~ HUill}QJQ;ismus dGW 
- . 
PB1Q~1os.1COnO Gelct ':1,C1 tro~'c1~!nco.n; i.~0!l' rCQrjt~8ot~1;,? ~tll0bt LDo.lll mWlt1©h, 
<Ii 
.,\, ~. 
," 
~BQ< tJ~ll'0uoosilQn C0ecn01iG A\''l.6\il;Ot~jJ].ioGk1l0 G~~\naQ!88Qh~tJ.ur~ Y©ll Q.oJ? 
.l;~~1!rolOIt1l VOt'~e::vtl)eit dO~GO¥j\m~hl!~hQl3 Ho.tDl;~; tJ1.,l)elv0¥ll !ilQ~0~1 Urafuh1t$ke1t 
D$.O~V05 OS0!:~C:~GottliQh6n ~~~i))/Jlt~v.\J$ndQn,utJ.fG$~fQglft (rfD10 
Phtlo8'019~le~o~ Au.tklii:E:'utag ll VOll Ezonot CAOOtl?Ol~o 19.~2I"p<>lS&5<» 
(2) tlAtl~ 1~l ,$Oiif[(O~ ~tJJ2fo.~Sl,))l1g '\ion dam sU,nd!oni'allo 4es r1QUsQhon 
gOh~~t Leibni~ n$Q!}t cil.et> Ki%'Ghenleh:re wad DO&m~tilt ooiner zc1t. sondern 
6lu.r©ltl~u.stlott neu.0~?$nq~(Bs¢nr.:H3he.tt o.n. D!OOl>,thodoxODoct1?im\ hauft 
S©h\JA0~1t~I~Qi 'it .o.ut' SC1kll\116~!gl'~i t~. W~<ll,01~$:P4?Ue~ ~uf Ni{i~~l$pJfU.ch" und 
et>kl&·J."tg~x> ni(llhts:, o.~na0i'~vOrtinol'ilti,? t~~Jt4~~? pblg.e Roth Q.i.<s wundeX"ba.;r0l'l 
unOl gohoAmnilSJ~vollQn Ann~e!h d ~h •. 1$10 ~~l{lart sl,~h solbst fur 
2. 
Chapter vii. 
Not®~<> 
·1nsolvento Leibniz,findet,dasz da.s ,!cht~ 1J;ndursprun~liohe 
C1aJ!;istertth\l!.m., <ldi.~ e!gene LohreOhrieti eelbst ubO.~ di.e Siinde ~ 'mitder 
. U'IiSSen6~h~it Wild -d0~ BGl"nwaft. vQllko~~'n veJl:e1nQaA' .~0i ~ . dagegen 1st 
61> wedG1r.-'> mit del' ~~identin1~~hl$n Au:?f~ss~ng~. nochm!t del' 174 den 
s[}rwbOlis©hon, Bu~horn d9X' P~"ot,(D~'Ji~anto:nentllalt$n~np vollkommen 
einverrvtandeiJ1» tJ6Jd04:b$zu,e1iQhd0!' Aif."sp.chQn, noqb 'deJl: FQlgen. Dabei 
iot jGdo©h sQJ\n flufri©lltigoo BoW\uJO,en ntGbt~')l; ~N~keX'Jc!l0lQl»QQneit 
t{].u,w imno~ oogli0I/);~,Q.u©h. i1)1¢ K~1r.-;Glion1.0hj"Q. nitdem ChJl:istonth~ una. 
, . V.,l. ; . . 
do'J!: n!Osc::no.s(}hQZt ·Cl.Vl.oCJ.'l.ODbl~Qn~. HD~(}' ~~Oo,lOe;i0~O$ L$ibn~~'~ A. 
P1cbler. p .• ~1·9. 
(:v) I'L00 E&QleaDio.bloo :t.ftQ)~¢nt; {)lop ,4..~aes ©O.c11eles o.u.ts:eo avant 
! loud<{ ohute,. at l' on ¢J:01t. q~e. leu:;; ohef en eto;! t Ull des p;I:1~cipaui4; 
'
I / \ . , 
f.Jui8 1 mQ~1tu~o n$ 0. '~~;;:!;pl:n.quo pao 08r~es la d$SOu.o. tQ po.$$.acG d 
.' 
APQ~l.~OO~ qu1 p~!]:.lo dt.\ OO::)lilo/6avoe 10 Dl~ozon •. cOLlUle Ci 'u.p.e vision, i 
1 ~<.,( l~l\ot3e. b!~im dOD Q10\ll.~QO »- ct. ~!lQ movolopPo· PQS oooesuiill~ ©hoOQ «lont l®s 
• • .:l- < 
·O:;1\t~oo Q'lt'ltOt111]O OOlJ'edo i"jlGl?o.J;lO!Jlt pl"QrJ~UO po.Q. CG ~!.<i0t 1,)0.0 i~1 l@ 
l~QUl. (l 'Qnt~el' dQ~S GQtto tl~OelllDo~olc?;, et 11 to.ut t9U:E;ljou~~ is.'VOU.0~'' icy 
., , ~ 4." b'"I '" l<> '!(';. ...... ! it qu.o 4 op,.,.,~~()!CllCQm..t(il\j~].9 ~OnVl$n\:j 4Qm210'ti1~~ o.u toOltQO $~~~"0· . 
Tb~Oll.odo l?~4:.; 151. G,,'Vi"lJt203c1 
. . 
(4:r ) ill 11 ect; b!Qtkpl.u.s :G.()n(trq~1\l.iOlc ~ la.j~sti~G J)~vlil.e ~Odo~o~a 1 'ame 
(, '. . .' / I . 
dGlja ©O~~Q:Pu~.PbYolquom0nt ~uD.n1[ilal~m0nt pOJr 10 p0Ghe (1;t~,une 
n()Q.'V'¢lJ;tJ .lJ,O~gQ¢t::i,Q~q,ut 'Os~ l~~~!Sontj9.~e de ,aett~,~, un0 ~G ~a1sonuable 
. p~ c~.,~~t!Qn 9'1}Q.Jltg3W>~ft10i1t. ~q.n~ \U'l). ©O~pl?l ~ ¢~ oll0 doiv® ~tr0 
,
.. I . ( . .11' . ) OOi."l"omp~(>mQ1"O,il¢nQnt. .~bOQij~~O~h PD..~" $2. Gov~()p .. l53o 
HH~J~ u$. ~~'!)ti.VG 1)'Q~ ~\\~s1 ~u.';}'l tSloit noc~ssai~0 do diiG quo 
/ tout~Q 1.00 vertus dOp, p~y®ns etOi@nt .'i$.u$S¢$, nyquo t9utG$ loal' 
ti4@tions 
Chapter :'1111. 3. 
Notes. 
I . I. / . 
atoient despe©hes; q,uoyqu' 11 so1 t vre.y que ce quine viE)nt pas de 
la . .Foy, ou do la c1r,9i tUI"0 de 1 feme dov~nt DiSu., est 1nfv©t,~ du 
• . . ( I, ' p®©h~, ~u mo~,:iJe virtuellQment 6Th00t6l.!C0~PQI"o 2830 Go 'Vi op .. 2850 
(6) ~,~ai~·,to~ecou:X qui AfeQontM~i~sii)nt que Di\';1u pI"Qd.UJ.i t 1~'m0il1eu.r 
p1an9 ,qu'il'achoisl ~ntre tQutQ8 l(;,)Sid~s ~osSiblefJ (10 l"u;niver8 ' 
<.\u'$;l tE'OThVG. l"bomoOPOX"ic/pC1r l"imp0!'fQctiori ~n-;ie;ina10 de~ c~~atuifes 
'" ~:buseX" dG son lib;g>~ ~~'''bitr0 et ~se plon~Gx>dans l~ iQiG~z"Cp, ~o 
. A'. I' .. , . ," , . 
. D1Q)~empQQho l~ pocho 'ot IS. Oi0@~0 p ~\1lt:~u~t"l.~$l~ POl"gcciiondo 
. . I . . ' 
l'~$,iV'(JJ!."O 9 ~upl Qst m4~ '¢~i(h!1.10m(::11.~t de 1a :Di~nnelll$ pou.t 1;) <;n"mettifo ; ce~ 
\ la, di~ jo 9 :font vci~" plU,80lJj.8~~!nGtpt";l8nt 9.\;\0 1.' irltont!o!o' ,do Dieu 
oot 10. plu,odt"oi to ot lu pluG SCl!~lltO'du, t~onu@·, qu.o lo,OJl:0~tU:r0 .6@ule 
oot (J((H.llpo.blo, quo 04 lJ1nito.t~oIill om iopes>icction Ol'iCil's3Q.lo Qflt 10. 
, I 
S()t'i].1."00 do O(lo412.ec ,'i,t\O O~ mQ.uvu~,QO VOloB~ve cot la ooml,o ~~'J,OO ~e sa ... 
, , ..A. I "" \ m!oo~ov qt~'Ot!Jl. no Oo.l~ll.dfoit 01;1"0 c1Q~tineQ.uQo.ltl.t oono l'()t~o o.11J,OCl~ ~ 
t /,., , ,. t. / la oolnto,o t),(JO OLIif~;&O(l0 Di0Vl. p (3t, Qtl0 . Ot'\.tQ 1 ooPO~:)o.g~go q~'Qn J,>out 
A·A ""'. '/. .-. . ' I 
c..'tfQ!i" iil'ct~0 ~lt1)., no pont otb"O ,t~Ic1U0G quo OUl1-; lQ bo~nlo Volont@ qu.'on 
so SOJ:rli pot: 10. CJ;>~S~w de Dion tf 0 Th't)a~o~ ~o.l"o167. Gil vi.p 0210. 
( '. ..' / ~7 ) n ~1o.m \l«>t"".t1. 190Gh0 li b~-:,or,)Dtlt?S:t V©u'rJ, JrQ19ondoo qlL)' QV1:l1 ~ nono 
'W~t!OQ1Jl~~",t"'Qn 9 OCl0110uto xi>' 0. pc.z estd P~"'QWO oS! trOu~ 4fOp©J(lClG~ qu.e 
lm©n, ~@li"M~',\r~U0 t\!~Q;=t<9:@l(i~ !In' (;;lotp©~nt Cg~l?o.tOlo 0 rt (B~10) 0 
lion 1i:6p©m.il:ll"~ a((Jl~~ quf ~llutoQPO@hcf 1i 'bj1"ot:10lrt ~ ot, g,u.o D1 ell 1,' ~ VTh 
P£©hQJAi; '~1$1'·6t~ta, AtlQ&l ~~[J~1 blq ,. qu1 0~t Q.e~~iClu·a0tuel b Slu1vont 
1Q d~ll."~t· dQ l~ p01-;mi$~iOn ~1"iY!nGcjt£"Qot VIf~Y q,u.·A~~~ '~st, dit$rmih/ : 
.~ P'©h®~ Gn{luit@ dQ~0Jft~illoti inClbjH';.ti«)n~ pE'vgi~te~; lDll&is c®tte 
4~<E)1fm1ra.0ti,Qn. n$ ©1o.t10Uit PQS l~c~~tiue;QJ4GGpny Ie. lib@~t/;et 10. 
. '/. " I eot$~aWlc,t!C1m '~ertC11noqu. '11 Y a t;ians. l'b¢mm~.,$ l>~@her pne l' empeche 
Chapter.,v11 • 4. 
. Notes •. -
/ po1nt de poqvQl;r ne. po1ntpeah~r .(a.b~olwnent lHil!rlant )e1;, puis9,u'il 
I, ," . , '. .' ( . . '., .. ' '. . 
peahe, d'etre' coupable et de me~iter la punition, d'autant queoette 
.' '. '. "', . .. , ", pun~ t10n peut servir~' 'lay ou a d'.autres ,pour .Qontribuer ales' 
d'termln.er Wle autre fQis· 'so n~ pOintploll.er ff Tll/odic/e .• , Par. 369.~v. 
G. vi. p. 334 •. 
(8) til' t ' i' 'f • t . t" I f l' ," ' t ' L $$ vral que D eun auro;l. pOlnct'ee ., aiIle au commencemen 
dalls un~to.t OU Clle·auroitlle~htd.~S, Ie premier moment,'comme les· 
. '(.' 
sc~olastiQ.ues l'ont tOrt- 'bien observe: o~11 n'Y',Q.'rien dans les 
lo1x. de. s~saae~s~,~u:i 1'1 eut':pi.1. l?o:):tte:r:~.t' Th~d1c~~. P~·~390 •. 
G.Vl·I>.334. 
(9 )-Lorsque l>ieu l>rodu1't 1a Ohose. ,11 l~ prOduit cotnn'le un ind1v1du, 
et non paa· QOiIU~' un. u.nj.Tersel a. Log1~ue (Jel'&you.e): .&1. 11 produ.1t 
son 'itaenOe &ye.nt ••• aoc1dens,: lila nature ayant se.QP/ratlons ,$u1vant 
/ 
la. l>r1ori t. de l.u.r n~t\lr •• et in signo anterior. 1'&t;lon1a.i,iQ L' on 
voit ~&'r l' oonuntnt la cr6.t1,1r$ptu,t ~tr. 1 .. , 'Yra:t_ .\l&u,$.dU; plob~t 
Sftll$ ill. 1& conli$nat ion de Dieu l' emp'i'¢he. q~1 s. rt61_ sur l' 'tat 
pr~'dent dt 1& Intrneol"4t~~. PQu.~$1l1 ... r. l$s lQ1x 4.. sa eagtsse 
non ... obst~t 1e P'Oh',q~1 "fa ~tre p:r.-od.u1t dl~bord p~l~ cr/atll.l"e •. ' 
Thlodla'e. ~"l'. 390. G.V~,.p.~46. 
(lOt 
est 1 'InQar~t1on de' sonF11s ~rt que, l' ordre de l$ nat~re lle~ert qu •. 
d 'occas1on \ oelu:L d~ la.drace: l'Ob'1~sance et 1e $Qcr11;:1ce da Verbe 
-1ll,Car~/ a piu da.va~tagf;l~u;el~ t"bell1()~d~ l<"hotnme 1).' ~ d~lu.. :0 
eerteneQeSSar1wILAdae pec~~ttUn! •• O' fel'-';x aU1PaqU4~' talelll ;;lO 'tant'l,lDl" ? 
,- mer~l't h~bel,!e redem~torelIlt ,1)ieu -ag1.t :pou;r sa, gloire' et Ie principal 
,.' ,aes' des$eln~ eet o~lu.:I. :dont 11 en t1re- d~vant~ge .Et 11 a Ploll:S 
. de giol~e de ,sOn FS,ls qu,e. de;t tout 1e l"Qste de $es ouvr&ge~ It 
.. . ..... ' ':' 
Oh.apter.,v11. " 
" NO~es. 
, ','., .. - . 
j" • 
I I' 
Inedits, , Theolo~,ie ~ ~0:l..xx ,f'. 311. Q,uoteOl. Ba~u~i~ Leibniz et 
l'Oga.nls~tiol'l Relig~ de l,a.Tel'l'e'.p.474. , 
'~ I '. - ", ' 
5. 
'~I)ie~ 1a ~~voyant .. bien~t ,ayantdesseln, :de ~ 'en serv1r, PQ~ $es t.ins, 
'1a~e desrais~mEi ~u,i>Ir~eur$S de. la. pa~fa.it.e sage~ee l"ont determine/ 
..... ~pe~ijlettreoesmaqx·e:t ili~m"'a y oon~ou'fi.~., Th{:oaic~e .. par.27b. G.V'i.~~t~ 
(11} , ''*Dieu. :prOdu.1't'l~¢rlatl1:re' COnformem$nt ~, l,t'ex;1g~niO~; des1nstans 
/ ( '. " '.' ,',., ' . . / / 
preeedens, sq.1'V'antle~ ,loi'x d.e~ sagesse,; et la Qr~$ture op~re 
. ~ - -. . 
, , , .. ' . .' / . ~ •• ~.,...- Qonfp~blement '$ oette natu.r,$" ~u.' 11 ,1,\13' :rend ~n la creant, 
tousJou:t's. L.s 11mltatiou$ ~t11nperfe()t1onsy:naU.$$.nt ,par la na.ture ~ 
du su;Jet,. Q.~1 born.l.production d'Die~. Q:test 1.·au1te de l'~mpe~-
. rtct10n O1'1s1nal. d.a Qrla~lU"'$:. m.,1s1 •• io •• , 1. ori •• y na,1ss_nt 
1 , . 
par 1 'op6.'1011 lnt.m, 11 bro. dt 1& ,oreatu"l:'4t.a.u.ianiqu' 11 yen peut 
Ie/ 
a"'o1r 4.an. 1.' lJl.,.t •• tqu,1. "d.,,!.t -.aliiepAl' 1,", rep.tltion" 
, 1 d . ! '. Ill' '2.,. Th&o .. 10.'.: P~.",,88 Ii G~.1.p.~ .. 6~: 
"nou,s aYOM tta'b11iu.. ,. •. 11l)t" a:1."b1~1".$t lac.u.at proOhain' 4u 
mal dt (lou.,p •• tt ~nlu' te o.u ~d$ ~.j;n •• ; g,u.olQ.~ "11. aot. t ytq qut 
, I ' ... ~ 't / 
·1' inlpert,ct1on ot:isilla1. des oreat~~s ,qus. •• ,~rO\1T.:Npr.~.n ae dane 
, , . / / ," ,," 1 'I 
les id •• tete;rnellfJ$,$u $st Ia p~.~1ere ~tl(i plu,$ ~oisn •• 1t. 
Th/od14/ •• :Pt.r .• 288., G,T1.p.2,s$_"l:JQt.qUCIl COUU)1'EUld 1.s, 11m1tat1ons~t 
'1 I"~ , 
lee Pt'ivat1ons $Qu..les~ee.1.1 t~$; .1 'on pe\lt dire que la, Cs.U$.S , 
, \:' , ' .. ," " . ! 
se,oondeS conco,+rent a l,atproduct1QnQ.$c., qu.:i'f,$Jit, 11m:l-t$1I SIUl8 eel. ' 
, ' , ' .. .• "/ /,' ,'.' '. .,"" I" I Dl~n ~~ra1t 1s. Q.au~. ~u., l>~¢h~t et ·tn-e'~t l,~oe.U$$ l.Uli<1ued ~E)od1oee 
(12) ~/ /' "Dleu est 1$ seule C$..1lf;H~pr1no1pal~a.e$ r~~l1teSp\1i'es et 
absolues, 0\1 <les perfeotions. Caus~e eeoundee, agunt in virtute primae. ;li 
'~ 
JI-
i ' 
.. ~~A 
,;;,) 
f,,'/ 
" , - ~ 
Chaptel'·v11. 
• ".o~'. ;; 
6 •. 
Notes •. • _r' • 
Ma1s lo'rsque on oomprendlee lim! tat1.ons at les privations, sous les 
. r/ai1t!~", 'l'on pe~t dire qu.e les, Clauses secondes Clonoourent'a. lao 
production de oe qui 
. / 
.' "/ , . 
,est11m1 te. Sans oela,. Diau sex-of.,t;la oause du. 
/' / TJ;>.eOdloee~ pa,r. 392.C .,vj, :349 .. 350 ./. A peobe ~ at, merne lao~use unique" 
• j' 
(13), "Not;l;eot~$n e;Ktendenda el3tvi'$ pe,cQatl' or1g111al16, utparvu11" 
q.u.1 nullum·a.ctuale ;P~CGa.twn, commi.ser~, ,danmentu:r;'" ~uemadmOdu.m multi 
. , 
yo,lunt ; sub Justo. en1m judice Deostneculp$6uam.iaer eS~~ neme) 
:p()te~~ " .. ~lst~ma theoloe:io~. r>. 9. (Qp.ot~d by,P10bie~ ''Die Theolog1e des 
Lelbn1z ff Vol. 1.p.~31. footnote.) 
.. (14:) "Con$1der~dWXi vldetu.l', qu~d a1t 1npec()~to o;t'ig1;n1a pra.etei' 
fom1t;eJl vel d11lJl>Qsitionen adpeoQandum~ seu. Q,uJd sit in eO, qu.od 
reatua 1nvolvat 1>oenamque mer •• t;l,l.r,.tlams1 1n bull\UDaotwn .rumpa'. 
lfequ •• nl. apP"l'et, qUOQlodo Ju..tl~ladiTlna\ punl~. iQ"l~ (nisi pOlna 
damn1), q,ua. Toluntt.l'l. non Bunt. An trso tU,oim\ls t peoO.tlorig1na11s 
n .. tur~c()na1$t~r. in b\lDl&.n$ 1ntltlll1tateaeu fom1te tam9.\l$ln mater!ali 
, .' 
et 1mpu.tatloJle tamquapll fOl'mal.i. ita·l1td~or$1'er1t DellS, sub eo cono1u8oS 
habere prQtI1tl1$ irae;, ~x¢luSos. ,n~.,r~d1tateooeJ,.u,t'J non tamell 1deo. 
nIsi ao1;u peccent" quema.dmOdum onmes adq.l t1 in gra.t1arn. nonreCtpt1 
. '  " 
fao1ent, ,dELQulandOs. ~t 'b~:ptj.~~t1 d.eclarantur1teru,mhat,..edes regnl 
- , 
coelorwn c,e$atqu~ in li~ 1d quod tn .pecc~to or1~lnali:form$le est. 
Atque 1t~ ;protest~tes. ~u1 V'olunt, 1JliP~t~tiollem tAAtum oessar •• OUQl 
catb.ollo1s', qu1reatwn toll! volunt, QOnol1iantur. N:\htla11ud e~lJn 
" , 
e$tin re~t\l1110 r~ale~tpOsit1vUJll.('n$ill defeotus ~rat1ae privativwn 
.;l • • 
qul<1dam eattan1;\lJJl) 'quam lmpu.tat1o, Consent~:t ':n~ec irttet-pi-etatio oum 
eorwndQot1na, .. qui arb1trantul', lnfantes 'l':l0n bap~1zatos. sola :poena 
damn1 aft101 •. "-Q.uuted from An.riot$.1;a ad COllO. ~r'ident. SeeA. Pi0hler • 
. . '. . 
"lle Theo1os1e des Le1bn1z" Vol.1.p.33~. 
7 • 
. ~ Notes. -', 
..... '," ....... .. ... I . / 
(15) ftx.~ prem1erf,) d1f:f'iOu.,lte ~st" OOlIl{nent 1 fame apl,l, ~tre 1ni'eat·ee du .. 
/ I . ,. .... , .'. I' -/ ' 
peob.e or1g;l.nel t q.ui est ~-raa!ne de.1S peahes actuels, sans qu f il Y a1 t 
, , ,-. '~ /' I . 
eu de 1 injustice en D).el,l .$ l'y exposer' Theod1aee. P~~.86. G.vi. 149. 
-' . I", 
"Or 1 ",~e etant IUl6 i'ois SOUS' la dominati.on un' pecha, '(it pr~te a en. 
. '-. ). . 
.commettre Actuell'ement, aussi tost que l:'llonune .seraen ·ete-t. d f.exercer 
la ra.1$on;o·' est UXle nouvelle qUe$t1on,sl cette d~t1posit1on d 'un : 
'. , I .1 . .1 ( ((. .. 1\ .' , .. . . ho~e ~U1 n'a pas ete ~e~enere par 1e oapteme, suft1t PQ~ le damner. 
'.. .' .. ' . I I . 
. quandtrfeII),~ ilne vteUdro1.t·.Jamals-$.u P$OlH~~qtuel.~comm.e11 peu.t 
. . . '. • . :.' .' . '. '.. ..,.. " .;<0.. . " . 
. a.rr1'V·Elr~ eta.:rr11(eaouvent ,$01t qu'll 'me\lr~.: ~va.nt .1 '.age d$ ra:l:son. 
'S01t ~u'il <i~v1.enne heb~t,/~v4Ult 'Ql4il d.ie~fa1re: usagEt. tf !rUlodice~ Par. 
(' " (16) "S1 1 •• "1'0",., .ns~mdl"ol.nt ci...ntans incline. ..u ... , V'1oe par 
uneeu1~.natllbll. dt. ot qU1 •• p .... :dan. 1 •• 40rp •• o. '.l"o1t une 
pun1t1on d~ leur propn1teur8, Mis een.ael"oitpas une ,.ine de la 
loy t. tL y a qutlqu.. 'ohO$$ -4 ".pprQQhe..nt .~all$ le$$u1tesdu pion' du 
'j . .1 .'. . . . 
prem101" hOmntfi .• Tb.tOdt4,. Pa;r~ 112. G.vi. .p,1.64. 
(11) Itpecca\l.l,m. Ot1e;ln$.1~ t~tUr.l .1mbabe,t f ut homi.ll~$ r$ddat in natural-
ibus de.J»1.1ea. in sp.U:'11tuallnll$ mo~tu()$ant~ l'~genel'at1onem; ihte11ectu 
ad sen:sib111a, VO'luntatead'Ci/.rnalia verais ,1ta. utn~tura fi11i 1rae 
sumua tt Cau~a Dti·. The'Odt.o~$. Par. 86. G. vi. p .. 4£)2 ~ 
(18) ftll ~uff;t.t ~U& D1$u'a defendu. une .¢hol;)~ 1l,~i~1bl~; ~lne .taut done 
. pointe '1ma81ner, q,ue l>iel,l.Y ait1'a1.ts1mpl.ement Ie 1.>erSOilnage de 
. I ' . '.' 
leg1s1ateur. qu;i donne WU{ loy ;pureroentpositi'\te ,·Qu d'unjuge qlli 
. impose et 1.lifl.lge' \U1e :l.>e 1ne par Ul'l:0rdre· de f.?·aVo'lonte'; sa,ns 'qu' i1 
ya1t dela oonnex1o~ entre lemal de ooulpe'et Ie mal·de ,peine. Et 11 
-"'. " 
Chapter vii., 
. Notes. 
8'.. 
/, . 
. ri·' ~f$t :ppintne¢6ssairede ~a, figure;r: que Dieu justement Ie ~,e~Ja~Qe 
3:!rritia.m1sune Clorru.pt1on1;out 'exPl"'es dans ).'ime at' dans le ,I, ,. 
-- 4. It' 
cor:ps de l"homme t: par iun~actlon .extr·aOdinaire,!>o\U" le pUnir: a'; 
\ ' '.. , 
peu pres COmIDe les Athenians donnoient Ie .. succle le. cigne ?o leur 
. /' I 
criminalsTl Theod1cee. Par. 112.G.v.1.p.164. 
Chapter viii. 
'Notes. 
(1) "Car s '11. n'y I3.voit que, d~s 'apparencesou songes; ,on ne' serolt 
, - / . . " .. , 
pas moins ,asseure de l' existence de ce qa! pense, comme ,d1 tfort 
bien' Mons,,. del? Cl3.ftes, et !noy j "~Q.j6ute . qu ~on,ll'en:, pou:t>roit pas 
mOine'defnons'trer 1 'e~).stericed.eD1~U p~ ,des vo"escilffe~l;Ult$S de' 
, ,l" " ., .' ' 
celles d'e Mons. deS: C~tes J et qui'" a ·¢equ.e~e oroy;. metlentplus 
~ .. ".., ~ 
loing. Car onn'a. rtulleI4ent besQin de' s.u:pposer un estrequi nous 
gs.r~tis$e d 'astre tromp',. l,>ui_Q,q:' 11 e~l '~nnotre pouvolrde no~s 
/. . ..' . ....' detrolllper dans,beau.Qoup d~,~hosesJ et 'all tuo1ns.$u.r \l~s plus1mportantes" 
Letter to Fouoher '1676. G .. i.;p~~74:'. 
(2) "O'pendant, ';a.utant qu.' 9n 1. peut 0:9nlprenQ,X'!$ J 11 n. reconno1t 
/' po1nt de bonta en Dieu. a. Pl'o}):retnent p~l~r, at 11',ense1gneQ,\l.e 
'. "If./ ' 
toutes les ohos ••• x1$tent par 1a neaes$1tt d. l~ nature D1vine, .. i 
. ' . I '/ ,. . 
sans qu.. Dieu. fa,,,' -Oho1x"., ThtQdlo* •• Pat'. 173. G.'V'1~p.2~7. 
(3) It Sed OJU1s.a pel'ttot1one aut l'Jlagn1tu.d1n. potu1 ••• t tomari 
argl,llIlentat1Q adhuo propr1or $'t;r1ctlorQ.u., hOc modo: 'itl8 neoe8sar1u 
exist1t (£leu. Ens de QuJua Essentia.t.t Exis~ent1a; s1v$ Ens a. S~ 
exist1t), ut ex t.rroin1& patet. JAJn D,u.s· e.t .Bna tal.e (.x J)tl 
def 1n:l. t lone), ergo Deuse~~$t1 t.. Haeo ,argu.t:!l~nta prooedu.nt '. Ii mod. 
coniedatur Ens ·P.rt~oti$$'lmwnaeu~ns neces$a;rlwn esse poes1 ble; nec 
impl~ea~e oontradi(rt:to:p:em,Y~l q.uOd idem eat •. possib,ilem ;~lise 
essent1am ex <i.u~ sequa.tu~ e~istent1aft.4rt1m~dversiones 1n p~;rtem 
generQilemP;r1ng1pior1lJll 'C~tteslan;rum. G,,"v ~p .36~ ... ' 
. (4:) "11 en est de mem6 du ,gouvernement, ,'de Dieu. :oe que.nous en 
, '..', .I . 
pouvonsvo1r jusqu'ioy, n'est pas un aaseSgro13 morceau, POUl? Y 
. '.". ,: ,. . 
reoonnoitre 1a beati.te' at l'brdte dU:, tout. 41MJila naturem~a des 
. Ch.apt~r-v~ii.' 
})lotef3-
--- / ' 
choses po:u1ie que cetord;!:"~-de La Cite Divine,que no~s ne" vOYOI\.S pas 
~nc~:t"'iCY, bfj.6, soitun objet de. nostre foy, denostreesp~~ance,de 
,nostl'e cont ianc ~ e:p.· Dietl;u T1lle'Od1 ~ie. ~ar .134~· G. vi .. 1>,,188. 
,,(5)., "L'obJ~t ~e D:i,eu,~ 9,uelque' cboeed*,:i.ri!ini,.ses soins embrass~nt 
1 'u:nive,i's·: ce' que nou;s en connoi.$$,onS rt' est presq~e r1en, et nous 
vo~d.i"1ons meS1,lTer s~ .sagesse et l;fa bonte' par 'nostl"ecoUloisa,nce. 
/'/ I. / ," / I Q.uelle temer1te, OU plustost quelleabSurdit~n The9d1cee .. Par. 134. 
G~ vi.p .• 1Sa.' 
, (6) 
devant nos Yf)'lX. lO1,'sque no1;!.,S VOyons quolqu,chOS$ d'eht1er, quelque 
" I ',. ' 
Tout lii,cC)omp11 en $oy. et isOl •• , :pour a1nai dire, pf,Lrmy lea ou'Vrages 
. , I 
de D1eu. un ~eJ. Tout,fo~e, pour a,1ns1 d1re~ ,st une plante, un 
an1ma;t, un homme, Nous ne sa\\t1on,s ass';s adlnlrerl .. beau.tl at 
l'art~f1c. a. s& atruoture" above. 
(7) "Je nt d.1a 1>01nt ~uel~, Monde, corporel est' une l.{aQhine ou. Montra 
, . I Q.ui va.ans l"interpQ,sSt1on de Dieu, et jt prEH~~e a.sta que les 
/ " . 
Ct;'eatul'es ont l:)8so1n. d~r;lon1nfluence "ont1n\\elle: mala Je --Bo,ut1'ens~> 
que C)'eat una montrequ.i'va $a.ns avoixo besQ1n <1. ~e. correotion: 
,.., ' . / A 
autrementil faudl'o1t dire ~\:le Die\:&' ·$e r$vi~e, D,1e~,a tQut pravu, 11 
a remadi/' tout p~X', Q.Vf;lnQe~" 11 la' dans ses QuvrageS una harmonia, 
una beaut' d'j~ pr~e'ta'Qlie (2nd.' re~11 to:'Clarke. G~V~i.,p.358. 
(8) ''Monsi,euz.. NewtOn et ee:e, ses a.eot·~te~rs' on1f ~noore une forte 
plaisante opiniOn df) l·louvrac$.e de Dle~. 'Selon eux, Di,eu a besoin de 
remonter de tetn~s e11 temps sa Montre. Autrement elle cesseroit d'ag~r. 
11 n 'a pa$ eu ass~ de veue,pour en faire tw. aouvement perpetual. " 
Chapter viii. 
. ~. 
c, 
'NPt~s • 
,CetteM;acbine de Dieu el;!t In~ne si, 'impa~fai te 'selon eux, qu' il:, e~t , 
O,bllg/ d.ele; delQrasl:ierQ.$ tempaen ',temp,s p~r un, concoul'sext,r~ordinaire 
e't meme de la., raccornmOde'r, 9,U i 1Isera pl,us"souventoblig' d 'y 
retouche:r at d 'yco:rriger; Selon mon 'sentiment, la meme' force et 
vigeur ysu'bsiste tousjours, et passe seulement de tnati~re en mati~re, 
, ' , 
I I ' 
suivant leslo1,;x: de ia nature, et le bel ordre ;preet~bli. Et je tiell:;:J, 
. .~, qu.andDieu1'~it des tn~;a.olest q.ue,oe n'eetpas :pour'soutenir les 
besQins 4e la nature,maia pouroeu,~ de-'l8o grace. Ell juger autrement, 
ce s'eroit avoil' una ldle fort ba$~H~ 4e l~ sagasse et de le; pu1ssance 
de D1eu" ( 1st. pa~erto Clarke,. G. v11.p .351. ) 
/ 
(9) ItCe sex-01t bien abu$er du ~.xt. de 1a Sainte Ea:r1ture, su1vant 
lequel D1e\l ,repo,e de eel OwYrag,e que d'en 1nfer.i' qu'11 n'y a 
plus de produotlon cont1nue'e. Ii. e.et vrJi¥ qu' i1 n'1 a point produat1on 
~. / 
de substanoee simples nouvell,.es:. m~1s on ~uro1t to:rt d'tn 1nferer 
, -
queD1eu ••• n'eat ma1ntenant dans 1e monde, que oOlDllltl'on con~o1t 
......... . -
que l'_e est dans 1, aOi'ps;'en,le souvernantseulement par sa . 
pre'senae sans un concours neae$$a~;ri3 pour 1. fa1re oontinuer son 
Ex1stence. (5th Paper to Cla:rk;e. Q:.v11 •. p. 411-2~) 
Chapter' lx. 
1. 
Notes. 
(1) "Si, tamen aoourate oOllsideremus nos aliquid amplius concipel'e 
,) , .' 
,~um, cogi ~8mus rem eXistere, 'quam cum oogi tamus esse possible. ,Ideo 
, 
videtur· .ve,ruID' esse, ·.exlstentlam esse gradum quendam reeli tetis; ~" (', ~.~-.,. '.:"~-'-" .:. ~ .~.." "'. - ~'-' '.- .- -.-
Tel oerte.esse ali'quem relationem ed gte'dusree'li tetis; non est 
. ~ ",' .- ~ _.. '~ .. 
,,8~tem ex;i,stentia ald.quis rea1itatis" gradus, nam de quilibet re&1itatis 
.... :. ~ --;. - ~ 
. j 
graq,u:, intelligi potest tum possibili te stam existentie: our ergo 
'. ,~ .,;. 
existent~a, exoessus graduumc' reali·tetis 'rei Ilnius supra Iradus 
. ',. - . 
.' '. I;' 
reali tati.s ,rei opposi tee; id est qUOd' est pel'feotius .omnibus inter se 
..... / . 
inc.()mp8tib~ltbus existi·t et contra quod existi test ceeterie 
~ "- . 
• 0';1 pe~~ecti,~.s •. I,taque 'TerUJD quidem est 14 quod 0 existi t pel'feotius esse 
non existent~,. ~ed Tarum non es:t·~ 'l.pS8m 'e:x:ist'entia~ es~'e perfectionem 
cum sit .. tantum queed:am per:teotlonum lnt'er se oo'mpel'etio. Bodemann • 
. " 
(2) . "Les 8ppal'temens a110ient en pj',l'ami.de; 11s deT8I,lolent tousjours 
;. ':' .. \ .... " . / 
plus beaux, e mesure qu' on montoi t Tel'S 18 pOinte, et· l1s repl'estent __ 
oi:ast de pl~s ~eaux mondes •. On Tin.t enfins ,dans .·le supr'me· qui 
'0 I 
terminoi t la Pyramide, et qui etoi t. le ,p~us beau. de tous; oar 1a 
... " ,; 
Pyram'ide a'To! t un oOD)mencement, mais on n' en Toyoi t plus 1& fin; elle 
.... . 
avoit une pOinte, mais pOint d.e 
/ 
base; elle alloit oroissant a l'infini 
C~est (comme la Deesse 11exp1iqua ) paroe . / qu' entre une lnflni te . 
de mondas possibles" 11 y 8 1e meilleur de tous, au('ement Dieu ne se 
/ , / 
seroit point determine 8 en ore~r auoun; meis i1 nly en a auoun qui 
nl en ait enoor de moins par'faitssu dessous de .luy: 0' est po.urquoy 
, I / 
1a Pyramide descend tousj ours S l' infini". Theodioee pal'. '16. G. Ti. 
p. 364. 
..,- .. 
2. 
Chapter-1x." 
No-tes.- ,/..~ -
I / (3) "ils confondirent l' indestructibili te tivec l' immortali te, pSI' 
lsquelle on entend dans' l' bomma non saulement que 1 ''Sma, meis encor 
/, ~ qua la personalite subsiste: clast 8 dire, en cListant que l'ame dee 
l' homme est immortalle. on fait subsister, ce qUi fait que c' ast la 
A / 
meme personne, laquelle garde ses qualites morales, en consarvsnt la 
, I 
conscience ou le sentiment reflexif interne de ce qu'elle est: ce qui 
/ I / la rend capable de ch'8timent et de recompense" Theodicee Psr.89. 
G. vi. p.151. 
\ .. , 
(4:) "Supposons que quelque particulier doiTe deTenir tout d'un coup 
, / 
Roy de la Chine, mois 8 condition d'~ublier oe quail a eate, Qomme 
s'il Tenoi t de ni8stre tout de nouTeau; n' eat ce pas autant dans 1& 
prsctique, ou qusnt aux effects dont on se peut appercevoir, que s'il 
/ 
,devoi't, estre aneanti, et qu' un Roy de la Chine deToi t estre cree dans 
le m'9'me instant 'a sa place? Oe que ce particulier n' 8 aUQune raison 
de souhaitter". "Discours de la 14et.PhYSique" Par. 34:. G.iT.p.4:60. 
" 
(5) "On peut dire du mal physique, que Dieu le Teut SOUTent oomme une 
peine due \aa ls coulpa, et souvent eussi oomme une moyen propre 8 
une fin, c'est 8 dire pour empecber "de plus grands meux, ou pour 
obtenir de plus grands biens. La peine sert eussi pour l'am8ndement 
et pour l'exemple, et 'le mal sert souTent pour mieux gouter le bien, 
et .quelques fOis sussi il contribue 'aune plus ,rande perfection 
" de ,celuy qui le.souffre, comme le grain qu'on seme, est suject a 
" une espece de corruption pour germer: c' est une 'belle comparaison, 
Chop:t.e~ -,ix~ 
Notes. 
4 • • f!' , .. • "{' .,~, 
3. 
..'. . . " .".' ' ' ... -~.", -., (': I 
dont Jesus Christs'est servi luy me'me. ftTheodicee. PQr.23. ,G.iT.P • 
• ' -I #, 1'. ' 
~.: 
116-7. 
(6 ) 
'/ I 
"SQus peche .t salls molbeur, et on en po!lrroi t foira comma das 
Romons des utopies. 4;es SeTar&mbes; mOis ceS memes' mondes,ser,o,ient 
- ,-~ 
,/ ' ' d' ~illeurs fort inferieur$ en bien 8U nostre. Je ne ,saurois TO'US le foire 
... / ,!~i: ~n.deteil:oar pais je connQitre. et puts jEt TOU$ reJ)reaenter des 
/ 
1nfini s. et laa oomp8t91' ensemble? )(8is TOUS le, deves juger 8Tec, moy eb 
. ,,' r. /,' 
8~fe~~u! puis,que Dieu e ob9*.~oe monde telqu'il est". Tbeodi09EL,' 1"01'.,.10. 
G. vi.p.lOS. 
) 
, 1./ 
('1 ":Pour oe qui est d'll~ peohe O'U du lila],. mC)l'ol, quoyqu' il 8r~~:ve 
au ssi fort souTant qu' i1 puisse serTir 4.e moyen pour 8btenir·'un 
bien. 'o'il pour emp~cher un autra lil8·1, ce n' est pas pv» po'urtant 
/ , 
cela, qui le rend un obj'et suff1sant de 1& volonte divine. ou, bis,n 
( '/ ' 
un objetlegitiIIie q,:'unavolonte. oreee; ~lfout q~'il ne soit admis 
/ 
QU perrnis~ qu' ep tont qu'il est regarde oomme une suite certaine 
. . . , ~, :: 
d 'un devoir indispensable: d~ s()rta que oeluy quine Toudroi t point 
permettl'e le p'Oh' d' ,'utruy, monqueroi t luy mi-Ille \ oe qu'i1 dolt. 
The~dic'e. 1'81'. 2~~ G. Ti. p.ll'l. 
Chapter ix. 4. 
Notes. 
(8 ) I ~ ftLa souveraine, bonte de Dieu fait, que sa volonte anteQed~nte 
repousse tout mal, mais le mal moral plus que tout autre, elle ne 
/ ,,' 
1 'admet aussi que pour des raisons superieures invincibles et 
,-
avec de grands correotifs" qui en reparent les mauvais effect. 
/' / 
aveo avantage" Theodioee Par,. ii4. G. vi. p. 166. 
(9) "Car il ,faut ~onsid/rer qu' il y a une ,imperfeotiQn ,originale dans 
/ / , /f I la oreat].lr~ avant l.e p,eoh , pa:r:oeque la orea,ture est limi tee 
, 
essentiellementj d'ou vient, qu',elle ne sauroit tout savolr, .et qu'ell 
/' .I 
se peut tromper et faire d' autres fautes·n Theodicee. Par. 2,0 •. 
G.vi •. p. ii5. 
(10) f'Mais par rapport 'a Dieu, rien n' est dou~eux, rien ne sauroi t ~tre 
/', ,:.' 
oppose a la regIe du meill.eur, ,a' qui ne souffreaucune exoeption 
r / 
ny dispense. Et 0.' est dans oe se:9s que" Dieu permet le peohe; oar il 
'- ' ' \ manqueroit a oe qu'il se doit, a cequ'il doit.a sa sagesse, a sa 
, I 
bonte, a sa perfection, s'il ne sui~oit pas leo grand resultat de 
toutes ses-tendences au bien, et s'il ne ohoisissoit pas ce qui est 
absolument le meilleur;- non obstant le ~al de. coulpe qui s 'y trouve 
I/,I /'! / I· / / 
envelpppe par la supreme neoessite .des verites et·ernelles. Theodioee. 
. . .... 
Par. 25. G •. vi. "p ~17~. ~ 
/ (11) ttQuand on detache les choses liees ensemble, les parties de leur 
tout, le genre humaine de l'univers, les attributs de Dieu les uns 
des autres, la puissance de la sagesse; il est permis de dire que 
I 
Dieu peut faire que la vertu sOit dans le monde sans auoun melange du 
vice, et m~me qu' il le peut faire aisement. Mais puisq~' il a, •• 
/ / /' ~" permis le vioe, il faut que l'ordre de l'univers trouve preferable a 
tout autre plan, ~L~it l'ait demande. n Th/odi~e,par.124.G.Vi p.l~8. 
Chapter 1x. 5.' 
Notes. 
r ~ 1 (12) fill ne luy etoit pas non plus indifferent de creer un tel ou tel 
/ I." . m~nde"de creer un chaos perpetual, ou de creer un syf:?teme plein d' 
/ I I 
ordree Ainsi les qualltes des objets, comprises dans leur, idees, 
ont fait la, raison de son choixfl. Remarques sur le Livre &'0. 
'G.vi. p.424. 
I / (13) "La vertu est Ie plus noble qualite'des choses creees; mais ce n'est 
I / / pas la seule bonne qua1ite des Creatures. 11 y en a une infinite d' 
autres qui attirent l'inolinat1on de D1eu; de toutes ces inClinationS 
/ 
resulte 1e plus de bienqu'i1 se peat, at1l Se trouve que s'il n'y 
/' 
av-oit que vertu, s'il n'y avoit que Creatures raisonnables, i1 y 
auroit moinl3 de b1en. Midas se trouva mOins riche, quand 11 n'eut 
que de 1'01'. Outre que la sagesse as doit varier. Multiplier 
u.niquement lameme'Chose; quelque noble qu'elle puisee -etre, ce 
, ' /. - I 
sero1t una supertluite, ce seroit une pauverte: avoir mille Virgiles 
" I 
,pien relies dans sa B1b1ioth$que, chanter tousjours les airs de,1 
',opera de Cadmus et d 'Hermione, cassel' toutes lesporcalaines pour 
n'avoir que des tasses d'or, n'avoir que desboutons de dianiants; 
, . -, 
ne manger que des perdrix, ne Poire que du yin de Hongrieou de 
Shiras, appelle'roiton aela ,raison?" Th;odia:a. Par. 124~ G.v!. 
p. 179. 
(14) 
(15) 
Chapter 1x. 6. 
Notes. 
, 
"The notion of a species involves only' eternal or necessary truths, 
but the .notion of an individual inVOlves, suo ratione pO,ssibilitatis, 
what is of fact, or related to the existence of things and,to·time, 
,and consequently depends upon ,certain free decrees ·of God considered 
as possible; for truths of fact or of existence depend upon the 
decrees of God" Remarques sur Ie. lettre de M. Arnaud. G.l1. 39. 
Quoted Russell. p. 209. above. 
If, Le mal vient plustost des Formes ,..... memes, mais abstraltes, crest 
/ dire des, idees que Dieu il'a pOint produits par un actede sa. ' 
vOlont/' non plus que "les nombres et les 'figures, et nOil pluS 
(en un mot) que toutesJ*". les essenc'e-s pOSSibles, qu'on,dolt 
tenlr pour tternelles et neeessa1re.s.; caX' elles se trQuve~t dans 
/' r ,', , ." la region ldeale des pOSSibles, orest a dire dans'l'entenciement 
Divin" Th'odic~e. Par. 335. G .. vi. p.314. 
, 
a 
Chapter x. 1. 
Notes. 
~ I I / 
tl) "On s'efforce souvent a m'imputer la necessite et la fatalite, 
I 
. quoyque peutetre personne 
/ , 
n'ait mieux explique et plus a fond que 
I / I I j'ay fait dans la Theodicee, la veritable difference entre liberte, 
/ 
contingence, spontaneite d'un '" / I I cote, 'et neces si te absolue" hazard, 
coaction de'l'autre. Je'ne say pas encore si on le faitparce qu'on le 
veut, quo~que je puisse dire; ou si ces' imputations viennent de bonne 
foy, de ce qu' on n'a point encore pes/ mes sentimens" 5th. Pap.er t.o 
Clarke. G.vii.p. 389. ' 
(2') I / I "Cette-fausse idee de :La liberte, formee par eeux qui. non. co;ntents 
, 
/ / de ~'exemter, je ne dis pas de la contrainte,. mais de lao necessite 
nteme, voudroient encor l'exemter' de la certitude et de, la d/termination, 
, 
c'esta dire lite la raison et·tl'e"la perfection., n'a pas laissie de plaire 
a quelques Schola'stiques, gen's qui s' embar,rassent souvent. dans· leur 
/ 
subtili tes, et prennent la paille des termes pour le gra.fn des choses. 
Ils concoivent quelque not ron crrime'riqu:e, 'dont ,tls se figurent de t irer 
I des utilites, et qu'ils t~chent de maintenir par des chicanes. La 
/ ,~
pleine indifference est de cette nature: l'accorder a la volonte, c'est 
, 
luy donner un privilege semblable a celuy que quelques Cartesiens et 
quelques Mystiques trouvent dans la nature Divine, de pouvoir faire 
I 
I'impossible, de pouvoir produire des absurdites, de pouvoir faire 
que deux propositions contradictoires soyent vrayes en m~me temps. 
Vouloir qU'une d{termination vienne d'une pleine indiff/rence 
/ 
absolument indeterminee, est vouloir qu'elle vienne naturellement de 
rie~. Thtodic{e Par. 320'. G.vi.p.306. 
2. Chapter x. 
Notes. 
( 3) "Sur la mati~re de la libert~ il nty a que deux partis 'a prendre: 
Itun est de dire que toutes les causes distinctes de It~e qui 
concourent avec elle, luy laissent la force dtagir ou de n'agir pas; 
/ , 
Itautre est de dire, que elles la determinent de telle sorte a agir, 
qu'ell)3 ne sauroit en defendre fl • Par.370. 
fila determination de l'~me ne vient pas uniquement du concours de 
~ / A toutes les causes distinctes de l'ame, mais encor de l'etat de l'ame 
meme et de ses inclinations qui se melent avec les impressions des 
sens, et les augmentent ou les 'affoiblissent. Or toutes les causes 
internes et externes prises ensemble font que l'"Wne se determine 
/ / 
certainement, mais non pas qu'elle se determine necessairement: car 
I il n'impliqueroit point de contradiction, qu'elle se determinat autre-
/ A. / .A / ! 
ment, la volonte pouvant etre inclinee et ne pouvant pas etre necessitee fl • 
The-bdice'e Par. 371. G.vi.p335. 
(4) "Ainsi lorsque Dieu choisit, c'est par la raison du meilleur; ~orsque 
/ l'homme choisit, ce sera Ie parti qui l'aura frappe le plus". Letter 
to M. Coste Dec. 1707.G.iii.p.403. 
flCe qui de'termine la volonte/~ agir, n'est pas le plus grand bien, 
comme on le suppose ordinairement, mais plutost quelque inqui~Ude 
actuelle, et pour l'ordinaire celle qui est la plus pressante. On luy 
I / peut donner le mon desir qui est effectivement une inquietude de 
/ 
l'esprit, causee par la privation de quelque bien absent, outre Ie 
desir d'estre delivre'de la douleur" Nouveaux Essais. Bk.iLcixL Par. 
31. G.v.p.169. 
,f 
3. 
Chapter x. 
" Notes. 
(5) "Errores pendere magis a voluntate quam ab intellectu, ,non admi tto . 
Credere vera vel falso, quorum illud cognmscere, hoc errare est, 'nihil 
aliud quam conscientia aut memoria est quaedam perceptionum aut 
rationum, itaque non, pendet a voluntate, nisi quatenus obliqua arte 
tandem efficitur etiam aliquando noblis ignaris, ut qual volunus 
noblis videre videamar "R{ponse aux rtflexions •• de la philosophie 
de desSie des ~ar~:es" G.iv.p.361. 
( 
{6} A~pe~t till faut avouer ce d/faut, et il faut rrteme reconnoitre que 
Dieu en auroit peutetre pU exempter les cr/atures, puisque rien 
n'em~che, ce semble, qu'il n'y en ait d~nt la nature soit d'avoir 
tousjours une bonne volonte~ Mais je rePonds qu'il n'est point 
ne~essaire, et qu' il n' a point It! faisable que'- tout~s les cre~tures 
raisonnables eussent une si grande perfection, qUi les approcnat 
/ /. I 
tant de la Divinite. Theodlcee. Par. 120. G.vi.p.173. 
{7} "8i la Ge~mltrie s'opposoit aut ant ~ nos passions et int:r€'sts 
/ 
presens que la morale, nous ne la contesterions et ne la violerions 
, I ! ~ueres moins, malgre toutes les demonstrations d'Euclide et d' 
Archimede, qu'on traiteroit de reveries, et croiroit pleines de 
/ 
paralogismes; et Joseph 8caliger, Hobbes et autres, qui ont ecrit 
contr~ Euclide et Archimede, ne se trouveroient point si peu 
accompagn/s qu'ils le s~nt". Nouveaux Essais. Bk.ii.c.xxi.Par.12. 
G.V.p.87. 
(8) nles stoiciens disoient que le sage seul est libre; et en effect 
I . 
on n'a point l'esprit libre, quand il est occupe d'une grande passlon , 
4. 
Chapter x. 
Notes. 
, 
car on ne peut point vouloir alors comme il faut, c'est a dire avec 
la d:lib/ration qui est requis:. C'est ainsi que Dieu seul est 
( 
parfaitement libre, et que les esprits crees 
qu'ils sont au dessus des passions: et cette 
\ 
ne le sont qu'a 
li bertl regarde 
me sure 
proprement 
nostre entendement, Nouveaus Essais. Bk.ii.c.xxLPar.8. G.v.p.160-l. 
(9) "il faut se faire une fois pour toutes cette loy: d'attendre et de 
suivre desormais les conclusions de la raison, comprises une bonne 
fois, quoyque n'apperceues dans la suite et ordinairement que par des 
/ I pensees sourdes seulement et destituees d'attraits sensibles, et cela 
pour se mettre enfin dans la possession de l'empire sur les passions 
I 
aussi bien que sur les inclinations insensibles ou inquietudes, en 
acquerant cette accoustumance d'agir suivant la raison qui rendra la 
I 
vertu agre~able et comme naturelle. N.E. Bk.ii.c.xxi. Par.35. G.v. p.173. 
f I 
(10) "Mais enfin nous avons asses prouve qu'il n'y a que l'ignorance ·ou 
la passion qui puisse tenir en suspens, et que c'est pour cela que 
/ 
Dieu ne l'est jamais. Plus on approche de luy, plus la liberte est 
parfaite, et plus elle se de'termine par le bien et par la raison" 
I I Theodicee. Par. 318. G.vi.p.305. 
(11) , II "Et selon le systeme de l'harmonie preetablie, l'fune trouve en elle 
A / ' meme, et dans sa nature ideale anterieure a l'existence, les raisons 
I. I / 
de ses determinations, reglees 
I. / / 
elle etolt determinee de toute 
, 
surtout ce qui l'environnera.Par ·la 
I I / 
eternite dans son etat de pure 
/ , 
possibi1ite a agir 1ibrement, comme e11e fera dans 1e temps, lorsqu' 
elle parviendra ~ l'existence. Th/odic/e. par.323. G.vi.p.308. 
5. 
Chapter x. 
, 
Notes . 
(12) . / "que nous sommes asseures de cette providence par la raison, mais 
/ 
. I . que nous sommes asseures aUSSI de nostre liberte par l'experience 
. /. Interleure que nous en avons; et qu'il faut croire l'une et l'autre, 
. /' quoyque nous en voyions pas Ie moyen de les concilier fl • Theodicee 
Par.292.G.vi.p.290. 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
1'\ flAinsi ny la futurition en elle meme, toute certain qutelle est, ny 
/ / la prevIsIon infallible de Dieu, ny la predetermination des causes, ny 
/' / 
celles des decrets de Dieu, ne detruisent point cette contingence et 
/ / / 
cette liberte". Theodicee. Par. 52.G.vi.p.13l. 
"Mais l'opinion la plus commune aujourdhuy parmy ceux qui s' 
/ / 
appellent Reformes, et qui est favorisee par Ie Synode de Dordrecht, 
I / 
est celIe des Infra,apsaires, asses conforme au sentiment de S. 
\../ 
I / Augustin, qui porte que Dieu ayant ftsolu de permettre le peche d' 
Adam et la corruption du genre humain, pour des raisons justes, mais 
cach~s, sa miseficorde luy a fait choisir quelques uns de la masse 
~ / / 
corrompue pour etre sauves gratuitement par le merite de Jesus Christ, 
et sa justice l'a fait r~oudre a punir les autres par la damnation 
/ / / qu'ils meritoient." Theodicee. Par.82. G.vi.p.146-7. 
I / \ I 
"Je reporids, que c'est la bonte porte Dieu a creer, atin de se 
. ,.,
corroouniquer; et cette meme bontl jOinte a la sagesse le porte a 
crier le meilleur:cela comprend toute la suite, ~teffect et les 
voyes. Elle l'y porte sans Ie n~essiter, car elle ne rend point 
/ , 
impossible ce qu'elle ne fait point choisir. Appelles cela fatum, 
, 
c'est le prendre dans un bon sens, qui n'est point contraire a la 
Chapter x. 6. 
Notes. 
/ 
liberte: Fatum vient de fari, parler, prononcer; il signifie un 
! / 
. jugement, un decret de Dieu, l'arrest de sa sagesse. Dire Qu'on ne peut 
pas faire une chose, seulement parce Qu'on ne le veut pas, c'est abuser 
des termes. Le sage ne veut Que Ie bon: est-ce donc une servitude, 
r A I Quand la volonte agit suivant la sagesse? Et peut on etre moins esclave, 
Que d'agir par son propre choix suivant la plus parfaite raison? •• L' 
'I , esclavage vient de dehors, il porte a ce Qui deplait, et sur tout a ce 
Qui dePlait avec raison: la force d'autruy et nos propres passions nous 
rendent esclaves. Dieu n'est jamais mu par aucmne chose Qui soit ho~s 
de luy, il n'est point sujet non plus aux passions internes, et il n'est 
jamais ~me 'a ce Qui puisse faire dtplaisir n • The'odice'e. Par.228.G.vi. 
p. 253-4 
(16) tl3e croy mgme Que cela nous ouvrira une voye de conciliation, car 
je m'imagine Que M.Arnaud n'a eu de la r{pugnance ~ accorde~ cette 
proposition, Que parce Qu'il a pris la liaison Que je soutiens pour 
, I, 
intrinseQue et necessalre en meme temps, et moy je la tiens intrinseQue, 
mais nullement ne~essaire; car je me suis assez eXPliQUe/maintenant 
/ / Qu'elle est fonde sur des decrets et actes libres. 3e n'entends point 
d'autre connexion du sujet avec Ie predicat Que celIe Qu'il y a dans 
les v'rit~ les plus contingentes, c'est ~ dire Qu'il y a tousjours 
QuelQue chose'a concevoir dans Ie sujet, Qui sert~ rendre raison, 
pourQuoy ce predicat ou /v/nement luy appartient, ou pourQuoy cela est 
, / 1 M ' 'd / 't / t' t arrlve p ustost Que non. alS ces ralsons es verl es con lngen es 
inclinent sans n~essiter. 11 est donc vray Que je pourrois ne pas 
faire ce voyage, mais il est certain Que je le feraytl. Remargues sur 
la lettre de M. Arnaud. May. 1686. G.ii.p.46. 
1. 
Chapter Xl. 
Notes. 
(1). "In ipsa Theologia mathematicum agebam, condebam defimitiones 
ateque inde ducere tentabam Elementa quaedam nihil claritate inferiora 
Euc1ideis" G. Vii.p.323. Quoted Iwanicki p.259. 
(2). These five propositions according to Kabitz are:-
1. der Gedanke der vol1kommenen Vernunftmaszigkeit des Universums, 
d.h. seiner logischen Gesetzlichkeit; 2. der Gedanke der 
selbstandigen Bedeutung des individuellen im UniversUffi; 3. der 
Gedanke der vo11kommenen Harmonie aller Dinge; 4. der Gedanke der 
quantitativen und qualitativen Unendlchkeit des Universums; 
5 •• der Gedanke der mechanistischen Naturerklarung." Article I'Leibnizll 
in Philosophisches Worterbuch" by H. Schmidt.p.365. (1934 Edit.) 
(3) "Cum primum enim a ne deprehensum est, essentiam corporis non 
consistere in extensione quod putarat Cartesius, vir a1ioquin sine 
controversia magnus, sed in motu, ac proinde substantiam corporis seu 
naturam. etiam Aristotelis definitione consentiente, esse principium 
motus (quies enim absoluta in corporibus nulla); principium autem 
motus seu substantiam corporis extenstione carere: tum demum 
lucidissime apparuit, quid distaret substantia speciebus, ac reperta 
ratio est, qua inte11igi Deus clare distincteque possit, efficere, ut 
ejusdam corporis substantia sit in multis 10cis dissitis vel, quod 
idem est, sub multis speciebus." Leibniz to Arnauld. 1671. G.ci.p.75. 
2. 
Chapter Xl. 
Notes. 
(4) Iwanicki's comment on the relation of Leibniz to the Ethics of 
, I 
Spinoza.is interesting and relevant here "Quant a l'Ethique de 
\ Spinoza; Leibnizla vit en manuscrit lorsqu'il se rendit a la Haye ( / I, 
en 1676.; puis, lorsqu'elle eut ete publiee apres la mort de 
I ~ l'auteur, elle lui fut transmise, au debut de l'annee1678, par 
, > /' '-
Schuller. Apres l'avoir lue, il ne eessait de signaler, tantot a 
/ , '-
Justel, secretaire du roi a Paris, tantOt a Vincent Placcius, 
, , 
professeur a Hambourg, tant6t a Walther Tschirnhaus, que dans cet 
ouvrage, ~ c~t/ 'de belles pens/es' il y avait'des paradoxes; des 
paralogismes et des erreurs. LL est vrai, disait iI, que l'auteur 
I 
de l'Ethique a admis l'existence de Dieu; mais au fond, s'il a 
gard: Ie mot, il n'en a pas moins supprim/la rtalite(, car ayant 
~ I, / 
ote aDieu l'intelligence et la volonte, 'il n'a fait de lui qu'une 
. , , 
ou une nature. VOf>la pourquoi Leibniz'-s, a· 
/ I 
'certaine necessite' 
1 / I 
l'exemple d'Arnauld, a appele Spinoza Ie 'veritable athee'. Comme 
l'a bien ~ H. Franck Rall('Der Leibnizsche substanzbegroff. HaJJe. 
I / I 
1899.) Stein a donc eu to~ de croire que Leibniz a ete porte vers 
Ie spinozisme entre 1676 et 1680." Iwanicki "Leibniz fl &c. p.55-6. 
(5) It la notion de l'harmonie constitue peut-etre l'objet essentiel 
des pre6ccupations philosophiques de Leibniz. La conception leibnizienne 
de 1 'harmonie ~ n 'a pas 'tel toujours la meme: jusqu ~a 1680 environ, 
/ 
l'harmonie regit selon son ordre les existences des ~res et leurs 
I / / / / 
actions. Plus tard, etant donne que toute action exterieure a ete 
/ ,/ / 
ref usee aux substances, l'harmonie se borna a regler Ies etats 
/ interieurs des diverses substances." Iwanicki. "Leibniz &c" p.286. 
r 3. 
Chapte~ Xl. 
Notes. 
(6) In an early letter to Jacob Thomasius (April, 1669) Leibniz 
thus writes "Nothing, therefore, is to be assumed in bodies which 
does not flow from the definition of extension and antitypy. But there 
flow from this definition only magnitude, figure, position, number, 
mobility, etc. Motion itself does not flow from these. Whence, properly 
speaking, motion is not given in bodies as a real entity in them, but I 
have demonstrated that whatever moves is continually created, that bodies 
at any instant in assignable motion are something, at any intervening 
time between the instants in assignable motion are nothing, a thing 
which was unheard of till now, but which is plainly necessary and will 
shut the mouth of the atheists. From these considerations it is evident 
that the explanation of all qualities and changes must be taken from 
mag~itude, figure, milition, etc., and that heat, colour, etc. are 
nothing but subtle notions and figures. As to what remains, I dare 
affirm that atheists, socinians, naturalists, aceptics, would never have 
been be±~ev truly met unless by this established philosophy; which I 
indeed believe a gift of God given to the old age of the world as an 
unique plank by which pious and prudent men are about to save 
themelves in the shipwreck of the overhanging atheism .. However small 
my knowledge of learned merykfter a little time, I neverthless tremble 
as often as I think how many men at the same time intellectual and 
absolutely atheistic I have met". ·p.648. "New Essaystf&cf! by A.G. 
Langley. 1896. G.i.p.26. 
I 
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